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This thesis investigates how the ecosystem-based principles of resilience and adaptive 
management can be best implemented under the appropriate assessment of the Habitats 
Directive to reconcile the increasing demand for offshore renewable energy (ORE) and 
biodiversity conservation. Particular heed is given to the question of how the 
implementation of the Habitats Directive can be coupled with the development of 
nascent ORE technologies and the potential impacts these innovations may have on 
marine Natura 2000 species and their habitats. More specifically, the research 
challenges the strict interpretation of the precautionary principle which has been 
crystallised by the EU judiciary under the regime of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive. The jurisprudential interpretation of the Habitats Directive needs to evolve in 
order to better reflect the ecological and infrastructural challenges associated with 
deploying innovative renewable energy technologies in dynamic and complex offshore 
environments. In this vein, the thesis suggests a novel approach to interpretation of the 
Habitats Directive to help accommodate these legal challenges. In so doing, it reinforces 
the interface between law and ecological science and considers the utility of embracing 
the principles of adaptive management as a better methodology to enhance the outcomes 
of the appropriate assessment and reconcile the interests for offshore renewables and 
protection of Natura 2000 sites. The aim of this research is solution-based: it seeks to 
improve the implementation of the assessment requirements of the Habitats Directive 









‘In developing climate change law, we must not forget the need to protect and enhance 
biodiversity. [....] we should discourage carbon sequestration projects that reduce 
biodiversity and social well-being.  Instead, we should seek win-win sustainable 
development solutions that reduce [greenhouse gas emissions] while protecting and 
enhancing biodiversity’. 1  
(Hodas, 2008)  
 
This statement embraces the core theme of this thesis. The noteworthy statement made 
by Andrew Jackson whereby  ‘the strictness of the EU’s biodiversity protection could 
necessitate the rejection of many renewable energy projects’2 still holds true today. As 
far back as 2011, the same author raised a number of critical interrogations, in particular 
that of whether ‘provisions aimed at biodiversity protection are sacrosanct even if their 
application impedes policies aimed directly at addressing climate change?’  Needless to 
say, this remains an everyday challenge for legal practitioners and regulatory decision-
makers in charge of administering and granting development consents to developers of 
                                                          
1 This statement was first enunciated by Hodas and subsequently reiterated by Jackson in his seminal 
paper addressing policy conflicts between renewable energy and biodiversity conservation (see quotation 
below). David R. Hodas, ‘Biodiversity and Climate Change Law’ in Jeffrey M.I., Firestone J., Bubna-
Litic K., Biodiversity, conservation, law + livelihoods: Bridging the North-South Divide (Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 399 
2 Andrew Jackson., ‘Renewable energy vs. Biodiversity: Policy conflict and the future of nature 




offshore renewable energy technologies.3  Surprisingly, the topic has received scant 
attention from legal scholars.  
 
1 - Context  
 
 
Energy law and policy have significantly evolved since the adoption of the European 
Coal and Steel Community Treaty4 and the Euratom Treaty5 in the aftermath of Second 
World War. ‘Energy law’ is best defined in the literature as ‘the regulation of energy 
related rights and duties of various stakeholders over energy resources over the energy 
life-cycle’.6  In the most recent scholarship, the terms ‘modern energy law’ has also 
emerged to reflect the evolution of the drivers behind the development of energy law 
and policy.7 While EU energy law and policy have traditionally been driven by energy 
security and economic motivations,8 it is now experiencing a paradigm shift towards 
achieving societal goals, which among other things demand the transition to equitable 
and affordable low-carbon economies.9 The ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans’ legislative 
package seems to confirm this point and tells us the direction that the EU is willing to 
take beyond 2020: ‘putting energy efficiency first’, achieving ‘global leadership in 
renewable energy’ while ‘ensuring that the transition to a clean energy system benefits 
all Europeans’ including the most ‘vulnerable and energy poor consumers’.10 Not by 
chance, combating climate change has played a pivotal role in initiating the ‘greening’ 
                                                          
3 Glen Wright, Anne-Marie O’Hagan, ‘Ocean energy projects: issues, challenges and opportunities’ in 
Wright G., Kerr S., Johnson K., (eds.) Ocean Energy: Governance Challenges for Wave and Tidal Stream 
Technologies (Routledge, 2018), 101 
4 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (adopted 18 April 1951, in force 23 July 
1952) (no longer in force)  
5 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [1997] OJ L 327/1 
6 Raphael J. Heffron and Kim Talus, ‘The Evolution of Energy Law and Energy Jurisprudence: Insight 
for Energy Analyst and Researchers’ (2016) 19 Energy Research and Social Science, 1, 4 
7  Raphael J. Heffron, ‘The global Future of Energy Law’ (2016) 7 International Energy Law Review, 290 
8 Ibid. 
9 Darren McCauley and others, ‘Energy justice in the transition to low carbon energy systems: exploring 
key themes in interdisciplinary research’ (2019) (233-234) Applied Energy, 916 




process of the EU energy law under the auspice of sustainable development.11  To 
comply with its obligations under of the UNFCC12 and its Kyoto Protocol,13 the EU has 
committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 
2050.14 The Kyoto Protocol and the more recent Paris Agreement15 have had a 
significant role in spurring the adoption of legally binding targets for renewable energy 
under the Renewable Energy Directive (REN Directive).16 The current 2020 climate and 
energy framework sets an EU target to achieve 20% of renewable energy consumption 
which relies on legally binding national targets until 2020.17 The revised REN Directive 
establishes a new governance framework setting out an initial renewable energy target 
of 27% by 2030.18 This target has been elevated to achieve at least 32% of renewable 
energy consumption by 2030.19 The new framework is only legally-binding at the EU 
level and will be fulfilled through individual Member States' contributions.20  
 
Achieving these climate-energy targets demands a radical transformation of our energy 
systems. In many jurisdictions, offshore renewable energy will soon become an 
                                                          
11 Israel Solorio and others, ‘The European Energy Policy and its “Green dimension”: Discursive 
Hegemony and Policy Variations in the Greening of Energy Policy’ in Barnes P., Hoerber T., (eds) 
Sustainable development and Governance in Europe (1st edn, Routledge, 2013), 91 
12 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9 May 1992, entered into force 21 
March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107 (UNFCC) 
13 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 11 
December 1997, entered into force 16 February 2005) UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, Dec. 10, 1997; 
37 ILM 22 (1998) 
14 European Commission, ‘Energy Roadmap 2050’ (Communication) COM (2011) 885 final. This target 
includes milestones to achieve 40% emission cuts by 2030 and 60% by 2040: European Commission, ‘A 
Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy by 2050’ (Communication) COM (2011) 112 
final. 
15 Paris Agreement (adopted 12 December 2015, entered into force 4 November 2016) UNTS 54113 
16 Directive 2009/28/EC of 23 April 2009 on the provision of the use of energy from renewable energy 
sources (REN Directive) [2009] O.J. L. 140/16 
17 European Commission, ‘20 20 by 2020 Europe’s climate change opportunity’ (Communication) COM 
(2008) 30 final. 
18 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable 
sources (recast)’ (Communication) COM (2016) 767 final. 
19 European Commission, ‘European leads the global clean energy transition: European Commission 
welcomes ambitious agreement on further renewable energy development in the EU’ (Press Release, 14 
June 2018). Available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-18-4155_en.htm> (22 
November 2018);  European Council, ‘Renewable Energy: Council confirms deal reached with the 
European Parliament’ (Press release, 27 June 2018). <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2018/06/27/renewable-energy-council-confirms-deal-reached-with-the-european-parliament/> 
(accessed 28 October 2018) 




imperative element of national energy policies to address growing opposition to onshore 
wind farms.21 Examples of public opposition abound across the European Union,22 
suggesting a general preference for offshore developments.23 In Ireland, local opposition 
has reached such a degree that two-thirds of terrestrial wind farm developments are 
subject to legal challenges.24 Similar to Ireland, public opposition to onshore wind farms 
is also evident in France, albeit in different ways. French opposition has sometimes led 
to the total destruction of wind turbines by fire.25 More than 58% of permit applications 
in France are subject to legal proceedings because of their perceived detrimental impact 
upon the landscape.26 As these statistics suggest, up-scaling wind energy developments 
on already ‘crowded’ lands is not straightforward. New forms of renewable energy must 
therefore be imperatively deployed offshore. 
 
For the sake of clarity, ‘offshore renewable energy’ should be understood as any type of 
renewable energy technology deployed in the marine environment. Offshore wind 
technologies, either fixed or floating offshore wind farms, as well as wave and tidal 
energy developments will be the focus of this investigation. These technologies are the 
most technologically advanced forms of renewable energy technologies deployed in 
                                                          
21 Edward A. Willsteed and others, ‘Obligations and aspirations: A critical evaluation of offshore wind 
farm cumulative impact assessment’ (2018) 82 Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2332  
22 John K. Kaldellis and others, ‘Environmental and social footprints of offshore wind energy. 
Comparison with onshore counterparts’ (2016) 92 Renewable Energy, 543; Kaldellis and others, 
‘Comparing recent views of public attitude on wind energy, photovoltaic and small hydro applications’ 
(2013)52 Renewable Energy, 197; Jacob Ladenburg, ‘Attitudes towards on-land and offshore wind power 
development in Denmark; choice of development strategy’ (2008) 33(1) Renewable Energy, 111 
23 Kristina Ek and Lars Persson, ‘Wind farms – where and how to place them? A choice experiment 
approach to measure consumer preferences for characteristics of wind farm establishments in Sweden’ 
(2014) 105 Ecological Economics, 193 
24 Michael M. O'Connor, ‘Gone with the Wind: The Uncertain Pursuit of Ireland’s 2020 RES-E Target – 
An Overview’ (2017) 24(4) Irish Planning and Environmental Law Journal, 148 
25 Ouest France, ‘Drome. L’incendie de deux éoliennes revendiqué sur un site libertaire’ (20 June 2018) 
https://www.ouest-france.fr/auvergne-rhone-alpes/drome-l-incendie-de-deux-eoliennes-revendique-sur-
un-site-libertaire-5835830 (20 October 2018); The Local, ‘Why do so many people in France hate wind 
farms?’ (7 August 2018) < https://www.thelocal.fr/20180807/why-do-some-people-in-france-hate-wind-
farms-so-much> (accessed 17 October 2018) 
<https://www.thelocal.fr/20180807/why-do-some-people-in-france-hate-wind-farms-so-much> (15 
September 2018) 
26 ADEME, (2017), Etude de la filière éolienne, bilan, prospective et stratégies (Part 2A).  Available at < 
https://www.ademe.fr/sites/default/files/assets/documents/filiere_eolienne_francaise_partie2a_perspective




Europe.27 ‘Ocean energy’ is also generally defined by the International Energy Agency 
Ocean Energy Systems (IEA-OES) as energy harnessed from ocean waves, tidal ranges 
(rise and fall), tidal currents, ocean currents as well as ocean thermal energy and salinity 
gradients in seawaters.28 In this thesis, the term ‘ocean renewable energy’ will 
exclusively refer to wave and tidal energy devices approaching commercialisation. 
 
To date, licensing processes represent a significant regulatory obstacle to many 
developers of ORE technologies due to current uncertainties regarding the impacts of 
these nascent technologies on marine ecosystems.29  While the ORE sector provides an 
innovative source of low-carbon energy, developers still face significant regulatory 
challenges to meet licensing requirements relating to environmental assessment 
processes.30 The Renewable Energy Directive requires that Member States ensure that 
permitting procedures for renewable energy projects are proportionate and necessary.31 
In a similar vein, the amended Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive32 also 
mandates for proportionate monitoring requirements.33  Interestingly, compliance with 
these requirements is not only hampered by the administrative complexity of licensing 
procedures in national jurisdictions,34 but also by the legal requirements deriving from 
                                                          
27 International Energy Agency, (2018), ‘Offshore Energy Outlook’ <https://www.iea.org/weo/offshore/>  
(accessed 12 February 2017); Andreas Uihlein and Davide Magagna, ‘Wave and tidal current energy – A 
review of the current state of research beyond technology’  (2016) 58 Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Review, 1070, 1071 
28 Ocean Energy Systems, ‘What is ocean energy’ < https://www.ocean-energy-systems.org/about-
oes/what-is-ocean-energy/> (accessed 15 March 2017)  
29 Le Lièvre C., O’Hagan A.M, Culloch R. Bennet F., (2016). ‘Legal Feasibility of implementing a risk-
based approach and compatibility with Natura 2000 network’. Deliverables 2.3 & 2.4 RiCORE project. 
53pp. <http://ricore-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/RICORE-D2-3D2-4-Legal-feasibility-Final-
1.pdf> (accessed 10 January, 2017), at 4 
30 European Commission, ‘Study on Lessons for Ocean Energy Development’ (final report, April 2017). 
<https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/03c9b48d-66af-11e7-b2f2-
01aa75ed71a1/language-en>, (15 April 2018), at 24-25 
31  Renewable Energy Directive, Article 13(1) 
32 Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the 
effects of certain public and private projects on the environment [2014] O.J. L. 124/1 (EIA Directive) 
33 EIA Directive, Article 13(1) 
34 Le Lièvre C., O’Hagan A.M., (2015). Legal and Institutional Review of National Consenting Processes, 
Deliverable 2.2, RiCORE project, 53pp. <http://ricore-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/RiCORE-




EU environmental directives. Paradoxically, the transition process to renewable energy 
may be slowed down precisely because of one of the ‘cornerstone’35 of the EU 
biodiversity policy: the Habitats Directive.36  
 
The Habitats and Birds Directives,37 also referred to as ‘Nature Directives’,38 aim to 
maintain and restore the conservation status of vulnerable species of plants and animals 
including wild birds and their habitats across their natural range within the EU. The 
foundation stone of their protection scheme relies on the creation of the network of 
Natura 2000 sites (hereafter: N2000), an ecologically coherent network of protected 
areas spanning the territory of the EU.39  In essence, the Habitats and Birds Directive 
establish substantive obligations on Member States to designate Special Areas of 
Conservation (SACs)40 and Special Protection Areas (SPAs)41 and to adopt within these 
sites, special conservation measures for a number of plant and animal species including 
wild birds and natural habitats naturally occurring within the EU territory.  Along with 
SPAs designated for bird species listed under Annex I of the Birds Directive and 
naturally occurring migratory birds, SACs form the N2000 network.42  Any new 
development located within or in the immediate vicinity of these designated sites must 
be subject to an assessment, also known as ‘appropriate assessment’ (hereafter: AA 
process), of its implications for the site concerned.43 
                                                          
35 European Commission,  ‘Guidance document Wind Energy Development and Natura 2000’ (2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/management/guidance_en.htm> (accessed 20 March 
2017),  at 17 
36 Directive 92/43/ECC of the Council of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild 
fauna and flora (Habitats Directive) [1992] OJ L 206/7 
37 Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild birds (Birds Directive) 
[2009] OJ L20/7 
38 European Commission, ‘Fitness Check of the EU Nature Legislation (Birds and Habitats Directives)’ 
(Commission Staff Working Document) SWD (2016) 472 final, at 6 
39 Habitats Directive, Article 3(1)  
40 Habitats Directive, Article 3(2), Article 4(1) 
41 Birds Directive, Article 4(1) (2) 
42 Habitats Directive, Article 3(1) 




N2000 sites have been found to be important pillars of biodiversity conservation, 
providing a so-called ‘umbrella benefit’ for a wide range of listed and non-listed animal 
species.44 As for the effects on marine wildlife, recent research has begun to reveal some 
positive effects on seabirds.45 To date, the network of N2000 sites in Europe’s seas is 
however largely incomplete46 and covers only 7% of the total EU marine territory.47 The 
relatively low coverage of marine N2000 sites, compared to their terrestrial 
counterparts, suggests that significant knowledge gaps about species and habitats in 
offshore areas have not been addressed yet.48 Notwithstanding difficulties in designating 
marine N2000 sites, the potential for conflicts and spatial overlap with offshore 
renewable energy should not be minimised. The expansion of the marine network has 
more than doubled in the last six years.49 Likewise, an important proportion of offshore 
wind energy projects in the Irish Sea, North Sea and Baltic Sea are located within or 
nearby N2000 sites. This is clearly noticeable when visualising and combining the 
Natura 2000 network viewer (http://natura2000.eea.europa.eu/#) with global offshore 
wind farms database (https://www.4coffshore.com/offshorewind/).  
 
Furthermore, the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020 sets a headline target ‘to halt the loss 
of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystem services in the EU by 2020’.50 To 
                                                          
44 European Commission, ‘Fitness Check’ (2016), (n38), at 42 
45 Fjona Sanderson and others, ‘Assessing the Performance of EU Nature Legislation in Protecting Target 
Bird Species in an Era of Climate Change’ (2016) 9 Conservation Letters, 172; Clara Péron and others, 
‘Importance of coastal marine protected areas for the conservation of pelagic seabirds: the case of 
Vulnerable velkouan shearwaters in the Mediterranean Sea (2013) 168 Biology Conservation, 210 
46 European Commission, ‘Fitness Check’, (n38), p.33 
47 European Commission, ‘Natura 2000 in the marine environment’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/marine/index_en.htm> (accessed 20 March 2018) 
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maps/dashboards/natura-2000-barometer> (accessed 11 November 2018) 
50 European Commission, ‘Our life insurance, our natural capital: an EU biodiversity strategy to 2020’ 




achieve this headline objective, the Strategy has adopted measurable targets51 and 
demands the full completion of the N2000 network in the marine environment.52 In this 
vein, the Fitness Check of the Birds and Habitats Directives53 indicates that a substantial 
number of additional marine sites will have to be designated by Member States to 
complete the N2000 network.54 The expansion of the marine N2000 network is 
obviously of paramount importance to stave off the loss of marine biodiversity. Yet, 
biodiversity objectives should not mean dismissal of the achievement of climate-energy 
objectives adopted under the EU Climate and Energy Package and the more recent 2030 
Climate and Energy Framework. In other locations of the world, coastal nations have 
also committed to protect 10% of their coastal and marine waters with marine protected 
areas by 2020 under Sustainable Development Goal 14.55  Progress towards this goal 
will also be evaluated according to the number of protected areas in relation to marine 
areas. 
The ‘greening’ process of energy law should impact more significantly upon the 
judiciary, and more particularly, upon how European Courts deal with ORE 
technologies in their adjudications. Accommodating innovative ORE technologies and 
their potential impacts on dynamic and poorly understood marine ecosystems is 
necessarily a source of ‘legal disruption’56  which needs to be addressed by the judiciary 
when providing authoritative interpretations of the legal framework.57  Leading 
commentators argue that ‘central to addressing the problem of climate change is [the 
                                                          
51 Ibid, at .5, 11. Target 1 of the Strategy aims to ‘halt the deterioration in the status of all species and 
habitats covered by EU nature legislation and achieve a significant and measurable improvement in their 
status so that by 2020’: (i) 100% more habitat assessments and 50% more species assessments under the 
Habitats Directive show an improved conservation status; and (ii) 50% more species assessments under 
the Birds Directive show a secure or improved status. 
52 Ibid, 11 
53 European Commission, (n38) 
54 Ibid, p.33: The Fitness Check indicates that around 55% additional sites must be proposed by Ireland to 
complete the N2000 network, against 75% in Belgium, 82% in Spain, 75% in Finland and 72% in 
Portugal.  
55 UNGA Res. A/RES/70/1 (2015) GAOR 70th Session Supp16, 23   
56 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Law and Energy Transitions: Wind Turbines and Planning Law in the UK’ (2018) 38 
(3) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 528, 531 




need] to recognize the interrelationships between energy and the environment and the 
detrimental human consequences that follow from ignoring that linkage’.58 
Notwithstanding this, we are now in a paradoxical situation where the interpretation of 
the Habitats Directive may become not an environmental benefit, but an obstacle 
standing in the way of innovative low-carbon energy technologies. Applying the 
precautionary principle, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has consistently held that 
national licensing authorities may authorise new developments only ‘if no reasonable 
scientific doubt’ remains as to the absence of threats to the integrity of nearby N2000 
sites.59  In order to comply with the principles elaborated by the CJEU, licensing 
authorities are therefore inevitably inclined to adopt an overly risk-averse approach to 
decision-making imposing very extensive monitoring requirements on developers to 
support the conclusions of an AA process. To date, the approach has been to request 
large amounts of environmental data and information: an expensive and time-
consuming approach for developers of ORE technologies.60  The judicial interpretation 
of the Habitats Directive does not sit easily with the emerging challenges associated 
with deploying new ORE technologies in offshore environments. Even so, the position 
of the EU judiciary seems to exacerbate a long-standing ‘disconnection’ between 
environmental law and science.61  The interpretation of the Habitats Directive appears 
particularly impractical given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding complex 
marine ecosystems. There are indeed, major gaps in our understanding of how complex 
and dynamic marine ecosystems interact with ORE technologies. Uncertainty and lack 
of knowledge is not limited to interactions of devices with the receiving environment 
                                                          
58 Raphael J. Heffron and others, ‘A treatise for energy law’ (2018) 11 Journal of World Energy Law and 
Business, 34, 45 
59 Case C-127/02 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot 
Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij (Waddenzee) [2004] 
ECR I-07405, para.59 
60 Craig Whelton, Lynsey Reid, ‘Providing information to enable the decision-taker to make an 
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but also pertain to the fundamental biology of marine habitats and species. Addressing 
scientific gaps cannot be a developer’s responsibility; it demands a societal response 
from governments, academia and industry all collaborating together. In the absence of 
strategic mapping and planning systems afforded by governmental authorities, existing 
data gaps are however only addressed by developers in the framework of licensing 
processes.62  
 
The EU hosts 84% of total worldwide offshore wind installed capacity equating 16 
MW.63 The offshore wind energy sector is projected to grow exponentially to a total 
capacity of 25 MW by 2020.64  In light of these figures, it is difficult to believe that the 
implementation of the assessment requirements of the Habitats Directive threatens this 
thriving industry. Other sectors such as wave and tidal energy are however edging 
towards commercialisation. In the absence of grid storage systems capable of storing 
large amounts of energy generated by offshore wind farms, these innovations offer a 
predictable source of energy which is indispensable alongside land-based and offshore 
wind energy developments. In June 2018, low wind conditions resulted in the United 
Kingdom experiencing a significant decline in its wind energy generation (from 
6000MW to 500MW). The country spent more than nine days without any power from 
wind energy.65  
Efforts to reduce uncertainty have, however, resulted in ocean energy companies facing 
disproportionate monitoring costs to meet the evidentiary thresholds of the Habitats 
                                                          
62 Julia Köller, Johann Köppel, Peters Wolfgang, (eds.). Offshore Wind Energy. Research on 
Environmental Impacts (Springer, 2006), 346 
63 Global Wind Energy Council (2018), Annual Market Update 2017 Global Wind Report. 
<http://gwec.net/policy-research/reports/> (accessed 15 March 2018), at 54 
64  Wind Europe, ‘Offshore wind in Europe: Key Trends and Statistics 2017’ (February 2018). Available 
at <https://windeurope.org/about-wind/statistics/offshore/european-offshore-wind-industry-key-trends-
statistics-2017/>  (accessed 15 March 2018), at 7 
65  Rachel Morison, ‘Britain has gone nine days without wind Power’ Bloomberg (7 June 2008). 
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Directive.66 An Irish development company was even forced to cancel its foreshore 
licence application for its single tidal energy device located adjacent to a SPA due to 
additional requirements for bird surveys in the Shannon estuary.67  Applying the 
precautionary principle to ORE permitting is of course necessary. However, an 
overreliance on the precautionary principle will certainly fail to achieve satisfactory 
trade-offs between the demand for biodiversity conservation and the increasing need to 


















                                                          
66 For example, Marine Current Turbines (MCT) has spent £3 million on monitoring works to obtain 
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L., (2009) ‘Seal of Approval’ The Nature of Scotland, (Winter Issue), at 22-23 
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2 - Research questions and objectives  
 
While the ORE sector offers promising benefits for ‘Blue Growth’68 opportunities and 
access to modern energy services,69 ORE also represents an additional source of 
pressure and physical disturbance to marine ecosystems. The purpose of this thesis is 
not therefore to subvert the precautionary principle but to promote better coherence 
between EU goals for renewable energy and biodiversity conservation. However, the 
thesis advances the premise that the relatively nascent nature of ORE technologies 
coupled with the existence of considerable data gaps and uncertainty on the receiving 
environment demand a paradigm shift70 in our approach to assessing and managing the 
impacts of the ORE sector on marine N2000 sites. Scientific uncertainty is so pervasive 
in the marine environment that decision-makers and, ultimately the courts that flesh out 
the precautionary principle, will need to develop a nuanced approach to the application 
of the principle to put the ‘inevitable fact of scientific uncertainty’71 at the core of 
decision-making.  
 
The Fitness Check found that the Birds and Habitats Directives are generally fit for 
purpose but the full realisation of their potential and stated objectives is nonetheless 
                                                          
68 European Commission, ‘Maritime Affairs, ‘Blue Growth: Opportunities for marine and maritime 
sustainable growth’ (Communication) COM (2012) 494 final, at 8-9. Offshore wind, wave and tidal 
energy have been identified as one of the five ‘value chains’ that ‘could deliver sustainable growth and 
jobs in the blue economy’ 
69 ‘Energy services’ are used to describe the benefits that energy systems provide to people. Energy 
services include ‘lighting, heating for cooking, power for transport, grinding, and numerous other 
services’ that telecommunications, ‘fuels, electricity and mechanical power make possible’.  Modi V., 
McDade S., Lallement D., Saghir J., Energy Services for the Millennium Development Goals (New York, 
United Nations Development Programmed, 2005). Available at 
<http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/environment-
energy/sustainable_energy/energy_services_forthemillenniumdevelopmentgoals.html>  (2nd November 
2018) 
70 To get a better understanding of the notion of ‘paradigm-shift’, read Thomas Kuhn’s seminal text on 
this issue:  Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press 1962) 




contingent upon substantial improvement of their implementation.72 In a similar vein, 
the recent Action Plan for ‘nature, people and the economy’ outlines that those in 
charge of implementing the Directives ‘are sometimes not sufficiently aware of their 
requirements or of the flexibility and opportunities they offer; this can lead to tensions 
between nature protection and economic activities’.73 At first glance, reconciling the 
protection of marine biodiversity with the need to account for challenges faced by 
project developers requires a nuanced approach to the precautionary principle to 
encourage the establishment of best scientific knowledge under the AA process. 
 
A critical challenge confronting planning and licensing decision-makers is indeed, to 
make ‘good’ legal decisions in the face of uncertainty regarding the interactions of ORE 
devices with complex marine ecosystems and their ‘acceptability’ in terms of impacts 
on protected features.74  Acknowledging the ‘inertia and paralysis’ of natural resource 
managers in the face of scientific uncertainty, Holling and others developed new 
paradigms of environmental assessment and management that incorporate the basic 
principles of resilience and adaptive management.75 Many environmentalists are still 
asserting that the only feasible option to deal with uncertainty in complex natural 
resource problems is adaptive management.76  In essence, adaptive management is a 
structured management process that deals with scientific uncertainty through ‘a 
rigorously planned and controlled trial’ based on careful monitoring to provide 
                                                          
72 European Commission, ‘Fitness Check’, (n38), at 96 
73 European Commission, ‘Action Plan for nature, people and the economy’ (Communication) COM 
(2017) 198 final, at 2 
74 E.J Milner-Gulland, Katriona Shea, ‘Embracing uncertainty in applied ecology’ (2017) 54 Journal of 
Applied Ecology, 2063, 2063 
75  Holling C.S, and others, Adaptive Environmental Assessment and Management (London, Wiley, 1978) 
76 Jim Berckley and Lance Gunderson, ‘Practical Resilience: Building Networks of Adaptive 
Management’ in Allen C.R, Garmestani A.S. eds., Adaptive Management of Socio-Ecological System 
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feedbacks and periodic review of decisions in the light of new information’.77  This 
approach has already been applied in a range of different environmental management 
contexts including forestry,78 fisheries,79 harvest management,80 wetlands and coral 
reefs.81  Given the high degree of uncertainty surrounding marine ecosystems, the ORE 
sector also represents an excellent opportunity to pilot the use of adaptive management 
strategies. Although recent research increasingly advocates the use of adaptive 
management in permitting processes for renewable energy projects, it mostly focuses on 
onshore wind developments.82  There has been little literature specifically focusing on 
the legal feasibility of implementing the principles adaptive management under the AA 
process of the Habitats Directive in order to facilitate greater penetration of offshore 
renewable energy.  Drawing on the seminal work of Holling, this thesis will thus 
explore how the established paradigm of ecosystem sciences can be best implemented 
under the AA process to improve the management of scientific uncertainty associated 
with permitting offshore renewables. In so doing, this research addresses one the key 
research priorities identified by the ‘legal research agenda’ for ocean energy.83  
Recognising that most of the research to date has failed to adequately tackle the legal 
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and regulatory issues hampering the ORE sector,84 the agenda identifies the need to 
develop risk-based and adaptive management strategies that can better accommodate 
scientific uncertainty within existing legal frameworks as a priority research area.85 In 
this respect, the thesis revolves around the following major research questions: 
1) How is scientific uncertainty currently addressed by regulatory decision-
makers and the EU judiciary under AA processes conducted for renewable 
energy developments? 
2) How can adaptive management be advanced within the confines of the 
precautionary principle to enhance the outcomes of the AA process in the 
face of uncertain ecological impacts on N2000 sites?  
The outcomes of this research will result in a more sophisticated approach to 
environmental decision-making for offshore renewable energy that embeds adaptive 
management and ecosystem-based management principle in an operational way. These 
findings will provide ORE developers and regulatory decision-makers with greater legal 
certainty when consenting and managing ORE developments under conditions of 
scientific uncertainty as to their potential impacts on N2000 sites and their qualifying 
features.  
Further, the recommendations of this research may be particularly useful in light of the 
future guidance documents contemplated by the Action Plan for ‘nature, people and the 
economy’.86 Following on from the Fitness Check of the Habitats and Birds Directives, 
the Action Plan foresees a number of priority actions to improve practical 
implementation of the Habitats and Birds Directives, and more specifically, their 
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coherence with socio-economic objectives.87 Recognising that an inflexible application 
of species protection rules can lead to an unnecessary burden and delays in permitting 
processes, the Action Plan envisages updating and improving existing methodological 
guidance on the site permitting requirements of the Habitats Directive and developing 
new guidance documents on hydropower and wind energy by 2019.88 The underlying 
objective of this EU initiative is to promote sector-specific, smarter and more effective 
permitting procedures for N2000 sites and species protection rules. This research 
therefore intervenes at a key period in the life of the Birds and Habitats Directives.  
 
2 - Methodology  
 
As the core topic of this thesis relates to the interpretation of the precautionary principle 
in the particular context of the AA of the Habitats Directive, the thesis applies a 
doctrinal approach to legal research and as such, it is predominantly based on a critical 
examination of environmental legislation and case law.89 Because the thesis intends to 
develop a methodological framework to optimise the treatment of scientific uncertainty 
under the AA, it was necessary to supplement the doctrinal research with empirical 
evidence gathering in order to test the hypothesis. The nature of the marine environment 
is such that it was not possible to give due consideration to the ecological impacts of the 
ORE sector without consulting relevant scientific materials and environmental reports 
commissioned by industry, synthesising recent findings and monitoring results around a 
number of selected offshore wind farms, ocean energy devices and ocean test facilities. 
This research does not however follow an empirical methodology. Indeed, it did not 
include social research method such as interviews, observations or questionnaires. It 
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nonetheless involved engaging with peer-reviewed scientific literature as well as pre- 
and post-consent monitoring reports at the level of a metadata study. The thesis also 
encompasses an interdisciplinary approach facilitated by the candidate being located in 
the Marine and Renewable Energy Ireland Centre (MaREI Centre)90 where leading-edge 
contemporary developments in scientific practices for ecological assessments in the 
marine environment are implemented. The research has been approached from the 
experience of the author who has been involved with industry partners in the completion 
of multidisciplinary research projects focused on environmental assessments and risk-
based consenting for offshore renewables. Hence, this research was embedded within 
the sector, thereby allowing the author to attain a thorough understanding of ORE 
technologies, their ecological footprints and practical challenges faced by the industry in 
securing necessary development consents. 
3 - Structure 
 
Chapter II offers a detailed literature review of selected reports and scientific materials 
synthesising the ‘state of art’ of scientific knowledge regarding the ecological impacts 
associated with offshore wind, wave and tidal energy deployments. Chapter III 
describes the various sources and typologies of scientific uncertainty pervading 
environmental impact assessments in the offshore renewable energy sector. The ‘raison 
d’être’ of these first two Chapters is to provide the scientific background necessary to 
understand the limits associated with monitoring marine wildlife and acquiring data and 
information in offshore environments. This discussion will enable the reader to re-
consider the dissonance between existing judicial requirements for certainty under the 
AA of the Habitats Directive and the state of scientific knowledge and methodologies 
available to ORE developers to predict and measure the potential impacts of their 
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technologies on marine ecosystems. Understanding and conceptualising the different 
sources of scientific uncertainty will also be critical to inform the question of how the 
judiciary should navigate that uncertainty in adjudications involving permissions for 
offshore renewables. In this respect, Chapter IV will offer a constructive criticism of the 
current interpretation of the precautionary principle developed by CJEU under the AA 
of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. Having identified potential obstacles and 
inconsistencies in the interpretation of the CJEU and domestic courts, Chapter V will 
discuss the complex interactions between the Union’s energy and environmental policy 
under the legal system of the Lisbon Treaty and challenge the position of the EU 
judiciary in light of the important proportionality principle and the overarching 
objective of sustainable development.  
Chapter VI will then explore the science of adaptive management. In particular, it will 
define the notion of ecological resilience and adaptive management and inform the 
question of how these established paradigms of ecosystem sciences can be best 
implemented in tandem with the precautionary principle to approve and deploy ORE 
projects under uncertainty without adversely impacting upon N2000 sites’ conservation 
objectives. In this connection, Chapter VI will propose an ‘interim’ methodological 
framework to guide the use of adaptive management strategies in AA processes for 
ORE deployments. Finally, Chapter VII will conclude with a series of legal 
recommendations to help structure the implementation of adaptive management in a 
manner that preserves the need for legal and regulatory certainty in consenting 
processes and reduces the prospect of increased discretion for competent licensing 
authorities. In this vein, special attention will be paid to the long-standing experience of 
adaptive management in the American case law in order to derive substantial legal 




authorise, deploy and operate ORE devices in compliance with the requirements of the 
Habitats Directive.  
Although the thesis is primarily focused upon ORE technologies, the relevance of this 
research goes beyond the interest of the ORE sector and many of these 







































MAPPING THE ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF OFFSHORE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS 
A LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
1- Introduction  
 
 
Chapter II offers a detailed review of the ‘state of art’ of scientific knowledge regarding 
the ecological impacts of offshore renewable energy (ORE) deployments. As explained 
in the Introduction to this thesis, offshore wind, wave and tidal energy developments 
will be the focus of this investigation.1 The term ‘ocean renewable energy’ will also be 
used in section 4 of this Chapter to denote wave and tidal energy devices. 
‘Environmental assessment’ is used as a generic term to refer to the legally prescribed 
environmental assessment procedures under the amended EIA Directive,2 the Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) Directive3 and the Habitats Directive.4 The term 
‘ecological impacts’ is preferred to ‘environmental impacts’ insofar as this review only 
covers potential impacts on marine species and their habitats, the physical environment 
and associated ecosystem processes (i.e. hydrodynamics and sediment transport). It does 
not include societal aspects such as human population and human health, material 
assets, cultural heritage and landscape as referred to under Article 3(1) of the EIA 
                                                          
1 International Energy Agency, (2018), ‘Offshore Energy Outlook’. 80pp. Available at < 
https://www.iea.org/weo/offshore/>  (accessed 12 February 2017); Uihlein A., Magagna D., ‘Wave and 
tidal current energy – A review of the current state of research beyond technology’ 2016) 58 Renewable 
and Sustainable Energy Review, 1070, 1071 
2 Directive 2014/52/EU of 16 April 2014 amending Directive 2011/92/EU on the assessment of the 
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3 Directive 2011/42/EC of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes 
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Directive. An important semantic distinction must be made between ‘effect’ and 
‘impact’. ‘Effect’ refers to a causal change caused by a stressor to a receptor. ‘Effect’ 
does indicate the magnitude or intensity of change for receptors, whereas ‘impact’ refers 
to the resultant negative or positive consequences of an effect on receptors.5 A potential 
effect, such as increased stress levels or displacement incurred by birds, fish or marine 
mammals, must be significant enough in intensity and duration to cause a meaningful 
impact (e.g. decline in population).6 ‘Receptor’ must be understood as any ecosystem 
attribute that responds to pressures and stressors.7 In this review, receptors include 
marine mammals, seabirds, fish and benthic communities, physical environment 
(sediments, seabed and coastal topography) and hydrodynamics (i.e. wave motion and 
currents). 
 
The Chapter covers the construction, operation, and decommissioning phases of ORE 
projects. For each of these stages, it highlights the potential impacts on the main 
sensitive taxa and receptors. The evidence base comes from peer-reviewed scientific 
papers, book chapters and environmental monitoring reports commissioned by industry 
developers.  This study also extensively relies on the recent review of post-consent 
monitoring of offshore wind farms (OWFs) published by the UK’s Marine Management 
Organisation (hereafter: MMO).8 Important background materials included post-
consenting monitoring reports produced by consultants or government agencies in 
relation to installed OWFs including Alpha Ventus, Nysted, Horns Rev I and Horns Rev 
                                                          
5 Boehlert G.W., Gill A.B., (2010) ‘Environmental and ecological effects of ocean renewable energy 
development: a current synthesis’ Oceanography, 23, 68 
6  Willsteed E., Gill A.B., Birchenough S., Jude S., (2017) ‘Assessing the cumulative effects of marine 
renewable energy developments: establishing common ground’, Science of the Total Environment, 577 
(15),19, 23 
7  Boehlert G.W., Gill A.B., (n5), at 69 
8 Marine Management Organisation (MMO), (2014), Review of post-consent offshore wind farm 
monitoring data associated with licence conditions. A report produced for the Marine Management 
Organisation, MMO Project No: 1031, 194pp. Available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/review-of-environmental-data-mmo-1031> (accessed 15 




II (Denmark), Greater Gabbard, Robin Rigg, London Array, North Hoyle and Kentish 
Flats (United Kingdom), Bligh Bank and Thorntonbank (Belgium) and Egmond aan Zee 
(Netherlands). Monitoring studies around these developments have typically used a 
Before-After-Control-Impact’ (BACI) approach to monitoring design, 
assessing/comparing changes/impacts on valued receptors prior to installation, during 
the construction and during the operational phase.  With regard to wave and tidal energy 
devices, this study extensively relies upon the findings of the Annex IV State of the 
Science Report on the Effects of Marine Renewable Energy Development Around the 
World (hereafter: State of the Science Report).9 This report is the most consolidated 
scientific contribution reviewing the state-of-the-art of scientific knowledge of the 
interactions between marine animals, their natural habitats and ocean energy devices.10 
The study also relies on peer-reviewed scientific papers synthesising findings from 
monitoring programmes in selected ocean test facilities. 
 
Little research has been directed to evaluating the ecological impacts of 
decommissioning.  The number of OWFs that have been decommissioned to date is 
low. The first decommissioning of an OWF, Yttre Stengrund,11 occurred at the 
beginning of 2016 in Sweden, followed by Vindeby12 in Denmark. The 
decommissioning programmes of these early OWFs are not accessible for public 
consultation. At this stage, the potential impacts associated with decommissioning 
operations may be derived from scientific knowledge gathered for the oil and gas 
industry and preliminary decommissioning programmes for existing OWFs. 
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Marine Renewable Energy Development Around the World. 224pp. 
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10   Ibid, 1 
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12  Dong begins Vindeby decommissioning – Wind Power Offshore. Weston D. 2017.  




Unfortunately, a large number of decommissioning programmes (hereafter: DP) are not 
in the public domain. The OWFs that have been studied for decommissioning are 
therefore different to those studied for the construction and operational phase. DPs for 
the Greater Gabbard,13  Sheringham Shoal,14 London Array,15 Glun Feet Sand,16 Gwynt 




2- Ecological footprints of offshore wind farms: what do we know? 
 
2.1. Marine mammals 
 
As discussed above, EU countries host 84% of total worldwide offshore wind installed 
capacity.19  Because most current OWF  developments operate in the North Sea, Irish 
Sea and Baltic Sea,20 empirical data collected to inform regulatory consenting processes 
have been primarily gathered for marine mammals regularly occurring in these regions: 
harbour porpoises (Phocoena phocoena), harbour seals (Phoca vitulina) and grey seals 
                                                          
13 Airtricity, (2007). Decommissioning programme – Greater Gabbard Offshore Wind Farm Project 
(Document 570000/403-MGT100-GGR-107). Available at < 
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F15-00005). Available at 
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18 Thanet Offshore Ltd, (2008). Thanet Offshore Wind Farm Decommissioning Plan. Available at < 
https://corporate.vattenfall.co.uk/globalassets/uk/projects/decommissioning-plan-2008.pdf>  
19 Global Wind Energy Council (2018), Annual Market Update 2017 Global Wind Report. 
<http://gwec.net/publications/global-wind-report-2/> (accessed 15 March 2018) 
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(Halichoenus grypus).  Elsewhere, other marine mammal species that have been 
identified as sensitive to OWFs include the North Atlantic right whale (Eubalaena 
glacialis), common Minke whales (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), blue whale 
(Balaenoptera musculus), humpback whale (Megaptera novaeangliae), and fin whale 
(Balaenoptera physalus).21   
 
OWFs may affect marine mammals in a myriad of ways.  High pulse sound, generated 
by pile-driving operations, a technique commonly used to secure monopile foundations 
on the seabed, is the main source of concern for marine mammals. Marine mammals 
rely on sound to navigate, communicate and detect their prey. High-level sounds during 
pile-driving operations may mask communication thereby affecting animals’ capacity to 
communicate, detect their mates and hunt. Pulse sounds from pile-driving operations 
may induce hearing damage that may result in a permanent threshold shift (PTS) 
(hearing loss) or temporary threshold shift (TPS) (temporary hearing injury).  
 
A growing body of evidence suggests that pile-driving noise leads to the displacement 
of marine mammals.22  Harbour porpoises (Phocoena phocoena) have been identified as 
highly susceptible to noise levels from pile-driving operations.23 A recent study 
analysing the effects of eight noise-mitigated and non-noise-mitigated OWFs in the 
German Bight has shown harbour porpoises declined by 68% within 5 km and 20% 
within 10-15 km from pile-driving sites.24 The decline in animal presence was more 
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than 50% at the nearest distance of 0-5km from OWFs.25 Aerial surveys combined with 
static acoustic monitoring at Alpha Ventus OWF also provide evidence of harbour 
porpoise displacement over a range of 10-20 km.26  Displacement during pile-driving 
were confirmed for the Horns Rev I and II, Nysted and Robin Rigg OWFs.27 At Horn 
Rev I and II development sites, noise-induced displacement behaviours were detected 
up to distances of 17 km (Horn Rev II)28 and 20 km (Horn Rev I) with a recovery time 
of up to two days for Horns Rev I29  and 24 to 72 hours (two-three days at a distance of 
2.6 km) for Horns Rev II.30  At Nysted OWF, acoustic monitoring showed that pile-
driving provoked a stronger negative reaction in harbour porpoise as animals were seen 
to leave the area almost completely and needed longer recovery periods after pile-
driving.31 These effects can be explained by the absence of noise mitigation measures 
during planning and construction of the first OWFs. The range of effects from pile-
driving noise on marine mammals reduced from 17km to 14km when working sound 
mitigation measures were used in the German Bight.32 According to Nehls and others, 
using effective sound mitigation systems during offshore pile-driving such as big bubble 
curtains may result in a substantial reduction of up to 90% in the harbour porpoise 
disturbance area.33 
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Behavioural responses of harbour seals and grey seals to pile-driving operations appear 
to be similar to that recorded for harbour porpoises.34 Changes in behaviour were 
recorded through telemetry studies, visual observations and remotely controlled camera 
systems in sanctuary and haul-out sites around the Horns Rev and Nysted OWFs.35 
Monitoring data from Nysted and Horns Rev show that seal species are sensitive to pile-
driving operations but there was no evidence of deterrent effects during the overall 
construction period.36   Significant short-term effects were observed in the number of 
seals hauling-out during pile-driving.37 Similarly, a recent study using telemetry data 
showed that harbour seals clearly avoided the area up to 20 km from Linc OWF (South 
East England) during pile-driving.38  Monitoring results at Linc OWF (United 
Kingdom) suggest that seals would need shorter recovery period as harbour seals were 
seen to return to site only two hours after piling.39  
 
The evidence base above seems to suggest that acoustic disturbances on marine 
mammals are limited to pile-driving activities. Long-term monitoring at Horns Rev and 
Nysted has shown that population of marine mammals returned in OWF areas to a 
comparable number after construction activity had ceased.40  Monitoring at Egmond aan 
Zee OWF in The Netherlands also reported a significant increase in harbour porpoise 
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activities within the wind farm during the operational phase.41 These initial conclusions 
need to be considered carefully as post-consent monitoring activities at Nysted OWF 
suggest slow recovery for harbour porpoises, with no return to baseline conditions after 
one year of operation.42  The effects of operational, non-pulsed sounds on marine 
mammals are still poorly understood. Once they become operational, OWFs would 
generate low levels of acoustic noise disturbance due to the absence of pile-driving.  
The impact of noise will however depend on the type of foundation structures (e.g. 
monopile, jackets or gravity foundation), animals’ previous experience of noise 
exposure, the hearing sensitivity and motivation of marine mammals.43 The need to 
forage and haul-out may, for example, outweigh the deterrence effects of noise 
disturbance.44 This may explain regular transiting behaviour of foraging harbour seals 
around the Linc OWF during pile-driving operations.45 Underwater noise emitted by 
maintenance vessels during the construction and operational phase may also be 
detectable by marine mammals.46 Harbour porpoises have been reported to react to low-
frequency noise emissions from boat activities during the operational phase.47 Brandt et 
al., demonstrated that lower numbers of harbour porpoises were found around all OWFs 
as a result of boat activities prior to piling-driving operations.48  
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The placement of OWFs may cause physical injuries or directly affect animal survival if 
marine mammals happen to collide with the sub-structures of offshore wind turbines.  
Alternatively, operational OWF may result in indirect negative impacts where multiple 
turbines create a barrier effect resulting in chronic disruption of animal behaviour. This 
effect occurs when marine mammals purposively avoid development areas during the 
operational phase. Indirect impacts on marine mammals are extremely complex to 
detect and quantify.   
Harwood and King (2017) argue that permanent threshold shift (PTS) or temporary 
hearing shift (TPS) may directly affect the survival of animals if it reduces their 
capacity to escape their predators.49 On the other hand, experiencing PTS or TPS may 
also indirectly affect their ability to survive and reproduce by altering the animal’s 
ability to locate its mate or to detect and capture prey.50 Further, acoustic disturbances or 
barrier effects from operating turbines may prompt chronic disruption of animal 
behaviour if animals are displaced from critical habitats in order to avoid the OWF 
area.51 Displacement effects associated with avoidance behaviour may have population-
level consequences on species if they result in increased stress levels and reduced 
energy budget for foraging, breeding and reproduction. A species population decline is 
likely to occur if the vital rates of a sufficient number of animals are affected.52 In a 
similar vein, displacement may also result in reduced foraging opportunities if animals 
are displaced to areas with lower foraging quality or where there is increased 
competition.53  
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Conversely, the installation of OWFs may come with indirect positive impacts.  
Colonisation of turbine foundations and scour protections by epifauna is commonly 
associated with an increase in prey availability for top predators such as cetaceans and 
seals attracted by foraging opportunities.54  Recent evidence has shown that foraging 
harbour seals and grey seals were attracted by the artificial reef effect of turbines 
foundations.55  There is however a risk that anthropogenic noise and vibration from 
pile-driving, maintenance vessels or operating turbines indirectly affect marine 
mammals by relocating their prey.56 Changes in abundance and distribution patterns for 
almost all cetacean species have been attributed to a reduction in pelagic biomass or 
changes in prey species composition.57  This may potentially cause increased stress 
levels in marine mammals as well as additional energy costs to capture their prey with 
associated negative consequences on foraging success, reproduction and breeding 
activities.58   
 
Marine mammals are also known to use the Earth’s magnetic fields to navigate over 
long distances. Marine mammals are thus sensitive to local interferences in magnetic 
fields from subsea cables. Potential effects of electro-magnetic fields may increase the 
risk of marine mammals beaching due to navigational errors as well as additional 
energy expenditure associated with longer detours in migration routes. Knowledge in 
this field is highly limited.  
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A number of seabird species are listed under the Birds Directive59 and as such, these are 
subject to special protection measures for their survival and reproduction in their area of 
distribution.60 Among these species, the common guillemot, red-throated diver, the 
sandwich tern, the Manx shearwater and the common terns come under the protection 
regime of the Birds Directive (see further Chapter IV). 
 
OWFs are associated with three types of adverse effects on seabirds: 1) displacement 
and barriers to flight movement with higher energy costs and adverse effects on survival 
and breeding success, 2) loss of functional habitat as a result of avoidance behaviour 
and 3) mortalities from collision risks.61 Risks of adverse impacts on seabirds are 
particularly high during the operational phase.62 Operational OWFs may affect birds 
through collision mortality and barrier effects.63 Barrier effects occur where sea birds 
are forced to extend their flight trajectories or migration routes to avoid OWFs and 
reach their colonies or foraging areas.64   
 
The impacts of OWFs on avian populations are highly species-specific.65  Collision 
risks depend on the flight altitude of species: seabirds flying at greater height may 
experience greater risk of collision with rotating blades.66 Collision risks are also more 
likely to occur when seabirds exhibit low-avoidance behaviours or directly fly through 
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OWFs (micro-avoidance).67 The design of offshore wind turbines has been found to 
have significant implications for collision risks, with potentially lower collisions risks 
as the hub height and turbine diameter increase.68 
Evidence of attraction responses to turbines has been reported for cormorants 
(Phalacrocorax carbo), the European shag (Phalacrocorax aristotelis) and other 
species of gulls.69  Monitoring findings at Horns Rev II OWF indicate that a number of 
gull species such as herring gulls (Larus argentatus), common gulls (Larus canus) and 
great black-backed gulls (Larus marinus) show no avoidance at all.70 The ‘ecological 
incentives’ behind the attraction of birds have been attributed to the use of the turbines 
for resting, roosting and feeding.71 Increases in prey availability encouraged by the 
artificial reef effects of offshore turbines are also reported to attract foraging seabird 
species.72 In Belgian OWFs, lesser black-backed gulls (Larus fuscus) and black-legged 
kittiwakes (Rissa tridactyla) for example, were seen to forage on pelagic prey between 
the turbines and on the epifauna on accessible jacket foundations.73 
Conversely, the placement of OWFs may create a barrier effect to the movement of 
migrating and breeding seabirds if birds exhibit strong avoidance behaviours (see 
below). Evidence collected through radar surveys, infra-red videos and visual 
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observation at Thorntonbank,74 (Belgium), Egmond aan Zee (The Netherlands),75 Robin 
Rigg76 (United-Kingdom), Horns Rev I and Nysted,77 and Horns Rev II78 (Denmark) 
suggest that seabirds generally avoid the vicinity of OWFs. Strong avoidance behaviour 
has been observed for northern gannets (Morus Bassanus), common scoters (Melanitta 
nigra), red-throated divers (Gavia stellata), sandwich terns (Sterna sandvicensis), Manx 
shearwaters (Puffinus puffinus), common guillemots (Uria aalge), razorbills (Alca 
Torda), and long-tailed ducks (Clangula hyemalis).79 Vanermen et al., (2017) 
demonstrate that northern gannets (Morus bassanus), common guillemots (Uria aalge) 
and razorbills (Alca torda) significantly avoided the vicinity of the Bligh Bank and 
Thorntonbank wind farms areas.80 Aerial surveys around Egmond aan Zee and Greater 
Gabbard OWFs81  and OWF developments in the German Bight similarly confirm that 
northern gannets tend to avoid the areas where wind farms are installed.82 Monitoring 
findings may be highly inconsistent among individuals of a same species depending on 
the configuration of OWFs.83  In other locations, species of gulls (lesser-black backed 
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gull) did not exhibit any displacement or attraction behaviours.84 Leopold et al., (2013) 
emphasised that for many species, displacement/collision could not be established 
uniformly between Belgian OWFs.85 Northern gannets and common guillemots for 
example, were seen to exhibit stronger avoidance around the Prinses Amalia Wind Park 
(PAWP) than in Egmond aan Zee due to the lower density of turbines at Egmond aan 
Zee.86  Avoidance responses at PAWP were also found for Black-legged Kittiwake and 
Razorbill, whereas for Egmond aan Zee, avoidance was only found for divers, the Great 
Crested Grebe and Common Scoter.87  
Seabirds may experience a loss of functional habitats as a result of macro-avoidance 
behaviours.88  Macro-avoidance typically occurs when birds completely avoid OWFs by 
flying around or over them, thus increasing their energy costs.89 In the case of 
breeding/migratory seabirds, increased times and costs associated with additional flight 
journey may alter species population demographic rates by reducing energy budgets 
available to forage, reproduce and breed.90 Seabirds are particularly vulnerable to 
displacement during breeding seasons. Breeding seabirds are ‘central place foragers’ 
which mean that they are spatially constrained to travel between their breeding colonies 
and foraging places.91 There is a limit to how far breeding seabirds can travel from the 
colony to forage: beyond a certain distance from nests, seabirds will be unable to bring 
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food back to their offspring and hence, breed successfully.92 Breeding seabirds are 
therefore more energetically sensitive to displacement and barrier effects of OWFs. 
Additional energetic costs resulting from increased flight distances may reduce the mass 
and body conditions of seabirds.93 Masden et al., (2009) explain that alteration of body 
conditions will in turn have detrimental effects on reproductive output and, or breeding 
success of a colony.94  While travel costs caused by avoidance of a single OWF may be 
marginal,95 the cumulative energy expenditure associated with avoiding multiple OWFs 
may significantly increase the risk of population impacts.96  
 
2.3. Fish and benthic communities  
 
The impacts of OWFs on demersal fish species and benthic communities are regarded 
as both positive and negative.97  Construction activities such as drilling, piling, and 
cable-laying will temporarily disturb the seabed by causing sediment particles to re-
suspend. Seabed disturbance leads to direct mortalities of benthic animals living in 
sediments (infauna) and on seabed (epifauna).98 Seabed disturbance will further cause 
mobile species to leave the area, while mortality of sessile species may occur due to 
smothering (i.e. burial under fallouts of sediments).99  
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The main impact resulting from the introduction of hard substrates and scour protection 
is the introduction of completely different faunal communities to those that occurred 
prior to construction.100 The introduction of turbine foundations and scour protection 
made of gravel and stones to secure turbine foundations in the seabed encourages the 
development of epifauna where native infaunal species initially predominated.101 
Another source of concern includes the potential impacts on benthic animals of 
operational noise (turbine vibration) and electromagnetic fields (EMF). Cables 
transmitting electricity to sub-stations and onshore installations will emit EMF that may 
affect the movement and navigation of invertebrates and certain fish species. EMF 
originates from both inter-turbines cables (collection system) and export cables. These 
two types of cables generate different EMF emissions and as such, may prompt 
different responses by marine animals.102  AC power transmission cables directly emit 
magnetic field (B-field) and induced electric fields (E-field) associated with the electric 
production.103 The interferences caused by EMF may:  1) disturb navigation and 
migration by creating a non-visual barrier on navigation routes; 2) alter important 
ecological functions such as prey detection for electro-sensitive species; 3) engender 
short-term behavioural responses and movement such as attraction or avoidance; and 4) 
provoke adverse physiological disturbances (hormonal disturbances, developmental 
delays of eggs and larvae).104 To date, responses to EMFs have been found for 
invertebrates (bivalves, cephalopods), bony fish, elasmobranches (shark, rays and 
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skates), crustaceans (lobster, prawns), marine mammals and turtles.105   These 
taxonomic groups are known to use electric and magnetic fields for hunting, navigation 
and spatial orientation.106 Snoek et al., (2016) have shown that some species of 
invertebrates, elasmobranches and bony fish, in some cases, show attraction or 
avoidance reactions to subsea power cables.107 Minor impacts have also been detected 
on migratory patterns of eels.108 As the main source of EMF results from submarine 
cables, benthic and demersal species are more likely to be adversely exposed to high 
field strengths than pelagic species.109    
 
There is currently a lack of research addressing the direct and indirect impacts of 
underwater noise on fish and shellfish species. Similar to marine mammals, pulsed 
sounds from pile-driving and vibration noise generated by operational turbines may 
increase stress levels in fish, mask their communications/orientation signals and 
potentially reduce reproduction and foraging success as well as migration activities.110 
With respect to the operational phase, Wahlberg and Westerberg (2005) explain that 
underwater noise may decrease the effective range for sound communication of fish.111 
In a similar vein, benthic invertebrates are likely to suffer from tissue injuries as a result 
of exposure to pile-driving noise.112 There is some evidence showing fish and shellfish 
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reactions to impulsive sounds.113  Andersson (2011) found that pile driving noise 
resulted in behavioural reactions in cod (Gadus morhua) and sole (Solea solea) 
occurring up to 70 km from the piling source.114 Mueller-Blenke et al. (2010) have also 
provided evidence of avoidance responses to pile-driving sound through increased 
swimming speed and freezing responses in sole.115 De Soto (2013) provides evidence 
that noise from seismic surveys cause significant development delays and body 
abnormalities in larvae.116 They conclude that if larvae are subject to intense noise 
exposure during their development, this could reduce their recruitment and have a 
delayed impact on stocks of mature animals.117 Some studies have shown that marine 
crustaceans detect, produce and respond to underwater noise, but crustacean sound 
sensitivity would be restricted to particle motion.118 Evidence of short-term colonisation 
of epibenthos and increased fish biomass after construction nevertheless have led some 
scientists to conclude that sounds generated by operating turbines would not have major 
adverse effects on fish and benthic organisms, attracted by foraging opportunities, 
shelter and protection.119 
 
Positive effects refer to the enhancement of habitats complexity and increased local 
biodiversity enabled by the artificial-reef effect of turbines foundations and associated 
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scour protections.120 Turbine foundations may create positive effects on fish and benthic 
communities through the combined effects of trawling restriction/exclusions and the 
artificial reef effects resulting from the introduction of hard substrate in marine 
waters.121  A number of scientific papers provide examples of artificial reefs and 
associated positive ‘attraction-production’ processes on local biodiversity.122 In 
Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, monitoring of benthic 
communities around turbine foundations and scour protection has shown increased 
biomass of epifaunal species such as edible crabs (Cancer pagarus), barnacles (Balanus 
improvisus) and blue mussels (Mytilus edulis).123  However, these effects are rarely 
consistent between OWFs due to different time-scales and sampling techniques used in 
monitoring studies.124 The colonisation of epifaunal species depends on a number of 
site-specific criteria including water depth, salinity, turbidity, sandbank topography, 
fishing pressure and foundation type used.125 As the literature suggest, it will take five 
years before there are stable faunal communities around new hard substrates.126  Despite 
this, colonisation of epifauna seems to be a common pattern in all OWF 
developments.127 Horns Rev I was described as a potential sanctuary area for two 
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threatened or red list epifauna species, the Ross worm (Sabellaria spinulosa) and the 
white weed (Sertularia cupressina).128   
 
Increased biomass in epifaunal assemblages in turn attracts larger fish species and lead 
to enhanced foraging opportunities for top predators including marine mammals and 
seabirds.129   Many environmental studies reveal an increase in biomass of commercial 
bentho-pelagic, semi-demersal and demersal fish species in the vicinity of European 
OWFs.130 Leonhard and Pedersen stress that a relationship exists between food 
availability and an observed increase of 7% of total fish biomass within Danish 
OWFs.131 Further, seven years after construction, Stenberg et al., (2015) indicate that 
the artificial reef effect of Horns Rev I OWF was ‘large enough to attract key fish 
species with a preference for rocky habitats’ such as whiting (Merlangius merlangus) 
and,  sand eel (Ammodytidae) including some reef fish species which were previously 
absent from surrounding areas.132 In a similar vein, Lindeboom et al., (2011) estimated 
a significant increase of sole (Solea solea), whiting (Merlangius merlangus) and striped 
red mullet (Mullus surmuletus), indicating that Egmond aan Zee offshore wind turbines 
may act as fish-aggregating devices.133    
 
Positive changes in biodiversity may nevertheless be outweighed by increased predation 
pressures from other foraging species134 and redistribution of fishery efforts in adjacent 
areas. Even more so, foundations of offshore wind turbines have been found to be 
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conducive to non-native species.135 Invasive species have been found to colonise a 
number of Danish and Belgian OWFs.136 Leonhard and Pedersen  (2006) estimate that 
of the 111 total invertebrate species observed during monitoring activities at Horns Rev 
I, only 37 species/taxons could be characteristically found as native fauna before the 
establishment of the OWF.137 Ten non-indigenous species were also reported to use the 
foundations of a Belgian OWF to expand their range and strengthen their strategic 
position in the area.138 According to Langhamer (2012), the spread of non-native 
species to OWFs constitutes an important threat to local biodiversity and may lead to 
local extinction of commercial fish species and, or changes in taxa in the entire 
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2.4. Physical environment and hydrodynamics 
 
Three receptors are commonly considered when monitoring the impacts of OWFs on 
physical environment: 1) scours at turbine foundations, 2) suspended sediment 
concentration and 3) current/turbid wakes (see below).140  Post-monitoring 
environmental data for 19 OWFs in the United-Kingdom have been compiled by the 
MMO providing a relevant evidence base on the effects of OWFs on hydrodynamics, 
sediment dynamics and seabed topography.141 First and foremost, OWFs have been 
reported to disturb sedimentary seabed by causing sediment particles to re-suspend by 
the effect of scour development and in-water turbid wakes. Changes in sediment 
dynamics may engender both ‘near-field’ and ‘larger-scale’ ‘far-field’ effects on the 
marine biodiversity and the physical environment.142  Near-field effects typically occur 
in the vicinity of the OWF, whereas ‘far-field’ dynamics occur outside OWFs. Far-field 
effects may generate adverse effects at the scale of an ecosystem by changing patterns 
of sediment deposition.143 In the near-field area, local increased sediment concentration 
occurs as a result of temporary re-suspension of sediment plumes during pile-driving 
and cable-laying operations. Increased sedimentation also results from the vertical 
interaction of current and tidal flows with turbine foundations. Vertical interactions of 
flows cause sediments to re-suspend and erosion of the seabed immediately around 
turbine foundation. Scour therefore appears as holes at the bottom of turbine 
foundations due to the removal of sediment materials.144  Scour can lead to a decrease in 
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local biodiversity as a result of oxygen reduction, increased turbidity and lack of 
visibility for representative species of diving seabird, marine mammals and fish.145  
 
Re-suspended sediment plumes around structure foundations are redistributed by the 
wake effects of each monopile following the same directional patterns of currents up to 
several kilometres behind turbine foundations.146 Satellite pictures acquired form 
Landsat 8 around London Array, Thanet and Great Gabbard OWFs have shown that in-
water turbid wakes may extend up to 30-150 metres wide and typically stretch up 
several kilometres behind individual turbines.147 At Thanet OWF, the extent of the wake 
exceeded 10 km.148 These images also reveal a significant increase of suspended 
sediment concentration in the in-water wake of individual turbines. Vanhellemont and 
Ruddick (2014) explain that turbid wake effects could significantly alter hydrodynamic 
flows and sediment transport.149 Hydrodynamics and sediment dynamics are known to 
support important ecological and physical processes including food web dynamics, 
nutrient cycling and distribution of larvae, juveniles and propagules.150 Turbid wakes 
may have far-field consequences on sedimentary habitats which in turn, may influence 
the composition of benthic assemblages.151 The impacts of turbid wakes on physical 
systems will however depend on sea-floor sediment types. Increased sedimentation 
most likely occurs where OWFs are installed on shallow sand banks.152 Similar 
observations have been reported for other offshore wind sites in Germany, the 
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Netherlands and Belgium, suggesting that in-water turbid wakes may be a general 
process associated with OWFs.153  Although research suggests that changes in sediment 
dynamics will mostly be localised and limited to sedimentary seabeds, the combined 
wake effects of multiple large-scale wind farms on ecosystems should not be ignored.154   
 
3 - Decommissioning 
 
 
The decommissioning takes place when OWFs have reached the end of their design life.  
OWFs developers may be required under the licence conditions to submit 
decommissioning programmes (DP) for approval by the competent authority prior to 
commencing construction works. Information relating to the impacts of 
decommissioning and associated mitigation measures should be incorporated in initial 
EIA Reports155 and, or Natura Impact Statements supporting applications for 
development consents. Decommissioning operations are not specifically referred to 
under the Habitats Directive. In many jurisdictions, DPs must however be subject to an 
appropriate assessment of the implications of decommissioning works for nearby 
Natura 2000 sites.156 Since a new ecological system is likely to emerge on and around 
turbine foundations during the operational phase, this information will need to be 
reviewed before the start of decommissioning works. In some cases, a new 
environmental assessment or AA may be required by competent authorities. Pursuant to 
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the polluter-pays-principle, developers are responsible for bearing the costs of all 
decommissioning works.157 
 
Decommissioning involves either the total or partial removal of all the elements of the 
OWF, whether offshore or onshore. Offshore elements include turbine towers, 
foundations, transition pieces connecting the lower part of the turbine to its foundation, 
scour materials, offshore substations and subsea cables (inter-array and export 
cables).158 Where partially removed, turbine foundations are cut-off at or below the 
seabed level and the remainder (i.e. scour protection and buried cables) is left in situ. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)159 establishes a 
presumption in favour of total removal of offshore installations. Abandoned or disused 
offshore installations should be removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking into 
account any generally accepted international standards established in this regard.160 The 
IMO Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and 
Structures161  state that all abandoned or disused installations standing in less than 75 m 
of water and weighting less than 4000 tonnes in air should be entirely removed.162 A 
similar rule applies to abandoned or disused offshore installations established on or after 
1 January 1988 standing in less than 100 m water and weighting less than 4000 tonnes 
in air.163 As soft law instruments of international law, these standards are not legally 
binding. However, they should be taken into account when a decision is made regarding 
the removal of ORE devices. To date, the average water depth of OWFs currently 
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installed or under construction is 27.5 m.164  Existing OWF turbines should therefore be 
removed in their entirety. Although the entire removal of offshore installations is the 
general rule, partial decommissioning is allowed where full removal is not technically 
feasible or involves extreme costs or unacceptable risks to personnel or the marine 
environment.165 The framework of the OSPAR Convention sets out a legal framework 
for decommissioning in the North East Atlantic. Under the OSPAR Decision 98/3, ‘the 
dumping or leaving wholly or partly in place of disused offshore installations’ is 
prohibited. The OSPAR Guidance on Environmental Considerations for OWF 
Developments provides that ‘the removed components of a wind farm should generally 
be disposed of entirely on land’.166 However, ‘if the competent authority decides that a 
component of the wind farm should remain at the site (e.g. parts of the piles in the sea-
bed, scour protection materials), it should be ensured that they have no adverse impact 
on the environment, the safety of navigation and other uses of the sea’.167   
 
The ecological impacts of decommissioning will depend on chosen decommissioning 
options, i.e. partial or total removal.  Here again, there is a requirement under the IMO 
Resolution that the chosen means of removal should not cause a significant adverse 
effect on living resources of the marine environment, especially threatened and 
endangered species.168 A common decommissioning approach proposed by developers 
consists of removing all parts of monopiles by cutting the foundations at the seabed 
level or at 1 or 2m depth below mud lines.169 Monopiles are then lifted and shipped to 
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land for dislocation or re-use.170  Scour protection is usually left in situ and different 
options are provided with respect to sub-sea cables depending on the depth at which 
they are buried.  In general, buried export and inter-array cables will be left in situ to 1-
2 m beneath the seabed to minimise risks of adverse effects on the seabed and benthic 
ecology. The considerable length of cable is usually advanced as the underlying reason 
to leave cables in situ.171   
 
Ecological impacts of decommissioning activities will mainly arise from cutting-off and 
lifting operations associated with turbine foundations. The cutting-off and removal of 
monopile foundations are likely to result in significant seabed disturbances and 
temporary increases in sedimentation.  Re-suspended sediments will affect water quality 
and reduce local biodiversity in the affected area. In both cases, the spatial scale of the 
affected seabed area is considered as similar to the area impacted during the 
construction phase.172 The type of vessels used for decommissioning works can be 
floating cranes, standard jack-up vessels or a special type of offshore unit with 
stabilising legs.173 These vessels have direct contact with the seabed for stabilisation and 
hence these will cause temporary disturbance to sediments and death of infaunal 
species.  Cut-off operations and boat activities will also temporarily increase ambient 
noise pollution. Cut-off operations occur underneath the water surface using different 
methodologies. Diamond wire cutting or water jetting are the commonly preferred 
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methods to cut foundations.174  Wire cutting involves cutting through the monopile with 
steel cutting wire. Panjerc found that sound radiated from diamond wire cutting 
operations would not be discernible from ambient background sound levels during 
cutting operations.175 Consequently, the impact of acoustic noise from cutting 
operations is considered as having low potential for disturbance to marine species due to 
its temporary nature.176 In the absence of further empirical data from decommissioned 
OWFs, such conclusions cannot be relied upon as best scientific knowledge. It is 
however likely that noise levels arising from decommissioning will generally be less 
damaging than decommissioning operations for oil and gas platforms, which routinely 
uses detonating explosives to fully remove or topple oil and gas platforms.177 No 
explosive systems have been reported in the accessed decommissioning programmes for 
offshore wind turbines.  
 
The cutting-off of turbine foundations will result in a direct loss of introduced habitats 
causing a reduction of local biodiversity, specifically the epifaunal and infaunal species 
that may have colonised turbine foundations and surrounding seabed areas. Loss of 
benthic ecology may represent a reduction in available prey for top predators. Potential 
adverse effects on local biodiversity will depend on the ecological performance of an 
OWF.  Where an OWF is reported as ‘ecologically performing’, cutting-off turbines to 
their foundations above the seabed may be considered as the preferable removal option 
in order to minimise disturbance to marine habitats and faunal communities that may 
have colonised the areas. The so-called ‘rig-to-reef’ programme for oil and gas 
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infrastructures may be a potential practice transferrable to the OWF industry.178 Similar 
‘renewable-to-reef’ programmes could be developed towards the end of life of an OWF 
to enhance habitats for species of conservation importance or increase/maintain stocks 
of commercially important foraging demersal fish species.179 Such practices could be 
incorporated into an adaptive management plan in compliance with the London 
Convention and Protocol Guidelines for the Placement of Artificial Reefs180 and 
OSPAR Guidelines on Artificial Reefs in Relation to Marine Living Resources.181 
 
4- Ecological footprints of ocean energy projects current empirical evidence 
4.1. General considerations  
 
Less is known about the impacts of wave and tidal energy devices on the surrounding 
marine environment. Ocean renewable energy technologies, except tidal energy, are still 
in development at Research & Development to pre-commercial stage. Data collection is 
on-going around single devices and small arrays of devices including SeaGen (Northern 
Ireland), Cape Sharp (Canada), Meygen (Scotland), Cobscook Bay Tidal Energy Project 
(United-States) as well as in the ocean testing facilities of the Fundy Ocean Research 
Centre for Energy (FORCE, Canada) and the European Marine Energy Centre (EMEC, 
Scotland).182  
Stressor-receptor interactions associated with wave and tidal energy converters are 
relatively similar to stressor-receptor interactions associated with OWFs. The main 
stressors include collision risks for diving seabirds, marine mammals and fish with 
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structures and mooring lines,183 attraction/repulsion of fish and invertebrates to 
structures and subsea cables, noise pollution as well as energy removal and changes in 
flow dynamics.184  Some general conclusions can be drawn from the existing knowledge 
base.  
4.2. Physical environment and benthos  
 
Wave and tidal energy devices are attached to the seabed either with gravity 
foundations, piled into the sea floor or by anchoring solutions.185  The placement of 
devices has the potential to create changes in the local ecosystem by altering the 
physical environment in which they are introduced.186  The physical environment 
includes the water column, seabed, water quality, hydrodynamics (flows) and sediment 
dynamics. Similar to OWFs, the introduction of devices into marine waters may cause 
near-field and far-field effects on hydrodynamics (tidal flow, wave height) and sediment 
transport.  
 
The vertical interaction of flows with operating devices will inevitably affect benthic 
communities in the immediate vicinity of each device by re-suspending sediment 
plumes and removing of infaunal communities.187 Near-field impacts will be 
characterised by alteration of benthic habitats and changes to benthic assemblages (from 
infauna to epifauna) within the construction footprint of devices and their cabling 
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routes.188 The placement of wave and tidal energy devices will first adversely affect 
benthic species at the localised scale of devices and then act as stepping stones 
attracting colonising species which will be different to infaunal assemblages occurring 
on surrounding substrates.189 
 
The interactions of wave energy converters and tidal turbines with water bodies are 
expected to come with different far-field effects.190 Wave energy converters extract 
energy from wave actions. The placement of multiple converters may alter the energy of 
wave propagation and as such, potentially affect shoreline erosion.191  Tidal energy 
converters capture energy from tidal currents, causing potential changes in flow 
dynamics and associated physical processes including sediment transport.  An important 
source of environmental impacts associated with tidal energy systems concern the far-
field effects of these technologies on benthic communities (infauna and epifauna), 
plants and other marine organisms that rely on flow dynamics for the transport of 
nutrients, dissolved gases, foods, and larval/juvenile and propagule dispersion.192  
Extraction of large amounts of energy from flow dynamics will result in a reduction in 
velocity which may cause a fragmentation of marine habitats and changes in sediment 
deposition.193  Copping et al., (2016) further stress that changes in hydrodynamics will 
also result in modification of the mixing and water column stratification processes that 
could in turn, affect primary production and marine food chains.194  
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Data collected at SeaGen indicate that there were no negative changes on benthic 
communities and show patterns of colonisation of the structure by blue mussels (Mytilus 
edulis).195 A more recent study indicates that the effects of the SeaGen turbine on the 
structure and integrity of the benthos were found to be locally restricted to 16m around 
the bottom of the turbine.196 Spatial patterns in epifaunal community structure and 
integrity were found to be significantly more variable in the immediate vicinity of the 
turbine, within the rotor diameter.197 These effects were not seen beyond this perimeter 
and therefore, these were not attributed to potential changes in hydrodynamics caused 
by the operating turbine.198 Additional findings from O’Carroll et al., (2017) show that 
if epifaunal communities at a single tidal energy device are negatively impacted, these 
effects are likely to be highly localised, within 20 m of the device.199 
 
In the absence of any sizeable arrays of turbines, potential effects of array-scale wave 
and tidal energy projects on physical processes, hydrodynamics and seabed topography 
are limited to numerical simulations.200 Speculations on cumulative effects of multiple 
arrays of tidal turbines on flow speeds and sediment dynamics foresee  potential effects 
at a distance of up to 10km.201 Findings from a recent hydrodynamic modelling study  
linking changes in natural velocity gradient in the Strangford Narrows (Northern 
Ireland) to variations in distribution of macro-benthic communities show that physical 
disturbances of sedimentary seabed resulting from the operation of multiple tidal energy 
turbines, would be unlikely to have a significant effect on benthic communities in high 
                                                          
195 Keenan G., Sparling C., Williams H., Fortune F., (2011) SeaGen Environmental Monitoring 
Programme: Final Report. Report by Royal Haskoning. 81pp. 
<https://tethys.pnnl.gov/publications/seagen-environmental-monitoring-programme-final-report> 
(accessed 10 December 2017), at 56-59 
196 O ’Carroll J.P.J., and others, (2017b) ‘Tidal Energy: The benthic effects of an operational tidal stream 
turbine’, Marine Environmental Research, 129, 277 
197 Ibid, 287 
198 Ibid, 286 
199 O’Carroll, Kennedy and Savidge (2017a), (n187), at 389, 397 
200 Copping and others, (n182), 98-103 
201 Miller R.G., and others, (2013) ‘Marine renewable energy development: assessing the Benthic 




tidal flow environments.202 Additional modelling efforts further suggest that the 
deployment of small arrays of wave energy devices (up to 10 devices) would have 
minimal near-field effects on the physical environment and minimal far-field effects on 
sediment transport.203 These findings are limited to modelling studies and, without any 
field measurement to validate these results, should be interpreted carefully.  As the 
number of devices increase, incremental effects on the physical environment are 
predicted.  Haverson et al., (2018) indicated that the proposed array of 9 tidal energy 
converters at St David’s Head (Wales) could act as a barrier to sediment transport, with 
potential adverse consequences for the benthic ecology of the region.204  
 
 
4.3. Seabirds  
 
Wave and tidal energy devices create particular collision risks for seabirds foraging in 
high energy environments due to the presence of submerged or semi-submerged device 
components.205  Unlike OWFs, the effects of wave and tidal energy devices are not only 
species-specific but also technology specific.206 Assessment of collision risks are 
currently derived from modelling studies based on the known abundance and 
distribution of seabird populations and the ecology of each species (more particularly 
their foraging ecology).207 Species that represent higher collision risks are those diving 
in tidal races or areas of high velocity and at depths where the turbine blades are moving 
underwater. Species at greater risk may include European shag (Phalacrocorax 
aristotelis), great cormorant (Phalacrocorax carbo), common guillemot (Uria aalge), 
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razorbill (Alca torda), black guillemot (Cepphus grille), Atlantic puffin (Fratercula 
arctica), red-throated diver (Gavia stellata), and northern gannet (Morus bassanus).208  
Wave and tidal energy devices may attract or deter foraging seabirds. For example, the 
attracting-effect has been shown at SeaGen where great cormorants significantly 
increased and moved from surrounding areas towards the turbine.209 These results have 
been attributed to the artificial reef or fish aggregation effect of the turbine, enhancing 
fish abundance and foraging opportunities.210  On the other hand, preliminary results of 
a statistical survey data analysis conducted at the EMEC test sites (Fall of Warness) 
indicate a change in density of auk species (i.e. black guillemot, common guillemot, 
Atlantic puffin, razorbill), cormorants and European shags, ducks and geese during the 
installations of test berths and devices.211 Birds generally recovered when devices 
became operational. Reduction in seabird density at EMEC test sites was attributed to 
vessel movements during installation activities rather than to the presence of 
infrastructures/ devices. Collision risks with seabirds are therefore dependent on species 
and site-specific foraging strategies, their underwater manoeuvrability, diving patterns 
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4.4. Marine mammals and fish species 
 
Unlike OWFs, the turbine blades and rotors of wave and tidal energy devices are 
underwater and may come with increased risks of physical injuries to marine mammals 
and demersal fish species from collision. The presence of ocean energy devices is 
thought to pose particular risks for animals in terms of colliding with rotating blades, 
underwater mooring lines or foundations of devices.213  
 
There is growing evidence showing attraction of marine mammals, and more 
particularly seals, to energetic tidal channels for feeding and travelling.214 The 
placement of a single operating turbine or array of turbines may create particular 
collision risks for seals that forage in fast-moving tidal current areas.215 A limited 
number of field studies have measured animal movement around single operational 
devices. Monitoring results at SeaGen have shown that seals and harbour porpoises tend 
to avoid the turbine hence collision risks are reduced.216 Field data collected through 
passive acoustic monitoring and telemetry at SeaGen provided indications of changes in 
the distribution of seals and harbour porpoises during construction and operation.217 
Data obtained from telemetry has nevertheless demonstrated that SeaGen did not result 
in a barrier effect as harbour seals were still transiting along each shoreline of the 
channel during operation.218  No changes in seal abundance were observed but tagged 
seals exhibited avoidance behaviour by transiting further away from the centre of the 
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Narrows.219 Seals continued to transit on both sides of the channel at a distance of 250m 
from the SeaGen turbine during the operational phase.220  
Harbour porpoises may have been temporarily displaced from the Narrows during the 
construction of SeaGen but there is evidence that porpoises generally returned to the 
Narrows after the installation period.221 Displacement of porpoises was attributed to 
natural variability222 and increased boat activity.223 Avoidance behaviour was noticeable 
regardless of whether the turbine was operating or not. A very recent study using 
passive acoustic monitoring around the Delta Stream tidal energy turbine in Ramsay 
Sound (Wales) also shows that harbour porpoises and dolphin would have the capacity 
to detect the sounds generated by the turbine and to manoeuvre around it.224 However, 
Malinka et al., stress that variation in site-specific behaviours and distribution patterns 
of animals means that the findings of this study are not transferrable to other tidal 
energy sites.225 
 
Patterns of avoidance behaviours around wave energy converters, reported as a 
reduction of animal density, were observed by the EMEC Data Analysis Project around 
installed wave energy devices at EMEC test sites.  Changes in marine mammal density 
(grey seals and harbour seals) were reported to occur during the installation of device-
related infrastructures (test berths, anchoring and moorings systems) with a return to 
baseline conditions during installation and operation of devices.226   
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Entanglement with mooring lines of ocean energy devices also represents an additional 
hazard for marine megafauna. Benjamin et al., (2014) propose a qualitative risk 
assessment approach to assess relative risk on marine megafauna on the basis of their 
biological characteristics and mooring features.227 The results show that ocean energy 
moorings are unlikely to pose major threats to large marine vertebrates due to their size 
and mass.228 Some mooring systems present higher risks (e.g. catenary moorings) and 
some species, in particular Baleen whales, would be at greatest risk due to their size and 
foraging habits.229 
 
Additionally, the installation and operation of wave and tidal energy devices may affect 
marine mammals and fish species if they result in increased noise disturbance, 
underwater vibration and electromagnetic fields. The range effects of anthropogenic 
noise from operational devices may include behavioural changes and physical injuries.  
These effects may involve hearing loss, auditory injuries, tissue damage, masking of 
communication, reduction of prey detection and behavioural responses to discomfort.230  
Noise generated by ocean energy devices will vary depending on the type of devices 
(e.g. oscillating water column, vertical or horizontal axis devices) and the stage of 
deployment (installation versus operation).231 Whilst the installations of many tidal 
energy devices do not require pile-driving activities, Fox et al., (2018) argue that other 
techniques involving drilling of anchors and armouring of cables using concrete mats 
and rock-dumping are also potentially noisy activities.232 When pile-driving activities 
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are required to install wave energy devices, these involve smaller-diameter piles than 
those used for monopiles. Piling operations at wave energy sites are therefore expected 
to produce less significant noise levels on marine mammals than piling of offshore wind 
turbines.233  To date, underwater noise from single devices has been measured and it is 
suggested that sound levels generated during installation and operation of single wave 
and tidal devices are generally below the threshold of harassment of marine 
mammals.234 No data collected to date suggests that noise generated by multiple 
operational devices will exceed the sound threshold necessary to cause auditory injuries 
or tissue damage in marine animals.235 Some field studies similarly suggest that noise 
levels from construction and operation of wave and tidal energy devices are unlikely to 
cause changes in behavioural patterns of marine mammals.236 Although temporary 
displacements of harbour porpoises were observed during the construction of SeaGen, 
no significant displacements of seals and harbour porpoises were detected during the 
operational phase, although marine mammals were seen to avoid the centre of the 
channel during turbine operation.237  Given this paucity of conclusive empirical data, 
insights into the interactions of marine mammals with multiple units primarily result 
from modelling studies using information gained from single devices.  
 
With regards to the interaction of fish with wave/tidal energy devices, monitoring 
efforts on fish density and distribution around the Cape Sharp Tidal energy device 
during the pre-deployment and post-deployment phase have shown that, despite high 
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seasonal variability, there is no significant effect of the turbine on fish densities.238   The 
findings of this study are preliminary. Due to important differences in the vertical 
distribution of fish between the reference area and the lease area, no conclusions could 
be drawn regarding the potential effects of the turbine on fish distribution in the water 
column.239 Additional studies indicate high avoidance rates and thus, reduced collision 
risks with horizontal-axis turbines during the day and when fish are gathered in 
schools.240   More recent findings at Cobscook Bay tidal energy turbine show that a 
single tidal energy device presents minimal risks to pelagic fish in that fish begin to 
avoid the turbine from 140m when the turbine was spinning.241 Uncertainty exists due to 
limited data available to determine the distance at which fish detect noise generated by 
devices or the noise levels that would trigger a change in fish behaviour. Viehman 
emphasises that the physical interaction of fish with a device will vary depending on 
fish size, species and life stages of fish present in the location.242 Avoidance will also be 
determined by sensing systems of fish and their capacity to detect the devices. It is 
therefore still unclear how the monitoring results collected for single devices or small 
arrays of devices could be transferred to inform about the impacts of commercial arrays 
of wave and tidal energy devices. As the number of devices increase, the ecological 
risks to fish are likely to be incremental. 
The effects of EMF from export cables around wave and tidal energy devices are 
expected to be similar to those associated with offshore wind farms. As stated above, 
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EMFs from export cables and inter-array cables are within the known detectable range 
of a number of taxa (i.e. elasmobranches, bony fish, crustaceans and cetaceans).243 
Sensitivity to EMF has been reported for a number of species of taxonomic groups 
(section 2.3). Empirical observations to date have not demonstrated any negative impact 
from EMF related to wave and tidal energy devices on sensitive species.244 Apart from 
the European Commission-funded MaRVEN project,245 the evidence base for EMF 
effects associated with wave, tidal and offshore wind energy turbines/cables are limited 
to laboratory experiments.246  Very few in situ monitoring studies of the effects of EMF 
around OWFs and ocean energy devices have been carried out.247  Behaviour responses 
may potentially attract or deter fish and invertebrates.248 EMF may also affect 
navigation and the ability of animals to navigate, detect prey, meet their mates and 
avoid predators.249 Behavioural responses including changes in navigation and 
orientation (e.g. temporary alteration of swimming direction) have been reported for 
some species (i.e. eels, sturgeon, sharks and salmonids).250 Responses were however 
variable within the same species, which means that no extrapolation of these results is 
currently possible to predict the significance of effects from multiple cables with higher 
power around multiple devices.251  Recent studies indicate that EMF emitted around 
single devices would be of low intensity, close to background levels and only 
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perceptible within a few metres of the source.252  As a result, the State of the Science 
Report considers that the interaction between EMF and marine animals is of low risk for 
small scale wave and tidal arrays.253 However, the level of risk will increase ‘as the 
industry develops’ with ‘longer-term projects, increasing and prolonging the potential 
EMF exposure’ to marine animals.254 
 
5 - Conclusion 
 
Knowledge of the ecological footprints of OWFs has been steadily increasing as a result 
of ongoing research within the scientific and industrial community. Important 
knowledge has been gained regarding the pathway of impacts on marine mammals, 
seabirds, fish and benthos. The main sources of pressures associated with OWF 
typically include direct physical injuries and mortality from collisions, hearing damage 
and behaviour disturbance due to pile-driving noise and changes in local biodiversity as 
a result of the introduction of hard substrates. The nature and magnitude of these 
impacts, however, vary significantly on the basis of several factors related to the 
physical characteristics of the receiving environment, the number and spatial 
arrangement of turbines, scale of development and local abundance and density of 
affected habitats and species.255 Monitoring results from one development site are not 
necessarily transferable to other wind farms located in different physical 
environments.256 Data collected at a particular location may also only reflect specific 
species’ behavioural patterns and functional use of this specific location.   All these 
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variables require a case by case evaluation of development proposals to determine the 
scope and intensity of pre- and post-deployment monitoring.257 
Negative acoustic impacts connected to pile-driving operations appear to be the main 
source of concerns for marine mammals. Scientific literature has consistently stressed 
that the impacts of underwater noise on marine mammals (pinnipeds and cetaceans) and 
fish species are more severe during the construction phase. A large body of scientific 
evidence indicates that high pulse sounds from pile-driving may induce adverse 
physiological effects such as temporary threshold shift or hearing loss and trigger 
changes in behavioural patterns of marine animals.258  On the other hand, operational 
OWFs could have both positive and minor negative impacts on marine animals. Data 
from environmental monitoring demonstrate that low-level noise and vibration emitted 
by operating turbines would be unlikely to lead to hearing injury to cetaceans or seals or 
trigger behavioural changes.259  Indirect impacts are more complex and may range from 
a loss of functional habitats and increased energy expenditure prompted by 
displacement behaviour of mobile species to avoidance of development areas. Whilst 
the construction phase is of greatest concern for marine mammals, risks posed to 
seabirds are particularly high during the operational phase of OWFs.260 The following 
adverse effects have been identified in the scientific literature: 1) barriers to movement 
and migratory patterns, 2) loss of feeding habitat and 3) mortalities from collision 
risks.261  These impacts were however highly site-specific, species-specific, seasonally-
specific and dependent on a number of external variables including the geographical 
location of the development with regards to nesting/breeding colonies.262   
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Positive impacts on of fish and invertebrates have been attributed to potential 
enhancement of habitat complexities permitted by the artificial-reef effect of turbines 
foundations and scour protections. Negative impacts primarily stem from direct 
mortality as a result of pulsed noise during pile-driving activities and replacement of 
infaunal communities by epifauna during the construction and operational phases. Taxa 
sensitive to electromagnetic fields have been identified. Research assessing species-
specific responses to EMF is underway. The first evidence of changes in hydrodynamics 
and sediments has been provided by Vanhellemont and Ruddick263 through aerial 
surveys and satellite imagery. In-water turbid wake effects associated with offshore 
wind turbines is characterised by increased local sedimentation and far-field changes in 
sediments deposition. Despite this preliminary evidence, understanding the potential 
ecological effects of this phenomenon on seabed topography, benthic assemblages and 
wider ecosystems remain largely speculative. 
 
With respect to ocean energy devices, early demonstration projects including SeaGen, 
the Maine Tidal Energy project and the Cape Sharp tidal energy project provide relevant 
data that contributes to understanding most ecological interactions associated with wave 
ad tidal energy technologies. Findings from monitoring at single devices to date indicate 
that there is no evidence of adverse interactions of marine animals with operating 
turbines. As discussed above, in the absence of sizeable arrays, most of the evidence 
base is currently derived from monitoring around single devices.264  The nascent 
technologies, in particular wave energy, lack a common technological design, which 
means that it is not possible at this stage to predict their ecological effects with 
sufficient confidence. In the absence of an established common design, the impacts of 
wave and tidal energy devices will vary according to the technology deployed. 
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Monitoring efforts for OWFs and ocean energy projects are primarily focused on 
individual ecological receptors. Population-level impacts and cumulative ecosystem 
impacts are largely unknown. Significant scientific uncertainty needs to be addressed 
with respect to the population consequences of noise disturbance, electro-magnetic 
fields and barrier effects associated with multiple OWFs and arrays of ocean energy 
devices.  Assessing the species population consequences of ORE developments is 
however absolutely critical to predict and quantify risks to the conservation status of 
protected features in N2000 sites. Chapter III will complement this study by identifying 
the main areas of scientific uncertainty that are currently hampering environmental 
assessments for offshore renewables. This examination will consider whether best 
scientific knowledge and methodologies are available to project developers to predict 
and measures the impacts of ORE deployments. This analysis will inform subsequent 
developments challenging the judicial interpretation of the assessment requirements 












CHAPTER III  
 
EXPLORING SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY   
 
DOES BEST SCIENTIFIC KNOWKEDGE EXIST IN THE 
OFFSHORE RENEWABLE ENERGY SECTOR? 
 
 1- Introduction  
 
‘Contemporary science cannot deliver certainty as at the end of the day, it throws up 
more questions than it solves. To some extent, the more that is learnt in science, the 
more the limits to knowledge are understood. In the end the only certainty is 
uncertainty’.1 
De Sadeleer’s statement captures the theme of this Chapter. Whilst the focus of Chapter 
II was a comprehensive review of the state of scientific knowledge of the ecological 
impacts associated with offshore wind, wave and tidal energy developments, Chapter III 
examines the nature of scientific uncertainty currently pervading environmental impact 
assessments for ORE deployments.2 This evaluation aims to answer a very simple 
question: does best scientific knowledge exist regarding the ecological impacts of ORE 
technologies in the marine environment?  It is essential that lawyers and regulatory 
decision-makers clearly understand the challenges associated with gaining scientific 
data and knowledge in the marine environment. Poor understanding of science often 
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leads, as the author will demonstrate in Chapter IV, to unrealistic expectations for 
certainty in licensing processes and adjudicative processes. Surprisingly, this topic has 
received scant attention in legal literature. This examination intervenes in the context of 
the jurisprudence of the EU judiciary under the assessment requirements of Habitats 
Directive. Applying the precautionary principle, the CJEU has consistently found that, 
in order to be lawfully conducted, an appropriate assessment (hereafter: AA) must 
identify, beforehand and in the light of the ‘best scientific knowledge in the field’, the 
likely significant effects of projects on N2000 sites.3  Existing scientific knowledge of 
dynamic marine ecological system is often extremely limited and this necessarily 
requires the application of the precautionary principle.  A full legal discussion on the 
particular interpretation of the precautionary principle by the Court will be the core 
topic of Chapter IV. This Chapter intends to provide the scientific background that is 
necessary to determine whether ‘best scientific knowledge’ exists to predict and 
measure the impacts of ORE projects on the receiving marine environment. 
Scientific uncertainty is a ‘constant feature of environmental law’.4 Notwithstanding 
this, this author will provide clear evidence suggesting that scientists and lawyers often 
approach scientific uncertainty in radically different ways. Whilst scientists tend to 
approach uncertainty ‘as an opportunity to do research’, lawyers perceive uncertainty 
‘as a barrier to enforceability and action’.5 There is, therefore, a need to establish a 
common understanding. It is precisely the need to tackle uncertainty in the natural 
world that has fostered the raise of precaution in environmental law. ‘Understanding 
scientific uncertainty is [therefore] crucial to the operation of the precautionary 
                                                          
3 Case C-127/02 Waddenzee [2004] ECR I-07405, para.54; Case C-304/05 Commission v Italy [2007] 
ECR I-7519, para. 69; Case C-404/09 Commission v Spain [2011] ECR I-11853, para. 99 
4 Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange, Eloise Scotford, (eds). Environmental Law: Test, Cases, and Materials 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), 45  
5 Olivia O. Green and others, ‘Barriers and bridges to the integration of socio-ecological resilience and 




principle’.6 Schomberg notes in this respect that in order to properly apply the 
precautionary principle, ‘a clarification is needed as to what is precisely understood by 
scientific uncertainty and what types of uncertainties are relevant for the invocation of 
the principle’.7  It may be misleading to address the application of the precautionary 
principle to the ORE sector without first discussing the notion of ‘uncertainty’. 
Scientific uncertainty ‘is nothing special’.8 Even more so, ‘uncertainty is a fact of life’.9 
Scientific uncertainty is ‘inherent to [all] ecological risks’.10 It results from the 
assumption that ‘scientific predictability comes up against staggering limits in the field 
of the environment’.11  As far as the natural world is concerned, ‘there is a strong deficit 
in predictive capability’.12 De Sadeleer observes that ‘the distance in time and space 
between sources and damages, the cumulative and synergistic effects, the unpredictable 
reactions of [marine] ecosystems and the large scale of impacts compound the 
methodological difficulties in assessing these risks’.13  Scientific uncertainty has 
however a greater impact on decision-making in the marine environment. Marine 
ecosystems are subject to a wide range of chaotic fluctuations that are not adequately 
modelled nor even understood by the scientific community.14 While the status of 
terrestrial plants and animals is relatively well documented, much less is known about 
                                                          
6 Patrick Jiang, ‘A Uniform Precautionary Principle Under EU Law’ (2014) 2(2) PKU Transnational Law 
Review, 490, 506 
7 Rene Von Schomberg, ‘The precautionary principle and its normative challenges’ in Fisher E, Jones J, 
Von Schomberg R, (eds.), Implementing the Precautionary Principle Perspectives and Prospects 
(Edward Elgar, 2006), 28 
8 Maria Lee, (ed.) EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making (vol. 43., Modern Studies 
in European Law, 2014), 38 
9 Warren Walker and others, ‘Defining uncertainty: A conceptual basis for uncertainty management in 
model-based decision support’ (2003) 4 Integrated Assessment, 6 
10 Nicolas Sadeleer, ‘The Precautionary Principle in EC Health and Environmental Law’ (2006) 12(2) 
European Law Journal, 139, 144 
11 De Sadeleer, (n1), 17 






non-terrestrial systems.15 Impact assessments in the marine environment are commonly 
regarded as ‘the most challenging of all’.16 
From there, scientific uncertainty is not just ‘a problem at the margins, but one that 
seriously limits the utility of the environmental impact assessments’.17 ‘Failure to 
acknowledge and treat uncertainty can lead to poor decisions’ and hence to poor 
conservation outcomes.18 It is therefore highly necessary to understand, identify and 
categorise the different sources of scientific uncertainty associated with ORE 
developments to better deal with them in regulatory licensing processes.19 To address 
this issue, Chapter III qualitatively categorises the major sources of uncertainty in 
environmental assessment procedures20 for offshore renewables. It does so by analysing 
judicial understanding of ‘scientific uncertainty’ in European Courts case law related to 
the precautionary principle (section 2). The legal substance of the precautionary 
principle and its concrete application to ORE permitting will be further discussed in 
Chapter IV.  Section 2 below will only refer to the precautionary principle for the 
purposive of defining the notion of scientific uncertainty.  Section 3 reviews the 
typologies of scientific uncertainty in the scientific discourse in order to demonstrate 
why particular ecological risks associated with ORE developments are inherently 
uncertain. This investigation involves engaging with the environmental assessment 
reports of seven offshore wind farms (hereafter OWF). The author accessed the Natura 
                                                          
15 Rosie Cooney, ‘A long and winding road? Precaution from principle to practice in biodiversity 
conservation’ in Fisher E., Jones J., Von Schomberg R. (eds.), Implementing the Precautionary Principle 
Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar, 2006), 224 
16 Adam Smith, ‘Impact Assessment in the marine environment – the most challenging of all’ (IAIA08 
Conference proceedings, 28th Annual Conference of the International Association for Impact 
Assessment, Perth, 4-10 May 2008), 1 
17  Fisher, Lange and Scotford, (n4), 851 
18 Helen M. Regan, and others, ‘Robust decision-making under severe uncertainty for conservation 
management’ (2005) 15(4) Ecological Applications, 1471; Milner-Gulland E.J., Shea K., ‘Embracing 
uncertainty in applied ecology’ (2017) 54 Journal of Applied Ecology, 2063 
19 Elizabeth A. Masden, and others, ‘Renewable energy developments in an uncertain world: The case of 
offshore wind and birds in the UK’ (2015) 51 Marine Policy, 169 
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Impact Statements (NIS) and Environmental Statements (ES) for the most recent or 
largest OWF deployed in Europe including Horn Sea I and II, Inch Cape OWF, Neart 
Na Gaoithe OWF, Thanet OWF, London Array and Triton Knoll OWFs (United-
Kingdom). The preliminary environmental report for Horn Sea Project III was also 
considered.  This strategic choice is justified by the fact that the NISs and EISs 
elaborated for these developments were the most informative reports with respect to the 
nature and extent of monitoring difficulties and uncertainties encountered by ORE 
developers. In these reports, the main sources of uncertainty were also qualitatively 
described for the main sensitive receptors namely, fish and benthic ecology, marine 
mammals, physical environments and sea birds.  The same process has been repeated 
for ocean renewable energy demonstration projects. The author extensively relied on the 
findings of the Annex IV State of the Science Report,21 which as explained in Chapter 
II, is the most consolidated scientific contribution reviewing the ecological footprints of 
wave and tidal energy technologies.  
Additionally, special attention is paid to the technical limitations of contemporary 
monitoring methodologies to consider whether or not best scientific knowledge can be 
reasonably expected from developers to inform an AA under the Habitats Directive. 
With a focus on offshore renewable energy, but without attempting to provide a 
comprehensive review of monitoring techniques, the purpose of this review is to reveal 
the strengths and weaknesses of the most commonly utilised monitoring techniques in 
the sector. An exhaustive review evaluating all monitoring systems could be the topic of 
an entire book. This study provides an overview of monitoring methods for site 
characterisation and post-consent monitoring.  On the basis of these findings, Chapter 
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IV will then constructively critique the evidentiary standard prescribed by the CJEU 
case law under the AA process of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. 
 
2- Defining scientific uncertainty in environmental impact assessments 
 
Uncertainty is ‘a non-intuitive term’ that can be interpreted differently depending on the 
context where it is applied.22  A large range of definitions has been advanced in legal 
and scientific literature. In general terms, uncertainty is a situation of incomplete 
information about a particular event and its characteristics.23  Walker et al., proposes a 
general definition of uncertainty as being ‘any departure from the unachievable ideal of 
complete determinism’.24 Butti further refers to uncertainty as a ‘state of having a doubt, 
not being confident about the reliability, accuracy and relevance of the information’.25  
Scientific uncertainty ‘does not pertain simply to a data gap but to a whole series of 
methodological, epistemological and ontological problems in scientific practice which 
means that science cannot provide the total truth’.26 De Sadeleer argues that a large 
taxonomy of uncertainty exists ranging from lack of full evidence, lack of 
understanding of causal mechanisms, incorrect assumptions, inconclusiveness, 
indeterminacy and ambiguity of data all the way to complete ignorance,27 which is the 
most extreme form of uncertainty.28    
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2.1. Scientific uncertainty in EU Courts 
 
Scientific uncertainty in EU environmental law is commonly defined by reference to the 
precautionary principle. Scientific uncertainty is described as ‘the linchpin around 
which the principle is organised’.29 It is precisely the existence of scientific uncertainty 
as to the existence and severity of a potential harm that triggers the application of the 
precautionary principle.30 Since National Farmers’ Union, it is settled case law that 
where there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks, the Institutions may take 
protective measures without having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those 
risks become fully apparent.31 Pursuant to the EC Communication on the precautionary 
principle,  the principle  is relevant in the event of a potential risk, even if this risk 
cannot be fully demonstrated or quantified or its effects determined because of the 
insufficiency or inclusive nature of the scientific data.32 The EC further outlines that the 
scope of the principle covers circumstances ‘where scientific evidence is insufficient, 
inconclusive or uncertain and there are indications through preliminary objective 
scientific evaluation that there are reasonable grounds for concern that the potentially 
dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal, plant health may be inconsistent 
with the chosen level of protection’.33 This definition implies that the application of the 
precautionary principle is justified in the event of a potential risk where the results of a 
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preliminary scientific evaluation ‘do not yield conclusive results’34 about the gravity or 
probability of occurrence of a risk in question because of the insufficiency of the data, 
their inconclusive or imprecise nature.35  As such, the precautionary principle must be 
distinguished from the principle of prevention whose application is warranted where the 
nature and scale of an impact are known or at least, can be predicted.36  
The Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (hereafter CFI) of the CJEU have 
shed some light on the judicial understanding of scientific uncertainty. Janssen and 
Rosenstock observe that the EU Courts equate uncertainty with risk in the context of the 
precautionary principle.37 In Waddenzee for example, uncertainty is attributed to the 
existence of a risk that cannot be excluded on the basis of objective information.38 
‘Scientific uncertainty’ and ‘risk’ closely intermingle in the context of the precautionary 
principle.39  It is indeed, the existence of scientific uncertainty that creates the risk. Renn 
elegantly writes in this respect that ‘within the frame of precaution, risk is seen from the 
perspective of pervasive uncertainty, ambiguity and, in particular, ignorance’.40  The 
essential distinction between  ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ lies in the fact that the former is, in 
some cases, ‘a quantity susceptible of measurement’ while the later, ‘uncertainty’, refers 
to cases of a ‘non-quantitative type’.41  In the Pfizer case, the CFI found that a ‘risk’ 
constitutes a ‘function of the probability’ that the interest safeguarded will be adversely 
affected as a result of exposure to the hazard.42 In this respect, the purpose of a risk 
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35 European Commission, (n32), at 13-14 
36 Fisher, (n26), 318; Stokes, (n30), 496 
37 Anne-May Janssen, Nele F. Rosenstock, ‘Handling Uncertain Risks: An Inconsistent Application of 
Standards? The Precautionary Principle in Court Revisited’ (2016) 7(1) European Journal of Risk 
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assessment ‘is to assess the degree of probability [of an undertaking] of having an 
adverse effect and the seriousness of such adverse effect’.43  Such a probability that an 
adverse effect will materialise is informed by the quality of scientific evidence 
supporting the evaluation of the risk. As such, ‘risk’ or ‘measurable uncertainty’ should 
be understood as ‘a ‘mathematically calculable’ value44  reflecting the likelihood of 
exposure to a particular event (probability of harm) and the gravity of the expected 
consequences (severity of harm) should this event materialise.45 ‘Uncertainty’ seems to 
defy all mathematical quantification and denotes the impossibility of making exact 
predictions.46  It arises from the insufficiency of the scientific basis, ‘whether empirical 
or theoretical’, to characterise a hazard in terms of probabilities and causal 
relationships.47  Acknowledging this dichotomy, De Sadeleer, Janssen and Van Asselt 
contend that the application of the precautionary principle is related to 'uncertain risk',48  
namely, to situations where despite serious reasons to believe that there may be danger, 
the scientific evidence is ‘neither sufficient to substantiate that danger nor to refute 
suspicions of that danger arising’.49  As such, the ‘raison d’être’ behind the 
precautionary principle is to address ‘uncertain risks which are not fully calculable and 
controllable’ because ‘the probability of occurrence or the effect in terms of damage 
cannot be estimated, although there are suspicions of danger’.50  If the risk may be 
‘uncertain’, it is settled case law that the precautionary principle can only be invoked if 
the available evidence shows that the seriousness of the risk is real and not 
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hypothetical.51  The seriousness of the risk must be scientifically confirmed by means of 
a preliminary comprehensive assessment ‘based on the most reliable scientific data’.52 
In this vein, judicial understanding of the degree of evidence or uncertainty triggering 
the application of precautionary actions has been inconsistent.53  The CJEU subordinates 
the application of the precautionary principle to the existence of a risk54 that cannot be 
determined with absolute certainty because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or 
imprecision of scientific evidence.55  In a number of decisions the CJEU has 
consistently held that: 
‘Where it proves to be impossible to determine with certainty the existence and 
extent of the alleged risk because of the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or 
imprecision of the results of the study conducted, but the likelihood of real harm to 
human or animal health or to the environment persists should the risk materialise, 
the precautionary principle justifies the adoption of restrictive measures’.56 
Similarly, in Pfizer,57 the CFI, although in slightly different terms, also ruled that: 
‘In a situation in which the precautionary principle is applied, which by 
definition coincides with a situation in which there is scientific uncertainty, a 
risk assessment cannot be required to provide the Community institutions with 
conclusive scientific evidence of the reality of the risk and the seriousness of the 
potential adverse effects were that risk to become a reality’.58 ‘Unless the 
precautionary principle is to be rendered nugatory, the fact that it is impossible 
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to carry out a full scientific risk assessment does not prevent the competent 
public authority from taking preventive measures’.59 
In light of this cited case law, ‘scientific uncertainty’ would pertain to the quality of 
scientific evidence and the associated capability of a risk assessment to characterise a 
risk. Scientific uncertainty is established whenever, due to insufficient, inconclusive or 
imprecise scientific evidence, a risk assessment cannot characterise ‘the frequentist 
probability’60 (i.e. likelihood of occurrence) of a particular event and the expected 
gravity of harm should this event materialises. The impossibility to provide exact 
predictions makes the risk uncertain, and this in turn justifies precautionary actions 
where there is a high incertitude about the ‘probabilities, outcomes or both, and a high 
vulnerability of the [interest] at risk’.61  
Whilst the qualitative criteria of ‘insufficiency’, ‘inconclusiveness’ and ‘imprecision’ 
seem to appear with some degree of clarity in the CJEU case law, no indication has been 
given by the EU judiciary on how these qualitative criteria must be interpreted by 
competent institutions.62 Stokes notes that the EU jurisprudence is characterised by 
significant discrepancies regarding the evidentiary thresholds triggering the application 
of the precautionary principle.63 Citing Sandin, Stokes argues that the definitional deficit 
of the precautionary principle ‘extends to determining the nature and level of evidence 
or “nature of suspicion” triggering the application of precautionary actions’.64  Some 
American scholars went so far as to conclude that the precautionary principle ‘is too 
vague to serve a regulatory standard’ because it does not specify when it should be 
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apply and how much caution should be taken.65  Against this backdrop, Garnett and 
Parson found that the level of evidence or degree of uncertainty that has been required 
by Courts to apply the principle vary depending on the interest at stake.66 These authors 
reviewed a number of cases indicating ‘a trend toward requiring less evidence of harm’ 
where there was a risk to human health.67 This is exemplified, quite clearly, in a number 
of judgements, including in Solvay Pharmaceuticals,68 Gowan,69 BSE (Bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy)70 and Pfizer71 where the application of the precautionary 
principle was upheld even in the absence or very low levels of conclusive evidence 
corroborating the reality of the risk. The Court found that EU Institutions were entitled 
to take stringent precautionary actions in the form of withdrawals, restrictions of a 
substance and a ban on bovine products, even in the absence of quantitative evidence, 
where there was a ‘proper scientific basis for a possible risk’ of development of 
resistance to antibiotic in human,72 or if there was a ‘probable link’ between the disease 
affecting animals and disease affecting humans.73 In Gowan, the Court upheld the 
restriction on the use of fenarimol on the grounds that ‘there were still certain concerns 
regarding the intrinsic toxic effects of fenarimol’74 and that ‘such concerns cannot be 
considered to be based on purely hypothetical considerations’.75 In Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals, the Court found that the competent EU Institutions did not commit a 
manifest error of assessment when deciding upon the withdrawal of authorisation for 
the Nifursol substance on the grounds that there were ‘reasonable doubts’ as to the 
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safety of this substance for public health.76  In this case, the Court argued that the 
precautionary principle is designed to prevent ‘potential risks’.77  With regard to 
environmental cases taken under the Habitats Directive, the CJEU has construed the 
precautionary principle in such a way the principle applies where it cannot be excluded, 
on the basis of ‘objective information’  and beyond all ‘reasonable scientific doubt’, that 
a development will not have an adverse effect on the integrity of N2000 sites.78 
A ‘thorough canvas’ of evidentiary thresholds justifying the application of the 
precautionary principle goes beyond the scope of this study. Science serves the purpose 
of guiding decision-makers when deciding on ‘when to act’ to avert a particular risk.79  
The level of uncertainty that is necessary before precautionary actions can be applied is 
a factual examination of the problem at hand. As a result, any attempt to identify a 
general ‘threshold test’ for precaution has been regarded as ‘highly artificial’.80 Fisher 
stresses that the precautionary principle is a process that obliges decision makers to 
scrutinise the science presented to them.81 The principle does not dictate any particular 
decision-making outcome.82  Stokes even perceives in the practice of the Courts (CJEU 
and CFI), a fervent acknowledgement of uncertainty and a deliberate tactic to ‘liberalise 
the threshold of precaution’ (broadening the meaning of uncertainty) in order to extend 
its scope of application.83  While the lack of a consistent judicial threshold for 
precaution may render the precautionary principle, or at least its application, more 
                                                          
76  Solvay Pharmaceuticals, (n68), paras.129 and 146-147 
77  Ibid, para.129 
78  Case C-127/02 Waddenzee [2004] ECR I-07405, paras.57, 59, 61 
79 Joel Tickner, David Kriebel, ‘The Role of Science and Precaution in Environmental and Public Health 
Policy’ in Fisher E., Jones J., Schomberg R., (eds.) Implementing the Precautionary Principle: 
Perspectives and Prospects (Edward Elgar, 2006), 47 
80 Fisher, ‘Is the Precautionary Principle Justiciable?’, (n26), at 318 
81 Ibid, 319 
82 Ibid 
83 Elen R. Stokes, ‘Liberalising the Threshold of Precaution – Cockle Fishing, the Habitats Directive, and 
Evidence of a New Understanding of “Scientific Uncertainty”’ (2005) 7(3) Environmental Law Review,  




‘ambivalent and malleable’,84 what is clear, is that discrepancies between evidentiary 
thresholds triggering its application have precluded the establishment of a clear judicial 
understanding of what ‘scientific uncertainty’ means in EU law. 
A more plausible explanation for the absence of clarification as to what constitute 
‘insufficient’, ‘inconclusive’ or ‘imprecise’ scientific evidence may be directly 
attributed to the standard of judicial review applied by the CJEU. In cases involving 
complex scientific risk assessments, the Court tend to circumscribe the scope of their 
review to verifying whether the exercise of powers by EU Institutions has not been 
vitiated by a manifest error of appraisal,  a misuse of power or whether the legislature 
has manifestly exceeded the limits of its discretion.85 Both the CFI and CJEU made it 
clear that, in the face of assessments involving highly complex scientific and technical 
facts, institutions have broad discretion in determining the evidential threshold to apply 
precaution and the nature and scope of precautionary measures.86 From there, the CJEU 
has refrained from extending their review to test the adequacy and quality of the 
scientific evidence presented to them.   
Notwithstanding the lack of clear judicial understanding for scientific uncertainty, De 
Sadeleer offers some insight regarding the meaning of the criteria of ‘insufficiency’, 
‘inconclusiveness’ and ‘imprecision’ as elaborated by the CJEU. De Sadeleer argues that 
‘insufficiency’ of scientific evidence ‘may occur when the various scientific disciplines 
involved in assessing the risk are not sufficiently developed to explain the cause-and-
effect relationship; Inconclusiveness: the realities of science dictate that the scientist 
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will never be able to sort out the relative influences of each factors; there may be too 
many unpredictable variables to enable the identification of the relative influence of 
each factor. Imprecision could be caused by the fact that the data to analyse the risks are 
not available or are out-of-date, information gaps, measurement errors, contradictions, 
ambiguity’.87   
Whilst the criterion of insufficiency would be established, for example, in the case of a 
lack of data, inconclusiveness and imprecision may occur where a lot of data or 
information is available but does not necessarily decrease or eliminate uncertainty about 
the nature, occurrence and severity of a risk.88  Van Asselt and Vos outline that: ‘many of 
the uncertainties that are relevant in the context of the precautionary principle cannot be 
reduced, let alone be exorcised’.89 This is because ‘knowledge and uncertainty are not 
[necessarily] communicating vessels: uncertainty can still prevail in situation where a 
lot of information is available’.90 Ascough et al., note that new knowledge ‘may reveal 
that our understanding is more limited or that the processes are more complex than 
previously thought’.91 This situation is better known as ‘data-rich-information-poor’,92 a 
situation where despite large amount of data, monitoring results do not provide 
meaningful information. Section 5 below will show that this undesirable ‘syndrome’ is 
common to all monitoring programmes carried out around ORE deployments in the 
marine environment. 
It is worth noting that scientific uncertainty may also encompass contrasting scientific 
opinions.93 In Pfizer, the CIF had to rule on the validity of the Council Regulation 
2821/98 banning the use of antibiotics in animal foodstuffs including the virginiamycin.  
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For the sake of clarity, this case was characterised by divergent scientific opinions 
opposing the Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition (SCAN) and a number of 
national expert bodies on whether the use of virginiamycin as a growth promoter in 
animals’ foodstuffs constituted a risk to public health by contributing to the 
development of antibiotic resistance in humans. Although the CFI made it clear that ‘it 
is not for the Court to assess the merits of either of the scientific points argued before 
it’,94 it expressly referred to the existence of contrasting scientific views to uphold a 
precautionary ban.95 Commenting on the Pfizer judgement, Forrester and Hanekamp 
conclude that a condition of scientific uncertainty would therefore, also be satisfied in 
the face of divergent scientific opinions, irrespective of the merits of the scientific 
arguments.96 This is consistent with the EC communication on the precautionary 
principle which explicitly states that scientific uncertainty may also arise from a 
controversy on existing data.97 Although this interpretation has never been clearly 
acknowledged by the Court of Justice, Janssen and Van Asselt stress that a similar 
construction of ‘scientific uncertainty’ has also been upheld by the CFI in the Alpharma 
cases.98  
In a nutshell, while the degree of uncertainty triggering the application of the 
precautionary principle ‘is still open to debate’,99 some substantive criteria have been 
developed in the EU jurisprudence.  First of all, a distinction must be drawn between the 
notion of ‘scientific uncertainty’ per se and the degree of uncertainty triggering the 
application of the precautionary principle. The degree of uncertainty justifying the 
adoption of precautionary actions has been primarily informed on a case-by-case 
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consideration of the interest at stake by EU Courts. As the case law currently stands, a 
quantitative definition of scientific uncertainty in the context of the precautionary 
principle does not exist. However, this short discussion has highlighted that a consistent 
‘qualitative’ approach to the definition of scientific uncertainty may have emerged from 
the CJEU case law. Even though the three judicial criteria of insufficiency, 
inconclusiveness and imprecision may raise more questions than they solve, one may 
reasonably conclude that ‘scientific uncertainty’ relates to the quality of scientific data 
gathered in the scientific evaluation of the risk.  Scientific uncertainty arises from 
situations where due to ‘the insufficiency, inconclusiveness or imprecision’ of the 
results of a scientific evaluation,100 or dissenting scientific opinions, it is not possible to 
characterise, with absolute certainty, the probability of occurrence, causal relationships 
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2.2. Scientific uncertainty in the scientific discourse 
 
A number of typologies for scientific uncertainty that may help understand the 
substance of the judicial criteria of ‘insufficiency’, ‘inconclusiveness’ and ‘imprecision’ 
have been developed in applied ecology.101 As observed by Cooney, ‘uncertainty 
surrounds virtually every aspect of actual and threatened loss of biodiversity’.102 While 
some uncertainties are reducible through measurement and data collection, other forms 
of uncertainty are simply inherent to all open ended and holistic ecological systems and 
as such, can rarely be eschewed through further investigations. While the former is 
commonly referred to as ‘systemic’, ‘knowledge’103 or ‘epistemic’ uncertainty’,104 the 
later, in its less tractable form, is known as ‘variability’ or ‘random’ uncertainty.105 
‘Systemic’ and ‘variability’ uncertainty are the two main sources of uncertainty that 
have been found to hamper accurate environmental assessments for ORE proposals.106  
These are conducive to two types of errors in scientific investigations which are 
designed to test a hypothesis. A Type I error is a ‘mistake of concluding that a 
phenomenon [or impact] exists where in truth it does not occur’.107 Conversely, a Type 
II error is a failure to detect something that actually occurs.108   
 
Variability uncertainty, which Trouwborst also refers to as ‘ontological uncertainty’,109 
stems from the inherent variability and stochasticity110 of marine ecosystems. 
                                                          
101 Helen M. Regan, and others, ‘A taxonomy and treatment of uncertainty for ecology and conservation 
biology’ (2002) 12 (2) Ecological Applications, 618; Walker and others, (2003), Op. cit, (n9), 5 
102 Cooney (2006), ‘A long and winding road?’, (n15), 229 
103 Ascough and others, (n22), 387 
104 Walker, and others, (n9), 13 
105 Ascough and others, (n22), 389 
106 Masden and others, (n19), 170 
107 Daniel Kriebel and others, ‘The Precautionary Principle in Environmental Science’ (2001) 109(9) 
Environmental Health Perspectives, 873 
108 Ibid. 
109 Trouwborst, ‘Precautionary Rights and Duties of States, (n45), 74 
110 Stochasticity refers to the characteristic of ‘random behaviour of systems that have chaotic dynamics’. 




Stochasticity constitutes an ‘essential but unpredictable component of all dynamic 
ecosystems’.111 While prediction is the central role of all scientific investigations, 
Planque reminds us that stochasticity explains why science may not be able to predict 
future state of marine ecosystems with ‘reasonable levels of certainty’.112 Marine 
ecosystems host a myriad of complex interactions between the biotic (living) and 
abiotic (non-living physical) environment. Interactions range from predation, 
mutualistic/competitive and tropic interactions, nutrient cycling, sediment transport and 
hydrological regimes.113  Without drawing a clear distinction between terrestrial and 
marine systems, Opdam et al., explain that local species populations of N2000 sites are 
part of larger regional populations and consequently are subject to ‘spatially complex 
dynamics, partly due to variation, partly to large scaled environmental variation’.114 By 
way of example, the number of animals of a population may fluctuate as a result of 
external environmental factors (e.g. weather conditions, fishing interactions and food 
availability) influencing their mortality, reproduction, recruitment rates and hence, the 
entire population structure. These types of natural variation in species’ occurrence, 
abundance or behaviour are not inherently random but they nevertheless make ‘the true 
value of interest extraordinarily difficult to measure or predict’.115  
 
On the other hand, inherent randomness occurs ‘not because of our limited 
understanding of the driving forces but because the system is, in principle, irreducible to 
                                                                                                                                                                          
uncertainty in ecological advice: lessons from fisheries’ (2003) 18 (2) TRENDS in Ecology and 
Evolution, 617, 618 
111 Benjamin Planque, ‘Projecting the future state of marine ecosystems, “la grande illusion”?’ (2016) 73 
(2) ICES Journal of Marine Science, 204 
112 Ibid. 
113 Cooney, (n15), 229 
114 Paul F.M. Opdam, Mirjam E.A Broekmeyer and Fred H. Kistenkas, ‘Identifying uncertainties in 
judging the significance of human impacts on Natura 2000 sites’ (2009) 12 Environmental Science and 
Policy, 912, 915 




any deterministic process’.116 Complex non-linear dynamics in marine ecosystems 
imply that ‘predictions of the future state of the system may be highly uncertain, even 
when the underlying deterministic processes are known exactly’.117 However, this is 
rarely the case in ecology.118 Hence, variability/random uncertainty is largely attributed 
to the inherent difficulties in identifying and quantifying by means of data collection, 
the influence of non-linear and stochastic biological, chemical and physical factors on 
marine habitats and species populations. Unlike systemic uncertainty, uncertainty 
related to natural variability cannot be solved by means of increased data collection. 
This makes impact predictions impossible or at least, highly inaccurate. 
 
Systemic or epistemic uncertainty includes the ‘non-random’119 and reducible element 
of scientific uncertainty. Masden et al., stress that systemic uncertainty ‘is function of 
human understanding and measurement of a situation or environment’.120 Systemic 
uncertainty arises from the lack or imperfection of knowledge as a result of missing or 
limited empirical data, which is usually linked to a ‘lack of investigation, sampling 
errors, measurement biases’.121 Systemic is probably the easiest form of scientific 
uncertainty in the context of the precautionary principle in that it can be reduced by 
additional data collection and empirical effort.122 Application of the precautionary 
principle in this context should prescribe ‘provisional or temporary measure until 
scientific investigation progresses adequately to describe more fully the risk’.123  
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The lack of data or sampling issues in data collection will influence the level of 
confidence that developers and regulators can place in model predictions. Issues in 
sampling procedures may relate to the frequency and size of samplings and the type of 
data recorded by scientists. Since predictive models are sensitive to data inputs, 
uncertainty surrounding these variables will have a significant effect on predicted 
collision risks.124  From there, systemic uncertainty is said to involve both a ‘process 
understanding’, which mainly refers to lack of empirical data or understanding of the 
deterministic behaviour of the system, and a ‘modelling’ component (i.e. model 
uncertainty), which results from the structure of computer models used by scientists to 
make impact predictions.125 Models are inevitably simplified representations of the 
properties and behaviour of the ecological system or phenomenon being studied.126  
Planque argues that ‘low predictive performances in marine ecosystem models are 
usually attributed to the absence or the poor representation of important ecological 
processes in numerical formulations’.127 As far back as 1973, Holling had already 
explained that model predictions are necessarily flawed due to the ‘mosaic of spatial 
elements with distinct biological, physical and chemical characteristics that are linked to 
each other by mechanisms of biological and physical transport’.128  These phenomena 
significantly limit our capacity to realistically predict and represent, in computer 
models, changes in the natural world. Overall, natural variation and stochasticity 
phenomena in marine ecosystems constitute what Planque refers to as ‘statistical 
nuisance’ in model projections.129  Citing Harremoës and Madsen, Ascough stresses that 
‘there is an optimum combination of model complexity and number of parameters as a 
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function of the data available for calibration’.130 A model with few parameters may for 
example, be too simplistic or too complex to realistically represent trends in a valued 
receptor. In this situation, inherent ‘structure’ model uncertainty will dominate the 
results. Conversely, ‘increased model complexity with many parameters to be calibrated 
will similarly lead to increased model uncertainty where ‘calibrated parameters do not 
contain sufficient information to allow calibration of all parameters with an adequate 
degree of certainty’.131 For instance, model uncertainty associated with sea birds 
collision risk models usually results from the fact that model parameters are ‘data 
hungry’ where the amount of available of data is limited.132 Another limitation arises 
from the use of fixed parameters to represent dynamic variables such as flight speed and 
direction. This ‘simplification’ in parameters leads to increased uncertainty in model 
predictions.  
 
A detailed analysis of model uncertainty goes beyond the scope of this study. Yet, it 
should be borne in mind that any scientific model relies on estimates, assumptions, 
equations and mathematical expressions which do not represent real-world issue. Any 
ecosystem model informing an environmental assessment is ‘inherently incomplete 
because it is unlikely to encompass the full range of possible factors and their 
interactions’.133  Accumulated uncertainties in data outputs and model parameters lead to 
prediction errors, also referred to as discrepancy between the ‘true value’ to be 
represented and models’ predictions.134 Model uncertainty in environmental assessments 
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will therefore always exist insofar as computer models will always be constrained by 
either systemic or variability elements of uncertainty.   
 
Acknowledgement of the inherent limits in scientific methodologies may have triggered 
the requirement to make use of the ‘best scientific knowledge’ in the field. This throws 
up the thorny question of whether some patterns of best scientific knowledge have 
emerged from the evidence base available to ORE developers. The following section 

























3- Nature of uncertainty in environmental assessments for offshore renewables:  
What don’t we know? 
 
Environmental assessments for ORE developments are largely constrained, although to 
a different extent, by both systemic and random elements of scientific uncertainty. 
Whilst systemic uncertainty has been significantly reduced in the offshore wind energy 
sector due to increasing post-consent data collection at installed OWFs, it remains the 
main source of uncertainty for the wave and tidal energy. Offshore wind, wave and tidal 
energy developments are however equally exposed to random uncertainty when it 
comes to assessing the potential population-level impacts and cumulative ecosystem 
impacts. Scientific uncertainty in predicting the population implications of ORE 
developments and their wider-ecosystem impacts concern all marine taxa with respect 
to their interaction with all types of technologies. The next subsection offers an 
overview of the main limitations related to available data for environmental assessments 















3.1. Practical examples of scientific uncertainty in environmental assessments of 
offshore wind farms 
 
Common areas of systemic and random uncertainty have been identified in a series of 
Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) elaborated for six recently consented OWFs in 
the United Kingdom: Hornsea One, Hornsea Two and Hornsea Three OWFs, London 
Array, Thanet OWFs (Extension), Inch Cape OWF, Neart Na Gaoithe, London Array 
and Triton Knoll OWFs.    
Despite improved evidence of behavioural responses of marine mammals to pile-driving 
operations, systemic uncertainty remains regarding the thresholds at which noise 
disturbances during the construction and operation of OWFs will cause hearing injury 
or trigger changes in animal behaviour.135 Dose-responses to anthropogenic noise are 
highly dependent on animal habituation, sensitivity and motivation at the time of 
exposure (e.g. feeding, resting and breeding).136  Animal responses to acoustic 
disturbance are further influenced by a number of environmental factors including the 
effect of bathymetry, current and seabed substrate on noise-propagation. The influence 
of these factors on noise propagation and behavioural responses of marine mammals is 
still poorly understood.  
Likewise, both systemic and random uncertainty regarding the extent to which auditory 
injuries and chronic disruption of animal behaviours will lead to a decline in species 
                                                          
135 Vattenfall Wind Power Ltd., (2017). Thanet Extension Offshore Wind Farm Preliminary 
Environmental Report (Vol2 Chapter 7 Marine Mammals). 
<https://corporate.vattenfall.co.uk/projects/wind-energy-projects/thanet-
extension/documents/preliminary-environmental-information-report/>  (accessed 5 April 2017), at 10-11; 
Mainstream Renewable Power, (2016). Neart Na Gaoithe Offshore Wind Farm Environmental Statement 
Chapter 13 Marine Mammals. <http://nngoffshorewind.com/downloads/offshore-environmental-
statement/> (accessed 5 April 2017), at 12-13 
136 Helen Bailey and others, ‘Assessing the environmental impacts of offshore wind: Lessons learned and 




populations have been reported as a key issue in all the EISs reviewed.137 Harwood and 
King estimate that an adverse effect on the conservation status of protected species will 
occur if animals incur sustained or chronic disruption of behaviour affecting animal 
vital rates (i.e. probability to survive, grow, give birth and breed).138  In some situations, 
local impacts on a limited number of animals may have important biological 
consequences on population stability if the conservation status of this species is 
unfavourable.139 Assessing the significance of an impact on species conservation status 
requires collecting long-time series of data to account for relevant natural variation in 
distribution and density of  species population.140  From the EISs reviewed, technical 
difficulties encountered by developers pertain to the complexities of collecting data on 
marine species population. The absence of baseline representative data on 
density/distribution are regularly reported, with more or less clarity, as the main obstacle 
to the evaluation of potential impacts on marine mammal populations at the site-specific 
level.141  Generally speaking, less is known about the distribution and population 
structure of marine species. Fine-scale representative data on marine species population 
is lacking for a number species of European Interest. Baseline data may be lacking or, 
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when available, these may not cover sufficient periods of time to detect important 
variations in marine organisms which are necessary to understand the potential effects 
of a project (see section 5 below). Fox and others point out that ‘the spatial scale of 
impacts may be much larger than the spatial footprint of a development and be beyond 
the means of individual developers to monitor adequately’.142  Survey data collected by 
developers are usually snapshots of population dynamics and therefore, only provide an 
indication of the number of animals predicted to be affected by a development (section 
5.1 below).143  
Population modelling tools, such as the Interim Population Consequence of Disturbance 
approach (iPCoD),144 have been developed to handle uncertainty and stochasticity in 
population impact assessments. These approaches aim to inform regulatory consenting 
about the population implications of disturbances on marine mammals.145 These 
modelling approaches require estimates of population size and distribution, which are 
rarely available for populations of marine animals. As an interim approach, iPCoD 
heavily relies on expert elicitations to address these data gaps and inform model 
parameters.146 Expert elicitation is a technique that is widely used in science 
conservation ‘where there is a lack of data but urgent need for conservation 
decisions’.147  Since expert judgements cannot substitute for real observational data,148 
modelling predictions are systematically biased by elements of model uncertainty 
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related to data inputs. Another method, Potential Biological Removals (PBR), is also 
used to set thresholds of ‘acceptable’ mortality that a population can safely incur before 
being adversely affected.149 This methodology is also biased by model uncertainty 
related to the use of population size estimates. 
 
With regard to seabirds, knowledge of flight heights of seabird species has enabled the 
identification of those species at greatest risk of collision and displacement around 
OWFs.150  Empirical evidence collected around OWFs has shown that sea birds exhibit a 
relatively high level of micro-avoidance with low collision risks.151 However these 
finding also indicate that these results were highly species-specific.152  Information on 
flight characteristics and estimates of avoidance behaviour are still lacking for a 
significant number of species that are regularly occurring in OWFs.153 The EISs 
reviewed reveal significant systemic uncertainty regarding the extent to which seabirds 
are displaced from their habitats and whether such displacement will have consequences 
for their reproduction, breeding and population stability.154  For example, the EIS for  
the Hornsea Two OWF states that existing data gaps result from the inherent difficulties 
to collect data, particularly in the offshore environment, which can be used to accurately 
estimate mortality, collision chance, and associated avoidance behaviour.155 Poor 
knowledge of population density/distribution and the ecology of seabird species 
represent an important regulatory challenge in the assessment of connectivity with 
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nearby SPAs.  As with marine mammal assessments, access to representative data on 
seabirds density and distribution is necessary to estimate the extent to which mortalities 
from collision or displacement may put the conservation status of species population at 
risk.156 The use of foraging ranges has been advocated as a suitable method for 
assessing potential connectivity between breeding seabird colonies and proposed 
development sites.157 However, the success of this method is hindered by considerable 
data gaps on structure of sea bird population and habitat uses in the marine 
environment. As such, establishing the population consequences of displacement cannot 
be measured empirically due to the lack of evidence and knowledge of species ecology 
and flight behaviour in offshore areas.158 The paucity of baseline information means that 
developers must still address considerable uncertainty in estimating collision risk and 
displacement effects on sea birds.   
 
Existing methodologies for collecting data and predicting the acceptability of OWFs for 
seabird populations are regarded as inadequate.159  Green et al., explain that the so-
called ‘Acceptable Biological Change’ (ABC), the ‘Decline Probability Difference’ 
(DPD) and ‘Potential Biological Removals’ (PBR)– modeling tools, are commonly used 
to define the threshold of acceptable impacts on sea bird populations.160 These 
methodologies are based on long-term projections of seabird demographic rates which, 
in light of present knowledge, are highly uncertain and untested. PBR-based thresholds 
are highly sensitive to assumptions made about density-dependence relationships which 
are rarely known for sea bird populations.161 As a result, the magnitude of effects on 
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demographic rates and hence, on seabird populations, cannot be accurately estimated 
due to insufficient or imprecise empirical measurements to inform model parameters.162  
Impact thresholds calculated from these modelling tools to define the acceptability of 
OWFs have been criticised for being arbitrary and not grounded in a solid empirical 
basis.163 To address these gaps, EISs and NISs tend to incorporate very conservative 
assumptions about the potential magnitude of impacts.164 These assumptions may be 
over-precautionary and hence unrealistic.  
 
Most EISs identify Electromagnetic Field (EMF) effects as a major source of systemic 
uncertainty due to limited research undertaken in this field.165  There is little or no 
evidence suggesting that marine mammals, fish and shellfish would be adversely 
affected by EMF from subsea cables.166 Scientific literature confirms EMF sensitivity 
for invertebrates, elasmobranches, bony fish, crustaceans and cetaceans, but species-
specific impacts of EMFs within these taxonomic groups are largely speculative.167 
Existing knowledge gaps in understanding dose-responses of animals to EMF make it 
impossible to determine whether there are any biologically relevant consequences at the 
population-level.168 Unfortunately, the lack of data has led some environmental 
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statements to conclude that EMFs impacts were negligible.169 Likewise, much 
uncertainty exists with respect to the effect of pile-driving noise on fish and shellfish 
and the spatial extent to which noise-induced mortalities or tissue injuries may occur.170 
The evidence base to date carries with it high uncertainty due to many information gaps 
on hearing thresholds of fish and shellfish species.171 Empirical information on dose-
responses of fish and marine invertebrates to anthropogenic noise is scarce and no 
scientifically verified sound exposure criteria have been developed for fish and 
invertebrates.172  Hawkins et al., argue that predictions in environmental assessments are 
based on the assumptions that all fish have similar hearing thresholds where in reality 
there are individual differences in sound detection, including among fish of the same 
species.173 In the absence of further empirical observation, it is impossible to assess the 
potential population impacts of OWFs on fish and shellfish populations. As observed by 
Hawkins, ‘bridging the gap between observed effects on individual fish and impacts on 
populations is often beyond our current capabilities’; ‘we are poorly equipped to do any 
more than use expert elicitation for predicting impacts’.174 Evidence of colonisation 
around turbine foundations have led scientists to conclude that sounds generated by 
operating turbines would not have major adverse effects on fish and benthic 
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organisms.175  Despite these findings, Thomsen et al., argue that no study has yet 
demonstrated any behavioural changes during the operational phase of  OWFs.176 
Hawkins and Popper further note that most EIAs submitted for OWFs are flawed 
insofar as they are based on inappropriate metrics to describe thresholds of acceptable 
noise levels: ‘the metrics used to assess the effects of noise effects were based on sound 
pressures, despite many of the fish species concerned being sensitive to particle 
motion’.177 Whilst hearing capabilities of marine mammals are based on sound 
pressures, fish species and invertebrates can sense the particle motion component of 
sound.178 The importance and function of the particle motion component of sound for 
the ecology of fish species and invertebrates is largely unknown.179 There is little or no 
data at all on the effects of particle motion and seabed vibrations on demersal fish and 
shellfish.180   
 
Furthermore, the Enviromental Statements for Thanet Extension and Triton Knoll Two 
OWFs highlight systemic uncertainty concerning the effects of these developments on 
sediment concentration, seabed topography and benthic ecology.181  As emphasised in 
section 2.4 of Chapter II, in-water turbid wakes are common phenomena generated by 
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the actions of currents around the foundation of turbines.182 Sediment plumes are re-
suspended in the water column and redistributed by currents up to several kilometres 
beyond individual turbines. Even 26 years after the commissioning of the world’s first 
OWF,183 the impacts of such a phenomenon on downstream sedimentation and marine 
fauna are still unknown. In the absence of detailed information, environmental 
predictions have been based on worst-case impact scenarios in terms of the highest 
concentration of suspended sediment plumes, the maximum changes in bed level 
elevation and the greatest spatial extent of ecological changes.184 Other reports 
elaborated for Hornsea Two and Hornsea Three OWFs also raise both systemic and 
random elements of uncertainty surrounding impacts of artificial reef effects for local 
biodiversity and the wider receiving ecosystem.185  Where these effects have been 
described as potentially positive in Chapter II,186 the placement of turbine foundations 
on the seabed may in turn facilitate the introduction of non-native species. The wider-
ecosystem impacts that non-native species will create for local diversity cannot 
currently be determined. EISs document the existence of uncertainty as to whether local 
species may benefit or be adversely affected by the introduction of non-native species 
which are different from the baseline environment.187 Non-indigenous species may for 
example, have adverse effects by increasing competition and predation on local 
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species.188 Important unknowns also exist as to whether the artificial reef effect 
associated with offshore wind turbines are enhancing local biodiversity, or simply 
attracting benthic communities and fish from surrounding areas. Post-consent 
monitoring activities around OWF sites have not demonstrated any positive or negative 
effects. Lindeboom highlights that, since ecosystems are still developing at most 
existing OWF sites, changes in macro-benthos observed so far should be considered 
short term as they probably reflect the initial stages of ecological changes.189 According 
to Lindeboom, ‘some impacts may not have been detected yet, simply because they 
have not developed to the extent needed to be detectable’.190   
 
3.2. Practical examples of scientific uncertainty in the ocean renewable energy 
sector 
 
Given their early stage of development, all sources of systemic/random uncertainty 
identified for the offshore wind energy sector similarly apply, with a higher degree if 
intensity, to wave and tidal energy projects. Wave and tidal energy developers are 
primarily exposed to systemic/knowledge sources of uncertainty regarding the nature of 
interactions of these devices with relevant marine receptors. The evidence-base to date 
is limited to monitoring studies at single wave and tidal energy devices.191 No sizeable 
arrays of wave or tidal energy devices have been deployed so far and this significantly 
limits opportunities to collect array deployment data to validate the findings of 
numerical models simulating the effects of multiple turbines.192 Scaling up risks from 
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single devices to array-scale projects is therefore largely impossible due to limited 
number of operational deployments. 
Uncertainty surrounding the nature and magnitude of collision risks with marine 
animals is a major consenting concern that may curtail the development rate of the 
industry. Significant knowledge and data gaps remain regarding the interaction process 
of marine mammals, fish and seabirds with operating wave and tidal energy devices. Of 
particular concern is the population of protected species for which the loss of a single 
animal may jeopardize population stability.193 With regard to marine mammals, no 
collision with devices has been observed made to date.194 As discussed in Chapter II, 
evidence of local avoidance by marine mammals in the vicinity of the SeaGen tidal 
turbine suggests that collision risks may be reduced for marine mammals.195 The 
precautionary shut-down mitigation action required under the marine licence for the 
SeaGen device meant that opportunity to confirm animal behaviour and interaction with 
the turbine was lost.196  The final removal of the shut-down protocol was approved but 
never implemented before decommissioning.197  Consequently, Savidge et al., assert that 
despite five years of operation no relevant knowledge was gained on how marine 
mammals actually interact with the structure and moving blades.198 The extent to which 
marine mammals are likely to collide with individual devices has therefore not been 
clearly established. It is also unclear whether animal collisions would systematically 
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lead to injury or death.199 The absence of clear understanding on how animals behave 
around operating devices significantly complicates progress towards approvals of array-
scale projects. The Annex IV State of the Science Report indicates that it is highly 
unlikely that risk will scale on a ‘simple linear fashion’ as the number of devices 
increase.200 In the absence of further observation and in-situ measurements around full-
scale arrays of devices, evaluation of collision/encounter interactions with marine 
animals are currently restricted to modelling simulations and laboratory experiments.201 
Evaluating the full effects of multiple devices on marine Natura 2000 sites and their 
qualifying species may not be possible until arrays deployment data from arrays is 
actually collected.202    
In a similar vein, there is no empirical evidence on the physical interactions/collisions 
of seabirds with underwater devices.203 Most environmental studies to date ‘have 
focused on potential changes in habitat use and displacement effects on seabirds 
resulting from the presence and operation of devices rather than on collision risks’.204   
The paucity of empirical study addressing collision risks of diving seabirds primarily 
results from difficulties in monitoring seabirds in highly energetic underwater 
environments.205 Assessment of collision risks are currently being derived from 
modelling studies based on the known abundance, distribution and ecology of each 
seabird species (e.g., foraging ranges, flight height and speed).206 The effects of 
underwater noise associated with a commercial array of devices are also largely 
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unknown. Here again, knowledge has been limited to single devices. At this stage, 
underwater noise from single devices can be measured but there are no standards for 
measuring noise effects associated with arrays of several devices.207 Likewise, sound 
measurements around existing wave and tidal energy devices tend to focus on sound 
pressure even though a number of marine species are known to be only sensitive to 
particle motion.208  How the acoustic output of multiple turbines may affect marine 
animals is also unknown. 209 A key issue that needs to be addressed is whether noise 
from commercial-scale arrays will result in chronic behavioural changes and affect 
animal vital rates, thereby creating larger adverse population consequences.  
Uncertainty regarding the effect of underwater noise on marine mammals and fish will 
remain an important source of concern for regulators. In light of the existing evidence 
base, it is not possible to extrapolate or scale-up the findings from monitoring 
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4 - Cumulative and in-combination impacts 
 
Cumulative impacts result from incremental changes and ‘additive impacts caused by 
other past, present and reasonably foreseeable actions together with the project itself 
and synergistic impacts (in-combination) that arise from the reaction between impacts 
of a project on different aspects of the environment’.210  Cumulative impacts can be both 
additive and synergistic.211 The Guidelines of the British Standard Institutions stress that 
impacts may become additive  where many minor effects on a single species, albeit non-
significant individually, add up to create a significant overall impact on species 
population.212 Synergistic impacts (in-combination) result from the interaction of 
multiple small impacts on a specific receptor, even if these impacts are not individually 
significant.213 Assessments of cumulative impacts, whether synergistic or additive, 
represent a significant challenge for developers.  Uncertainty surrounding cumulative 
impacts has caused delays of up to three years in the approvals for some Round 2 OWFs 
in the United-Kingdom.214  
Assessment of cumulative and in-combination impacts is largely hampered by the lack 
of agreement on what ‘cumulative impacts’ mean and methodological flaws in 
conducting cumulative impact assessments (CIAs).215 Ambiguity in the terminology of 
‘cumulative impact assessment’ is well exemplified in the key legislative drivers for 
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EIA.216 Under the Habitats Directive, any ORE project that is likely to have a 
significant effect on a N2000 site shall consider the in-combination effects on the 
relevant site concerned.217  Whilst the Habitats Directive refers to the ‘in-combination’ 
effects of a project on N2000 site, the revised EIA Directive provides that the 
characteristics of the project must be considered having regard to the ‘cumulation of 
existing and/or approved projects’.218 The SEA Directive, on the other hand, provides 
that an environmental assessment identifying the ‘secondary, cumulative, synergistic 
[…] positive and negative effects’ shall be carried out for public plans likely to have 
significant environmental effects.219 
Inconsistencies in terminology may have contributed to the lack of a coherent 
methodological approach to CIA.220  As far back as 1999, guidelines were issued by the 
European Commission to support more coherent methods and approaches to CIA.221 
Methodologies to assess cumulative impacts of OWFs have also been developed by the 
scientific community.222 However, the success of these methodologies is limited by 
considerable difficulties in identifying appropriate historical baselines as well as spatial 
and temporal scales over which cumulative impacts should be assessed.223 CIA 
methodologies should extend beyond the scope of site-specific direct and indirect 
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impacts224 to consider how incremental pressures arising from a single development 
together with the sum of past, present and future overlapping activities will affect trends 
in receptor conditions.   
Project-based CIAs for ORE projects are challenging due to significant knowledge gaps 
surrounding the impacts of all other existing or planned activities on marine ecosystems. 
Random and systemic uncertainty associated with proximate developments will 
accumulate to make CIA even more complex. Knowledge gaps are also exacerbated by 
uncertainty over how these impacts overlap and propagate in time and space through the 
marine environment.225 Willsteed evaluated CIA for nine large-scale OWFs and 
concluded that current project-led practices do not meet the information needs of 
regulatory decision-makers.226 Cumulative impacts in the marine environment 
encompass changes brought about by multiple stressors and activities that interact and 
accumulate over broad temporal and spatial scales. Environmental pressures in the 
marine environment interact in a ‘non-linear relationship’ to generate ‘a variety of 
outcomes, including synergistic and antagonistic effects’.227 Hence, ‘understanding the 
cumulative effects of a development requires, by definition, consideration of the sum 
total of effects on the environment to date and the incremental effects that a proposed 
development will have on that baseline’.228  This seems to confirm the findings of 
Therival and Ross who state that CIA should ‘help to link the difference scales of 
environmental assessment in that it focuses on how a given receptor is affected by the 
totality of plans, projects and activities, rather than on the effects of a particular plan or 
project’.229 CIA methodologies must therefore establish a fixed baseline against which 
                                                          
224 MMO, (2013), (n220), at 11 
225 Edward A. Willsteed and others, ‘Assessing the cumulative effects of marine renewable energy 
developments: establishing common ground’ (2017) 577 Science of the Total Environment, 19, 21 
226 Willsteed and others, (n215), at 2332, 2341 
227 Judd, Backhaus and Goodsir, (n216), 259 
228  Willsteed and others, (n215), 2341 
229 Ricky Therivel and Bill Ross, ‘Cumulative effects assessment: Does scale matter?’ (2007) 27 




cumulative impacts can be predicted, taking into account the spatio-temporal mobility 
of valued receptors and the spatial and temporal accumulation of multiple stressors. 
Despite this, assessment practices have been reported to invariably endorse a single 
stressor approach, ‘assessing how single stressors (e.g. noise disturbance, habitat loss) 
generated by a proposed development together with the same stressor arising from 
proximal developments impact a single valued receptor’.230  CIA methodologies that are 
focused on a single stressor approach are regarded as particularly ill-suited insofar as 
the spatial and temporal boundaries of stressor effects, for example noise propagation, 
do not match the spatio-temporal characteristics of wide-ranging marine receptors.231   
Further, the review of post-consent OWF monitoring indicates that discrepancies 
between methodologies, sampling techniques and data presentation prevent a ‘synoptic 
approach’ where monitoring information from different sites can be scientifically 
compared to evaluate cumulative pressures.232  This shortcoming has been observed for 
all receptors including marine mammals,233 fish and shellfish,234 benthic habitats and 
benthic communities.235  The lack a common methodological approach is further 
exacerbated by the fact that wider-ecosystem impacts of ORE developments are largely 
unknown. Developers currently face difficulties to confidently predict and mitigate 
potential direct and indirect ecological impacts of large-scale ORE developments on 
ecosystem dynamics. Shortcomings primarily stem from a significant lack of scientific 
understanding on the cause-effect relationships between ecosystem components.236 
Marine ecosystems are ‘chaotic by the unpredictable and manifold mutualistic, trophic 
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and competitive interactions between species and a large natural variability’.237  The 
inherent complexity and connectivity between marine receptors suggest that project-
based EIA are unlikely to resolve the ‘conundrum of cumulative impact assessment’.238 
Species interact within communities and across multiple trophic levels.239 Each 
ecological receptor may perform a myriad of ecological functions including habitat 
provisions and secondary production. Impacts on one functional receptor or key 
structural species may therefore indirectly affect the conservation status of an associated 
or dependent species and ultimately create non-anticipated wider-scale ecosystem 
impacts.240 Such connectivity between marine species and their environment may lead 
to indirect impacts on valued receptors as a result of changes in prey availability and 
food-web dynamics.241 Understanding the interactions between valued receptors and 
their food is critical to understand potential cumulative impacts.  The majority of studies 
have concentrated on the enhancement of local biodiversity around turbine monopiles 
but the ecological functions of these new benthic systems in relation to other protected 
receptors such as marine mammals and sea birds has been identified as a clear 
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5 - Monitoring limitations in the marine environment 
 
5.1. Specificities of monitoring challenges in the marine environment 
 
There are significant limits to what can be reasonably ‘achieved through project-led 
monitoring programmes on a site-specific basis’.243 Bennet et al., explain that the 
relatively small scale of ORE developments makes monitoring works extremely 
challenging due to the existence of stochasticity and important natural variation 
influencing how animals and marine organisms use and respond to the marine 
environment.244 Some impacts are simply not detectable by project developers at the 
scale of development sites. Difficulties associated with detecting an impact mainly stem 
from the degree of natural viability in behaviour, abundance, distribution of marine 
species and the difficulties in detecting animals underwater in poor visibility 
conditions.245    Some species travel over thousands of kilometres and spend most of 
their time underwater. Marine mammals for example are extremely difficult to detect 
due to their large dispersal range, cryptic behaviour and intermittent echolocation 
signals. Similarly, populations of seabirds are subject to important temporal variation 
operating at scales wider than survey areas, making it difficult to understand cause-
effect relationships and distinguish project-impacts from background natural 
variation.246 Fox and others further point out that the conservation status of many 
marine species are influenced by a number of external stressors, natural variation and 
large-scale stochastic factors that are related to fisheries interactions, climate change, 
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food web dynamics and weather conditions.247 The influence of these factors combined 
with the large mobility and dispersal ranges of marine species exacerbate the problem of 
‘Data-Rich but Information Poor’(DRIP)  syndrome.248  As briefly mentioned above, 
DRIP is an undesirable situation where, despite considerable monitoring efforts and 
collection of large amount of data, monitoring results do not provide useful information 
that can give greater confidence to decision-makers.249 All types of ORE projects 
including OWFs commonly suffer from DRIP. Lessons learned from OWFs across the 
North Sea, indicate that basic monitoring around OWFs is not sufficient to ‘disentangle 
specific cause-effect relationships, especially in systems with a high natural 
variability’..250  Maclean and others have also shown that the design of visual seabird 
surveys for the Round 2 of OWF developments in the United-Kingdom lacked sufficient 
statistical power to detect consistent changes in sea bird populations due to important 
fluctuations in the numbers and distribution of birds at any given location.251 ‘Statistical 
power’ refers to the capacity of a monitoring programme to detect meaningful changes 
when they are occurring.252. If the statistical power of a monitoring programme is too 
low, there may be an unacceptable risk of not detecting negative changes in animal 
behaviour, abundance or distribution.253 The statistical power of monitoring 
programmes depends on a number of factors which include the length, duration and 
frequency of surveys, sample sizes and characteristic of data.254 Designing monitoring 
programmes that can provide data capable of distinguishing project-impacts from 
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background ecosystem variation and, accordingly, reduce uncertainty is highly 
challenging. In this vein, Bennet and others observe that wave and tidal energy projects 
are more susceptible to the risk of DRIP. The smaller spatial footprint of these project 
increases the difficulty that a monitoring programme has in distinguishing project-
related impacts from background variation in the wider ecosystem.255 
 
5.2. An overview of specific limitations of monitoring techniques  
 
To date, ORE developers must ‘prove the negative’256 with respect to all possible 
negative impacts on N2000 qualifying features. Existing monitoring techniques 
however present a number of limitations that significantly hamper our capacity to 
predict and detect changes in animal behaviour and species population. Most of 
observational methods to monitor wildlife on land are simply not available in, or 
transferrable to the marine environment.257    
 
Detection probability of monitoring programmes depends on a number of factors 
including the spatial resolution of monitoring systems, animal behaviour and 
surrounding environmental conditions.258 Collecting data in the marine environment is 
challenging because of limited available methods having high resolution for measuring 
animals’ movement and behaviour underwater.259 The detection probability of 
monitoring techniques may be hampered by two processes termed ‘availability bias’ and 
                                                          
255 Bennet F., Culloch R. and Tait A., (n244), 15 
256 Copping and others, (n21), at 44 
257 Douglas P. Nowacek and others, ‘Studying cetacean behaviour: new technological approaches and 
conservation applications’ (2016) 120 Animal Behaviour, 235 
258 Ursula Verfuss and others, ‘Comparing methods suitable for monitoring marine mammals in low 
visibility conditions during seismic survey’ (2018) 126 Marine Pollution Bulletin, 1 
259 Gordon D. Hastie and others, ‘Tracking Technologies for Quantifying Marine Mammals Interactions 
with Tidal Turbines: Pitfalls and Possibilities’ in Humanity and the Sea: Marine Renewable Energy 




‘perception bias’.260  Verfuss explains that availability bias occurs when the presence of 
an animal is missed because the animal was not available for detection.261 This is the 
case where an animal is present but does not emit a detectable signals. An example of 
availability bias is where animals underwater are not seen by visual observers or silent 
animals are not capable of detection by acoustic monitoring systems. ‘Perception bias’ 
occurs when animals are capable of detection, whether because the animal is visible at 
the surface or because it emits a signal, but the detection system failed to detect the 
cue.262 All monitoring techniques are biased, although to different degree of severity, by 
these two types of bias. Using a combination of monitoring systems is therefore 
generally advised in the scientific literature in order to improve the detection 
performance of monitoring programmes.263  
 
Boat-based or aerial-based visual surveys are generally used to establish baseline 
information on the abundance and distribution of sea birds and marine mammals.264 
Bailey et al., indicate that visual surveys are unlikely to have sufficient power to detect 
potential changes in animal behaviour as well as fine-scale spatial and temporal 
variation in abundance and distribution.265 Detection probabilities of these techniques is 
indeed, limited by substantial sampling biases resulting from observers’ counting errors 
and the inability to detect animals at night and during poor sea/weather conditions.266  
Visual surveys from boats or planes, are thus likely ‘to under-represent’ the number of 
marine mammals’ as these animals spend much of their time underwater with sea states 
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significantly influencing detection probability. 267 Waggit et al., evaluated the efficiency 
of shore-based surveys and demonstrated that shore-based surveys are hampered by low 
observer’s ability to detect foraging birds away from coastlines.268  Recent technological 
advancements in radar systems or digital (camera) surveys may provide more detailed 
assessments of avoidance behaviours and collision risks of sea birds around offshore 
wind turbines. These techniques may provide more accurate records of seabird flight 
height than visual surveys.269 However, data collected by radar surveys do not allow 
identification of species and therefore, they must still be validated by field 
observations/visual surveys.270 Acoustic monitoring may have greater statistical power 
than visual surveys to detect potential changes in marine mammals abundance and 
distribution271 and fine-scale interactions with operating turbines. Marine mammals, and 
more particularly seals, are known to use acoustic cues to navigate, communicate and 
forage.272 This technique is known as echolocation where acoustic signals emitted 
reflect off of the targets and the returning echo provides animals with information on the 
surrounding environment.273  Passive Acoustic Monitoring (PAM) is commonly used to 
detect vocalizing marine mammals using hydrophones. Compared to visual surveys, 
PAM provides cost-effective and continuous monitoring resulting in data on trends in 
species presence and species identity at any time (day/night) including in poor sea or 
weather conditions.274 Vocalization may also provide pertinent information on 
behavioural state of the animals being monitoring (i.e. foraging, migrating and 
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socialising).275 PAM systems are nonetheless subject to limitations relating to operating 
frequencies, discretion and directionality of vocalization by marine mammals.276 
Animals will remain undetected if they do not vocalise continuously. Likewise, some 
vocalizations are highly directional which means that projected sound only propagates 
in narrow beams.277  PAM systems are likely to suffer from low detection probability if 
hydrophones are not within the beam of acoustic signals produced by marine 
mammals.278  Another notable limitation results from limited knowledge of vocal rates 
of species, making it difficult to identify the species group of detected animals.279  
Active Acoustic Monitoring (AAM) is a more invasive method of echolocation where 
sound pulses are emitted into the water using a sonar projector and the system listens to 
the acoustic reflections of this pulse from an animal by means of hydrophones.280 AAM 
can track animals that do not echolocate or echolocate or happen not to emit vocal 
signals (i.e. harbour porpoises or dolphins).281 AAM can provide fine-scale data on the 
movement of animals around turbines but also suffers from limited spatial detection 
range and poor capacity to classify detected animals down to species.282 Environmental 
conditions such as bathymetry, high sea states and surrounding anthropogenic noise 
significantly alter the detection performance of PAM and AAM by degrading the 
intensity of animals’ signals.283 
 
Other techniques such as telemetry are widely used for monitoring sea birds and 
pinnipeds around both OWFs and ORE sites. Telemetry consists of ‘tags that are 
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attached to individual animals allowing for data on their movements and behaviour to 
be transmitted to a receiver or downloaded directly from the tag after recovery’.284 
Tagging is easier for pinnipeds and seabirds as these animals breed onshore where they 
can be captured and tagged. A key limitation of telemetry is that data sets are short-term 
and less is known about animal behaviour outside breeding seasons.285 Findings from a 
recent telemetry study around the SeaGen tidal turbine indicate that the duration of tags 
deployments is very short (up to 10 days) and tagging operations must therefore be 
repeated many times throughout the breeding season with the risk that different animals 
are being tagged each year.286 At SeaGen, Savidge explains that, even though it was  
presumed that the same representative sample of animals was tagged each year, it was 
not possible to precisely track individual responses to the presence of the turbine.287 
Moreover, only a limited number of animals could be tagged due to challenges in 
catching them.288  This clearly limits the ability to measure consistent behaviour changes 
in the same animal and to determine whether these variations can be attributed to a 
potential development. This also means that sample sizes are likely to represent a very 
limited portion of the entire population, making the evaluation of potential population-
level impacts almost impossible.289  
 
Additionally, no standards or methodologies for measuring EMF impacts in the 
underwater environment are currently available to developers.290 Gill et al., stress that 
there is an important ‘lack of clarity and high uncertainty relating to what should be 
monitored and which methodology and scale of monitoring is appropriate’ to assess the 
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impacts of EMF.291 So far, they argue that ‘no monitoring activities at OWFs have been 
inadequate because no monitoring has had enough statistical power to detect EMF 
impacts on key sensitive species’.292  
 
Overall, monitoring techniques will slightly differ depending on the ORE technology 
deployed. There are differences between wave/tidal energy and OWFs in terms of 
resolution of data needed to assess risks with marine wildlife.293 Wave and tidal energy 
are still in their infancy and therefore monitoring priorities have concentrated on 
understanding fine-scale behavioural reactions of protected marine species around 
single devices.294  This evaluation requires high-resolution data at fine-spatial scale to 
understand the interactions of animals with single devices.295 At this stage, a critical 
challenge to move towards commercialisation is to monitor and determine collision 
risks/encounter interactions of fish, birds and marine mammals with moving 
components of ocean energy devices.296  Most current monitoring approaches lack the 
resolution to be able to examine such close-range behaviours and determine whether 
collisions are taking place.297 The State of the Science Report states that a number of 
monitoring methods have been suggested to observe marine mammals and fish 
behaviour around devices at close-range, but none have been demonstrated to actually 
work in energetic tidal and wave environments.298 Wave and tidal energy devices are 
installed in high-energy environments where monitoring technologies are difficult to 
operate. The use of unmanned environmental monitoring platforms (i.e. fixed or moving 
remotely controlled vehicles) carrying multiple monitoring devices (cameras, sonars and 
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sediment traps) has increased in an effort to overcome survivability issues associated 
with traditional monitoring techniques.299 Camera, hydrophones and multi-beam sonars 
are usually mounted on monitoring platforms. They enable detection, tracking and 
observation of fine-scale behavioural responses of fish, diving sea birds and marine 
mammals around single devices.  The most commonly used monitoring systems so far 
involve PAM (hydrophones), shore-based, aerial and boat-based survey, telemetry, 
video camera and active acoustic monitoring using multi-beam sonars.300  These 
systems are subject to similar detection limitations identified above. Copping et al., 
point out that PAM and AAM may provide information about how animals behave 
around devices but do not have enough resolution to determine whether there is physical 
contact between animals and devices.301  Monitoring findings at SeaGen suggest that 
active sonar systems were found to be able to detect marine mammals in tidally 
turbulent conditions but few systems have spatial and temporal resolution, range and 
detection capabilities of the systems was insufficient to track animal movements.302 
Hastie further stressed that it was impossible to detect and track animals immediately 
downstream of the SeaGen turbine because of the turbulence produced by it.303 The 
ambient environment including wind generated whitecap on the surface and density 
variation in the water column also have had a significant effect on the quality of 
acoustic data.304  Findings of a recent PAM survey, consisting of twelve hydrophones 
directly mounted on the Delta Stream tidal energy turbine (Ramsay Sound), has 
nonetheless indicated that the PAM system could, successfully and almost continuously, 
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track the movements of small cetaceans around the turbine.305 The limited duration of 
turbine operation also meant that sufficient data could not be collected to understand the 
effect of turbine rotation on animal presence and movement.306 Noise measurement 
methodologies are particularly challenging to operate due to high ambient noise in 
dynamic wave and tidal environments and the large variation in  technological designs 
of wave and tidal energy devices.307 The ambient noisy environment was also reported 
to significantly degrade the quality of datasets resulting in significant monitoring time 
loss.308 Underwater noise from single devices can be measured309 but the lack of 
common technological design inhibits comparison of data sets.310 However, no 
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6- Concluding remarks 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that scientific uncertainty can never be completely 
eradicated.311  As rightly explained by Fisher in her writings, scientific uncertainty is 
rarely due to ‘a simple need to do more research’.312 ‘Scientific uncertainty is shorthand 
for a whole series of methodological, epistemological and ontological problems’.313 
These logical flaws hold particularly true in the marine environment. Marine 
ecosystems are characterised by complex interactions and non-linear dynamics which 
are not properly understood by the scientific community. The fluid nature of marine 
ecosystems, combined with the large dispersal range and natural variation of marine 
organisms place important scale-related limitations on our capacity to predict and 
establish cause-effect relationships between a particular development and observed 
changes in valued receptors. Consequently, monitoring in the marine environment 
commonly suffers from low detection probability. More information does not 
necessarily exclude or reduce risks. Limitations in observation techniques mean that 
data input and parameters that are utilised in predictive scientific models may generate 
imprecise modelling outputs and fail to remove risks. Minor uncertainties caused by a 
margin of error may thus delay licensing processes even when the environmental risks 
posed are relatively low.   
With respect to wave and tidal energy devices, there are also specific technological 
barriers that are explicitly related to the survivability and resolution of monitoring tools 
in high energetic sea conditions. These issues significantly hamper accurate impact 
predictions about single devices and may curtail the development rate of the entire 
ocean energy sector.   
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Given the current paucity of empirical data and existing shortcomings in scientific 
methods, it is clear that best scientific knowledge has not been fully achieved yet and as 
such, it is not available to developers of ORE technologies.  Lawyers should fully 
understand the limitations of science in characterising complex ecological risks 
associated with expanding the ORE industry. Scientific uncertainty should not open the 
door to strict protectionism against technologies that have promising benefits for 
climate change mitigation. In particular, the problem of scientific uncertainty will never 
be solved if one remains wedded to an approach that exclusively aims at avoiding 
ecological risks. In this vein, the author agrees with Lee who states that ‘the inevitable 
fact’ of scientific uncertainty ‘should never be used as rhetorical device to stymie 
action’.314  Instead, ‘in terms of practical decision-making, uncertainty is always 
important, since it emphasises the need for flexible, adaptive approaches to 
governance’.315   Since there will always be a need to act on limited science, the author 
will argue that a more innovative and ‘science-based’ approach to application of the 
precautionary principle316 that facilitates adaptive management is warranted to achieve 
structured certainty where such a ‘desirable ideal’ does not exist.  Solutions and 
practical recommendations to do so will be proposed in Chapter VI. In the meantime, 
Chapter IV will use the findings of this Chapter to analyse and constructively critique 
the way the CJEU and domestic Courts have traditionally dealt with scientific 
uncertainty under the AA process of the Habitats Directive.
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE HABITATS 
DIRECTIVE  
AN UNSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE FOR OFFSHORE 
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPERS 
 
 
1 – Introduction 
 
This Chapter offers a strong critique of the particular interpretation of the precautionary 
principle by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under the appropriate 
assessment (hereafter: AA) of the Habitats Directive.  The CJEU plays a key role in 
ensuring that European Union (EU) law is observed in the interpretation and application 
of the Treaties.1 The Court has given an important doctrinal role to the precautionary 
principle in interpreting the requirements for an AA under Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive. As briefly discussed in the Introduction, Article 6(3) has been interpreted in 
such a way that before granting development consents, licensing authorities must be 
satisfied beyond all reasonable scientific doubt that projects will not create a 
significantly impact upon the integrity of Natura 2000 sites (hereafter: N2000).2  In its 
most recent case law,3 the Court has steadfastly reiterated its position in Commission v. 
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Portugal4 to note that it is at the time of decision-making that the legal test of no 
reasonable scientific doubt must be satisfied. As a matter of course, there is no guidance 
on what constitutes ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’. Commentators have already 
cautioned against such a dogmatic approach to biodiversity conservation also referred to 
as “deathbed” approach to biodiversity conservation.5  Such a high standard of proof, 
reminiscent of criminal law, is extremely difficult to establish in dynamic marine 
environments, particularly in the context of novel and untested ORE technologies where 
data and scientific evidence are still being collected. This holds particularly true for 
wave and tidal energy projects given the nascent nature of these technologies. As 
discussed in Chapters II and III, knowledge of the ecological effects of OWFs has been 
steadily increasing as empirical evidence from commissioned wind farms is 
accumulating.  Ocean energy devices however, are still in a pre-commercial stage.6  The 
magnitude and nature of the potential impacts of these nascent technologies on marine 
ecosystems is still poorly understood due to limited experience of full-scale 
deployments.7 Evaluating the full effects of ocean energy technologies on N2000 sites 
and their qualifying features may not be possible until the first arrays of turbines are 
authorised, deployed and monitored in real-sea conditions. As we approach the first 
array deployments of tidal turbines, a rigidly applied precautionary principle may 
paradoxically restrict the value of innovative renewable energy technologies with higher 
capital costs than well-established conventional energy systems. 
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 There is a need to diversify our renewable energy portfolio. As discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, up-scaling wind energy development is becoming more 
difficult due to the scarcity of locations with appropriate wind exposure.8 Terrestrial 
wind energy developments face increasing public opposition characterised by the so-
called ‘Not In My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) objection.9 New forms of renewable energy 
must be deployed offshore. Offshore wind energy is certainly the most mature and 
viable renewable energy technology deployed at sea but it provides an intermittent 
source of energy with variable returns on investment. Wave and tidal energy present a 
number of advantages compared to wind energy. In particular, wave energy and tidal 
stream devices come with fewer visual impacts and ensure predictable and continuous 
renewable energy output produced from the action of waves and current flows.10   The 
Court should therefore be careful not to impose unrealistic requirements for certainty as 
this may restrict opportunities to diversify our energy mix portfolio to include novel 
forms of renewable energy technologies such as wave and tidal energy systems. 
 
Chapter IV does not intend to challenge the utility or legitimacy of the precautionary 
principle nor does it intend to challenge the Habitats Directive. Likewise, the objective 
of this study is not to give a systematic ‘green pass’11 to ORE technologies. Instead, 
Chapter IV aims to highlight the difficulties that an inflexible precautionary principle 
under the AA of the Habitats Directive creates in terms of burden of proof imposed on 
developers of ORE technologies. The CJEU has not had the opportunity to confirm the 
application of the strict precautionary standards of Article 6(3) in cases involving 
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permissions for ORE developments. In this regard, this analysis anticipates what could 
be the consequences of applying the inflexible precautionary standards of the Court in 
permitting procedures for offshore renewables. Using the onshore and the ORE sector 
as case-studies, the author raises the important question of how realistic the application 
of the precautionary principle prescribed by the CJEU is in the context of ORE 
developments. 
 
2 - A ‘criminal-like’ standard of proof under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive 
2.1. Preliminary remarks on the status of the precautionary principle 
 
The precautionary principle was universally accepted in Rio de Janeiro at the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration 
provides the most cited iteration of the precautionary principle and refers to precaution 
as an ‘approach’ rather than as a ‘principle’ of law: 
‘The precautionary approach shall be widely used by States according to their 
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage [to the 
environment], lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’.12   
 
Since then, the precautionary principle has been incorporated in various environmental 
law treaties, conventions and soft law instruments.13 Despite this, the status of the 
precautionary principle, and more particularly its place as a norm of customary 
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international law, is still discussed in the legal doctrine.14 MacDonald argues that the 
label of ‘principle’ or ‘approach’ defines the ‘parameters of the current debate’ over the 
status of the principle’.15 Trouwborst and Hey argue that the difference of terminologies 
is devoid of legal meaning insofar as the two terms are used interchangeably in various 
international instruments and as such, the two formulations would have the same 
characteristics.16 Regardless of this semantic distinction, Trouwborst found that the core 
elements of the principle have attained the status of a general principle of International 
law and a customary norm.17 A trend towards recognition of a customary status to the 
precautionary principle18 seems to have emerged among environmental scholars.19 The 
formulation of precaution as an ‘approach’ or a ‘principle’ may still have a significant 
bearing for the remainder of this analysis. At first glance, principles are endowed with a 
higher degree of legal strength and normative content. Peel notes that ‘precaution’ as a 
principle would create a positive obligation to take protective measures where a 
potential risk of harm cannot be retired or verified on the basis of scientific 
knowledge.20  As an approach, ‘precaution’ would give greater flexibility to regulators 
to take protective measures in certain circumstances depending on their appreciation of 
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uncertainty and the seriousness of potential harms.21  In a similar vein, MacDonald 
considers that precaution as an ‘approach’ offers more flexibility ‘to guide future 
policies’ and give more weight to technological, social and economic considerations.22  
Depending on the interests at stake, MacDonald argues that a ‘stringent principle’ may 
be preferable, while in other contexts, ‘an open-ended approach may be necessary’.23 
Without necessitating a particular decision, precaution as a ‘principle’ may thus carry 
with it a duty to take more protective actions, including regulatory prohibitions,24 and 
stands as a presumption in favour of environmental protection in the face of uncertainty.  
 
The focus here is on the application of the precautionary principle in EU biodiversity 
law. At the EU level, the status of the precautionary principle, although not the exact 
contour of its implementation, has been defined with greater clarity. The principle is 
entrenched under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as a 
guiding principle of the environmental policy.25 The CJEU has also explicitly enshrined 
the precautionary principle as a general principle of European Union law.26  Consistent 
with its status as a general law principle, the precautionary principle applies outside the 
environmental sphere across a wide range of policy areas including energy policy 
(section 2, Chapter V). As such, the precautionary principle has been applied with 
varying degrees of weight by European courts.27 Discrepancies in its implementation 
have been justified by the fact that its application across a wide range of policies has 
been rather ‘contextual’.28 It is worth noting that variation and flexibility depending on 
particular circumstances is not specific to the precautionary principle but rather a 
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common feature to the application of all legal principles.29 Broadly speaking, the level 
of precaution has been primarily influenced by the interest being threatened and the 
standard of protection set out in secondary law ranging from weak to strong application 
of the principle.30 Hence, a weak application of the precautionary principle is commonly 
characterised by a high threshold of scientific evidence to invoke precautionary 
measures and a preference for risk management.31 Conversely, Garnett and Parsons 
argue that a strong precautionary principle is characterised by ‘a lower epistemic 
threshold of uncertainty and tends toward risk prevention’ even if there are only weak 
grounds for believing that a project may be harmful.32  In its strongest formulation, the 
precautionary principle epitomises the rationales for proactive restrictions or 
prohibitions in the face of uncertain ecological impacts. Trouwborst better summarises 
this approach ‘as erring on the side of caution, in favour of the environment, giving the 
environment the benefit of the doubt, or put another way, “in dubio pro natura”’.33 This 
is exactly the interpretation of the precautionary principle that the CJEU contemplates 
when interpreting the requirements of the ‘appropriate assessment’ under the Habitats 
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31 Ibid, 505 
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33 Arie Trouwborst, Precautionary Rights and Duties of States (1st edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
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2.2. Protection rules of Article 6(3) and Article 12 of the Habitats Directive 
 
The Habitats Directive lists nine marine habitats types and 16 marine species for which 
Special Areas of Conservation (SACs) are required.34 The Birds Directive lists 60 
species of seabirds whose conservation requires designation of Special Protection Areas 
(SPAs).35 SPAs must also be designated to ensure survival and reproduction of all 
regularly occurring migratory species not listed in the Birds Directive.36 Representative 
species of marine mammals protected by the network of N2000 sites include inter alia: 
the harbour porpoise (Phocoena phocoena), the harbour seal (Phoca vitulina), the grey 
seal (Halichoenus grypus) and the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncates).37  
Under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, any ORE project located in the vicinity of 
a N2000 site and that is likely to have a significant effect thereon, either individually or 
in combination with other projects, must be subject to an AA of its implication in view 
of the site’s conservation objectives. Competent national authorities are to authorise a 
development only if they have made certain that it will not adversely affect the integrity 
of the N2000 site concerned. If the findings of the AA conclude that a development is 
likely to have a significant impact on the integrity of a designated site, then that 
development cannot go ahead, unless it meets the criteria of Article 6(4). The 
derogation scheme of Article 6(4) applies when, despite a negative AA, and in the 
absence of alternatives, the project must nevertheless be carried out for imperative 
reasons of overriding public interest (IROPI).38  The AA process necessitated by Article 
6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive applies mutatis mutandis with respect to the SPAs 
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designated under the Birds Directive.39  Pursuant to Article 4(1) and (2) of the Birds 
Directive, SPAs must be designated by Member States to ensure survival and 
reproduction of bird species listed in Annex I and all regularly occurring migratory bird 
species not listed in Annex I of the Birds Directive.40 This means that ORE projects 
likely to have a significant effect on a designated SPA, shall similarly be subject to an 
AA of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive.  
 
Article 12(1) of the Habitats Directive affords strict protection to European Protected 
Species (EPSs) listed in Annex IV (a) against deliberate capture, killing of specimens, 
b) disturbance of species, particularly during the period of breeding and migration, c) 
deliberate destruction or taking of eggs and d) deterioration and destruction of their 
breeding and resting places. The strict protection regime of Article 12 concerns all 
cetacean species and a number of fish and turtle species including the Green sea turtle 
(Chelonia mydas), the hawksbill sea turtle (Eretmochelys imbricata) and the 
Loggerhead sea turtle (Caretta caretta).41  Any new ORE development which is liable to 
adversely disturb these species or to destroy and, or deteriorate their breeding or resting 
sites must be subject to ‘strict scrutiny’.42  Unlike the AA process of Article 6(3), the 
CJEU has not prescribed any standard of proof for the purpose of informing an 
assessment under the strict protection regime of Article 12 (1). However, a twofold 
regime of protection is applicable to marine species listed under both Annex II and 
Annex IV (a) of the Habitats Directive.43   This concerns harbour porpoises (Phocoena 
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phocoena) and bottlenose dolphins (Tursiops truncates). These species are protected by 
a dual regime of protection for their natural habitats under Articles 6(1)-(4) and a strict 
protection system against death, physical injuries, disturbance and deterioration of key 
functional places under Article 12(1).44 The protection schemes of Articles 6 and Article 
12(1) will therefore overlap, when for example, breeding sites and resting places are 
already designated as N2000 sites. This means that where a project is likely to have a 
significant effect on a site designated for an Annex II and IV (a) species, the assessment 
process shall satisfy the requirements of both Article 6(3) and Article 12(1) in order to 
avoid any double assessment.45 The AA process of Article 6(3) and the judicial 
interpretation of the precautionary principle based thereon are thus equally applicable to 
N2000 sites hosting 1) sea birds species listed under Annex I of the Birds Directive and 
regularly migratory species of sea birds, as well as 2) marine species listed exclusively 
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2.3. Setting the legal context for ORE permitting under the Habitats Directive  
 
The Habitats Directive does not specifically refer to the precautionary principle for the 
purpose of Article 6(3). The Waddenzee case46 is seminal in this respect in that it 
clarifies the nature of the precautionary principle that is to be applied to the 
authorisation of ORE projects. In Waddenzee, the CJEU endorsed a strong application 
of precautionary principle, requiring a very low threshold of scientific evidence to carry 
out an AA and prohibition of new development in the face of scientific uncertainty.   
 
The trigger to carry out an AA is a ‘very light’ one.47  The precautionary principle 
applies for this purpose. Any renewable energy project that is ‘likely’ to have a 
significant effect’ on a N2000 site, shall be subject to AA of its implication for the site 
in view of the site’s conservation objectives. ‘Likely’ constitutes the threshold at which 
an AA is required under Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. The CJEU subordinates 
the requirement for an AA to the condition that there is a mere ‘probability or a risk’ of 
significant effect on a N2000 site.48 The CJEU held that ‘in light of the precautionary 
principle, such a risk exists if it cannot be excluded on the basis of objective 
information that the plan or project will have significant effects on the site concerned’.49 
‘In case of doubt, an AA must be carried out’.50  ‘Likely’ therefore refers to the 
probability of occurrence of a significant effect and not to the nature of the potential 
damage. In this respect, one may wonder when a potential effect on N2000 sites is 
‘significant’ enough to require an AA.  With respect to the EIA Directive, Arabadjeva 
argues that ‘significant effect’ is an ‘open-ended’ and ‘vague standard which does not 
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provide clear guidance as to the precise point at which a legal obligation to conduct an 
EIA is triggered’.51  According to Arabadjeva, the ‘semantic uncertainty’ of the term 
leaves the decision-maker ample room for discretion in determining whether an 
environmental assessment under the EIA Directive shall be required, ‘creating a degree 
of legal uncertainty’ for those affected by such a legal requirement.52 Under the Habitats 
Directive, the CJEU addressed this legal gap, clarifying the nature and purpose of the 
screening process triggering an AA process as follows: 
 
[…] Where a plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the 
management of a site is likely to undermine the site’s conservation objectives, it must 
be considered likely to have a significant effect on that site. The assessment of that risk 
must be made in the light inter alia of the characteristics and specific environmental 
conditions of the site concerned by such a plan or project’.53 
 
A contrario, 
‘Where such a plan or project has an effect on that site but is not likely to undermine its 
conservation objectives, it cannot be considered likely to have a significant effect on the 
site concerned’.54 
 
AG Kokott clarified this ruling by holding that, in principle any adverse effect on the 
conservation objectives must be regarded as having a significant effect on the site.55  In 
a similar thought, AG Sharpston contends that ‘the possibility of there being a 
significant effect on the site will generate the need for an appropriate assessment’.56  
There is no need to establish such an effect – it is merely necessary to determine that 
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there may be such an effect.57 In other words, where a possibility exists that an ORE 
project may adversely affect the conservation objectives of the site either by causing a 
total loss of habitat type or species or by deteriorating such habitats, disturbing or 
diminishing the number of species for which the site has been designated, an AA shall 
be conducted. As Verschuuren rightly notes, the CJEU has placed a ‘strong emphasis’ on 
the precautionary principle for the purpose of screening.58  AG Sharpston argues that the 
requirement for the effects in question to be ‘significant’ lays down a ‘de minimis 
threshold’ excluding plans and projects with no ‘appreciable effect on the site’.59  In 
practice however, avoiding the assessment procedure of Article 6(3) will be very 
difficult, if not impossible, for novel technologies.60  There is no way to prove that the 
effects of a new proposal will not be significant where the consequences of such a 
proposal are not known due to scientific uncertainty. An AA is therefore likely to be 
systematically required in future authorisations for ORE projects anyway. For this 
reason, some authors consider that the Court ‘has rendered discussion of the word 
‘significant’ purely academic’.61  
 
The conclusions of the AA shall inform the question of whether a project will have an 
adverse effect on the integrity of marine N2000 sites. This stage of the procedure is 
hereby referred to as the ‘integrity test’ of Article 6(3). Competent authorities may 
authorise a development only if they can ‘ascertain’ that it will not adversely affect the 
integrity of the N2000 site concerned. The CJEU has favoured an inflexible application 
of the precautionary principle when interpreting the normative term of ‘ascertain’. The 
CJEU held that, after having taken into account the conclusions of the AA, competent 
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licensing authorities may authorise a plan or project only if they have made certain that 
it will not adversely affect the integrity of the site.62 According to the Court, ‘that is the 
case where no reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects’.63  
With that said, the CJEU further added that where a doubt remains as to the absence of 
adverse effects on the integrity of the site, the competent authority will have to refuse 
authorisation.64 In other words, licensing authorities shall refrain from granting 
development consents where reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the effects of 
ORE projects on the integrity of N2000 sites.  
 
The CJEU justifies its position in light of the precautionary principle and performs a 
very light proportionality test according to which Article 6(3) integrates the 
precautionary principle and makes it possible to prevent, in effective manner, adverse 
effects to the integrity of N2000 sites.  A less stringent authorisation criterion under 
Article 6(3) could not, according to the Court, ensure as effectively the fulfilment of the 
objective of site protection intended under that provision.65 This jurisprudence has been 
consistently repeated in a number of subsequent decisions66 including in the recent 
Hilde Orléans,67 People over Wind68 and Grace and Sweetman69 cases (see further 
below). The CJEU further clarified the threshold of precision that the AA must meet for 
the purpose of Article 6(3). An assessment is not appropriate if ‘it contains gaps and 
lacks complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all 
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reasonable scientific doubt as to the effects’ of a project on the integrity of a site.70 
Further, to be lawfully conducted, an AA must identify, in the light of the best scientific 
knowledge in the field, all aspects of the development project which can, by itself or in 
combination with other plans or projects, affect the site’s conservation objectives.71  It 
cannot be held that an assessment is appropriate ‘where information and reliable and 
updated data are lacking’.72 It is therefore the developer’s duty to ensure that their 
Natura Impact Statements73 have no gaps and that the science relied upon is the best 
scientific knowledge in the field.74 What is more, in a recent decision in Moorburg,75 the 
CJEU reiterated its position in Commission v. Portugal76 to note that it is at the time of 
decision-making that there must be no reasonable scientific doubt as to the absence of 
adverse effects on the integrity of the site in question.77  
 
Interestingly, the CJEU has not defined the notion of ‘reasonable scientific doubt’.  
From a common law perspective, this evidentiary burden appears to equate to the 
criminal standard of proof of ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’.78    In the common law 
system, the prosecution has the burden of proving the charge beyond reasonable 
doubt.79 This is the highest standard of proof which can be contrasted with the lesser 
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civil standard of proof: the balance of probabilities. An often quoted case defines the 
burden of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ as follows: 
‘Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be proof of such a convincing character 
that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act upon it in the most 
important of his own affairs. The jury will remember that a defendant is never to 
be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture’.80 
 
Even more clearly, the Supreme Court of the United States favours a straightforward 
definition of ‘reasonable doubt’ whereby: 
‘Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a proof that leaves jurors firmly convinced 
of the defendant’s guilt.  […]. If based on your consideration of the evidence, 
you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty you must find him guilty. If 
on the other hand, you think there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you 
must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty’.81 
 
It is therefore the prosecution’s responsibility to prove its case by more than a mere 
preponderance of the evidence. ORE developers embody the role of both the 
prosecution and defendant (who corresponds to the accused in a criminal law trial) in 
that they must prove their ‘innocence’ by providing sufficient evidence to convince 
licensing authorities beyond a reasonable doubt that their projects and associated 
ancillary works will not adversely impact upon the integrity of N2000 sites. If 
competent licensing authorities consider that ‘there is a real possibility’ that a project 
and its ancillary works will adversely affect the integrity of the site, development 
consent must be refused unless the project is found to be necessary for an imperative 
and overriding reason of public interest within the meaning of Article 6(4). 
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The Court has not had the opportunity to confirm its jurisprudence in cases involving 
permissions for ORE developments. In two recent judgements, the CJEU has 
nonetheless confirmed that the strict precautionary standards of Article 6(3) similarly 
apply with respect to the authorisation of two Irish terrestrial wind farms. Even though 
the factual backgrounds differ, both cases arose from a reference for preliminary ruling 
submitted to the CJEU by the Irish High Court and the Irish Supreme Court.  In essence, 
in People over Wind,82 the CJEU had to decide whether mitigation measures could be 
taken into consideration at the screening stage to determine whether an AA was 
necessary with respect to ancillary cable works connecting the wind farm to the 
electricity grid. The Court repeated its seminal case law whereby Article 6(3) ‘integrates 
the precautionary principle and makes it possible to effectively prevent adverse effects 
on the integrity of N2000 sites; a less stringent criterion of authorisation could not 
ensure as effectively the objective of site protection’.83 In light of this established 
jurisprudence, the CJEU has considered that it is not appropriate to take into account 
mitigation measures at the screening stage as this would deprive the ‘integrity test’ of 
the AA process of its purpose and create a risk of circumvention of that stage,84 which 
constitutes an essential safeguard of the ‘effet utile’ of the Habitats Directive.85 People 
over Wind is an important departure from an established practice in Ireland whereby 
mitigation measures could be considered at the screening stage.86  This ruling will now 
make it significantly harder, if not impossible, to screen out the need for a full AA, 
including towards renewable energy projects. Stated differently, many more renewable 
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energy developments will have to satisfy the evidentiary burden of ‘no reasonable 
scientific doubt’ to be granted development consents.   
 
A similar ruling was upheld in Grace and Sweetman,87 to reject the legality of a Species 
and Habitats Management Plan elaborated with a view to reconciling a wind energy 
development with the conservation objectives adopted for the hen harrier in a SPA. The 
factual background of this case will be discussed in further details in the first section of 
Chapter VII when analysing the legal feasibility of adaptive management. In a nutshell, 
the CJEU held that the positive effects of the habitat creation/restoration measures 
envisaged in the management plan to address the adverse impacts of the wind farm on 
the habitat of the hen harrier were highly difficult to forecast with any degree of 
certainty.88 In so doing, the Court applied the reasoning of its landmark decision in 
Briels89 to consider that habitat creation or restoration measures are compensatory by 
nature and hence, cannot be taken into account for the purpose of the AA process of 
Article 6(3).90 Here again, the decision is firmly entrenched in the precautionary 
principle.91  Based on the precautionary principle, the AA shall not leave any reasonable 
scientific doubt as to the absence of adverse effect of the proposed works on the 
integrity of the site concerned.92 
 
These judgements are important further steps in the concretisation of the precautionary 
principle of Article 6(3) in the context of renewable energy developments. First of all, 
renewable energy projects cannot avoid the need for a full AA by taking mitigation 
measures into account for the purpose of screening the need for an AA. Second, in the 
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face of remaining uncertainty, it is not possible to soften the standard of no reasonable 
scientific doubt by taking into account biodiversity conservation measures to establish 
the absence of a threat to the integrity of the site under the scope of the AA. 
 
As a matter of course, these cases are not the first cases involving a clash between the 
promotion of wind energy and the protection of habitats and species.93 For example, in 
Azienda Agro-Zootenica Franchini Sarl, the CJEU took the view that the Habitats 
Directive does not preclude more stringent legislation which prohibits in absolute terms 
the installation of all wind projects not intended for self-consumption on sites forming 
part of the N2000 network.94 In the recent Schwarze Sum River case,95 the CJEU opted 
for a more balanced approach when considering that, because of its contribution to 
environmental protection and sustainable development, the production of renewable 
energy from a hydro-electric plant can constitute an overriding public interest justifying 
derogation under the Water Framework Directive (WFD).96 Although a similar 
jurisprudence would surely be welcomed in the context of the Habitats Directive, the 
author will argue later on in a detailed analysis of the proportionate character of the 
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3 - The judicial interpretation of ‘ecological integrity’: a catalyst for precaution in 
the face of uncertain impacts on Natura 2000 sites 
 
3.1 The purposive approach to interpretation of the notion of ‘ecological 
integrity’ 
 
As discussed above, the granting of licences is conditional upon the findings of the AA 
meeting the legal test of no reasonable scientific doubt. Remarkably the concept of 
ecological integrity remained undefined under the Habitats Directive until the Sweetman 
decision.98 In the Sweetman case, the CJEU gave an important doctrinal role to the 
precautionary principle to interpret the notion of ‘integrity of the site’.99  According to 
the CJEU, a project adversely affects the integrity of the site: 
‘If it is liable to prevent the lasting preservation of constitutive characteristics of 
the site that are connected to the presence of a priority natural habitat type whose 
preservation was the objective justifying the designation [of that site]. The 
precautionary principle should apply for the purpose of that appraisal.100 
 
The CJEU justified its reasoning in the light of the precautionary principle:101 
It is to be noted, that since the authority must refuse to authorise the plan or 
project where uncertainty remains as to the absence of adverse effects on the 
integrity of the site, the authorisation criterion laid down in the second sentence 
of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive integrates the precautionary principle 
and makes it possible to prevent in an effective manner adverse effects on the 
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integrity of protected sites as a result of the plans or projects being considered. A 
less stringent authorisation criterion than that in question could not ensure as 
effectively the fulfilment of the objective of the site protection intended under 
that provision. Such an appraisal applies all the more in the main proceedings, 
since the habitat affected by the proposed road scheme is among the priority 
natural habitat types [...]. The competent national authorities cannot therefore 
authorise interventions where there is a risk of lasting harm to the ecological 
characteristics of sites which host priority natural habitat types’.102 
  
The judgement in the Sweetman case is remarkable. The purposive method of legal 
interpretation provides a clear-cut example of how the doctrinal role of the 
precautionary principle is being used by the Court to deal with uncertain direct and 
indirect impact in the AA process (section 3.3 below). In Sweetman, CJEU 
unequivocally considered that the permanent loss of 1.47 hectares of a priority habitat 
under Annex I of the Habitats Directive in the vicinity of the total 270-hectare area of 
such priority type habitat constitutes an adverse impact on the integrity of this site. In so 
doing, the CJEU relied on the doctrinal function of the precautionary principle to inform 
a purposive interpretation of ‘adverse effects on the integrity of the site’ under Article 
6(3).103 The central goal of this approach is to achieve the aims of environmental 
directives by interpreting the meaning of their normative terms.104 As discussed in 
Chapter III, the precautionary principle has been used doctrinally under a number of 
environmental Directives to interpret the meaning of legal terms105  such as ‘wastes’,106 
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‘discarding’107 or ‘plans or projects’.108 A first statement on the purposive approach to 
interpretation has been given in Palin Granit in which the EU Court allows an 
expansive interpretation of the term ‘waste’ under the Waste Framework Directive. After 
arguing that the term ‘waste’ turns on the meaning of the term ‘discard’, the CJEU held 
that: 
‘The term 'discard' must be interpreted in light of the aim of Directive 75/442 
which, according to its third recital, is the protection of human health and the 
environment against harmful effects caused by the collection, transport, 
treatment, storage and tipping of waste, and Article 174(2) EC, which provides 
that Community policy on the environment is to aim at a high level of protection 
and is to be based, in particular, on the precautionary principle and the principle 
that preventive action should be taken. It follows that the concept of waste 
cannot be interpreted restrictively […].   The question whether a given substance 
is waste must be determined in light of all the circumstances, regard being had to 
the aim of Directive 75/442 and the need to ensure that its effectiveness is not 
undermined’.109 
 
The purposive approach of Palin Granit has been consistently reiterated by the Court 
including in the Waddenzee case for the purpose of screening with respect to 
interpreting the meaning of ‘likely significant effect’ on the site.110 Commenting on the 
genesis of this method in the earliest case law,111 Judge Schockweiler argued that: ‘this 
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[purposive] interpretation allows a development beyond the literal meaning of the text 
in a dynamic direction in the light of the purpose pursued by the Treaty in its entirety 
and in its context’.112 The rationale behind the purposive interpretation technique is to 
ensure the ‘effet utile’ of environmental directives by interpreting their provisions in the 
light of their objectives.113  In a similar vein, the doctrine of effectiveness or ‘effet utile’ 
is described by Judge Fennelly as the ‘constant companion’ of the purposive method of 
the Court. This doctrine provides that ‘once the purpose of a provision is clearly 
identified, its detailed terms will be interpreted in the light of this purpose in order ‘to 
ensure that the provision retains its effectiveness’.114 Both the doctrine of effectiveness 
and its corollary, the purposive method of interpretation, ‘lead the Court to seek above 
all effectiveness, consistency, and uniformity in the application of Community law’.115   
 
In both Sweetman and Briels, the CJEU held that the Habitats Directive must be 
construed as a coherent whole in light of the conservation objectives pursued by the 
Directive.116 In the Sweetman case, the CJEU has interpreted the notion of ‘integrity of 
the site’ in light of overall objectives pursued by the Habitats Directive – which is to 
maintain or restore at a favourable conservation status the natural habitats and species of 
Community Interest.117  In Sweetman, the priority natural habitat type of European 
interest was the limestone pavement. The conservation objectives of the eligible 
extension of the Lough Corrib SAC were to maintain the limestone pavement at a 
favourable conservation status. Following the reasoning of AG Sharpston, the Court 
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came to the conclusion that the loss of a small portion of limestone pavement (1.47ha 
out of 270 ha) amounts to an adverse impact on the integrity of the site itself.  
Competent authorities cannot authorise an intervention where there is a risk that such 
intervention will bring about disappearance or the partial and irreparable destruction of 
a priority natural habitats type even if this would affect only 1,5 % of total habitat type 
protected by the site concerned.  In other words, the CJEU has restricted the notion of 
‘integrity’ to that of ‘conservation objectives’ of the qualifying interest of the site, i.e. 
the limestone pavement.118  In 2017, McIntyre and O’Halloran argued in their writings 
that the question of whether similar reasoning would be applied to a non-priority habitat 
type or species was not clearly specified.119  The recent Commission notice on Article 6 
has unequivocally confirmed that the logic behind the judicial interpretation of ‘site 
integrity’ in Sweetman is also relevant with respect to non-priority habitat types and to 
habitats of species.120  
 
Paradoxically, although the CJEU establishes a holistic requirement to consider the 
ecological characteristics that are connected to the presence of a N2000 qualifying 
feature, the Court also endorses a restrictive approach to the integrity standard by 
holding that the loss of a limited portion of limestone pavement constitutes an adverse 
impact on the ecological integrity of the site, hence, leaving no leeway for a de minimis 
exemption under Article 6(3). Typically, a de minimis exception would allow competent 
authorities to permit projects which despite the existence of a localised impacts on a 
N2000 site or its qualifying features would not compromise the entire ecological 
integrity of the site itself, and as such the capacity of the site to meet its conservation 
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objectives (see section 3.2 below). This was the interpretation taken by the Irish High 
Court in Sweetman: 
 
Read with the three words [“the integrity of”] in question deleted, the Article 
would offer protection that was comprehensive, unqualified and unconditional. 
If there was any desire to extend the protection that the Directive would afford, 
and it is hard to see why there would be given that the protection is entirely 
comprehensive, that could be achieved with much greater clarity by inserting 
words such as “whether direct or indirect” after the word “thereon”, so that the 
requirement for an appropriate assessment would be stated to apply to all plans 
or projects likely to have a significant effect on a site, whether directly or 
indirectly.121 
 
In so doing, the CJEU has narrowed down the scope of the integrity assessment to a 
strict analysis of the sites’ conservation objectives, ignoring the scientific understanding 
of ‘ecological integrity’.122 More shockingly, the CJEU has paid no attention to the 
methodological guidance of the EC (see below).  It will be argued later that such an 
understanding of ecological integrity may have far-reaching implications in terms of 
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3.2. ‘Ecological integrity’ in the scientific discourse  
 
The reasoning of the CJEU seems to be in contradiction with the EU methodological 
guidance of the EC123 and scientific understanding of ecological integrity. The EC 
guidance documents endorse an ecosystem understanding of the notion of ‘integrity of 
the site’ under the Habitats Directive. Pursuant to the EC guidance ‘Managing Natura 
2000 sites’, the meaning of ‘integrity of the site’ can be considered as a ‘quality of being 
whole or complete’.124  In a dynamic ecological context, it can be considered as having a 
‘sense of resilience and the ability to evolve in ways that are favourable to conservation 
of its qualifying features’.125 The same guidance indicates that the ‘integrity of the site’ 
refers to the ‘coherence of the site’s ecological structure and function, across its whole 
area, or the habitats, complex of habitats and/ or population of species for which the site 
has been classified’.126  A site can be described as having a high degree of integrity 
where the inherent potential for meeting site conservation objectives is realised, the 
capacity for self-repair and self-renewal under dynamic conditions is maintained.127  In 
the methodological guidance on Articles 6(3) and (4), the EC provides the ‘integrity of 
site checklist’ to assist developers with determining whether a project will adversely 
affect the integrity of a site.128  Assessing potential effects on the integrity of a N2000 
site involves a holistic determination of whether the project will disrupt those factors 
that help to maintain the favourable conditions of the site, interfere with the balance, 
distribution and density of key species that are the indicators of the favourable condition 
of the site. In this respect, the checklist of the integrity test requires other ‘ecosystem’ 
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considerations including the question of whether a project will change the vital defining 
aspects (e.g. nutrient balance) that determine how the site functions as a habitat or 
ecosystem, or change the dynamics of the relationships (between, for example, soil and 
water or plants and animals) that define the structure and/or function of the site.129  The 
connotation of ‘integrity’ under EC guidance documents clearly relates to the concept 
‘ecological integrity’ as defined in the field of ecology.130  A plethora of statements exist 
on what constitute ‘ecological integrity’.131 ‘Ecological integrity’ has been defined as a 
‘proxy’ to measure the capacity of a natural ecosystem to support biological diversity.132 
In a similar thought, Wurtzebach and Schultz clarify that ecological integrity 
emphasises the importance of ecological processes, such as natural disturbances 
regimes, that provide the structures and functions on which the full complement of 
species in an ecosystem depend.133 An ecological system has integrity if its ‘dominant 
ecological characteristics’, namely species composition, structure and functional 
organisation, ‘occur within their natural range of variations and can withstand and 
recover from most perturbations imposed by natural environmental dynamics and 
human perturbations’.134 Adapting the definition of Karr and Dudley,135 the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment similarly acknowledges that ecological integrity refers to the 
‘the ability of an ecological system to support and maintain a community of organisms 
that has species composition, diversity, and functional organization comparable to those 
of natural habitats within a region’.136  An ‘integrity assessment’ is commonly defined in 
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ecology as a measure of ecosystems’ conditions that represent their ‘structure, function, 
species composition, diversity and functional organization’.137 In line with the scientific 
definition, the integrity of N2000 sites must be intimately associated with the 
maintenance of ecological processes and functions that sustain the conservation of the 
site’s designated features.138  The integrity of the site, and as such its capacity to achieve 
its conservation objectives, would therefore be dependent upon securing the ecological 
functions and structures of the site as a whole.  
 
The notion of ‘integrity of the site’ is not defined by the Habitats Directive.   This is 
highly surprising in that this is precisely the condition that the AA process of Article 
6(3) purports to protect from harmful activities.  The legal definition of ‘integrity of the 
site’ under the Habitats Directive can be derived from that of conservation status.  As 
noted above, the overarching requirement of the Habitats Directive is to achieve 
‘favourable conservation status’ (hereafter: FCS) of Annex I habitat types and Annex II 
species.139  Conservation objectives of N2000 sites are specified objectives to be met 
within the site in order for it to make a meaningful contribution to achieving the 
objective of FCS of natural habitats or species for which the site has been designated. 
The Habitats Directive defines ‘conservation status’ as the ‘sum of influences’ acting on 
a natural habitat and its typical species that may affect its long-term natural distribution, 
structure and functions as well as the long-term survival of its typical species within the 
territory referred to in Article 2.140 With respect to species, conservation status means 
the ‘sum of the influences’ acting on the species concerned that may affect the long-
term distribution and abundance of its population within the territory referred to in 
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Article 2.141 The ‘territory’ referred to in Article 2 corresponds to N2000 sites. The 
Habitats Directive defines ‘sites’ as ‘geographically defined areas whose extent is 
clearly delineated’.142  In other words, the integrity of a N2000 site seems to be 
informed by the ‘sum of the influences’ within this site that ensure important ecological 
functions and processes sustaining the conservation status of species or habitats types. 
The wholeness of a site’s ecosystem should therefore be considered in the regime of 
Article 6(3).143  From this textual analysis of Article 1 (e) and (i), the integrity test of 
Article 6(3) would involve a holistic, ecosystem-based determination of whether the 
effects on a N2000 site of a proposed undertaking, including ORE projects, are such that 
these will disrupt those ecological factors within the site that help maintain the 
favourable conservation conditions of the species and habitats for which the site has 
been designated.   
 
As a matter of course, conservation objectives are highly relevant to determine whether 
an adverse effect on the integrity of N2000 sites will occur. The ‘integrity test’ of Article 
6(3) should be understood as a determination of whether the identified significant 
effects on the site’s conservation objectives of are such that these will encroach on the 
integrity of the site,144  understood as the ability of the site to evolve in ways that are 
favourable to conservation of its qualifying features’.145  A proposed ORE development 
must be considered as adversely affecting the integrity of a N2000 site only if its 
implementation would undermine the site’s capacity to sustain key ecosystem functions 
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that are critical to restore/maintain the conservation status of its key natural habitat type 
or species.    
 
Other commentators have confirmed this point. Analysing the notion of ‘site integrity’ 
from both an ecological and legal perspective, Rees et al, point out that ‘assessing the 
integrity of N2000 sites requires the complex task if understanding the ecosystem 
organisation at a location in terms of ecosystem structure, functions and connectivity 
with qualifying features’.146 The achievement of sites’ conservation objectives and of 
the overarching objective of FCS would be dependent upon securing these ecosystem 
functions and processes.147 Rees et al, conclude that it is therefore important for both 
ecological and legal purposes ‘to treat the site as a whole’ and not the to focus merely 
on its individual feature or limited portion of habitats within the site.148  Interestingly, 
the CJEU took a different view. The jurisprudence of the CJEU in Sweetman seems to 
refrain from considering the integrity of ‘site’ as a whole and restricts the notion of 
ecological integrity of the site to a limited examination of the effect on the integrity of a 
portion of habitat within the site.    
 
To comply with the judicial principles of the CJEU, domestic courts endorse a similar 
approach to interpretation, sometimes restricting the integrity test to a strict analysis of 
N2000 sites’ conservation objectives. By way of an example, the purposive approach of 
the Court can be seen, quite strikingly, in RSPB v Secretary of State for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs [2015].149   In this case, the Royal Society for the Protection of 
Birds (RSPB) was seeking judicial review of the dismissal of its claim against the 
Secretary of State’s decision to direct Natural England to cull two species of gulls 
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within a SPA. Judge Mitting departed from the purposive approach of the CJEU in 
ruling that the focus of the integrity test must be on the effect on the ecological integrity 
of the site and not on the conservation objectives behind its designation.150 Under the 
2011 conservation objectives adopted for the SPA, if natural fluctuations were known, 
the objective was to maintain the population at or above the minimum for the site. 
Where natural fluctuations were unknown, to maintain or restore the population above 
75 % of that at designation; a loss of 25% or more is unacceptable. On this basis, the 
Secretary of State decided that the reduction of the number of gulls to a figure which 
maintained the population to a number which was above 75% of its baseline would not 
result in the population of gulls being in an unfavourable status.151 Mitting J. concluded 
that the Secretary of State made a careful and rational assessment of those numbers 
which could be safely culled before the long-term viability of the lesser-black gull was 
impaired.152   Mitting J. further reasoned that what might lead to the decline of gulls was 
the decrease of their habitats and a cutting off or reduction of food. Because the cull 
would not, except temporarily, affect the habitat of the gulls, the integrity of the site 
would not be affected by it.153 The Court of Appeal quashed the decision and came back 
to a strict analysis of the conservation objectives. The Court held that the Secretary of 
State misinterpreted the conservation objectives and wrongly used a generic threshold 
(25%), which only allows for natural fluctuation in the bird populations in the SPA, to 
justify deliberate reduction of populations to, and thereafter maintaining them at, a 
percentage (above 75%) of the population at designation.  In the absence of a known 
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minimum figure, the threshold of 75% is simply a proxy for the bottom end of their 
natural range.154 
 
In a nutshell, although the Sweetman conclusions establish a holistic requirement to 
consider the ecological characteristics of N2000 sites, this emphasis on the ecosystem 
approach contrasts with the restrictive understanding of ‘ecological integrity’ taken by 
the CJEU. According to the CJEU, a small direct impact on N2000 qualifying features 
constitutes an adverse effect on the integrity of the site even if the site’s inherent 
ecological integrity and as such, its capacity to meet conservation objectives, is not, per 
se undermined. Paunio reasons that in the context of EU law, where ‘multilingualism 
reduces the appropriateness of linguistic reasoning, a highly purposive approach, by 
increasing substantive certainty, will increase legal certainty as a whole’.155   The CJEU 
may ‘bend or ignore the literal meaning’156 of “ecological integrity” to prevent 
divergent interpretations of this complex scientific notion in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of the protection scheme of the Habitats Directive.  Beyond these 
linguistic concerns, the purposive method of interpretation taken by the judiciary 
strikingly illustrates a significant disconnection between environmental law and 
ecological science, and more particularly, between how these connected disciplines 
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3.3. A catalyst for precaution in the face of uncertain direct and indirect impacts 
on Natura 2000 qualifying features 
 
McIntyre notes that the CJEU expressly links the application of the precautionary 
principle with situations ‘where uncertainty remains as to the absence of adverse effects 
on the integrity of the site’.157 In Sweetman, the highly purposive method of 
interpretation taken by the CJEU in relation to the term of ‘site integrity’ epitomises the 
guidance function of the precautionary principle. In particular, this ‘effectiveness-
dominated’, which Lees also refers to as ‘certainty-focused’,158 approach to 
interpretation,  provides a striking example of how the doctrinal role of the 
precautionary principle is being used by the judiciary to deal with uncertain direct and 
indirect ecological impacts in the AA process.  
 
The Court clearly endorses a restrictive approach to the notion of ‘ecological integrity’ 
by considering that the permanent loss of a small portion of a priority habitat (1.5% of 
the total surface of such priority type habitat) constitutes an adverse impact on the 
integrity of a N2000 site, hence, leaving no leeway for a de minimis exemption under 
Article 6(3).  In the specific context of the Sweetman case, there was no certainty that 
the loss of 1.47 hectares of limestone pavement (direct impact) would not have an 
adverse impact on the long-term structure and functioning of the site and thus, the 
conservation status of the limestone pavement.  By considering that a loss or damage 
caused to any portion of priority natural habitat constitutes an adverse impact on the 
integrity of the site itself, the CJEU clearly regards the purposive approach as a legal 
interpretation technique capable of informing substantive protection in the face of 
uncertainty. In the Sweetman context, the exclusion of a de minimis exemption under 
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Article 6(3) will ensure that no unexpected adverse effects to the integrity of N2000 
sites will occur as a result of the ‘ripple effect’ of localised minor incursions. The 
‘precautionary function’ associated with the purposive approach has been largely 
endorsed by AG Sharpston as a legal interpretation method that prevents ‘the death by a 
thousand cuts’ phenomenon, that is to say, cumulative habitat loss as a result of 
multiple, or at least a number of, lower level projects being allowed to proceed on the 
same site’.159 
 
Paradoxically, the CJEU also establishes a holistic requirement to consider the 
constitutive characteristics of N2000 sites ‘that are connected to the presence’160 of a 
N2000 qualifying feature. The applicants in the main proceedings before the Irish High 
Court in the Sweetman case161 argued that the integrity assessment of Article 6(3) ‘was 
designed to deal with the situation where an effect on the site, although not a direct one, 
might nevertheless undermine the integrity of the site’.162 This would the case in 
situations where upstream activity might have an adverse impact on water quality or 
qualifying habitats and species situated downstream.163 Without permitting a de minimis 
exception, the reference made by the CJEU to ‘the characteristics of the site’ indicates 
that the Court may have envisaged all situations where a project may have an indirect 
adverse effect on the sites or its qualifying habitats or species because of affecting other 
relevant ecosystem processes or functions that are important to sustain the conservation 
status of the habitat types or species of interest. In Bund Naturschutz in Bayern,164 the 
CJEU has shed some light on the notion of ‘characteristics of the site’ when deciding on 
the type of ‘appropriate’ protective measures to be adopted by Member States in respect 
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of proposed Sites of Community Interest (SCIs).  The CJEU opts for a broad 
understanding of the notion of ‘characteristics of the site’ to include other ecological 
features which are not per se the habitat types or species for which the site has been 
designated but contribute to the conservation of these qualifying habitats and species. 
The Court held that the characteristics of the site ‘must reflect a number of factors 
including the degree of  representativity of the habitat type, its structure and functions, 
the feature of the habitats which are important for the species concerned and the value 
of the site for the conservation of the habitat or species’.165  While this clarification was 
made with respect to appropriate protection measures for proposed SCIs, there is no 
reason why the reasoning of the Court would be different once the site has been 
included in the list of SCIs.   The approach of the Court is consistent with the ‘integrity 
of site checklist’ of the EC methodological guidance.166 As discussed above, the 
‘integrity of the site checklist’ highlights that the integrity test requires taking into 
account broader  ‘ecosystem’  considerations to assess the effects of a project on other 
ecological factors such as: 1) ‘any vital defining aspects (e.g. nutrient balance) that 
determine how the site functions as a habitat or ecosystem’; 2) ‘dynamics of 
relationships between, for example, soil and water or plants and animals that define the 
structure and/or function of the site’, 3) water dynamics or chemical composition.  Such 
an emphasis on the ecosystem approach indicates that natural values which make the 
site suitable for the conservation of qualifying species or habitats must be equally be 
considered in the integrity test of the Article 6(3) regime.167  
 
Rees and others follow the same line of reasoning when arguing that the legal definition 
of  ‘site integrity’ must be understood as including the maintenance of ecological  
processes and functions that sustain the conservation status of a qualifying marine 
                                                          
165 Ibid, para.46 
166 European Commission, ‘Methodological Guidance’, (n123), at 28-29 




habitats or species.168 To determine whether the integrity of the site will be affected by 
an ORE project, ‘the essential question the decision-maker must ask is ‘why was this 
particular site designated and what are its conservation objectives?’.169     
 
The fundamental issue here is that scientific knowledge usually lags far behind what is 
required by law to inform regulatory decision-makers.170  This is particularly the case in 
relation to measuring the complex interactions between ecosystem processes and 
functions in relation to conservation status of N2000 features.171  In this connection, the 
CJEU may therefore have created an additional level of protection to ensure that no 
indirect adverse impacts will occur because of insufficient scientific understanding of 
ecosystem connectivity. As such, the judicial interpretation of ‘integrity of the site’ 
seems to infer that the legal test of no reasonable scientific doubt must equally be 
satisfied with respect to any direct or indirect impacts likely to occur by connectivity 
with natural habitat types or species of N2000 sites. This has been confirmed quite 
clearly in the very recent Moorburg case.172 The CJEU found that the project being 
challenged was not located in the N2000 areas concerned but rather at a considerable 
distance from them (600km upstream), but that this in no way precludes the 
applicability of the requirements of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive.173 The CJEU 
rejected the argument of the German authorities whereby it is ‘almost impossible to 
determine with certainty all the likely effects of specific measures on N2000 areas over 
large geographical distances’.174 Although this case concerned the installation of a coal-
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fired power plant, similar reasoning may be applied to offshore renewable energy 
plants.  
 
Overall, the purposive approach to interpretation, reminiscent of the precautionary 
principle, clearly emphasises the fundamental differences between how law and 
environmental sciences approach scientific uncertainty. In Chapter III, the author has 
stressed that this dichotomy is particularly noticeable in the field of environmental law 
where the need for legal certainty must account for unpredictable ecological systems. 
Environmental law is characterised by a ‘heavy reliance on science’.175 In fact, as 
observed by De Sadeleer, ‘science is the lynchpin around which environmental law is 
organised’.176  ‘This marriage is not entirely free of strife: while the jurist seeks 
certainty, the scientist points out to the uncertainty inherent to ecological risk’.177 In 
environmental sciences, ‘uncertainty [typically] provides a catalyst for exploration, 
whereas uncertainty is antithetical to the rule of law’.178 Latour also writes that ‘science 
can tolerate gaps but the law has to be seamless’.179 As such, ‘lawyers often view 
uncertainty as a barrier to enforceability and action’.180  The underlying rationale behind 
the reliance on the purposive method is unquestionably  to ensure the ‘effet utile’ of the 
site protection scheme of Article 6 in the face of uncertain direct and indirect impacts on 
N2000 features by imposing a very high scrutiny on new proposed developments.  At 
this stage, the important question arises as to how realistic the judicial interpretation of 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive is in the particular context of offshore renewable 
energy. More precisely, what are the legal consequences associated with the 
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interpretation of ‘integrity of the site’ in terms of standard of proof required from ORE 
developers?   
 
4- Precautionary and purposive interpretation of ‘integrity of the site’: an 
unrealistic standard proof for offshore renewable energy developers  
 
The jurisprudence of the CJEU, and more particularly the recent judgements in People 
Over Wind and Grace and Sweetman,  raises a number of difficult legal questions 
regarding the balance to be struck between technological innovation in the field of 
renewable energy and environmental protection.181  
 
First of all, the judicial standard of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’ makes the line 
between ‘hypothetical risks’ and non-trivial uncertainty extremely thin.  Hanekamp and 
Forrester observe that ‘a very high level of scepticism as to what science cannot deliver 
goes hand in hand with a very optimistic level of confidence regarding what science 
should be able to deliver’.182 In this situation, ‘the line between real risk and mere 
conjecture may be practically imperceptible’.183 It is settled case law that purely 
hypothetical risks cannot, in any circumstances, justify the application of the 
precautionary principle insofar as ‘zero risk’ does not exist.184 Before the precautionary 
principle can be invoked to refuse development consent in the face of uncertain impacts, 
the seriousness of the risk must be real and not hypothetical.185  Acting on hypothetical 
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risks would violate  the general principle of proportionality.186 ‘Hypothetical risk’ or 
trivial uncertainty is founded on mere conjecture which has not been ‘scientifically 
verified’ and as such, has not been fully demonstrated.187  An obvious issue here is that a 
large number of potential ecological risks associated with the deployment of ORE 
technologies have not yet been verified with sufficient scientific backing and as such, 
these risks can still be considered as ‘hypothetical’.188  As emphasised in Chapter III, 
some interactions of the marine environment with ORE devices may be benign but in 
the absence of sufficient observation and empirical data, it is not possible to retire some 
important aspects of risks associated with collision, underwater noise and animal 
displacement. A number of risks associated with ORE projects have not been 
scientifically confirmed and as such, it is not currently possible for the scientific 
community to conclude, with absolute certainty, that these risks are sufficiently remote 
to exclude the application of the precautionary principle. We also simply ‘don’t know 
what we don’t know’.189  It is then conceivable that a ‘hypothetical risk’ may still 
constitute a ‘reasonable scientific doubt’ if the likelihood of it materialising cannot be 
completely ruled out on the basis of existing scientific knowledge. The application of 
the strict precautionary rules of the CJEU in this context would clearly depart from the 
‘evidence-based approach’ recommended by the EC in its guidance on the precautionary 
principle. Although not legally binding, the EC guidance on the precautionary principle 
subordinates the adoption of precautionary actions to the proportionality principle.190 In 
a radically different decision relating to public health concerns, the Court adopted a 
similar threshold of evidence, namely that of ‘reasonable doubts’ as to the safety of the 
Nifursol for human health to uphold the withdrawal of authorisation for that 
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substance.191 Interestingly, the Court subtly argued that such a low evidentiary threshold 
amounts to a ‘zero risk tolerance’ which ‘does not refer to purely hypothetical risks and 
cannot therefore be compared to the concept of zero-risk’.192  For the Court, the policy 
of ‘strict zero tolerance’ can be justified under the precautionary principle, and 
considering proportionality, to establish a total ban of an additive even in the case of 
uncertainty as to the extent of the potential risk to human health.193 A full discussion on 
the proportionality principle will be given in section 6.2 of Chapter V.  As first glance,  
it is worth noting that this reasoning seems hardly compatible with the proportionality 
principle when it comes to cases dealing with complex environmental risks.194  With 
respect to environmental cases, knowledge is far less advanced than it is with respect to 
human health issues. In this vein, De Sadeleer observes that ‘the obligation to take 
account of the most salient scientific findings does not warrant strict rules of 
evidence’.195 The rationale behind this is that ‘uncertainties are far more important in 
this field given the difficulty of predicting the reactions ecosystems to ecological 
risks’.196 This holds even truer with regard to adjudications involving project 
developments in offshore areas.  Achieving certainty beyond reasonable scientific doubt 
is extremely difficult for reasons that are inherent to the ecology of marine ecosystems. 
As discussed in Chapter III, the state of marine ecosystems is rarely known with 
absolute certainty due to the inherent difficulties of monitoring life underwater and in 
offshore environments.197 Marine ecosystems are subject to a wide range of natural 
variations and stochastic fluctuations which means that no scientific investigation can 
reasonably meets the standard of no reasonable scientific doubt without prior experience 
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of monitoring in real sea conditions. Any new technology deployed in the marine 
environment creates a risk to marine biodiversity. This can be the case even if the 
devices are deployed outside marine N2000 areas. The procedural requirements of 
Article 6(3) are not limited to the geographical scope of N2000 sites and may equally 
apply to developments situated outside N2000 sites.198 Where a site offers best 
conditions for biodiversity conservation, avoiding this site is preferable though  
avoiding N2000 sites may not necessarily retire risks in all circumstances. Connectivity 
in the marine environment contribute to exacerbating the ‘ripple effect’ or long-distance 
effect of localised impacts.199 Lièvre et al., argue elsewhere that the mobile nature of 
marine mammals, seabirds and fish result in a high likelihood of connectivity between 
the location of development sites and N2000 sites.200 Spatial areas of connectivity with 
marine N2000 features ‘may extend over hundreds of kilometres reflecting the foraging 
and migratory use of the marine environment by many species’.201 In other words, the 
risks are not necessarily removed by placing development sites in location remote from 
marine N2000 sites. Adverse effects may occur as a result of physical 
interactions/collisions with mobile protected species or alteration of ecological 
processes outside the vicinity of SPAs/SACs. The far-field effects of the in-water wakes 
of multiple offshore wind turbines, as described in more detail in Chapter II (section 
2.4) and Chapter III (section 3.1), also provide an example of connectivity with offshore 
wind energy sites. Although the impacts of turbine wakes on local biodiversity remain 
unknown, their spatial extent has been shown to be significant (section 2.4, Chapter II).  
Furthermore, it has been emphasised that conducting an AA entails determining whether 
a proposed development may cause long-term population changes such, that its 
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implementation would compromise the achievement of specified N2000 sites’ 
conservation objectives.202 Understanding population-level impacts requires collecting 
data on species population dynamics (i.e. distribution and density) in order to estimate 
the number of animals predicted to be adversely affected by a development. Chapter III 
emphasised that a number of EISs for recent installed OWFs reported difficulties 
associated with tracking marine animals over large geographic areas.203  Technical 
difficulties primarily stem from the paucity of representative data on ranging behaviour 
and population structure of marine species. Some data gaps are also simply too broad to 
be bridged by developers at the project-level.204  The  relatively small spatial scale of 
development sites combined with short timeframes and financial constraints of 
monitoring programmes mean that sample sizes are highly unlikely to cover important 
seasonal variation in many marine organisms.205 As a result, all types of ORE projects 
including OWFs are highly likely to be ‘Data-Rich Information-Poor’,  which as defined 
in section 5 of Chapter III,  means that despite significant data collection, these data do 
not enable meaningful verification of predicted impacts.  
In the absence of further scientific understanding, the interpretation of ‘site integrity’, 
when considered in conjunction with the legal test of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’, 
places an unrealistic and impractical burden on ORE developers to provide sufficient 
evidence to convince licensing authorities that  their projects will not, individually or in 
combination with other projects, adversely affect:  1)   any marine habitat types or 
species in the vicinity of N2000 sites (directly);  2)  any marine habitat types or species 
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outside the vicinity of N2000 sites (indirectly) by connectivity with a nearby SPA/SAC, 
and, 3) any ecological processes (i.e. hydrodynamics, nutrient cycling, sediment 
transport) that contribute to sustaining the conservation status of marine N2000 features. 
This is not realistically achievable in light of the current state of scientific knowledge. 
 
Practical difficulties in meeting the evidentiary standard set out under Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive have recently resulted in a single tidal energy turbine withdrawing its 
application for a foreshore licence in Ireland.  According to the development company, 
the additional bird surveys that were required to inform the AA process were beyond the 
timeline of the funding available to deploy and test the device.206 Even in the context of 
OWF, another striking example is the withdrawal of Phase 2 of the London Array. 
Although the generating capacity of Phase 2 had been significantly scaled-down to 
reduce potential harmful effects on the red throated diver, three more years of data 
collection were required to reduce uncertainty as to the possible displacement effects on 
seabirds with no guarantee that these would be sufficient to satisfy licensing authorities 
that any impact on the birds ‘would be acceptable’.207 
 
Some commentators will always argue that the number of wind energy projects that 
have been denied development consents because of the rigid application of the 
precautionary principle of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive is very low.208  This can 
be explained by the fact that offshore wind energy is now the most mature and viable 
offshore renewable energy technology. The offshore wind industry benefits from 
                                                          
206 Lorna Siggins, ‘Planning hitch forces renewables firm to pull Shannon project’ The Irish Time (Dublin, 
13 August, 2018) 
207 BBC News, ‘Sea birds halt London Array wind farm extension’ BBC (19 February 2014). 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-26258271> (10 July 2018); See further: London Array, ‘Phase 
Two’. <http://www.londonarray.com/the-project-3/phase-2/> (accessed 27 September 2018) 




increasing financial attractiveness in investments with rapid cost reduction.209 To date, 
84% of total worldwide installed capacity is located in the EU,210  with a total capacity 
of 15 MW deployed in 2017.211  Offshore wind developers are in a stronger financial 
position and hence can afford to cover expensive monitoring campaigns to confidently 
inform regulatory decision-makers. Given their contribution to CO2 abatement, large-
scale OWFs are also more likely to get around a negative AA for imperative reasons of 
overriding public interest (IROPI).212  Although the requirements laid down in Article 
6(4) are said to be of restrictive application,213 AG Sharpston points out that Article 6(4) 
does not create an ‘insuperable obstacle to authorisation’.214 The EC has consistently 
taken ‘a soft glance’215 at the question of whether large-scale developments with 
positive economic impacts could be considered as IROPI in the sense of Article 6(4).216 
The author will further develop this argument in section 6.2 of Chapter VI.  At this 
stage, an overly demanding evidentiary threshold may result in only large-scale 
renewable energy projects being able to absorb extensive monitoring costs necessary to 
satisfy the standard of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’ in the AA process. 
At first glance, a rigid precautionary principle under Article 6(3) might seem to caution 
against any project that carries with it risks of local significant impacts on N2000 sites. 
However, by failing to account for some risk, we are now in a bizarre situation where 
the stringent interpretation of the precautionary principle under Article 6(3) may 
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become ‘paralyzing’ and ‘defective’.217 The judicial  standard of ‘no reasonable 
scientific doubt’ typically embodies what Wildavsky refers to as a ‘trial without error’218 
paradigm of risk management whereby ‘no change is allowed unless solid proof that the 
proposed undertaking is not harmful’;219 ‘no trial without prior guarantees against 
error’.220 ‘When in doubt, do nothing’.221 Sunstein has already warned against such a 
strong ‘minimax’222 application of the precautionary principle.223 As observed by 
Sunstein, an absolutist precautionary principle would preclude the introduction of any 
desirable technological innovations ‘that make human lives easier, more convenient and 
healthier’.224  By the same token, Wildavsky asserts that the precautionary principle in 
its extreme application would make even the smallest innovation impossible if it is 
suspected of entailing a risk.225 Cooney argues that ‘doing nothing is often not an 
effective option in the conservation context’.226 In the particular context of renewable 
energy technologies, applying such a strict precautionary principle ‘focuses on [very] a 
narrow aspect of what is at stake’.227 Suspending a ‘Damoclean sword’228 over 
innovative technologies that are necessary to abate one of the greatest environmental 
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threats, associated with impacts from climate change, will have far more dramatic 
consequences on biodiversity. Anthropogenic climate change is a major threat to 
biodiversity.229  A recent study indicates that 35% of N2000 species are ‘very highly’ 
and ‘extremely highly’ vulnerable to climate change effects.230  Hence, it is highly 
unlikely that the network of N2000 sites will yield the intended protection outcomes 
unless adequate climate change mitigation measures are taken to abate CO2 emissions.   
Setting a standard of proof that cannot be realistically met by developers of renewable 
energy technologies may paradoxically run afoul of the precautionary principle: it 
marginalises the role of science and this may, in the long-term, deprive both society and 
biodiversity of ‘significant benefits’ associated with climate change mitigation. What is 
more, imposing such a high request for certainty about  uncertain [ecological] risks is 
also regarded as ‘incompatible’, ‘if not contradictory, with the core of the precautionary 
principle which implies that neither proof nor evidence is available’.231 Van Asselt and 
Vos point out that it is precisely ‘the acknowledgment of the limits of science in 
providing conclusive evidence that has led to the development of the precautionary 
principle’.232  Some authors go as far as to argue that setting a very high burden of proof 
‘could defeat the purpose of the precautionary principle’ insofar as the very nature of the 
principle is to address scientific uncertainty.233 Indeed, if the precautionary principle is 
interpreted in such a way that it precludes the achievement of best scientific evidence 
that is needed to effectively protect biodiversity from the long-term impacts of climate 
change, the application of the principle can hardly be considered as precautionary. 
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Moyle elegantly writes on this aspect saying that an exclusive focus on avoiding risks 
makes the precautionary principle ‘extremely timid’: ‘the fear of a loss ignores the 
potential conservation benefits that may be gained from different strategies’.234  
Combating global warming demands a better understanding of how low-carbon energy 
technologies interact with the receiving marine environment. Getting knowledge in 
turns, requires further monitoring and data collection. Setting a standard of proof that is 
too high to be passed by project developers to secure necessary development consent 
will inevitably reduce possibilities to deploy, monitor and learn from new renewable 
energy technologies in a way that would benefit biodiversity conservation by improving 
the state of scientific knowledge and future licensing decision-making. The 
consequence of taking a highly precautionary approach could lead to a situation where, 
as observed by Todt and Lujan, developers and regulators ‘would never know what real 
benefits these technologies may bring’.235 Likewise, they ‘would also never understand 
if the possible negative effects really exist, and if so, if these effects can be resolved and 
minimized efficiently, or if they may turn out to be acceptable given the overwhelming 
benefits derived from the technology in question’.236 In a similar line of thought, 
Copping and others argue elsewhere that, as far as the wave and tidal energy sector is 
concerned, ‘there may be positive trade-off between environmental risks and 
performance of devices but these trade-offs can only be resolved once full-scale projects 
come online’.237   
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While it can be argued that the precautionary principle should not be operated to 
prohibit the deployment of technical innovation that has promising benefits for climate 
change mitigation,238 on the other hand, pushing the precautionary principle too far, in 
the way of full relaxation, is not desirable either, as this would favour unproven and 
potentially harmful technologies. This is exactly what the precautionary principle was 
designed to avoid.  The problem is therefore pervasive and epitomises the ‘uncertainty 
paradox’ of Van Asselt and Vos, i.e. the paradoxical position of regulatory decision-
makers who ‘increasingly rely on science for more certainty and conclusive evidence 
but science in turn, cannot deliver decisive evidence on uncertainty risks’.239 There is 
therefore, a need to promote a ‘middle ground’ balancing principle.  In situations where 
technological innovation is perceived to be necessary but the environmental 
consequences of these technologies are uncertain, the very nature of the precautionary 
principle should be to address scientific uncertainties in order to maximise the use of 
beneficial technologies while reducing undesired effects. As far back as 2006, Weiss 
urged that the precautionary principle should be complemented by the principles of 
adaptive management to make it compatible, and even, stimulate technological 
innovation.240 The author shares the same view.  Adaptive management, also distilled 
down as ‘learning by doing’,241 is paramount to improve the merits of the precautionary 
principle in situations where, despite scientific uncertainty, there is a strong ‘call for 
moving in the dark rather sitting still’.242   An adaptive management procedure does not 
necessarily require having a high level of certainty before delivering necessary 
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development consents.243 However, it provides the process to ‘improve relevant 
knowledge about dynamic ecological systems, while seeking to minimise risks 
associated with ongoing management’ which are likely to arise as a result of decisions 
made on the basis of incomplete information.244 The practical aspects of this 
management approach and its operational application to the ORE sector will be the core 
topic of Chapter VI.   
 
The purposive approach of the CJEU has had a significant impact on how domestic 
courts interpret the assessment requirements of Article 6(3).245 Domestic courts are 
bound by the interpretation of the CJEU by virtue of the doctrine of supremacy.246  The 
subsequent section provides a short review of domestic case law from Ireland and the 
United Kingdom illustrating the difficulties and resources needed to inform an AA that 
meets the high evidentiary threshold of the CJEU.247 Although the domestic case law 
identified primarily concerns judicial reviews of permissions for onshore renewable 
energy projects, it is worthy to note that domestic courts, have almost systematically, 
applied the judicial principles elaborated by the CJEU. It is therefore likely that a 
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5 - Application of the judicial principles of the CJEU by domestic Courts: a 
deployment challenge? 
 
The recent judgement in Mynydd Y Gwynt Ltd v. Secretary of State for Business Energy 
and Industrial Strategy248 illustrates the regulatory difficulties faced by developers of 
renewable energy projects to pass the legal test of no reasonable scientific doubt. By 
way of background, Mynydd Y Gwynt Ltd sought permission to install 27 wind energy 
turbines in Wales.  At issue was the effect of the proposed wind energy development on 
the red kite population of the neighbouring Elenydd Mallean SPA. The conservation 
objectives of the SPA were to support at least 15 pairs of breeding red kites. The 
Secretary of State refused to grant development consent on the grounds that she was not 
satisfied that the project, alone or in combination with other projects, would not have a 
detrimental effect on a protected population of red kite as a result of the risk of collision 
with turbine blades. A number of uncertainties had not been addressed by the 
development company including, inter alia, the reliability of bird survey data, the 
proportion of red kites coming from the nearby SPA, the effectiveness of mitigation 
measures and the level of mortality from collision that the red kite population could 
sustain before the site’s conservation objectives would be undermined.  The claimant 
(Mynydd Y Gwynt Ltd) relied on extensive survey data from 2009 to 2015 and 
guidance provided by Scottish National Heritage (SNH) to argue that there was no 
connectivity with the Elenydd Mallean SPA in that the proposed development was 
located more than 4 km away from the SPA and no nesting activities had been identified 
within 6 km. The maximum foraging range of red kites during the breeding season was 
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established at 6 km by the SNH guidance. On this basis, the claimant contended that 
there would be no real risk that the red kites would come from the SPA to forage. 
Natural Resources Wales (NRW) required additional survey work within 10 km of the 
proposed development site to account for the bird’s foraging range during non-breeding 
seasons (although no such a requirement was contained in the SNH guidance). NRW 
argued that Mynydd y Gwynt had no data to demonstrate the origins of the red kites 
using the proposed development site. Therefore, it could not be shown that the wind 
farm, alone or in combination with other projects, would not have likely significant 
effect on the SPA.  In light of the precautionary principle, NRW’s stance was that it 
should be assumed that red kite birds came from the SPA. The developer commissioned 
further surveys but NRW maintained its position. NRW’s conclusion was not that there 
was a real risk to the kite population, but rather that Mynnyd y Gwynt had not provided 
enough evidence to show that such a risk on the site’s conservation objectives could be 
excluded. Unlike NRW, the Examiner concluded that, in light of up-to-date survey data, 
a reasonable degree of certainty had been reached to demonstrate that red kites did not 
originate from the SPA and that consequently, the project would not result in a likely 
significant effect on the site.   Despite this, the Secretary of State requested further 
information from NRW and Mynnyd y Gwynt on the maximum morality rates that 
could occur without adversely affecting the integrity of the SPA. Mynnyd y Gwynt 
responded to some of the issues raised by the Secretary of State but failed to provide 
further information about the red kite population. The Secretary of State agreed with 
NRW that the development company had not demonstrated beyond all reasonable 
scientific doubt that the red kite did not come from the SPA. She therefore turned down 
the application on the ground that there were some risks that the red kites using the site 
would originate from the SPA.  Mynydd Y Gwynt Ltd appealed the decision on the 




certainty’ with respect to each element of the assessment (i.e. mortality rate and the 
proportion of red kites and the proportion of re kites coming from the SPA) instead of 
using available data to consider ‘the matter as a whole’ and make a reasoned judgment 
in making the assessment rather than ruling on the basis of the ‘worst possible 
hypothesis’ (100% of red kites were coming from the SPA).249 At the first instance, the 
High Court held that the burden of proof was on Mynydd y Gwnyt in the sense that it 
was up to the applicant to provide sufficient information to convince the Secretary of 
State that there was no real risk of adverse effects as to the integrity of the red kite 
feature of the SPA.250  In summary, the High Court concluded that Mynnyd y Gwynt had 
failed to provide information reasonably required to determine the appropriate 
assessment. The Secretary of State had, however, done the best she could on the 
available information. Therefore, the approach cannot be said to have been wrong in 
law.251 The Court of Appeal agreed that the Secretary of State had acted lawfully.252 
Mynydd Y Gwynt attempted to argue that the Secretary of State went too far by 
requiring absolute certainty on the issue. The Court dismissed the appeal. The Secretary 
of State was not asking for absolute certainty about the red kite population, rather, the 
Court held that the Secretary of State required clarity.253 The Secretary of State was thus 
entitled to conclude that ‘such clarity was not provided by the information before 
her’.254According to the Court, the legal test of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’, does not 
mean imposing a strict legal burden of proof upon one party. Instead, it means ‘no more 
that it is in the interest of the applicant to provide the information necessary to enable 
favourable decision to be made’.255  
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That said, whilst it is for the competent authorities to undertake the AA process, the 
onus is on the proponent of the project to provide the information necessary to secure 
the approval.256 The Mynydd y Gwynt Ltd case concerned visible red kite birds on land. 
Establishing, beyond reasonable scientific doubt, the absence of connectivity with 
nearby marine N2000 areas might be even more challenging due to difficulties in 
monitoring species offshore or below the water surface. Providing more data or 
information is expensive and time consuming.257 This responsibility should not be borne 
solely by developers of renewable energy technologies under the framework of 
licensing procedures.  With respect to seabirds, Furness et al., rightly demonstrate that it 
is not currently possible to know with absolute certainty the colonies that sea birds 
come from unless strategic ringing programmes are undertaken.258    
 
In Ireland in Kelly v An Bord Pleanála,259 the applicant was seeking orders of certiorari 
to quash the authorisation granted by An Bord Pleanála, the Irish statutory planning 
authority, for two wind farm developments in Roscommon (Ireland). The legal grounds 
upon which judicial review was sought were that the Natura Impact Statements 
provided by the developer were inadequate in that they did not meet the requirements of 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive and jurisprudence based thereon. The applicant 
equally contended that An Bord Pleanála failed to carry out AAs which met the judicial 
criteria of the CJEU and to give reasons for its determination in the AAs. The proposed 
developments consisted in two wind farms of 16 and 19 turbines respectively, located in 
the same vicinity of N2000 sites hosting bird species of national and EU interest.  Phase 
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1 (wind farm 1) was located within 10 kilometres of 10 N2000 sites. Phase 2 (wind farm 
2) was planned within 15 km of 14 Natura sites hosting bird species of national and EU 
interest. The main concerns included inter alia: 1) the displacement of Golden Plover 
and Lapwing birds; 2) the disturbance of feeding/ roosting/ commuting areas and 
natural flight lines of a number of protected birds; and 3) collision strike with wind 
turbines.   
 
With respect to the first ground of concern, the Inspector from the Board agreed that, 
given the extensive and alternative habitats available to the target species, there was 
unlikely to be any significant long-term impact. However, regarding the second ground 
of concern, the Inspector argued that the level of information provided by the developer 
was insufficient. The Inspector was also of the view that a higher burden of proof must 
be required to demonstrate the absence of adverse effects on the integrity of the SPA. In 
particular, the Inspector argued that the survey did not address the interconnections 
between the conservation sites and failed to submit information on flight patterns of 
Greenland White-Fronted Geese. The Inspector further stressed that the developer did 
not provide adequate information to prove beyond all reasonable scientific doubt that 
Phase 1 of the wind farm developments would not impact the feeding, roosting, 
commuting area and natural flight lines of protected bird species and the integrity of 
their conservation sites. Likewise, the developer had not proven beyond reasonable 
scientific doubt that the proposed turbine heights would not adversely affect the 
integrity of the SPA as a result of bird strikes. Furthermore, the Inspector argued that the 
construction of the wind farms within the karstic layer may significantly alter the 
recharge of the turlough habitats (Lough Croan SAC) from groundwater flow patterns. 
The alteration of water flow would have a significant impact on the ecology of the area. 




further investigations to determine the design of turbine bases. Nevertheless, the 
Inspector from the Board was of the view that a higher burden of proof must be required 
to demonstrate the absence of adverse effects on the integrity of Lough Croan. An Bord 
Pleanála took a different view. In light of the substantial survey works carried out by the 
developer, together with comprehensive data and information submitted to the Board, 
An Bord Pleanála considered that the proposed development would not adversely affect 
the integrity of the N2000 sites concerned. An Bord Pleanála was satisfied that the wind 
farms could be developed with no significant effect on the hydrology or hydrogeology 
of the area. An Bord Pleanála further considered that in light of the comprehensive 
additional data on feeding/ roosting/ commuting area and natural flight lines of birds, 
the integrity of the sites would not be adversely affected.  An Bord Pleanála adopted a 
similar determination with respect to Phase 2. Whilst An Bord Pleanála has the ability to 
disagree with its own Inspector, the Bord has to provide the reasons for departing from 
the Inspector’s conclusions.  In the absence of such determination, the Irish High Court 
held that An Bord Pleanála did not have jurisdiction to grant permissions. The ruling of 
the Court reads as follow: 
 
‘My conclusion is that, on the evidence before the Court, the Board has failed to 
carry out an appropriate assessment which meets the requirements of Article 6(3) of 
the Habitats Directive, as explained by the CJEU.  There is no evidence before the 
Court of an assessment conducted by the Board which meets the criteria set out at 
paragraph 40 [of the Sweetman judgement] and identifies, in the light of the best 
scientific knowledge in the field, all aspects of the proposed development [...] and 
contains  complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions which the Board 




proposed development on the integrity of a number of N2000 sites close to the site 
of the proposed development’.260 
 
The Supreme Court went on to consider that  
‘The findings and conclusions reached by the Inspector in relation to the matters 
identified as potentially affecting the integrity of N2000 sites are such that the 
appropriate assessment in the Inspector’s report could not support a determination 
that the proposed development would not adversely affect the European sites, 
having regard to their conservation objectives when considered by the Court in 
accordance with established judicial review principles’.261 
 
The determination made by the Bord cannot therefore be considered as lawful unless 
such determination is made as part of an AA lawfully conducted.262  By reason of this 
failure, An Bord Pleanála had failed to carry out a proper AA process which met the 
criteria of the European jurisprudence namely, an AA based on complete, precise, 
definitive findings and conclusions capable of removing all reasonable scientific 
doubt.263 It is not clear whether the Court would have taken a similar decision if the 
Bord had explicitly provided the reasons for departing from its Inspector’s 
recommendations.  In Ireland, it is settled case law that An Bord Pleanála must indicate 
the reasons for its determination.264 To date, most judicial reviews of permissions for 
wind farms in Ireland relate to internal failures at An Bord Pleanála to comply with its 
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statutory obligation to adequately reason its decisions265 under the Planning and 
Development Acts.266 
 
In Bagmoor Wind Ltd v Scottish Ministers,267 the Scottish Court of Session relied on 
Waddenzee to uphold the decision of the Scottish Ministers refusing to grant 
development consent to Bagmoor Wind Ltd Company on the grounds that adverse 
effects on the integrity of the Glen Etive and Glen Fyne SPA could not be excluded 
beyond reasonable doubt. It was agreed that the integrity of the SPA would be affected 
in the event where only one pair of eagles (over a total of 19 pairs being present) is 
eliminated either by collision or by abandonment of a territory of the SPA. According to 
the Court, despite an avoidance figure of 99% (or 0.015 collisions per year) of golden 
eagle, the possibility of abandonment of a portion of territory was not excluded beyond 
reasonable scientific doubt.268 Indeed, such a high avoidance rate confirmed that there 
was a displacement risk and that this could lead to abandonment of territory by eagles 
thus producing a risk of adverse effect on the integrity of the SPA.   
Other national jurisprudence exhibits a more flexible application of the precautionary 
principle.  In a recent decision involving People Over Wind and An Bord Pleanála,269 
the Irish Court of Appeal introduced a refinement to the notion of ‘best scientific 
knowledge’ arguing that ‘best scientific knowledge’ refers to scientific knowledge 
which is ‘reasonably available’.270 According to the Court, the objective of the 
‘Waddenzee formula’ is to ensure that an AA  ‘meets proper contemporary standards’ 
and ‘that the integrity of the SAC is not compromised by the grant of permission which 
is in turn premised on a scientific analysis which is out-dated, flawed or which does not 
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measure up to state of the art scientific understanding’.271 The applicants were seeking 
judicial review of a decision authorising the construction of a wind farm situated 12 to 
17 km from two SACs in Co. Laois, one of which included the River Barrow and River 
Nore SAC. At issue was the vulnerability of the protected fauna to the risk of increased 
sedimentation in these watercourses during the construction phase of wind farm 
development. These rivers constitute a habitat for the Irish subspecies of the Nore 
freshwater pearl mussel (Margaritifera durrovensis), listed in Annex II of the Habitats 
Directive. The concern was that run-off from the construction activities would contain 
high levels of sediment which would drain into the River Nore, thereby placing further 
pressure on the pearl mussel. The questions submitted to the Court concerned the nature 
of the obligation on An Bord Pleanála when evaluating best scientific evidence for the 
purpose of conducting an AA.  The Court of Appeal held that the obligation of An Bord 
Pleanála is to have to the best scientific knowledge which is ‘reasonably accessible’. 
That said, the Court noted that a ‘hugely detailed environmental assessment concerning 
every relevant scientific and environmental aspect’ of the wind farm was prepared with 
21 mitigation measures all of which were designed to mitigate the risk of contamination 
by sediment release. On the basis of these documentary materials, the Court of Appeal 
ruled that ‘there was no suggestion at all that the Board did not have available to it the 
best scientific knowledge’ reasonably available.272 The AA carried out by An Bord 
Pleanála ‘met the Sweetman requirements in that it has demonstrated to the necessary 
degree of certainty that the integrity of the SAC will not be affected by the proposed 
works’.273 The Irish Supreme Court refused to refer the question related to the 
interpretation of ‘best scientific knowledge’ to the CJEU.274   It is not clear whether the 
interpretation of the Court of Appeal would have survived scrutiny by the CJEU. he 
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Supreme Court held that the question of whether the materials before the Board was 
‘best scientific knowledge’ is a question of fact and does not give rise to an issue of law. 
Both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court refused to refer the question of 
interpretation to the CJEU on the ground that the case did not raise any issue or question 
of interpretation. According to the Supreme Court, sufficient certainty could be found in 
the words of Article 6(3) and jurisprudence of the CJEU.275 
 
Following the grant of development consent for the construction works, the developer 
(Coillte Teoranta) subsequently addressed the question of connecting the wind farm 
concerned to the electricity grid by means of a cable. An application for leave to appeal 
was made by People Over Wind (the applicant) to the Irish High Court. The dispute in 
the main proceedings concerned whether Coillte Teoranta erred in taking mitigation 
measures into consideration at the screening stage to determine if it was necessary to 
carry out an AA with respect to the laying of a connecting cable. The High Court 
decided to refer the question to the CJEU for preliminary ruling.276  The CJEU 
reaffirmed the application of the strict precautionary standards of authorisation under 
Article 6(3).277  As mentioned above, the CJEU held that is not appropriate to take into 
account mitigation measures at the screening stage as this would deprive the appropriate 
assessment of its purpose and create a risk of circumvention of that stage which 
constitutes an essential safeguard provided by the Habitats Directive.278  Unfortunately, 
the CJEU did not have the opportunity to confirm whether the flexible understanding of 
the standard of ‘best scientific knowledge’ proposed by the Irish Court of Appeal would 
be sufficient to meet the standard of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’ of Article 6(3). 
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Overall, the decision of the Irish Court of Appeal in People Over Wind [2015] raises the 
question of the standard of judicial review domestic courts are entitled to apply in cases 
involving quality of complex scientific evidence. Interestingly, the CJEU requires that 
projects are examined using ‘best scientific knowledge in the field’ but does not clearly 
define what ‘best scientific knowledge’ means for the purpose of this appraisal. The 
CJEU case law would suggest that, in the face of opposing scientific hypothesises or 
opinions, competent authorities shall conclude that a reasonable scientific doubt 
exists.279   This interpretation of scientific uncertainty was upheld by the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) in the Pfizer case.280 In Pfizer, the CFI had to rule on the validity of the 
Regulation 2821/98 of the European Council banning the use of four antibiotics in 
animal foodstuffs including the drug virginiamycin. Divergent scientific opinions were 
opposed by the Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition (SCAN) and national expert 
bodies as to whether virginiamycin constituted a risk to human health by contributing to 
the growth of antibiotic resistance in humans. Although the CFI made it clear that ‘it is 
not for the Court to assess the merits of either of the scientific points argued before 
it’,281  the CFI interpreted scientific uncertainty as contrasting scientific opinions to 
justify the application of a precautionary ban on virginiamycin.282 Since dissenting 
scientific opinions are likely to found in all uncertain risk cases,283 legal scholars have 
contended that such an interpretation of uncertainty renders empty the precautionary 
principle.284   In the context of the Habitats Directive, this interpretation would prevent 
competent authorities from authorising a project under Article 6(3) whenever one 
qualified scientific body takes a divergent opinion on whether a project would adversely 
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affect the integrity of N2000 sites.   RSPB v. Scottish Ministers [2017] is a seminal case 
in this respect.285 At First Instance, the Scottish Court of Session (Outer House)286 had to 
decide whether the conclusions of the AA carried out for a group of substantial offshore 
wind farms287 comprising a total of 335 wind turbines, were capable of removing all 
reasonable scientific doubt by giving complete, precise and definitive findings using the 
best scientific means. By the same token, the litigation concerned the question of 
whether the findings of a contested scientific fact or methodology were capable of 
judicial review. The scope of the court’s powers of review was placed into sharp focus. 
The modelling options and statistical method (i.e. scalar methodology) relied upon by 
the consenting body, Marine Scotland, to identify thresholds of acceptable biological 
change on the bird populations of two SPAs were not approved by SNH. SNH advised 
the use of an alternative method, the ‘reduced uncertainty’ ABC (ruABC). In the Outer 
House, the Lord Ordinary was therefore not satisfied that scalar was the best scientific 
means capable of providing the best evidence. The Lord Ordinary found that the 
conclusion of the AA did not satisfy the legal test in that its conclusions were not 
capable of removing all reasonable scientific doubt. By relying on the scalar-derived 
thresholds, ‘Marine Scotland, as an assessor, made a mistake which flaws the 
appropriate assessment’.288 Whether as an assessor or as a decision-maker, Marine 
Scotland was not entitled to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that adverse effects on 
the integrity of the Forth Islands and Fowlsheugh SPAs were excluded.289  The decision 
was then quashed in the Inner House on the grounds that the standard of review that the 
Court should apply when assessing the legality of an AA is that of manifest error of 
assessment,290 being the same test of judicial review set out in Wednesbury291 and 
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applied by the CJEU (see infra). The Court held that the Lord Ordinary ‘trespassed into 
the province of the fact finder’.292 The judgement of the Outer House was of an 
evaluative scientific nature. ‘Even if there may be errors identified upon a close scrutiny 
of the data or methodology, none could be described as manifest’.293 The ruling of the 
Inner House reads as follows: 
‘Sometimes, of necessity, the Court will have to grapple with difficult scientific 
concepts. Where that is required, the approach in England & Wales is to require 
the public authority to provide a sufficient account of the facts, and how the 
relevant science relates to them, to enable the Court to consider whether the 
decision involves an error of law or an abuse of discretion. That is entirely 
reasonable. However, it is not the function of the Court, in a judicial review, to 
decide between differing views of experts in a technical area’.294 
The Court went on to consider that 
The Lord Ordinary clearly spent an extraordinary amount of time and effort 
analysing the scientific methodology. [...] The rationale behind his thinking 
must have been his expression of what he regarded as a legal test; that being 
whether the AA's conclusions were capable of removing all reasonable doubt. 
Yet the existence, or otherwise, of a reasonable doubt is primarily a matter of 
fact for the decision-maker (and not a judicial reviewer) to determine.295 
The Inner House concluded that Marine Scotland was not obliged to depart from the 
scientific judgement that its own expert (Marine Scotland Science) had been applying. 
They were entitled to make the scientific judgement that the methods which they had 
adopted were the best available in the circumstances. In the AA, Marine Scotland 
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applied the correct precautionary principle that a development could only be 
authorised if no reasonable scientific doubt remained that the integrity of the sites 
would not be adversely affected. [...] That was an evaluative judgement which they 
were, as experts in the field, entitled to make in concluding as a matter of fact that no 
reasonable scientific doubt remained. There is no sound basis in law for reviewing 
that finding.296 
In other words, the existence of a reasonable scientific doubt under the Waddenzee test 
remains primarily a matter of fact to be appreciated by the decision-maker and not the 
judicial reviewer. RSPB v. Scottish Ministers clearly highlights the fact that divergent 
scientific opinions may be opposed regarding the monitoring methodologies or 
parameters utilised in scientific models. Scientific models may generate imprecise 
modelling outputs and these scientific limitations can be invoked against the legality of 
AAs. Furthermore, it raises the more general question of the standard of review 
domestic courts are entitled to apply when complex scientific data are involved.  Where 
the CJEU held that the standard of review to be applied with respect to environmental 
assessments is that of ‘manifest error of assessment’ or ‘misuse of power’297 staying 
within the limits of this narrow control may not be straightforward where the legality of 
an AA is closely linked to the capacity of scientific evidence to remove all reasonable 
scientific doubt.  The legal test of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’ may reinforce what 
some lawyers refer to as ‘scientification’ of judicial reviews,298 a practice in which 
Courts act as a ‘super risk assessor’299 extending their review to the scientific merits 
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underlying contested decisions.300 The process of ‘scientification’ of judicial reviews 
has been highlighted as a problematic tension in case law involving uncertainty and 
uncertain risks.301 Chalmers et al., observe that European Courts increasingly move 
towards ‘a proceduralist test of whether a sufficiently rigorous risk assessment has been 
carried out’.302 Since the existence of scientific uncertainty is the triggering factor that 
prompts the application of the precautionary principle, Courts tend to adopt a new role 
by ‘increasingly paying attention to science underlying the [planning] decision-
making’.303  Besides the evident regulatory barriers that such a high standard of proof 
creates for the consenting of ORE projects, the legal test of ‘no reasonable scientific 
doubt’ may also increase the risk that national judges, with no scientific expertise, 
erroneously interpret complex scientific data and methodologies to upheld ‘non-
environmentally friendly’ development consents or to turn down projects with relatively 
low risk of adverse effects. This may also add an important degree of legal uncertainty 
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6 - Conclusion 
 
 
Although the Habitats Directive does not create a general ban on new ORE 
technologies,304  the judicial interpretation of the assessment requirements of Article 
6(3) sets a very high standard of proof which cannot be realistically met in the marine 
environment. The CJEU case law favours a ‘criminal-like’ standard of proof whereby 
developers must provide necessary evidence to inform national regulatory authorities 
‘beyond all reasonable scientific doubt’ about the absence of threats to the integrity of 
nearby marine N2000 sites.305 In a similar approach, the Court also prescribes a 
precautionary and purposive approach to interpretation of the notion ‘integrity of the 
site’ in order to assess the implications of new developments for N2000 sites.306  The 
purposive method may have been envisaged by the Court to address situations of 
scientific uncertainty under the so-called doctrine of ‘effectiveness’ or effet utile.307 
However, it clearly contributes to exacerbating existing regulatory barriers on the ORE 
sector by placing an unrealistic onus on developers to prove the absence of threat with 
nearby N2000 areas.  
 
Interestingly, the Fitness Check of the Birds and Habitats Directive acknowledges that 
‘some respondents have suggested that national court rulings may have reduced the 
scope for flexibility in applying some provisions of the Directives’ but that the evidence 
presented by them ‘was not conclusive’.308 In the particular context of ORE 
technologies, this Chapter has demonstrated that the strict interpretation of the 
precautionary principle under Article 6(3) epitomises an inflexible application of the 
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Habitats Directive.  A significant mismatch exists between the high evidentiary standard 
of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’ and the current state of art of scientific knowledge of 
marine ecosystems. Predicting and understanding the potential environmental impacts 
of any novel renewable energy technology deployed in dynamic marine environments is 
also extremely challenging and costly.  Data collection in the marine environment can 
cost millions and take a number of years to complete.  What is more, science is never 
ascertainable. Science is empirical and deals with nature as it exists. The primary 
criterion and standard of evaluation of scientific theory is evidence, not proof. Given 
our limited understanding of marine ecosystems, it is likely that nascent ORE 
technologies will always have inherent scientific uncertainty associated with them.   It is 
therefore unreasonable to expect developers to fully inform decision-makers beyond all 
reasonable scientific doubt.  The judicial understanding of the precautionary principle 
under Article 6(3) was first crystallised in the seminal Waddenzee case.309 At that time, 
N2000 sites were predominantly designated on land310 and the ORE sector represented a 
marginal proportion of our energy mix.311 If the strict application of the precautionary 
principle of Article 6(3) is to be upheld in future planning permissions, this may result 
in any novel renewable energy technology suffering from disproportionate scrutiny and 
a low level of certainty for investors.312 From there, the strict jurisprudence of the Court 
may need to be revisited in light of the controversial Innovation Principle313 which 
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requires that the negative effects of legislations and policies on innovation are fully 
assessed.314  
 
This particular interpretation of the precautionary principle under Article 6(3) is 
however a pure creation of the Court. This is certainly not what is required by the 
precautionary principle as formulated under the system of the EU Treaties. The 
precautionary principle cannot be understood to require such a strongly restrictive 
approach in the renewable energy sector. Whilst the precautionary principle is obviously 
a central pillar of EU environmental policy aiming at a ‘high level of environmental 
protection’,315 the precautionary principle of Article 6(3) ‘does not stand alone in the 
acquis communautaire’.316 The formalisation of sustainable development as an 
overarching objective of the environmental integration principle of Article 11 TFEU is 
of high significance in this respect in that it ‘tells us the direction that EU law is taking 
or should be taking’.317   
 
Sunstein contends that an overly strict precautionary principle in the particular context 
of innovative technologies may be described as a ‘crude and sometimes perverse way of 
promoting [biodiversity] goals which can be obtained through other [less restrictive] 
routes’.318 A better route exists.  Given the poor conservation status of biodiversity in 
the European Union,319 in particular the marine habitats types protected under the 
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Habitats Directive,320 it is clear that a relaxation of the protection scheme of the Habitats 
Directive is excluded. However, refinement of the precautionary principle makes sense 
so as to reconcile the important objectives for renewable energy and biodiversity 
conservation. A major question arises as to whether there is not an alternative way to 
protect marine biodiversity while promoting the exploitation of low-carbon energy 
sources at sea. An explicit approach to adaptive management tied to ongoing 
environmental monitoring may give us a way to do so.  This will be the core topic of 
Chapters VI and VII.  Before moving to Chapter VI, it is important to consider the 
relationship between energy and environmental policy under the legal system of the 
Lisbon Treaty. Likewise, the author will also position the ORE sector and the 
jurisprudence of the Court within the underlying requirements of the proportionality 
principle and the objective of sustainable development. This forms the focus of the 
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CHAPTER V  
OFFSHORE RENEWABLES AT THE CROSS-ROADS 
BETWEEN ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
 
 REDIFINING THE ROLE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
INTEGRATION PRINCIPLE  
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
The present Chapter positions the offshore renewable energy (ORE) sector in the 
context of the environmental integration principle (hereafter: EIP) and the overarching 
objective of sustainable development. The raison d’être of this Chapter is to clarify the 
underlying requirements of the principle of environmental integration, as enshrined 
under Article 11 TFEU1 and Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Right of the 
European Union,2 with respect to licensing decision-making relating to ORE 
deployments. More specifically, this Chapter will determine whether the EIP should be 
understood as systematically requiring a strong application of the precautionary 
principle to ORE licensing under the appropriate assessment (hereafter: AA) process of 
the Habitats Directive. In answering this important question, the author analyses the 
core elements of sustainable development and its legal interactions with the EIP of 
Article 11 TFEU. 
As far back as 2010, Vedder highlighted that ‘environmental protection and sustainable 
development continue to occupy a prominent place in the objectives of the European 
                                                          
1 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/49 
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Union’, creating an irresolvable issue regarding ‘the exact weight to be given to the 
various objectives where they are at odds with each other’.3 The principle of 
environmental integration of Article 11 TFEU constitutes a provision of general 
application.4 Article 11 TFEU requires that the environmental protection requirements 
of the Treaties must be integrated into the definition and implementation of other EU 
policies and activities with a view to promoting sustainable development. This 
provision, which is, as observed by Krämer, probably the most important environmental 
provision in the whole Lisbon Treaty, ‘raises considerable implementation problems for 
lawyers, policy-makers and administrations’.5 Practical and legal issues associated with 
the implementation of this principle become particularly striking where the goals for 
biodiversity conservation under the Habitats Directive clash with measures aiming to 
deliver EU climate-energy targets.  
 
The Habitats Directive is the epitome of environmental integration. As a horizontal 
environmental measure, the assessment requirements of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive apply across all sectors. In this respect, the EIP has played a pivotal role to 
support the application of a strict precautionary principle under the AA process of the 
Habitats Directive. Chapter IV has shown that, in the context of renewable energy, the 
precautionary principle prescribed by the CJEU under Article 6(3) disproportionately 
favours biodiversity objectives by imposing a very high standard of proof (i.e. no 
reasonable scientific doubt) to inform the conclusions of the AA.6  Voigt rightly explains 
that trade-offs exclusively for biodiversity conservation goals are not necessarily 
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conducive to sustainable outcomes.7  This holds particularly true where the application 
of the EIP may complicate the authorisation of low-carbon energy technologies with 
obvious benefits for climate change mitigation.8 The Habitats Directive cannot be 
divorced from other important objectives that are closely tied to the overarching 
objective of sustainable development. Climate change has emerged as a ‘hot topic’ that 
goes to significantly reinforce the integration between energy and environmental policy 
since its formal introduction in the EU legal order by the Lisbon Treaty.9 Combating 
climate change is now explicitly enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty as an objective to be 
pursued in the sphere of the Union’s policy on the environment.10 Combating climate 
change is also a cross-cutting objective of sustainable development: ‘tackling climate 
change and fostering sustainable development are two mutually reinforcing sides of the 
same coin: sustainable development cannot be achieved without climate action’.11 In EU 
law, sustainable development is also rooted in a broad requirement for integration 
whereby important policy objectives formulated under the TFEU shall not be ‘dealt with 
in isolation’.12 Although not explicitly tied to sustainable development, Article 7 TFEU 
requires of the EU to ensure consistency between its policies and activities taking into 
account all policy objectives. Despite this, we are now in a bizarre situation where the 
judicial interpretation of Habitats Directive complicates the development of climate 
change mitigation technologies.  
 
                                                          
7 Christina Voigt, ‘Article 11 TFEU in the light of the principle of sustainable development in 
international law’ in B. Sjåfjell, A. Wiesbrock (eds.) The Greening of European Business under EU Law: 
Taking Article 11 TFEU Seriously (Routledge, 2015), 42 
8 Frederik Kistenkas, ‘Rethinking European Nature Conservation Legislation: Towards Sustainable 
Development’ (2013) 10 (1) Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law, 72 
9 Chad Damro, Ian Hardie, Donald MacKenzie, ‘The EU and Climate Change Policy: Law, Politics and 
Prominence at Different Levels’ (2008) 4 (3) Journal of Contemporary European Research, 179 
10 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/49 
(hereinafter TFEU), Article 191(1) 
11United Nations, The Sustainable Development Agenda. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/> (last accessed 14 May 2018) 
12 Sander Van Hees, ‘Sustainable development in the EU: Redefining and Operationalizing the Concept’ 




The respective policy objectives relating to the environment and the promotion of 
renewable energy are two mutually reinforcing goals under the so-called ‘sacred temple 
of sustainability’.13   In order to move towards genuine sustainable development, it is 
essential to ensure that the Habitats Directive remains consistent with important 
climate-energy policy goals. Sustainable development seeks to integrate different social, 
economic and environmental objectives. Integration requires balance. Balance in turn, is 
achieved by means of proportionality.14  One way to ensure consistency is therefore via 
the application of the requirements arising from the proportionality principle.  
 
Section 2 of this Chapter will first offer a discussion on the complex relationship 
between EU energy and environmental policies under the legal system established by 
the Lisbon Treaty (section 2). Here, the author will pay a particular attention to the 
position of renewable energy as a cross-cutting objective of both the Union’s energy and 
environmental policies. Section 3 will then define the important principle of 
‘integration’ in the context of sustainable development and highlight its inter-
relationships with what this author will refer to as ‘Energy-Climate and Biodiversity 
dilemma’. In this vein, section 3 will emphasise the position of renewable energy as a 
critical vehicle of vertical integration in the context of ecological sustainability. Sections 
4 and 5 will consider  the complex legal interactions between the EIP of Article 11 
TFEU and the objective of sustainable development as enshrined under Article 3 of the 
Treaty of the European Union (hereafter: TEU).15  Section 5 will build on these findings 
to raise the important question of whether the EIP, as a constituent principle of 
sustainable development, necessarily infers that precedence should be given to 
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biodiversity conservation goals over objectives for renewable energy.  Finally, section 6 
will challenge the jurisprudence of the CJEU in light of the important proportionality 
principle in order to re-consider the ‘sustainable’ character of the judicially recognised 
linkage between Articles 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive. This will necessarily 
oblige the author to determine whether ORE constitutes an ‘imperative’ and ‘overriding’ 
of public interest (IROPI) in the sense of Article 6(4).  Overall, this Chapter will suggest 
a novel understanding of the EIP that is more consistent with the overarching objective 
of sustainable development.  
2 – The complex marriage of energy and environmental policy under the Lisbon 
Treaty  
Whilst the goal of the Habitats Directive is to promote the maintenance of 
biodiversity,16 its Preamble seems to echo the tenets of sustainable development.  The 
Preamble states that the implementation of the Directive should take into account 
‘economic; social and cultural requirements’17 and ‘makes a contribution to the general 
objective of sustainable development’.18 The third recital of the Preamble further 
indicates that ‘the maintenance of biodiversity may in certain cases require the 
maintenance, or indeed the encouragement, of human activities’.19 In this vein, the 
critical question arises as to whether the authorisation criteria elaborated by the CJEU 
under the AA of the Habitats Directive conform with the essence of sustainable 
development. 
The judicial interpretation of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive provides a concrete 
example of how the EIP may be operated in practice to impede the deployment of green 
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energy technologies. It clearly epitomizes a strong normative interpretation of the 
environmental integration principle in which precedence is exclusively given to 
conservation objectives.20  Interestingly, the CJEU does not seem to believe that there is 
an antagonism between the goals for biodiversity conservation and the EU targets for 
renewable energy. For instance, in Azienda Agro-Zootenica Franchini Sarl,21 the CJEU 
took the view that the Habitats Directive does not preclude more stringent legislation 
which prohibits in absolute terms the installation of all wind projects not intended for 
self-consumption on sites forming part of the N2000 network.22 The applicants in the 
main proceedings submitted that the objectives of the energy policy, in particular the 
aim of developing new and renewable forms of energy, as established by Article 194(1) 
TFEU, should take precedence over environmental-protection objectives. The CJEU 
adopted a different line of reasoning. The CJEU noted that the scope of the legislation 
was confined to commercial wind energy developments and thereby left the possibility 
of exemption for wind turbines intended for self-consumption with a capacity not 
exceeding 20 kW. The contested legislation was not therefore, in the view of the Court, 
liable to jeopardise the European objective of developing new and renewable forms of 
energy.23  This ruling is clearly disputable in light of the consistency principle of Article 
7 TFEU (see section 5.2. below). The achievement of renewable energy policy goals 
requires diversification of our renewable energy portfolio and development of 
commercial-scale renewable energy infrastructures. It is highly unlikely that wind 
energy farm solely intended for self-consumption will make a meaningful contribution 
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to achieving the EU-wide targets to achieve 20% of renewable energy consumption by 
202024  and 32% by 2030.25  
 
Chapter IV has clearly emphasised that the Court has always maintained its stringent 
jurisprudence including towards onshore wind energy developments. The two cases in 
Grace and Sweetman,26 and People over Wind27 offered an invaluable opportunity for 
the Court to clarify its case law with respect to renewable energy developments. The 
present author believes that the Court may have missed an opportunity to align its 
jurisprudence with the overarching objective of sustainable development.  From there, a 
crucial question arises: are the respective objectives relating to biodiversity conservation 
and renewable energy really at odd with each other?  The answer is no. The overarching 
objective of sustainable development makes the respective objectives for biodiversity 
conservation and renewable energy indivisible under what the author will refer to as the 
‘energy-climate and biodiversity’ dilemma. 
 
The promotion of renewable energy is inextricably linked to the environmental policy 
goals in the EU legal landscape.28  The very first recital of the 7th Environment Action 
Plan (hereafter EAP) states that the Union has the objective ‘to become a smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economy by 2020 with a set of policies and actions aimed at 
making it a low-carbon and resource efficient community’.29 The position of 
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‘sustainable development’ and of ‘low-carbon economy’ within the ambit of the 7th 
EAP is not devoid of legal significance. The 7th EAP sets the overarching objectives to 
2020 that must guide EU environmental policy. The document is remarkably 
characterised by an effort to integrate of energy-climate objectives and biodiversity 
conservation under the auspices of sustainable development. Climate change mitigation 
and renewable energy are at the core of the entire programme.30 At the forefront, the 7th 
EAP clearly states the EAP should help achieve the environment and climate change 
targets of the European Union.31 The 7th EAP further indicates that the programme 
‘builds on policy initiatives in the EU 2020 Strategy including the Union’s climate and 
energy package, the Communication on a Roadmap for moving to low-carbon economy 
and the EU Biodiversity Roadmap’.32 Even more so, the 7th EAP acknowledges that the 
‘integrated and coherent’ development of environment and climate policy is necessary 
and must be guided by three inter-related priority objectives namely: 1) protecting, 
conserving and enhancing the Union’s natural capital, 2) turning the Union to a resource 
efficient, green and low-carbon economy, 3) safeguarding the Union’s citizens from 
environmental-related pressures and risks to health and well-being.33 These three 
objectives are inter-related: ‘action taken under one objective will often help to 
contribute to the achievement of the other objectives’.34 In particular, ‘action to mitigate 
climate change will increase resilience of the Union’s economy and society while 
protecting the Union’s natural capital resources’.35   
 
As far back as 1998, a decade before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the promotion 
of renewable energy was already perceived as a key driver of integration between 
                                                          
30 See in particular recital 24, paras.22, 33, 43(a) 
31 Ibid, para.9 
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energy and environmental policy in the context of sustainable development.36 In 1998, 
the EC Communication on ‘Strengthening Environmental Integration within 
Community Energy Policy’, adopted as part of the abandoned Cardiff process,37  
stressed that for ‘successful integration of sustainability in our everyday life’, the 
adoption of energy actions at the Community level are necessary to increase the share 
and production of cleaner energy sources in the internal market.38  The Cardiff process 
was the first ground-breaking step forward in the integration of energy and 
environmental concerns under the discourse of sustainable development.39 
 
 In this regard, it is worth noting that it is within the scope of the environmental 
competence that the EU adopted its first legislative actions in the field of renewable 
energy. In accordance with the principle of conferral of power,40 the European Union 
shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it in the Treaties. The 
absence of an explicit legal basis for energy in the pre-Lisbon period has never been an 
insurmountable obstacle to the adoption of legislative measures on the promotion of 
renewable energy sources. Before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the first 
Renewable Energy Directive, Directive 2001/77/EC,41 was explicitly adopted under the 
environmental competence of Article 175(1) EC (Article 192(1) TFEU). Under this 
Directive, the EU adopted a global indicative target of 12 % of gross national energy 
consumption from renewables by 2010 and a 22,1% indicative target of electricity 
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produced from renewable energy sources in total Community electricity consumption 
by 2010.42  The 2001/77/EC Directive was then replaced by the 2009/28/EC Directive 
on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (REN Directive).43 In a 
similar approach, provisions imposing a legally binding target to achieve 20% of 
renewable energy have found a legal basis on former Article 175(1) EC.44  On the other 
hand, Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the REN Directive establishing sustainability criteria for 
biofuels and bioliquids have been adopted on the basis of the Treaty provision on the 
internal market (Article 95 EC Treaty), now Article 114(1) TFEU. This strategic choice 
of legal basis may emphasise the predominant environmental goal behind the adoption 
and enforcement of legally binding targets for renewable energy.45  It is settled case law 
of the CJEU that ‘if a measure is designed to pursue a two-fold purpose or has a twofold 
component, and if one of these is identifiable as the main  or predominant purpose or 
component, the act must be based on the legal basis required by that aim or predominant 
purpose’.46 The CJEU accepts that measures that simultaneously pursue a number of 
objectives that are ‘indissociably linked’, without one being secondary and indirect in 
relation to the other, can be founded, exceptionally on the various corresponding legal 
bases.47 The choice of Article 175(1) EC underscores the position of environmental 
protection as the ‘centre of gravity’48 of the 2008 REN Directive. Yet, the REN 
Directive predates the Lisbon Treaty. Some commentators argue in this respect that 
Article 175(1) may have been chosen as a legal basis by default due to the lack of 
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energy-specific competence in the former EC Treaty.49 Energy policy has subsequently 
been formally introduced by the Lisbon Treaty as a shared competence of the European 
Union.50 Article 194(1) (c) and (2) of the Lisbon Treaty explicitly confers the Union’s 
competencies to promote renewable energy. Article 194 (1) (c) TFEU elevates the 
development of new and renewable forms of energy as one of the four objectives of the 
Union energy policy. Accordingly, the legal basis proposed by the EC for the revised 
REN Directive is Article 194 (2) TFEU.51   
 
Despite this, the creation of the EU’s energy competence turns out to be a delicate 
legislative exercise. Although the promotion of renewable energy has now an explicit 
legal basis under the Energy Title, Article 194(1) TFEU circumscribes the scope of the 
energy policy to ‘the establishment and functioning of the internal market’ and to ‘the 
need to preserve and improve the environment’. The first paragraph of Article 194(2) 
further stipulates that ‘without prejudice to the application of other provisions of the 
Treaties, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure shall establish the measures necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the energy policy.52  Commenting on Article 194(2), Vedder asserts that 
this provision still places the EU energy policy in an environmental perspective.53  On 
the other hand, the reference to the establishment and functioning of the internal market 
seems to indicate that Member States have not vested the Union with a completely new 
competence in this field.54 In this respect, Vedder contends that the specific reference to 
the internal market ‘may only allow for a European energy policy insofar as imports and 
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exports of energy are concerned’.55  Moreover, second paragraph of Article 194(2) 
provides that measures adopted on the basis of Article 194(1), under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, ‘shall not affect’ a Member State’s right to determine the 
conditions for exploiting its energy sources, its choice between different energy sources 
and the general structure of its energy supply. However, this limitation of the EU energy 
competence is without prejudice of Article 192(2) (c). By way of derogation, Article 
192(2)(c) provides that measures ‘significantly’ affecting Member States’ right to 
promote one source of energy over another and to decide the general structure of their 
energy supply can still be adopted under the environmental competence to achieve the 
environmental policy objectives, including that of combating climate change.56 The 
derogation is subject to the special legislative procedure. The EU legislator acting under 
the scope of the environmental policy competence may thus still override Member 
States’ sovereign rights to determine their energy mixes by unanimous decision of the 
Council. Unlike the derogation stipulated by Article 194(2), the caveat of Article 
192(2)(c) only applies to measures ‘significantly’ affecting Member States’ choice 
between different energy sources. In the absence of an expressly defined threshold for 
‘significant’, the EU legislator enjoys some leeway to interfere with Member States’ 
sovereign rights in the field of energy when acting within the framework of the 
environmental policy.57 This means for example that a number of legislative measures 
aiming to tackle the environmental effects of global warming still fall within the 
environmental competence58 of Article 192(1) or Article 192(2).59 This statement is 
reinforced by the formulation ‘without prejudice to the application of the other 
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provisions of the Treaties’ under the energy competence of Article 194(2). This non-
prejudice clause seems to indicate that the limitation of the EU’s competence in the field 
of energy ‘only applies to the extent to which Member States have not yet transferred 
competences by other Treaties provisions’.60 In this connection, Article 194(2) can 
hardly be considered as lex specialis with respect to environmental-energy related 
measures adopted in the realm of the climate change policy actions.61 As mentioned 
above, the Lisbon Treaty firmly establishes the objective of ‘combating climate change’ 
as an objective of the environmental policy under Article 191(1) TFEU. Pursuant to 
Article 191(1) TFEU, the Lisbon Treaty defines ‘promoting measures at international 
level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular 
combating climate change’ as an objective of the environmental policy. Whilst some 
commentators argue that the inclusion of climate change within the ambit of EU 
environmental policy is a ‘purely cosmetic change’,62 the present author considers that 
Article 191(1), when read in conjunction with second paragraph of Article 194(2) and 
Article 192(2)(c), may have considerable legal implications for Member States’ rights to 
determine their national energy mixes. The energy competence of Article 194(2) TFEU, 
when read in conjunction with the provisions of Article 192(2), gives the EU some 
considerable leeway to pave the way towards further energy transition in the scope of 
the environmental policy.  
 
The decision of the General Court in Republic of Poland v Commission63 illustrates this 
sensitive issue. In this case, Poland brought an action for annulment of the Decision 
2011/278/EU of the European Commission concerning the rules for harmonised free 
allocation of emission allowances under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. The 
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Republic of Poland argued that this decision infringed the prohibition of Article 194(2) 
TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 192(2) (c), insofar as the contested decision 
affected Member States’ right to decide upon different energy sources and the general 
structure of their energy supply.64 By focusing on natural gas as a reference fuel to 
define emission allowance benchmarks in the greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme, 
the Commission would have arbitrarily favoured Member States predominantly using 
natural gas compared to Member States that are heavily based on coal.65  Interestingly, 
the contested decision was based on the former Emission Trading Directive66 adopted 
under the environmental competence of Article 192(1).  The General Court of the CJEU 
adopted a striking decision by holding that the prohibition on interfering with Member 
States’ rights in the field of energy under Article 194(2) cannot be read as a general 
prohibition that is applicable to EU actions taken within the framework of the 
environmental policy.67  According to the Court, Article 194 TFEU is a general 
provision which relates solely to the energy sector and, consequently, delineates a 
sectoral competence. 
More recently, the Republic of Poland brought another action challenging the legal basis 
for Decision 2015/1814 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning the 
establishment and operation of a market stability reserve for the Union greenhouse gas 
emission trading system.68 This decision was similarly adopted in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure on the basis of Article 192(1). The Republic of Poland 
asserted that the increase in the price of greenhouse gas emission allowances envisaged 
by the decision would directly affect Member States’ choice between different 
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technologies for future investments and as such, the contested decision should have 
been adopted in accordance with the special legislative procedure.69 In these 
proceedings, the European Commission acknowledged that the increase in the price of 
allowances was intended to encourage fuel switching and to discourage investment in 
coal-fired plants.70 The CJEU held that as a derogation rule, the special legislative 
procedure of Article 192(2) (c) must be interpreted restrictively.71  The Court pointed 
out that the merit of the legal basis must be considered in light of the aim and content of 
the contested decision.72 In this respect, the Court noted that the aim and content of the 
decision was not to affect a Member State’s choice between different energy sources 
and the general structure of its energy mix. Rather, the contested decision aimed at 
correcting the weaknesses of the Emissions Trading System that could prevent the 
scheme from fulfilling its environmental objective of reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.73  The increase in the price of allowance was only an indirect consequence of 
the contested decision and therefore, the EU legislature was entitled to base the decision 
on Article 192(1) TFEU. 
 
From there, it is remarkable to note how the EU legislator may have reserved the right 
to direct Member States’ choice between different energy sources when acting under the 
scope of the environmental competence of Article 192(2).74 Article 192(2) clearly 
appears as a pivotal competence for adopting measures aimed at promoting the use of 
renewable energy. Some scholars have gone so far as to contend that ‘such shared 
competence has some traits of an exclusive competence’ where the environmental 
policy goal related to climate change closely intermingles with the energy 
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competence.75  Sveen also rightly observes that as environmental and energy legislation 
become ‘more detailed and intertwined’ under the Lisbon Treaty, ‘it is hard to define 
where the European Union has not pre-empted Member States action’ in the field of 
energy policy.76  AG General Bot made a striking observation in this regard: 
’Whilst it is clear from the second subparagraph of Article 194(2) TFEU that the 
European Union’s energy policy is intended to preserve freedom of choice as 
regards national energy mixes, without prejudice to Article 192(2)(c) TFEU, 
such energy policy decisions may nevertheless be affected by measures adopted 
in the context of its environmental policy, as is demonstrated by Directive 
2009/28 itself, which, by laying down mandatory targets for green energy 
consumption in each Member State, necessarily exerts an influence on the 
composition of their respective energy mixes’.77 
Against this, legal scholars have claimed that ‘energy measures aiming at preventing 
climate change should be adopted by virtue of both Articles 192(1) and Article 194 (2) 
TFEU’.78 Despite discussions during the co-decision procedure to include both Article 
191(1) and Article 194(2) as an appropriate legal basis for the revised REN Directive,79 
the choice of Article 194(2) as a single legal basis has been upheld.80  The choice of 
Article 194(2) may be justified by the fact that the revised REN Directive does not 
assign mandatory national targets. National mandatory targets will be abandoned for the 
period 2020-2030 and replaced by an EU-level target to be achieved collectively 
through individual Member States’ contributions, without preventing Member States 
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from setting their own, including more ambitious national targets.81 This new approach 
to governance in the field of energy for 2030 significantly  increases flexibility for 
Member States to decide on the structure and composition of their energy mixes.  The 
EU legislator may have excluded the use of the environmental competence of Article 
192(1) as a relevant legal basis to circumvent the prohibition of interfering with 
Member States’ rights to determine the structure and composition of their energy mixes.  
 
Notwithstanding the existence of two distinct legal bases for the promotion of 
renewable energy and environment, the CJEU has been particularly active in increasing 
the value of environmental protection goals as a legitimate ground to promote the use of 
renewable energy sources. In particular, the CJEU has continuously relied upon the EIP 
to justify restrictions to the operation of the single market with a view of promoting the 
use of renewable energy. The promotion of renewable energy has been explicitly 
recognised by the Court as sufficiently important to justify restrictions to one of the 
fundamental rules of the single market (see section 6 below).82   
 
In line with the spirit of the 7th EAP, the ‘energy-climate versus biodiversity’ dilemma 
should be a driver for strengthened integration between renewable energy and 
biodiversity conservation under the auspices of sustainable development. As mentioned 
above, the objective of sustainable development has played a pivotal role to integrate 
climate-related energy objectives and environmental considerations within the ambit of 
the environmental policy. As rightly observed by Galera, ‘here is where the “EU 
constitutional concerns” firmly established by the Lisbon Treaty should play an 
important role if we want to shape the future of our energy and environmental policy 
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under the “sustainability” paradigm’.83 Promotion of renewable energy is at the core of 
sustainable development. 
3- Sustainable development and integration in the context of the ‘Energy-Climate 
versus Biodiversity’ dilemma 
3.1. Sustainable development and ‘integration’ in International law  
 
Sustainable development is best defined in the Bruntland Report as ‘development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs’.84 In the framework of the United Nations, sustainable 
development concerns the ‘continuing need to ensure a balance between economic 
development, social development and environmental protection as interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development’.85 
Legal scholars have often struggled to ascertain the legal nature of this concept. Lowe 
for example, considers that sustainable development ‘is inherently incapable of having 
the status [...] of a rule of law addressed to States’.86  Indeed as emphasised by Barral, 
the flexible formulations relating to sustainable development in international law mean 
that evidence of opinio juris and State practice - that characterise customary 
international rules of law87 – cannot be ascertained.88  If sustainable development in 
itself cannot be regarded as a rule of customary law, Barral sees in this concept the 
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existence of a general practice accepted by law.89  Voigt goes further to consider that 
sustainable development is a general principle of law.90 According to her, classifying 
sustainable development as a general law principle is ‘legitimised by its widespread use 
in many national legal systems and in international law, signifying a common 
conscience and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, as well as by its 
moral necessity.’91 In a related publication, Voigt argues that the normative force, broad 
scope and support of sustainable development in the international community are 
indicative of its principled character and make it difficult to argue otherwise.92   
 
Although sustainable development has proved to be a notion ‘defying legal 
classification in international law’,93 there is now general agreement whereby its 
normative content is defined by the principle of integration.94  A noteworthy statement 
of the International Law Association Committee indicates that ‘integration is pivotal to 
the promotion of sustainable development: it is the principle that both brings together 
the many challenges confronting the international community and at the same time, 
provides the most realistic chance of their solutions’.95  ‘Integration’ would ‘form the 
backbone of sustainable development’.96  
 
The principle integration in the context of sustainable development involves two 
dimensions.  The ‘horizontal’ dimension of sustainable development is intrinsically 
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linked to the equitable balancing of economic, social and environmental protection 
imperatives.97 The vertical dimension of sustainable development, as enunciated by the 
Brundtland Commission, involves what Barral refers to as the twin conceptions of intra-
generational equity (within the same generation) and ‘inter-generational equity 
(between generations).98  Inter-generational equity or inter-generational justice99  calls 
for the equitable development opportunity in the present and sustained development 
opportunity for the future.100 
 
In international law, the principle of integration in the context of sustainable 
development first arose in the United Nations Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment.101 Although ‘sustainable development’ was not initially mentioned under 
the Stockholm Declaration, the uneasy need to ‘integrate’ environmental protection and 
economic development was already clearly established under a number of Principles of 
the Stockholm Declaration. As far back as 1972, Principle 4 of the UN Conference on 
Human Development stated that ‘Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and 
wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat. [...] Nature conservation, 
including wildlife, must therefore receive importance in planning for economic 
development’.102 In a similar approach, the vertical process of integration, i.e. the so-
called ‘inter-generational’ dimension of sustainable development, was clearly endorsed 
in Principle 13, which provides that ‘in order to achieve a more rational management of 
resources and thus to improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and 
coordinated  approach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is 
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compatible with the need protect and improve the environment for the benefit of their 
population’.103 
 
In 1987 the ‘integrational’ aspect of sustainable development was clearly recognised in 
soft international law. In that year, the World Commission on Environment and 
Development issued the report ‘Our Common Future’,104 also known as the Bruntland 
Report’, which for the first time stressed the need to ‘integrate’ economic development, 
environment and social development in policy and decision-making.105 In a similar 
approach, ‘inter-generational equity’ or ‘inter-generational justice’106  is reiterated as the 
core principle of sustainable development under Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration.107 
Inter-generational equity calls for development choices that equitably meet the 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.108 The 
horizontal integration of sustainable development is clearly endorsed by Principle 4 of 
the Rio Declaration whereby, in order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process 
and cannot be considered in isolation from it.    
 
Sustainable development rapidly moved towards a normative principle after its 
introduction among the legally-binding principles of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).109 The UNFCCC is an important milestone 
in that it fully recognises the imperative of climate change mitigation in the context 
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sustainable development. The framework Convention also places the concept of inter-
generational equity into a climate justice approach. Article 3(1) of the UNFCC provides 
that Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
but differentiated responsibilities.  Article 3(4) further states that the Parties have a right 
to, and should, promote sustainable development. To do so, ‘policies and measures to 
protect the climate system against human-induced change should be integrated with 
national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is 
essential for adopting measures to address climate change’.   
 
The element of inter-generational equity deserves closer consideration.  The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) states that ‘equity between 
generations underlines the very notion of sustainable development’.110  Inter-
generational equity is closely connected to the notion of ecological sustainability, which 
presupposes the existence of ‘ecological functions that are indispensable for a durable 
and equitable human society’.111 ‘Inter-generational equity’ has a direct bearing on what 
Gaines refers to as the ‘energy-climate trilemma’ or ‘energy trilemma’.112  ‘Energy 
trilemma’ is an indicator used by the World Energy Council to reflect the complex 
balance between the three imperatives of energy security, energy equity and 
environmental safety.113 In the words of Gaines, the challenge of resolving the trilemma 
revolves around a single question: How can the world produce more energy to meet 
rising demand, at a cost affordable to all, without causing catastrophic climate change in 
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the process?114   It is commonly asserted that the so-called ‘energy-climate trilemma’ is 
‘a problem of sustainable development’.115 The issue with this notion (energy-climate 
trilemma) is that it fails to reflect the core element of ecological sustainability, which is 
a central component of genuine sustainable development. This author therefore prefers 
the term ‘energy-climate-biodiversity’ dilemma to better emphasise the complex 
relationships between ecological sustainability and the promotion of renewable energy 
in the context of sustainable development.   
 
3.2. Ecological sustainability as a backbone of ‘integration’ between climate-
energy objectives and biodiversity conservation  
 
Ecological sustainability is the ‘ecological core’ of sustainable development.116 The 
concept of ecological sustainability derives from the purpose of sustainable 
development which typically requires that ‘ecological functions exist that are 
indispensable for a durable and equitable human society’.117 Ecological sustainability is 
met where ecological systems are sufficiently resilient to sustain important ecosystem 
functions and processes supporting plants, animals and large populations of human.118 In 
this respect, ecological sustainability determines the ‘safe operating space’119 within 
which human activities can operate without exceeding critical ecological limits of 
ecosystem functioning.  Beyond these limits (or thresholds), ecosystems may no longer 
sustain future generation and development is no longer sustainable. Without giving 
                                                          
114 Gaines, (n112), 7 
115 Ibid, 9 
116 Klaus Bosselmann, ‘Grounding the rule of law’, in Voigt C., (ed.) Rule of Law for Nature: New 
Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 75, 89 
117 Christina Voigt, ‘The principle of sustainable development: Integration and ecological integrity’ in 
Voigt C., (ed.) Rule of Law for Nature: New Dimensions and Ideas in Environmental Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), 146, 151 
118 Ibid. 
119 Johan Rockström and others, ‘Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for 




absolute priority to ecological interest, ecological sustainability sets the ecological 
limits within which the balancing exercise mandated by sustainable development 
between economic, social and ecological interests must take place. Sustainable 
development is a broader objective that demands that current human development does 
not exceed ecological limits that are necessary to support life and equitable development 
of future human generations.120 
 
Climate change is inherently an intergenerational problem with ‘serious implications for 
equity between present and future generations’.121 In linking human well-being and 
natural ecosystems, the framework of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)122 
has crystallised the idea that human development is vitally dependent on healthy 
ecosystems for the provision of ecosystem services.123 Ecosystem services are the 
benefits people receive from natural ecosystems.124 Natural ecosystems contribute 
directly to human well-being, through provisioning services (food, raw materials), 
cultural services (recreation, landscape aesthetic), regulating services (flood protection, 
carbon sequestration, waste assimilation); and supporting services (e.g. nutrient cycling, 
photosynthesis).125  Anthropogenic climate change is a major driver of biodiversity loss 
and changes in ecosystem services. The MEA stresses that biodiversity loss as a result 
of unmitigated climate change will inevitably lead to declining ecosystem services and 
cause people to experience increased poverty in some social groups.126   Climate change 
is projected to exacerbate the loss of biodiversity and increase the risk of extinction for 
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many species, especially those already at risk’.127  Increasing CO2 emissions from fossil 
fuel extraction and combustion are a significant driver of loss of marine biodiversity.128 
Ocean acidification and increased ocean temperatures are direct consequences of 
unabated CO2 emissions.
129 Scientists have consistently raised awareness of the adverse 
biological impacts of ocean acidification on survival, growth, reproduction and other 
functions of marine species.130 According to the IPCC, approximately 10% of species 
assessed so far will be at an increasingly higher risk of extinction for every 1°C rise in 
global mean temperature.131  With respect to marine habitats, the cumulative effect of 
temperature rise and increased CO2 levels, ‘primarily impact the integrity of marine 
habitats by changing their abiotic conditions’.132 Changes in abiotic conditions lead to 
deterioration of their quality and eventually to the loss of key N2000 habitats types and 
protected species.133  As discussed in Chapter IV above,  35% of species protected by 
the Habitats and Birds Directives have been identified as being ‘very highly’ and 
‘extremely highly’ vulnerable to climate change effects.134  Of the assessed species with 
an unfavourable-bad conservation status, 60% have been designated as being high to 
critical vulnerability from climate change.135 
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ORE projects come with indirect benefits for biodiversity in that they contribute to 
reducing CO2 emissions generated by fossil combustion, the primary cause of climate 
change.136  This statement must be advanced with caution as the long-term benefits that 
ORE may create for biodiversity through the abatement of CO2 emissions are highly 
difficult to measure or quantify.137 The Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
the Conservation of Migratory Species and Wild Animals138 has recently warned against 
the impacts on migratory species of mitigation measures aimed at reducing the effects 
of climate change: ‘measures aimed at curbing climate change, such as renewable 
energy are thought to have most immediate negative impacts on migratory species today 
compared to the direct impact of climate change’.139  Quantifying the trade-offs between 
local significant impacts of renewable energy projects and their long-term conservation 
benefits to biodiversity is highly difficult to measure.140 Nevertheless, no one can 
dispute that renewable energy installations generate significantly lower greenhouse gas 
emissions per unit of energy.  Recent figures indicate that in 2015, wind energy avoided 
218 million tonnes of CO2 in the EU.
141 Some more recent figures further show that at 
the end of 2016, climate change benefits in terms of reduced CO2 (million tons/years) 
associated with wind energy production have been estimated at 9.9 million tons (772 
g/kWh) in Denmark and  52.5 million tons in Germany.142 In the United Kingdom, 
offshore wind farms enabled a reduction of 8,6 million tonnes of CO2 emissions at the 
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end of 2016.143  In addition, power generated by ocean energy alone may permit a 
reduction of 276 million tonnes of CO2 annually by 2050.
144   
 
Renewable energy is an important element of integration in the context of climate 
change mitigation and ecological sustainability. The need for renewable energy is well 
represented under the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development.145 Renewable energy occupies a significant position under 
the Sustainable Development Goals 7,  13 and 14 which respectively aim to ‘ensure 
access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all’ (Goal 7), ‘take 
urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts’ (Goal 13), and strengthen the 
resilience of marine and coastal ecosystems while also minimising ocean acidification 
(Goal 14).146 These goals, described as indivisible and integrated, will contribute to 
meeting relevant Aichi Targets, in particular Target 5 (i.e. habitats loss halved or 
reduced) and Target 10 (i.e. ecosystem vulnerable to climate change) aiming at reducing 
the direct pressures on biodiversity.   
 
Biodiversity protection also has an important role to play in mitigating the effects of 
climate change. N2000 sites are important nature-based solutions to slow down threats 
associated with climate change. N2000 sites contribute to building resilient ecosystems 
capable of coping with the effects of climate change and provide a number of ecosystem 
services.147 For example, marine protected areas help protect marine habitats that 
sequester and store large amounts of carbon and prevent the release of carbon by 
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averting anthropogenic perturbations of sediments.148 By reducing anthropogenic 
pressures, marine reserves enable species to recover in abundance, biomass and 
diversity. Increased genetic diversity and biomass in turns improve ecosystem resilience 
and provide raw materials for adaptation to climate change.149  Ecological sustainability 
is therefore dependent upon the outcomes of both the objectives for biodiversity 
conservation and renewable energy. Climate change mitigation and adaptation cannot be 
achieved without biodiversity protection. The EU Biodiversity Strategy recognises that 
biodiversity loss cannot be averted without tackling the effects of climate change.150 It is 
therefore important to equally pursue and maximise these two related objectives in the 
EU policy framework.  
 
The 7th Environmental Action programme (EAP)151 places an important onus on 
integrating climate-related energy objectives and biodiversity goals. The Programme 
states that ‘ecosystem-based approaches to climate change mitigation and adaptation, 
which also benefit biodiversity and the provision of other ecosystem services, should be 
used more extensively as part of the Union’s climate change policy, while other 
environmental objectives such as biodiversity conservation and the protection of soil 
and water should be fully taken into account in decisions relating to renewable 
energy’.152 Upon closer examination, the 7th EAP notably recognises that actions to 
mitigate and adapt to climate change will increase the resilience of the Union’s 
economy and society, while stimulating innovation and protecting the Union’s natural 
resources.153 Accordingly, the 7th EAP may be read as a reciprocal commitment to 
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integration between the EU objectives for climate and energy and biodiversity 
protection.   
A similar commitment to integrate climate-energy and biodiversity goals is also 
noticeable, although to a significantly lesser extent in the EU Strategy for Sustainable 
Development (EU SDS)154 and the more recent ‘Europe 2020’ Strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth.155 The EU SDS sets the objectives and key principles 
for sustainable policy-making. Although the EU SDS has been criticised for being 
overly economically-oriented,156  the EU SDS indirectly encourages integration of 
climate-energy and biodiversity goals by re-asserting a series of operational objectives 
for ‘climate change and clean energy’ under which the Strategy clearly asserts that the 
energy policy should be consistent with the objective of environmental sustainability 
insofar as ‘energy policy is crucial to ‘tackle the challenge of climate change’.157 
Unfortunately, the Europe 2020 strategy does not put forward such a reciprocal 
commitment to integration.  It meaningfully incorporates the EU’s commitments on 
climate/energy targets but does not refer to the other important non-climate related 
objectives of the environmental policy. This ‘weak embedding of environmental 
objectives’158 in what is now the main policy instrument for sustainable development in 
the EU is highly regrettable in that it elides one of the fundamental pillars of sustainable 
development: biodiversity protection.  
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4- The nexus between sustainable development and environmental integration in 
EU law 
 
The environmental integration principle (EIP), as enshrined under Article 11 TFEU, 
‘calls for a permanent, continuous “greening” of all Union policies’.159 The principle 
introduces a requirement whereby environmental protection requirements must be 
integrated into the definition and implementation of other EU policies and activities 
with a view to promoting sustainable development. As noted above, ‘environmental 
protection and sustainable development continue to occupy a prominent place in the 
objectives of the EU’ creating an irresolvable issue regarding the exact weight to be 
given to the various objectives where they are at odds with each other’.160 
 
The Brundtland definition of sustainable development has been endorsed by the 
European Council.161 Sustainable development is now enshrined under Article 3(3) of 
Treaty on the European Union as an overarching goal governing all the Union’s policies 
and activities.162   Sustainable development has remained normatively indeterminate in 
the EU legal framework. Sustainable development was first introduced into the EU 
treaties by the Treaty of Amsterdam163 amending the Treaty of Rome (EC Treaty).164 In 
EU Law, sustainable development has been traditionally associated with the EIP since 
the incorporation of the environmental integration clause into Article 130r (2.2) of the 
European Economic Community Treaty165 by the 1986 Single European Act.166  Article 
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130r (2.2) required that ‘environmental protection requirements shall be a component of 
the Community’s other policies’.167 This provision was then reinforced by the 1992 
Maastricht Treaty168 which turned the environmental integration provision to turn it into 
an obligation.169  It is not necessary to debate at length on the origins of the EIP.170  
However, it is worth noting that the most definitive contribution to the EIP, in relation to 
sustainable development, was brought by the Treaty of Amsterdam. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam has extended the application of the EIP to all EU policy areas referred to in 
Article 3 of the EC Treaty171 and promoted it as a general principle of EU Law.172 More 
particularly, Article 6 of the revised EC Treaty clarified the remit of application of the 
EIP and made it instrumental to the objective of sustainable development.173  Article 6 
of the EC Treaty provided that: 
 
‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in 
Article 3, in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development’.174 
 
What is more, the Treaty of Amsterdam elevated the concept of sustainable 
development to the status of ‘objective’ to be pursued by the EU.175 Sustainable 
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development is now formally recognised as a primary objective of the European Union 
under the Lisbon Treaty which, in simple terms, provides that: 
 
‘The Union shall […] work for the sustainable development of Europe, based on 
balanced economic growth, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming 
at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and 
improvement of the quality of the environment’.176 
 
This definition encapsulates the three pillars of sustainable development (i.e. 
environmental, social and economic).177  Article 3(3) TEU has been interpreted as 
placing these three objectives on an equal footing.178 It follows from this that the 
overarching goal of sustainable development would be based on the reconciliation and 
not on the opposition of these imperatives.179  De Sadeleer notes in this respect that 
‘since no hierarchy is provided between these different pillars, they constitute an 
inseparable whole and cannot be interpreted in isolation from one another’.180  
 
Article 3(3) must nonetheless be read in combination with the EIP of Article 11 TFEU 
(previous Article 130r 2.2, EEC Treaty).  For some authors, Article 11 TFEU would 
formalise the environmental pillar of sustainable development (see below).181 Article 11 
TFEU reproduces, almost identically, the wording of Article 6 of the revised EC Treaty, 
as follows: 
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‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a 
view to promoting sustainable development’. 
 
Whilst te EIP is placed under Part I of TFEU in the category of principle of general 
application, the legal nature of sustainable development in EU law is indeterminate.182 
Sustainable development is encapsulated in a number of provisions in the EU Treaties 
without however being clearly defined.183  Sustainable development is for example 
legally characterised as an overarching objective under Article 3(3) of the TEU and as a 
principle under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.184  From a 
non-binding declaration, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is now recognised as 
having the same legal status as Treaties by virtue of its incorporation in Article 6(1) 
TEU.185  The formalisation of sustainable development at the Constitutional level as an 
objective of the European Union and as a principle complicates any attempts to 
determine its legal nature.   
 
Consequently, the legal status of sustainable development is the subject of controversy. 
Sustainable development has been referred to as an EU objective of constitutional value 
by De Sadeleer.186 According to Langlet, the fact that sustainable development is 
mentioned as a ‘principle’ in the ninth paragraph of the introduction to the TEU ‘reflects 
the Member States’ opinion that sustainable development has evolved into a legal 
principle’.187 Sjåfjell also suggests that the codification of sustainable development in 
the environmental integration clause of Article 11 has strengthened its legal status as an 
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EU law objective, a principle and rule at the same time.188 It goes without saying that 
doctrinal controversies regarding the status of sustainable development raise the 
important question of hierarchy between Article 11 TFEU’s requirement to integrate 
environmental protection requirements into non-environmental EU policies and actions, 
and Article 3(3) TEU which merely imposes a duty to balance competing 
environmental, social and economic interests.  ‘By definition, “principles” are endowed 
with a higher normative content than “objectives”’.189 At first glance, this would appear 
to downgrade social and economic goals versus the environmental protection 
requirements of Article 11 TFEU.  
 
Besides the question of the legal nature of sustainable development, an additional 
important legal issue arises: that of the legal substance of the environmental integration 
principle.190  One may wonder what ‘integration’ means and whether environmental 
policy objectives should systematically be given priority in the process of integration? 
 
A relevant interpretation of sustainable development and environmental integration has 
been given by AG Léger in First Corporate Shipping,191 a case concerning the 
interpretation of Article 2 (3) of the Habitats Directive. Article 2(3) provides that 
economic, social and cultural requirements and regional and local characteristics must 
be taken into account in measures taken pursuant to the Directive. According to AG 
Léger, sustainable development ‘does not mean that the interest of the environment 
must necessarily and systematically prevail over the interests defended in the context of 
other policies [...]. On the contrary, [sustainable development] emphasises the necessary 
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balance between various interests which sometimes clash but must be reconciled’.192 
This interpretation appears as ‘a testament of the conciliatory nature’ of sustainable 
development.193 Notwithstanding AG Léger’s position, the CJEU made no reference to 
sustainable development. The Court instead, held that ecological criteria are the only 
criteria to be taken into consideration when selecting N2000 sites.194 Since its landmark 
decision in the Leybucht Dykes case,195 the CJEU has systematically favoured the 
ecological objectives of the Habitats and Birds Directives in case of conflicts with the 
other objectives of the Treaty, in particular with economic and recreational 
considerations.196    
 
In contrast to the conservative approach of the Court, Kingston et al., acknowledge that 
the ‘“constitutionalisation” of sustainable development in each of Article 3(3) TEU, 
Article 11 TFEU and Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights may reasonably 
demonstrate a belief, at the highest political level, that it is actually possible to achieve 
economic, social and environmental goals at the same time’.197  Kingston further asserts 
that ‘at the constitutional level, the EU not only acknowledges the important 
relationship between its economic and environmental policies, but proposes and indeed 
mandates [such] a balance’.198 Since no hierarchy is expressly established between 
Article 3 (3) TEU and Article 11, there is a need to clarify what integration means and 
what constitute environmental protection requirements in the scope of the EIP. 
Particular attention must be paid to the important legal question of whether the EIP must 
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be interpreted in such a way that environmental protection requirements should 
systematically predominate in regulatory licensing for ORE projects. 
5– Understanding the role of the Environmental Integration Principle in EU law 
 
5.1 The multiple functions of the environmental integration principle  
 
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Amsterdam version of the EC Treaty, Article 11 appears to 
mean that sustainable development would only be reached ‘when environmental 
requirements are integrated into other policy’ areas.199  In analysing the nature of 
sustainable development in international law, Barral explains that: 
 
‘To equate sustainable development with the principle of integration would be 
unduly restrictive. Sustainable development is an objective that the International 
Community must strive to achieve, whereas the integration principle is the 
means by which sustainable development will be achieved. Hence, rather 
than being sustainable development, the principle of integration is the key 
technique for its realization’.200 
 
A similar comment can be advanced with respect to EU law.  The EIP is instrumental to 
sustainable development but does not intend to be synonymous with sustainable 
development.  Interestingly, the term ‘integrated’ is not defined in the provisions of the 
Lisbon treaty, nor is ‘environmental protection requirements’. ‘Integration’ finds its 
etymological origins in the Latin integratio meaning ‘putting together parts or elements 
and combining them into a whole; becoming complete’.201 Integration presupposes 
‘breaking down’ the compartmentalisation of EU policies to promote a nexus approach 
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where governance acknowledges the interconnection between environmental policy and 
other policy domains.202  Krämer argues that the EIP involves a ‘continuous process’ of 
‘bringing environmental requirements closer to EU policies and activities’.203   
 
In the author’s view, the EIP should be understood as a cross-cutting provision imposing 
a duty on EU Institutions to apply mutatis mutandis the objectives and principles of the 
environmental policy to all other policies and actions with a view to achieving 
sustainable development. In Concordia Bus Finland, the CJEU argued that 
environmental protection requirements extend beyond the confines of environmental 
policy and can be pursued in the context of public procurement.204 According to the 
CJEU, the EIP ‘emphasises the fundamental nature of the objective of a [high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment], and its extension across 
the range of policies and activities’.205   The CJEU further held that any legal basis in the 
Treaties can be a legal basis for environmental protection.206  The EIP has been 
instrumental in extending the limits of the Union’s competencies, normally governed by 
the principle of conferral.  McIntyre rightly notes in this respect that: 
‘In the light of the principle of environmental integration,  the Union Institutions 
enjoy competence to take additional legal measures to ensure protection of the 
environment whenever they are acting in furtherance of a wide range of EU 
policies including agriculture, transport, energy and so forth’.207 
                                                          
202 Ingrid Boas, Frank Biermann, Norichika Kanie, ‘Cross-sectoral strategies in global sustainability 
governance: towards a nexus approach’ (2016) 16 (3) International Environmental Agreements: Politics, 
Law and Economics,449, 460 
203 Krämer, (n5), 84 
204 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v. Helsingin Kaupunki [2002] ECR I-7213, paras.51, 57; 
Case C-428/07 Horvath v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2009] ECR I-
6355, para. 29 
205 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR I-7879, paras.41-42; Case C-320/03 Commission v 
Austria [2005] ECR I-9871, para. 73 
206 Case C-440/05 Commission v Council [2007] ECR I-9097, para.60; Case C-300/89 Commission v 
Council (Titanuim Dioxyde) [1991] ECR I-2867, paras.22-25 




As discussed in section 1 of this Chapter, the so-called ‘enabling function’ of the 
principle has been strikingly used by EU institutions to interfere with Member States’ 
sovereign rights to decide between different energy sources.208 The EIP is not only 
relevant to extending the scope of Union’s competencies in the elaboration of EU 
legislation; it also helps in the interpretation of secondary law.209  In particular, the EIP 
performs a so-called ‘guidance function’210  whereby ‘European Union Law may – and 
indeed – must be interpreted in the light of the environmental requirements of Article 
191 TFEU, even in areas outside the environmental field’.211  Given the broad 
formulation of Article 191 TFEU, the substance of the integration principle 
encompasses ‘all conceivable environmental objectives, principles and criteria’ falling 
within the remit of the environmental policy.212  In this respect, the notion of 
‘environmental protection requirements’ has been broadly understood to include not 
only the aims of Article 191(1) TFEU, but also the environmental principles of Article 
191(2) TFEU. The environmental principles listed under Article 191(2) include the 
precautionary principle, the principle of prevention, the polluter pays principle and the 
principle of rectification of environmental damage at source.213  The EIP has played a 
pivotal role in justifying the application of the precautionary principle to aid in the 
interpretation of secondary EU legislations. This ‘guidance function’ was particularly 
relied up by the CJEU which continually gives an important doctrinal role to these 
environmental law principles to support a liberal approach to interpretation of EU 
directives both within and outside the ‘environmental sphere’214 including public 
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health,215 State aid,216 movement of goods.217  A clear cut example of how the doctrinal 
function has been used by the EU judiciary is given by the noteworthy Waddenzee218 
and Sweetman219 cases, mentioned many times in this thesis.220 In a similar approach, 
the meanings of ‘waste’221 and ‘producer/holder of waste’222 under the Waste 
Framework Directive (WFD)223 were interpreted in a purposive and contextual manner 
in light of the polluter-pays principle, the preventive and the precautionary principle. In 
Commune de Mesquer,224 the CJEU notably relied on an extensive interpretation of the 
polluter-pays principle to extend the notion of ‘waste producer’  and as such, the 
liability for bearing  the cost of waste disposal, to the seller-charterer of hydrocarbons 
who ‘has contributed’ by its conduct to the risk of pollution.225   
 
It is therefore within the context of the ‘guidance function’ of the EIP that the 
interpretive function of the precautionary principle has been elaborated by the EU 
judiciary to help in the interpretation of the Habitats Directive. From there, one may 
wonder whether the EIP of Article 11 TFEU necessarily calls for a strict formulation of 
the precautionary principle under the assessment requirements of Article 6(3) of the 
Habitats Directive. 
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5.2. The environmental integration principle: systematic predominance of 
environmental objectives?  
 
The incorporation of the terms ‘in particular with a view to promoting sustainable 
development’ by the Amsterdam Treaty certainly suggests that sustainable development 
is one of the objectives pursued by this provision. Legal commentators have stressed 
that the environmental focus of the EIP has been potentially ‘diluted’ by the introduction 
of ‘the qualifying objective to achieve sustainable development which allows economic 
and social consideration to be balanced against environmental requirements’.226 This 
holds particularly true given the ‘proliferation of integration principles’ brought about 
by the Lisbon Treaty.227 The obligation to integrate environmental protection 
requirements may no longer be regarded as an ‘exclusive priority’ in the post-Lisbon 
legislative era.228 A number of cross-sectoral approaches are also binding under a 
number of additional integration clauses including inter alia in the areas of culture,229 
regional policy,230 industry,231 health,232 internal market233 and consumer protection.234 
Article 7 TFEU is probably the most significant cross-sectoral integration clause into 
the EU legal order. Article 7 TFEU provides that the ‘Union shall ensure consistency 
between its policies and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in 
accordance with the principle of conferral of power’.235  Its incorporation under Part I 
‘Principles’ of the TFEU means that Article 7 lays down a general obligation applicable 
to all sectoral policy objectives covered by the Lisbon Treaty.236  According to McIntyre, 
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‘the principle of “consistency” amounts to a principle of “general” or “universal” 
integration of policy objectives bringing all policy requirements listed under the TFEU 
into play and requiring that each must be considered in the adoption of every measure to 
which it might be relevant’.237  Therefore, two major integration clauses can be so far 
identified. First, the EIP, as codified under Article 11, which is specifically dedicated to 
ensuring that environmental protection requirements are given sufficient consideration 
in all Union policies and actions. Second, Article 7 TFEU also establishes a general 
obligation on EU institutions to take into account all EU policy objectives in the 
pursuance of EU policies. Legal scholars have developed different opinions regarding 
the legal interactions of Article 7 and Article 11.  Krämer for example, explains that the 
principle of consistency under Article 7 should not be understood – ‘as meaning that the 
environmental objectives mentioned shall be considered as other, additional objectives 
of the transport, agricultural, fisheries policies and be treated as such’.238 Krämer also 
argues that ‘there is a particular obligation for the EU institutions in the context of 
Article 7 TFEU to ensure that the different policies and activities work towards the 
objective of high level of protection and an improvement of the quality of the 
environment’..239  Jans and Vedder defend an alternative interpretation. The existence of 
multiple integration clauses does not support the conclusion whereby environmental 
policy objectives have some measure of priority over other policy areas.240  For Jans, 
‘the integration principle is designed to ensure that protection of the environment is at 
least taken into consideration, even when commercial or other policy decisions are 
being made’.241 ‘The manner in which potential and actual conflicts between protection 
of the environment and, for example, how the functioning of the internal market should 
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be resolved cannot be inferred from the integration principle as such.’242  Lee adopts a 
similar approach whereby ‘the range of integration principles may have reduced the 
visibility and status of environmental integration’.243 Environmental policy is no longer 
the only ‘beneficiary of integration’ and this, she argues, is more in line with the breadth 
of sustainable development: the proliferation of integration clauses ‘puts paid to any 
lingering hope that environmental policy integration might be about the prioritisation, 
rather than the simple consideration of environmental values’.244  
 
De Sadeleer developed a nuanced understanding of environmental integration by 
acknowledging that Article 11 ‘lays down a stronger commitment’ than some of the 
other integration clauses.245 De Sadeeler first acknowledges that there is no hierarchy 
established by the TFEU between the different EU policy objectives. ‘Given that the EU 
institutions have important discretionary powers as to how they shape and prioritize 
their policies’, De Sadeeler also considers that the ‘environmental policy is not likely to 
have been accorded a particular priority over other policy areas’.246  Nevertheless, the 
same author notes that unlike Article 7, the EIP ‘poses a concrete obligation’ to integrate 
and not merely to ensure ‘consistency’ with the environmental objectives and principles 
of Article 191(1), (2) of the TFEU.247 If the environmental protection requirements of 
Article 11 may be given ‘stronger weight’, these shall remain consistent with the EU 
energy policy objectives for renewable energy. In this respect, De Sadeeler further 
points out that the obligation to ensure ‘consistency’ under Article 7 not only has a 
strong horizontal dimension but also a vertical one, which among other things, implies 
that the interpretation of secondary legislation must  be consistent with EU policy 
                                                          
242  Ibid. 
243 Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making, (n156), 69 
244 Ibid. 






objectives, in particular that of combating climate change.248   It is settled case law that 
EU institutions have ‘to strike a balance between the relative importance of the 
environment objectives and other objectives as they proceed’.249 The CJEU has held on 
numerous occasions that EU Institutions must endeavour to reconcile the various 
objectives laid down in the founding Treaties;  a duty ‘which does not allow one of 
these aims to be pursued in isolation  [or] in such a way as to make the attainment of 
other aims impossible’.250   Where it is possible to give some priority to environmental 
objectives,251 priority should not ‘close possibilities’ to achieve the objectives pursued 
under other policies.252  EU Treaties are forming a consistent legal system.253 As such 
their ‘provisions should be interpreted so as to help, and not hinder, the EU’s other 
policy objectives’.254 Likewise, EU institutions shall act within the limits of the power 
conferred on it in the Treaties and in conformity with the objectives set out in them.255  
In this vein, general objectives of EU law, and notably the objective of sustainable 
development, function as a framework for EU Institutions.256  European Institutions, 
including the EU judicature must therefore ensure that the precautionary principle 
remains consistent with the achievement of renewable energy targets, initially adopted 
under the environmental policy.   This dictum is also applicable to Member States and 
their national authorities responsible for implementing EU policy and law in light of the 
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principle of sincere cooperation,257 imposing an obligation ‘to refrain from actions 
which could jeopardise achievement of Union’s objectives’.258 
From there, the author supports the argument voiced by De Sadeleer. Article 11 
certainly imposes ‘a stronger commitment’ on EU Institutions to take into account 
environmental objectives and principles of Article 191(1) and (2) TFEU when adopting 
and implementing policies and legal actions based thereon. However, ‘environmental 
integration’ does not mean that strict priority must be automatically given to ecological 
criteria when interpreting the provisions of the Habitats Directive.  Article 11 TFEU 
would only formalise the ‘ecological element’ of sustainable development. This view 
also broadly corresponds to the position of Sjåfjel. Sjåfjel explains that Article 11 TFEU 
‘is a rule that refers to and strengthens sustainable development as an objective and 
which, at the same time, codifies the principle of sustainable development, particularly 
its operative environmental integration dimension’.259 Sustainable development is a 
wider concept that goes beyond the imperative of environmental protection. Sustainable 
development as expressed by the CJEU in the Laval260 and Viking Lines261 judgements 
aims to integrate economic activities with the objectives of high level of employment 
and social protection.   
Article 3(3) of the TEU seems to require a balancing exercise between various 
environmental, social and economic imperatives. However, simply restricting 
sustainable development to a mere balancing act between these competing imperatives 
would be a misconception. Voigt rightly outlines that, even though ‘there is no doubt 
that balancing environmental, economic and a social factor is pivotal for sustainable 
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development, this does not necessarily mean that ‘all three need to or even can be 
treated in the same manner or given the same weight’.262 ‘Integration’ without a goal is 
devoid of sense.263  In this vein, Voigt points out that ‘integration’ in the context to 
sustainable development must be subject to the ultimate goal of ‘ecological integrity’ or 
‘ecosystem integrity’.264 This brings us back to the discourse on ecological 
sustainability, which as discussed in section 3.2, forms the ‘ecological core’ of 
sustainable development. ‘Ecological sustainability cannot be achieved without climate 
mitigation actions. More now than ever, ecological sustainability requires the 
integration of the climate-energy objectives and biodiversity protection to halt 
degradation of biodiversity and ensure provision of ecosystem services to mankind (see 
section 3.2 above).  If the declared aim of environmental integration is to achieve 
sustainable development, the principle should be instrumental to this goal. As a 
constituent principle of sustainable development, environmental integration cannot be 
interpreted as giving absolute priority to conservation goals. Instead, it should be 
operated to encourage more sophisticated trade-offs and equally maximise EU 
objectives for biodiversity conservation and renewable energy. Possible ways to achieve 
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6- Towards a new understanding of environmental integration in the field of 
renewable energy    
6.1. The EIP and the promotion of renewable energy in CJEU’s case law    
 
Since its seminal decision in the so-called Danish Bottles265 case, the CJEU has been 
described as a “constitutionalist actor” of substantive environmental integration in the 
EU’s economic policy’.266 The protection of the environment is one the Community’s 
essential objectives which may justify restrictions to the free movement of goods. 
Interestingly, the Court has been particularly active in legitimising, on the grounds of 
the EIP, far-reaching restrictions to the free movement of goods in order to promote of 
use of renewable energy on the territory of Member States. In so doing, the Court added 
the promotion of renewable energy to the so-called Cassis de Dijon267  list of imperative 
requirements justifying restrictions to the free movement of goods under Article 36 
TFUE. 
PreussenElektra268 is certainly a landmark judgement in this respect. The CJEU, for the 
first time, explicitly relied upon the principle of environmental integration to justify 
derogation to Article 34 TFEU prohibiting quantitative restrictions to the free movement 
of goods to promote the use of domestically-produced renewable electricity.269 At issue 
in PreussenElektra was the requirement that electricity retailers purchase a proportion 
of their electricity from locally generated wind energy. The CJEU had to decide whether 
German feed-in tariff imposing purchase obligations on electricity suppliers to favour 
domestic producers of green electricity were compatible with what is now Article 34 
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TFEU. The CJEU found that territorial restrictions aiming at promoting the use of 
renewable energy are ‘useful for the protection of the environment inasmuch as they 
contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions which are amongst the main 
cause of climate change that the EU and Member States have pledged to combat’.270  At 
paragraph 76 of the judgement, the CJEU explicitly refers to the principle of 
environmental integration to conclude that the German support scheme was not 
incompatible with the fundamental rule of free movement of good in the single 
market.271 
Five years after the Lisbon Treaty came into force, the CJEU in Ålands Vindkraft AB,272  
adopted a similar reasoning by analogy to PreussenElektra.  By way of background, 
Sweden passed legislation restricting the benefit of green electricity certificates to 
renewable electricity installations located on the territory of Sweden. Ålands Vindkraft, 
a wind energy producer, sought approval from the Swedish Energy Authority for its 
wind farm located in Finland with a view to being awarded green electricity certificates. 
The application was refused on the ground that only green electricity installations 
located in Sweden can be approved for the award of green electricity certificates. An 
important question for preliminary ruling was referred to the CJEU to determine 
whether the Swedish legislation, restricting economic benefits attached to electricity 
certificates to producers established in Sweden, constituted a quantitative restriction on 
imports prohibited by Article 34 TFEU. If so, the CJEU had to decide whether these 
territorial restrictions could be justified in light of the objective of environmental 
protection. Unfortunately, the CJEU did not explicitly refer to Article 11 TFEU. Instead, 
the CJEU reiterated its statement in Preussen Elektra according to which the use of 
renewable energy is useful for the protection of the environment inasmuch as it 
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contributes to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions which are amongst the main 
causes of climate change that the EU and its Member States have pledged to combat.273 
Recalling EU international commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, the CJEU 
confirmed its settled case law whereby national measures that are capable of hindering 
intra-Community trade may be justified by overriding requirements relating to 
protection of the environment.274  From there, recognising that the Swedish legislation 
constituted a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions, the CJEU 
found that the objective of promoting the use of renewable energy was in principle 
capable of justifying restrictions to the free movement of goods.275   Again, in Essent 
Belgium,276 the Court reached the same conclusion: the objective of promoting the use 
of renewable energy, because of its contribution to the protection of the environment, is 
capable of justifying barriers to the free movement of goods.277  In this case, the CJEU 
found compatible with Article 34 TFEU, a Flemish support scheme obliging national 
electricity suppliers to purchase green electricity certificates issued to producers of 
green electricity established in the Flemish region. 
 
Furthermore, in Ålands Vindkraft AB and Essent Belgium cases, the CJEU had to 
consider whether the national support schemes and legislation met the requirements of 
the proportionality principle.  In order to establish whether a restriction is proportionate, 
it must be shown that the contested legislation or measures ‘do not exceed the limits of 
what is [both] appropriate and necessary to attain the legitimate objective pursued.278  
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In Ålands Vindkraft AB, the CJEU found that the territorial limitation imposed on the 
issuance of green certificates was necessary to attain the legitimate objective of 
environmental protection pursued in the circumstances.279 As a short comment on the 
proportionality test carried out by the CJEU, in Ålands Vindkraft AB, the Court 
considered that, once the green electricity has been allowed into the transmission or 
distribution system, it is difficult to determine its specific origin and, accordingly its 
systematic identification at the consumption stage as green electricity is difficult to put 
into practice’.280  To justify the proportionality of the Swedish legislation as a whole, the 
CJEU relied on a number of arguments. In particular, the CJEU held that EU law has 
not harmonised the national support schemes281 and assigned different mandatory 
national targets282 taking into account differences in renewable energy potentials and 
energy mix of each Member States. In light of recital 25 of the REN Directive, the 
Court held that these differences justify that Member States are able to ‘control the 
effect and costs of their national support schemes according to their different potentials’ 
to ensure the proper functioning of national support schemes’.283 While the necessity 
test appears to be satisfied, the restriction on importation of green electricity must also 
be appropriate to attain the legitimate objective pursued. In Ålands Vindkraft AB, the 
CJEU held that there was no doubt that the national support scheme was effective in 
creating incentives for electricity producers, suppliers or consumers to increase their 
production/use of green electricity. Consequently, it was not, according to the Court, 
possible to call into question the ability of the scheme to attain the legitimate objective 
of promoting the use of renewable electricity.284  The CJEU had an additional 
refinement. The support scheme must be proven to function under effective and fair 
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conditions285 ‘to attain the legitimate goal pursued’286 namely, the promotion of the use 
of renewable energy. The Court adopted a similar line of reasoning in Essent 
Belgium.287 
 
A detailed analysis of the proportionality test applied by the CJEU in Ålands Vindkraft 
and Essent Belgium goes beyond the scope of this study. However, two related 
arguments can easily be put forward to ‘rethink’ the strict application of the 
precautionary principle when it comes to approving deployments of renewable energy 
technologies in the context of Article 6(3). What the author seeks to highlight here, is 
that in these two important decisions, the CJEU explicitly raised the objective of 
promoting renewable energy in the category of ‘overriding requirements’288 of 
environmental protection capable of justifying restrictions to one of the fundamental 
rules of the single market. What is more, the CJEU explicitly relies upon the EIP to 
justify this position.  According to the Court, the promotion of renewable energy is 
‘useful for the protection of the environment’ inasmuch as ‘it contributes to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions which are amongst the main causes of climate change that the 
EU and its Member States have pledged to combat’.289 This is certainly a remarkable 
step towards acceptance by the Court that renewable energy is centrally important to 
achieve EU environmental policy objectives. In these cases, the EIP seems to extend the 
judicial principle of precedence to the promotion of renewable energy. The principle of 
precedence has been worked out by the CJEU in its case law on the precautionary 
principle to give ‘precedence’ to environmental and public health concerns over 
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economic interests (section 6.2.2 below).290  Without going so far, one ought to argue 
that if the objective of promoting renewable energy is sufficiently important to restrict 
the functioning of the single market, it should, at least, be afforded the same weight as 
any other environmental goals within the scope of Article 11 TFEU. Stated differently, 
the guidance function of the EIP should foster a jurisprudential re-interpretation of the 
precautionary principle when examining applications for ORE development consents 
under the AA process of Article 6(3). 
Less immediate but not less important, the Court does not exempt the EIP from the 
application of the principle of proportionality, which has been found, within the case 
law, to be a general principle of law.291  Proportionality does not exclude an activity to 
be prohibited in the first place. However, ‘when there is a choice between several 
appropriate measures, recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages 
caused must not be disproportional to the aims pursued’.292  It is frequently argued in the 
doctrine that the principle of proportionality entails a three-limb test: 1) the test of 
suitability/adequacy, 2) the necessity/less restrictive measures test and 3) the 
proportionality test stricto sensu.293 It is under this later test that the genuine balancing 
exercise of the proportionality principle should in principle take place.294  In the author’s 
view, the two first limbs of the principle equate the ‘effectiveness’ requirement that 
Trouwborst summaries as follows: ‘a measure is effective if it is likely to produce the 
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outcome desired’.295 The proportionality test stricto sensu in turns, requires that the 
level of protection afforded to one legitimate interest must be commensurate with the 
degree of disadvantage that this causes to other legitimate objectives.296  Hence, the 
stricto sensu test operates as a ‘counter-balance’ to the effectiveness criterion: whilst 
‘effectiveness ensures that the outcome is served’; ‘proportionality [stricto sensu] 
ensures that this is all that happens and no more than that, by adjusting the means to the 
objective’.297  From there, even suitable and necessary measures can thus be found 
disproportionate if they impose an excessive burden on private interests, individuals or 
fundamental freedoms.298   The three-limbs test has never been clearly endorsed by the 
CJEU. This complicates any attempt to determine the substance of the third stricto 
sensu component of test.299  The stricto sensu test has sometimes been considered as part 
of the necessity test when identifying less restrictive alternatives.300 Some authors also 
assert that the approach of the CJUE has varied slightly from a two-limb test to a three-
limb evaluation of proportionality depending on whether the contested legislation or 
measure was enacted by Member States or EU Institutions.301  Despite discrepancies in 
the application of the principle, the author will consider the proportionality principle in 
its tripartite dimension to challenge the particular interpretation of the precautionary 
principle, as crystallised by the CJEU in its interpretation of the assessment 
requirements of Articles 6(3) and (4) of the Habitats Directive. 
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6.2. Rethinking the linkage between Articles 6(3) and 6(4) in light of the 
proportionality principle  
 
The achievement of sustainable development demands a concerted effort to equally 
maximise the respective policy objectives for renewable energy and biodiversity 
conservation. ‘Concerted effort’ suggests that the interests of conservation and 
renewable energy should be proportionally balanced in decision-making. The EC 
Communication on the precautionary principle follows along the same line when it 
states that ‘reliance on the precautionary principle is no excuse for derogating from the 
general principle of proportionality’.302 Unlike Ålands Vindkraft and Essent Belgium, 
the CJEU does not explicitly refer to the proportionality principle in its seminal case 
law on the interpretation of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive.  Rather, the CJEU 
performs a very light proportionality test when holding that the authorisation criteria 
under Article 6(3) ‘integrate the precautionary principle and make it possible to 
effectively prevent adverse effects to the integrity of protected sites’.303 ‘A less stringent 
approach to authorisation under Article 6(3) could not ensure as effectively the 
fulfilment of the objective of site protection intended under that provision’.304  In light 
of the ‘three-limb’ test described above, this ruling hardly satisfies the inherent 
requirements of the proportionality principle when applied to the particular context of 
offshore renewable energy. 
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6.2.1. Offshore renewable energy: an ‘imperative’ and ‘overriding’ public 
interest? 
The Court’s strict observance of the precautionary principle has placed a significant 
emphasis on the linkage between Articles 6(3) and (4).  If after an AA process, the 
competent authorities conclude that there are reasonable scientific doubts as to the 
absence of potential impacts on a N2000 site, ORE projects can still be permitted under 
the derogation clause of Article 6(4) if competent authorities can prove that the project 
is necessary for imperative reasons of overriding public interest (IROPI).305  As a matter 
of principle, AG Kokott has asserted that no failure to observe the principle of 
proportionality can be established in light of the derogating scheme of Article 6(4).306 
The Court has therefore assumed that Article 6(4) would be easy to employ in the event 
of a negative AA.   
At first glance, the argument of AG Kokott appears sensible in light of the CJEU 
findings in Schwarze Sulm River.307  Recognising the positive contribution of renewable 
energy to environmental protection and sustainable development, the Court has 
confirmed that the production of renewable energy from hydrokinetic sources can be 
considered as an overriding public interest justifying derogation under the WFD.308 This 
decision may be seen as perfectly embedding ‘a weighing to sustainable 
development’.309 Although similar jurisprudence would surely be welcomed in the 
context of the Habitats Directive, Schwarze Sulm River does not stand as a general rule. 
In this particular case, the Court allowed the competent Austrian authority to authorise 
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the construction of a hydro-electric project on the basis of the derogation scheme of the 
WFD because the competent authority could justify that all the derogation conditions 
set out under that Directive were fulfilled.310   
In the context of the Habitats Directive, many scholars have rightly stressed that Article 
6(4) hardly provides a ‘workable option’ for many private-led ORE projects.311 As an 
exception, the derogation of Article 6(4) must be interpreted restrictively and applies 
only after the conditions of Article 6(3) are satisfied.312 Before they can qualify as part 
of the weighing process of Article 6(4), ORE technologies and their ecological 
footprints would still need to be precisely understood and weighted against the feature 
that may be damaged.313 Likewise, the conditions of ‘no alternative’ solutions and of 
‘imperative’, and ‘overriding’ public interest must still be cumulatively satisfied.314  
Kokott notes that the concept of ‘imperative’ and ‘overriding’ have their equivalence in 
the test of proportionality in that the necessity of striking a balance results from these 
two concepts.315 Article 6(4) defines the ‘imperative’ character of an interest by reason 
of its nature. Among other things, reasons of social and economic nature and, in the case 
of priority qualifying features, public health, public safety and consideration of 
‘primary’ importance for the environment can be ‘imperative’. In the Oxford Dictionary, 
‘imperative’ refers to an ‘authoritative command’ to safeguard or achieve an interest ‘of 
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vital importance’.316 For example, in the EC guidance on Article 6(4), ‘imperative’ may 
refer to ‘situations where a plan or project proved to be indispensable within the 
framework of action or policies aiming to protect fundamental values’ including health, 
safety and environment’.317 The ‘public’ and ‘imperative’ nature of combating climate 
change is now firmly embedded, within demanding and mandatory climate-energy 
targets, in public international law under the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement318 
of the UNFCC, and in EU law under the Renewable Energy Directive. The CJEU has 
also recognised the promotion of renewable energy as a mandatory requirement relating 
to the protection of the environment.319   The Court further points out that ‘an increase in 
the use of renewable energy is also designed to protect the health and life of humans, 
animals and plants, which are among the public interest grounds listed in Article 36 
TFEU’.320   
If an ‘imperative’ character could therefore easily apply to the ORE sector, the EC has 
reasoned in its written evidence on the Severn Tidal Energy Barrage, this does not 
necessarily mean that each individual project ‘would automatically be of a sufficiently 
overriding character’.321 The public interest must also be ‘overriding’: this means that a 
proposed development must be of such importance that it can be weighted up against 
the Habitats Directive’s objectives of conservation.322 Pursuant to the EC guidance on 
Article 6(4), the public interest is ‘overriding’ where, after a balancing exercise, 
national competent authorities have to make their approval subject to the condition that 
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the imperative reasons outweigh the conservation objectives of the affected site.323 As 
discussed above, the notion of ‘overriding’ has been worked out by the CJEU to raise 
the objective of promoting renewable energy in the category of ‘overriding 
requirements’ of environmental protection capable of justifying restrictions to the 
operation of the single market.324  In this respect, the Court has upheld national support 
schemes having equivalent effects to quantitative restrictions on import/export for the 
purpose of Article 34 TFEU.325 If the objective of promoting renewable energy 
outweighs the economic freedoms of the Treaty, it is arguable that all individual ORE 
deployments will be recognised as truly ‘overriding’ in the context of the Habitats 
Directive.  According to the Court, private developments only satisfied these conditions 
in exceptional circumstances: ‘where a project, although of a private character, in fact 
by its very nature and by its economic and social context, presents an overriding pubic 
interest and it has been shown that there are no alternatives’.326  Not every kind of public 
interest is sufficient to justify derogation. Only those of long-term benefit to the society 
are sufficient to outweigh the long-term conservation interests of the Directive.327   
These conditions seem to be generally observed in national jurisdictions with some 
domestic courts having rejected recognition of an IROPI interest to small wind farm 
developments.328 From there, one may reasonably assume that for the condition of 
‘overriding’ interest to be satisfied, a proposed development will have to provide a 
meaningful contribution to the demand for electricity and CO2 abatement. In the context 
of emerging technologies such as wave and tidal energy, it may be difficult for national 
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competent authorities to substantiate that a proposed development provides an 
overriding public interest. The rationale behind this is that these emerging technologies 
must first be tested and then deployed at necessary scales to meaningfully satisfy the 
demand for CO2 abatement and renewable electricity. The importance of a project for 
CO2 abatement and national renewable energy strategies must be sufficiently 
substantiated to justify an adverse impact on the integrity of the site via the derogation 
clause of Article 6(4).  This has been confirmed, albeit h in the context of the Water 
Framework Directive, by the arguments of the European Commission (EC) in the 
Schwarze Sulm case. The EC questioned the ‘overriding’ character of the hydro-electric 
plant by arguing that ‘hydroelectricity is only a source of renewable energy among 
others’ and that ‘the energy produced by the hydropower plant envisaged will only have 
a minor impact on the regional and national energy supply’.329  The CJEU eventually 
dismissed the European Commission’s action because the EC did not sufficiently 
substantiate its argumentation. Here again, competent national authorities enjoy a broad 
discretion to decide whether a specific project is of such ‘overriding’ importance in the 
context of Article 6(4).330  For some authors, this may highlight a ‘lack of integration’331 
between the derogation clause of Article 6(4) and the objectives of the REN Directive. 
Van Hees observes that the mere existence of Article 6(4) as a derogation does not in 
itself necessarily guarantee that the weighing exercise, which is mandated by 
sustainable development, will be carried out in practice to balance renewable energy 
production and biodiversity protection.332 Instead, it seems to exacerbate the conflict 
between two sustainability-oriented objectives or ‘green versus green dilemma’.333 The 
derogation of Article 6(4), albeit described as a ‘manifestation’ of the proportionality 
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principle and of the aim of sustainable development,334  seems to provide a ‘weighing of 
limited interest’335  to the ORE sector.   
 
Although the necessary balancing of the respective interests for ORE and biodiversity 
conservation may not be possible under Article 6(4) as it currently stands, a re-
interpretation of the notion of ‘overriding public interest’ within the meaning of the 
Habitats Directive could facilitate greater integration between these imperatives. In a 
similar reasoning as Schwarze Sulm River, the ‘high priority status’ attached to the 
promotion of renewable energy336 could also be recognised by the CJEU under the 
Habitats Directive and the ‘overriding’ and ‘public interest’ criteria of Article 6(4) re-
interpreted on this basis to encompass all forms of ORE technologies. Although this re-
interpretation will certainly encourage licensing authorities to give more importance to 
offshore renewables when applying the requirements of Article 6(4), the outcome of 
such a balancing act could still be debated. As noted above, competent authorities enjoy 
broad discretion to invoke the derogation clause and to decide upon whether more 
weight should be given to individual renewable energy projects. What is more, even if a 
general derogation rule for offshore renewables was enshrined under Article 6(4), 
permitting ORE projects to proceed under an IROPI condition would not necessarily 
lead to genuine sustainable outcomes guaranteeing adequate levels of protection to 
marine biodiversity. Worse still, it will be argued that facilitating the approval of ORE 
projects under Article 6(4) instead of Article 6(3) may not be compatible with the stated 
objectives of the Habitats Directive. 
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6.2.2. The derogation clause of Article 6(4): a better safeguard of biodiversity 
conservation? 
 
The core aim of the Directive consists in ensuring biodiversity through 
maintaining/restoring the conservation status of natural habitats type and species.337  
This entails, as the Court has already explained, ‘the lasting preservation of the 
constitutive characteristics of the site’338 that are necessary to optimise the site’s 
contribution to the objective of favourable conservation status. ORE projects can only 
be considered under the scope of Article 6(4) if, despite the implementation of 
mitigation measures, the AA of Article 6(3) has found that prohibited adverse effects on 
the integrity of the site will occur or cannot be excluded beyond all reasonable doubt.  
In other words, the integrity of the site may still be adversely affected if proposed 
development is allowed to proceed for an imperative and overriding reason of public 
interest under Article 6(4). Unlike mitigation, the compensatory measures of Article 
6(4) are not specifically directed at minimising or even cancelling the negative impacts 
on the integrity of the site and its qualifying features.339   Rather, compensatory 
measures are independent of the project and tend to compensate after an adverse impact 
on the site’s integrity has been done.340 What is more, their aim is limited to the broad 
requirement of protecting the ‘overall coherence’ of N2000 network.341  This 
presupposes that the network of N2000 sites was ecologically coherent in the first place 
and not only an ‘ecological network on paper’.342 Compensatory measures might consist 
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of 1) restoring or enhancing existing N2000 sites affected by the development, 2) 
recreating habitats on a new or enlarged site, or, 3) proposing a new N2000 site under 
the Birds and Habitats Directives.343  In this respect, the EC guidance places a strong 
emphasis on the creation/restoration of biological values, natural habitats and 
functionality (functions and properties) comparable to those which had justified the 
selection of the site.344 Here, the focus is on the need to provide ‘comparable’ 
functionality and not, as McGillivray observes, on the creation of ‘an exact replication’ 
of these functions.345 The ‘somewhat weak’ success of compensatory measures in 
reinstating comparable ecological assets and functionality casts serious doubt on the 
suitability of the linkage between Articles 6(3) and (4) in achieving the objective of 
conservation pursued by the Habitats Directive.346 The EC guidance recognises the 
‘intrinsic difficulties’ of replacing ecological conditions.347  It concedes that ‘it is highly 
unlikely that ecological structures and functions as well as the related habitats and 
species populations can be reinstated up to the status they had before the damage by a 
plan or project’.348 As the literature points out, the uniqueness and complexity of some 
ecosystems make the success of compensation measures even more uncertain349 and 
subject to considerable time lags.350 Approaches to marine habitat compensation exist in 
the marine environment.351 However, poor knowledge of marine ecosystems, combined 
with the sparse and highly mobile nature of most marine fauna, makes the technical 
feasibility and prospect for success of marine biodiversity offsets expensive and 
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inherently uncertain.352 These have been raised as the main reasons why compensatory 
measures are rarely implemented in the context of European offshore wind farms.353 A 
review of 55 offshore wind farm impact assessments reveals that only 7% of the 
compensatory measures envisaged by developers had the aim of offsetting the 
degradation of remarkable sites and none of these measures were properly designed.354  
Furthermore, compensatory measures may not lead to sustainable trade-offs in all 
circumstances.355  Many times, the CJEU has stressed its ‘suspicion’ regarding the 
development of ecological equivalencies. The CJEU has repeatedly held that the 
putative positive effects of habitats restoration/compensatory measures - even when 
implemented prior to the commencement of construction works - are highly difficult to 
forecast with any degree certainty and therefore, these cannot be taken into account in 
the AA process of Article 6(3).356 It is also worth noting that Article 6(4) does not 
require the same precautionary standard of Article 6(3) in relation to the effectiveness of 
compensatory measures.357 A ‘reasonable guarantee of success’ based on the ‘best 
scientific knowledge available’, seems to be sufficient to approve a project under 
Article 6(4).358 In this respect, Van Hoorick observes a ‘contradictio in terminis’ in the 
ruling of the CJEU whereby Article 6(4), when interpreted in light of sustainable 
development, permits the conversion of a natural fluvial ecosystem into a man-made 
fluvial and lacustrine system.359 According to Van Hoorick, this ruling would runs 
against the purpose of sustainable development. Indeed, it is arguable that by converting 
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natural ecosystems into a man-made ecosystem, one can reasonably ensure the long-
term coherence of N2000.360 By contrast, he argues that avoiding and minimising 
encroachment in natural ecosystems certainly will.361 As discussed above, the balancing 
of ORE interests and biodiversity conservation could possibly be contemplated through 
a re-interpretation of the normative term of ‘overriding public interest’. The 
consideration of a development under the derogation scheme of Article 6(4) 
presupposes that, despite examination of mitigation measures aiming at avoiding or 
reducing negative impacts, the AA had failed to establish the absence of adverse impact 
on the integrity of the site. Given the weak prospect of success associated with marine 
biodiversity offsets, authorising smaller or medium-scale ORE projects with uncertain, 
yet lesser significant, and/or minor impacts, to proceed in tandem with appropriate 
mitigation measures under Article 6(3) certainly appears as a more sustainable approach 
than permitting larger-scale developments with established encroachments on N2000 
sites’ integrity to be deployed together with poorly effective compensatory outcomes. 
 
The CJEU has made clear that derogation clauses cannot be ‘contrary to both the spirit 
and purpose of the Habitats Directive’.362 In practice however, there seems to be an 
apparent ‘legal paradox’363 between the cemented linkage of Articles 6(3) and (4) and 
the stated protection objectives of Article 2 of the Habitats Directive.  The EC has 
consistently opted for a very permissive understanding of what reasons of public 
interest can be regarded as IROPI in the sense of Article 6(4). A number of large 
infrastructures including railway connections,364 motorways,365 airports366 and port 
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extensions367 with positive impacts for the economy and local unemployment368 have 
received favourable opinions from the EC. Krämer contends that none of these opinions 
would successfully survive scrutiny by the CJEU.369  Clutten and Tafur go so far as to 
state that the purpose of the Habitats Directive would be ‘imperilled’ by the flexible 
interpretation being accorded to IROPI.370 Climate change considerations may rapidly 
be sufficient to outweigh the conservation objectives of the Habitats Directive if large-
scale ORE deployments become an indispensable part of our electricity mix. Although 
at the time of writing, no large offshore wind farms have been approved pursuant to a 
positive opinion of the EC under Article 6(4),371 this could rapidly become a workable 
option with respect to large offshore energy infrastructures falling in the category of 
‘project of common interest’ under the TEN-E Regulation.372  The TEN-E Regulation 
allows competent authorities to place more weight on the side of strategic energy 
infrastructures, including grid development works associated with large OWFs,373 
falling in the category of ‘project of common interest’.374 In many circumstances, the 
conditions of IROPI will  thus be too high to be passed by smaller projects but 
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ironically not demanding enough to prevent large-scale offshore developments from 
proceeding under derogation clause of Article 6(4). Stated differently, the strict linkage 
of Article 6(3) with Article 6(4) does not necessarily ensure acceptable levels of 
protection to marine habitats and species. It may instead prevent smaller projects with 
uncertain yet potentially less alarming impacts on N2000 sites from being authorised 
under the scope of Article 6(3) while permitting large-scale and truly harmful 
developments to proceed on the basis of Article 6(4) for imperative reasons of 
overriding public interest. 
 
In conclusion, the dogmatic approach to conservation taken by the CJEU hardly seems 
to be compatible with the tenets of the ‘necessity’ and ‘suitability test’ underpinning the 
proportionality principle. As far as the violation of the proportionality test stricto sensu 
is concerned, this latter test should require weighing up the importance of the objective 
pursued with the interests that are threatened by that measure.375 Weighing the 
respective importance of environmental protection, human health and economic 
considerations, the Court of Justice and the CFI have enshrined, on the basis of the 
precautionary principle, a general principle of precedence whereby the protection of 
human health, public safety and the environment must be given precedence over 
economic interests.376 The Court went as far to state that the ‘protection of public health 
must unquestionably take precedence over economic considerations’.377 Imposing a 
precautionary withdrawal or ban on the use of additives in animal feed stuffs, antibiotics 
and pathogenic microorganisms in food waste, was thus not found disproportionate, 
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even in the absence of evidence corroborating the reality of the risk.378  AG Jacobs 
explains that ‘if the set of environmental objectives involves a high level of protection, 
the restraint will inevitably be also higher’.379 In this vein, Jacobs further argues that 
‘endorsing higher levels [of environmental protection] implies a readiness to accept 
more restrictive measures, as that is the very nature of proportionality’.380  In light of the 
EC Communication on the precautionary principle, the proportionality of a measure 
must nonetheless be evaluated in light of  ‘the chosen level of protection’.381  The final 
decision is therefore ‘eminently political’382 and seems to be guided, not by the 
scientific findings evaluating the risk, but by the constitutional objective to pursue a 
‘high level of [environmental] protection’.383 A high level of environmental protection is 
entirely predicated on the pursuit of the newly incorporated objective of combating 
climate change. From there, the principle of precedence can hardly be invoked on the 
basis of precaution if it has for effect to complicate the achievement of climate-related 
objectives that are fully integrated into the environmental policy. ‘By putting the brake 
on development unless Article 6(4) applies’,384 and as such, by placing so much 
importance on certainty in the context of Article 6(3), the jurisprudence of the CJEU 
disproportionally affects the ORE sector and obstructs innovation that is needed to 
tackle the impacts of climate change (Chapter IV, section 2.4). While some risk 
aversion is warranted in the presence of irreversibility, an overly high evidentiary 
burden under Article 6(3) may, on the other hand, encourage project developers and 
decision-makers to minimise the importance of uncertainty or ‘to create certainty where 
it does not exist’ with a view to reconciling the assessment with the interpretation of the 
                                                          
378 Case C-97/83 Melkunie [1984] ECRI I-2367, paras.15, 17; Case T-392/02 Solvay Pharmaceuticals, 
Op. cit, para.150; CaseT-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA [2002] ECR II-03305, para.393 
379 Francis Jacobs, ‘The Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of the Environment’ 
(2006) 18(2) Journal of Environmental Law’, 185, 195 
380 Ibid. 
381 European Commission, ‘Communication on the Precautionary Principle’, (n302), at 3 
382 Ibid, 3 
383 TFEU, Article 191(2) 
384 Emma Lees, ‘Concretising the precautionary principle in habitats protection – Grüne Liga Sachsen v 




Court. The fear of uncertainty may in turn prompt ‘scientifically unsound’ AA385 
thereby, reducing incentives to develop science-based strategies to reduce scientific 
uncertainty and improve future licensing decision-making for projects with obvious 
positive effects on climate change mitigation and biodiversity.  
At first glance, an example of proportional examination may be illustrated by the 
decision of the UK Supreme Court in Sustainable Shetland (Appellant) v The Scottish 
Ministers.386 The Supreme Court upheld a planning permission granted by the Scottish 
Ministers to an onshore wind farm. At issue was the failure of the Scottish Ministers to 
take proper account of their obligation under the Birds Directive with regard to the 
whimbrel population. The wind farm proposal was not located in the Feltar SPA but in 
the mainland area where the whimbrel population of the Shetlands was highly 
significant, representing 95% of the total UK population. The ornithological section of 
the Environmental Statement (ES) indicated that the population of whimbrel was poorly 
understood and, in the absence of previous wind farm developments, the likely impacts 
had been inferred from knowledge of other related bird species. The ES predicted that 
disturbance would result in the long-term displacement of 1.8 pairs which might be able 
to resettle elsewhere and a collision mortality rate of 3.7 birds per year.  A Habitat 
Management Plan (HMP) was also designed by the developer which contained habitat 
management actions, restoration and control of predators to increase whimbrel breeding 
success. The Scottish Ministers were satisfied that the HMP would offer benefits to the 
conservation status of whimbrel and their habitats and considered that an estimate of 3.7 
collision rate per year was very small when considered in the context of the 72-108 
annual deaths from other causes. If, in spite of the implementation of the HMP, the 
negative impacts were to remain, these negative effects on conservation status of the 
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whimbrel population were outweighed by the benefits the project would bring in terms 
of substantial renewable energy generation and the support this offers to tackling 
climate change and meeting EU Climate Change Targets. The Supreme Court held that 
the Ministers were entitled to regard the limited anticipated impacts on whimbrels 
combined with the prospect of the HMP achieving positive improvements for the 
conservation status of the whimbrel population as a sufficient answer to the 
objections.387 Unfortunately the Supreme Court missed the opportunity to address the 
question of whether the Ministers’ reliance on balancing considerations (renewable 
energy and climate benefits) in the specific context of Article 2 of the Birds Directive 
was relevant in law.388 The balancing factors in relation to the benefits of the project for 
climate change mitigation were, according to the Court, a ‘fall-back position’ which 
would only come into play if the Minister’s primary reasoning was not accepted.389 
Therefore, the question of balancing renewable energy and protection of birds did not 
require determination by the Court. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court adds a compelling 
refinement when holding that ‘as environmental benefits’, these considerations must be 
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7- Conclusions: ‘integration’ but not predominance of environmental protection 
requirements over renewable energy objectives 
 
The position of the EU judiciary under the regime of Article 6(3) of the Habitats 
Directive seems to embody ‘silo thinking’ - isolating the concept of biodiversity 
protection from the broadened challenge of climate change. In the particular context of 
renewable energy, the CJEU may have misunderstood the requirements arising from the 
environmental integration principle. As a constituent principle of sustainable 
development, the EIP does not infer ‘prioritization’ of biodiversity goals over climate-
energy related objectives.  Notwithstanding the existence of two distinct legal bases for 
renewable energy and environmental protection, the objective of sustainable 
development makes the integration of EU policy objectives for renewable energy and 
biodiversity even more explicit in the context of climate change. Since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, climate change actions have to be taken under the scope of 
the environmental competence of the EU.391  In this vein, the promotion of renewable 
energy has been found to be a significant driver of integration, sometimes blurring the 
separation between energy and environmental policies in the EU legal landscape. Some 
scholars begin to regard the promotion of renewable as a common objective of the 
environmental and energy policies.392  This has been implicitly underpinned by the 
CJEU, including in the post-Lisbon era, in Åsland Vindkraft393 and Essent Belgium.394 
The CJEU has recognised, on the grounds of the EIP, the objective of promoting 
renewable energy as an overriding requirement of environmental protection capable of 
justifying restrictions to the functioning on the single market. If the promotion of 
renewable energy is sufficiently important to restrict the operation of the single 
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market,395 a genuine balancing exercise reconciling the important objectives relating to 
renewable energy and biodiversity conservation should be envisaged earlier under the  
AA process of Article 6(3) and not only as a last resort within the derogation scheme of 
Article 6(4). 
Despite long-standing controversies surrounding the legal nature of sustainable 
development, ‘there is agreement that sustainable development in the hands of judges 
could operate as some sort of “intervening principle” mediating between potentially 
conflicting rules or principles’.396  The overarching objective of sustainable 
development has already been used doctrinally by the CJEU to aid in the interpretation 
of the Habitats Directive. In Nomarchiaki Aftodioikisi Aitoloakarnania,397 the Court 
took the view that the provisions of the Habitats Directive and more particularly Article 
6(4), interpreted in the light of sustainable development, permits the conversion of a 
natural fluvial ecosystem into a man-made fluvial and lacustrine ecosystem.398 As 
observed by Kistenkas, a balancing approach can therefore be achieved infra legem 
within the ‘acquis communautaire’ of the EU Treaties..399 A contextual interpretation of 
Article 6(3) in light of the objective of sustainable development should pave the way 
towards a more flexible application of the precautionary principle in the particular 
context of renewable energy. That is, of course, easier to say than do.  In Rule of Law 
for the Nature, Voigt notes that sustainable development, as a legal principle, has a role 
to play as a ‘working tool for transforming and reforming the legal system’.400 The same 
author however notes that sustainable development still ‘awaits practitioners to shape it 
into a practical means of balancing conflicting interests [without] derogating from its 
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ecological core’.401   Whilst the constitutional objective of sustainable development is 
certainly a powerful interpretative tool in the hand of the judiciary, the doctrinal 
function of sustainable development will not be of practical help for front-line decision-
makers who are in charge of deciding upon development consents. A rigorous 
methodology embedding a science-based precautionary principle will certainly provide 
the operational framework that is currently missing to reconcile ORE developments and 
N2000 sites.  
Fostering the integration of scientific knowledge into regulatory decision-making is a 
genuine condition of sustainable development.402 ‘Integration’ in the context of 
sustainable development goes beyond the need to balance between ecological, social 
and economic competing imperatives. ‘Integration’, as Voigt rightly contends, demands 
that human activities and development occur within the ultimate limits or thresholds of 
ecosystem integrity.403 ‘These thresholds define the ecological constraints without which 
development cannot be sustainable’.404 Ecological limits are poorly understood and this 
is precisely why science has a critical role to play to meaningfully inform regulatory 
decision-makers. In the next Chapter, the author demonstrates that the best way to 
maximise the use of scientific knowledge while assuring that ORE deployments do not 
unduly encroach on the integrity of N2000 sites is to promote and facilitate adaptive 
management.
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 RECONCILING OFFSHORE RENEWABLES WITH 
NATURA 2000 SITES 
AN INTERIM ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
 
1- Introduction  
 
‘Resilience thinking provides inspiration for those who want to extend their thinking 
about sustainability, but it also challenges some ideas underpinning the impact 
assessment profession’.1 ‘One important component of responsible and environmentally 
sustainable planning and operation of renewable energy sites is adaptive 
management’.2   
Forty years after Holling’s seminal contribution in Adaptive Environmental 
Management and Assessment,3 the importance of embracing the principles of resilience 
and adaptive management is still advocated, both in Europe and North America, as a 
better methodology to deal with scientific uncertainty in environmental assessments.4 
Drawing on the pioneering work of Holling et al., this Chapter investigates how 
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adaptive management (AM) principles can be operated in the context of the appropriate 
assessment (AA)  of the Habitats Directive to enhance decision-making in the face of 
knowledge gaps and uncertainty regarding the implications of ORE developments for 
Natura 2000 (N2000) sites.5  More specifically, it suggests adopting a resilience 
perspective to inform the use of a threshold-based approach to AM to consent, deploy 
and operate ORE projects within the limits of the specified conservation objectives of 
N2000 sites.  
As the ORE sector is rapidly growing, there is an urgent need to provide regulatory 
decision-makers with the best scientific knowledge concerning the real implications of 
ORE technologies for Natura 2000 sites. To do so, regulators and developers need the 
best management approach capable of delivering up-to date scientific data. Chapter IV 
has clearly emphasised that the overly strict precautionary principle prescribed by the 
CJEU under Article 6(3) is not suited to this need. Instead, it stands as a significant 
stumbling block to the approval of innovative ORE technologies thereby, slowing down 
the production of best scientific knowledge which is absolutely critical to support 
scientifically-informed regulatory licensing processes. In this particular context, 
‘learning while doing’ is certainly the ‘most appropriate type of caution’6 where 
inaction would have the unacceptable effect of letting climate change proceed 
unmitigated.  
Where uncertainty and data gaps are inevitable, AM may offer a better methodology to 
achieve the ecological outcomes of the Habitats Directive without unduly hampering the 
ORE sector. Whilst originally developed in the field of Canadian fisheries 
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management,7 AM is now increasingly advocated as a more pragmatic approach to deal 
with scientific uncertainty in the field of biodiversity conservation.8 AM is rooted in the 
theory of ecological resilience9 and as such, it is increasingly recognised as central to 
deliver an ecosystem approach.  In essence, AM is not a ‘front-end’ exercise but an 
iterative management process that accounts for inherent uncertainty in ecosystem 
dynamics and allows for that uncertainty to be reduced and for management to be 
improved over time as new information become available from monitoring.10  
Monitoring is designed to respond to specific scientific questions and hence contribute 
to the wider scientific knowledge base which can be used to amend decision in light of 
new information and refine policy and consenting processes. As such, AM may be 
regarded as a vehicle to incorporate the paradigms of ‘post-normal science’11 into 
environment assessments.12 In the particular context of the Habitats Directive, an AM 
approach to appropriate assessment would typically accommodate scientific uncertainty, 
not by seeking to predict all possible impacts beyond a scientific doubt from a strict ex 
ante perspective, but by incorporating that uncertainty, encouraging learning through 
rigorously planned monitoring programmes, mitigation and adaptation in light of new 
science-based information.  
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Jerome R. Ravetz, ‘Uncertainty, complexity and post-normal science’ (1994) 13 (12) Environmental 
Toxicology and Chemistry, 1881 





AM is not new in the EU. The need for AM has been increasingly acknowledged in the 
guidance13 of the European Commission (EC) to mitigate the effects of climate change 
on Natura 2000 sites.14 Likewise, the approach has recently been implemented to 
minimise the risks posed by operating onshore wind farms on birds and bats.15 AM has 
also been trialled to reduce scientific uncertainty associated with single tidal energy 
turbines or small arrays of turbines, including the SeaGen (Northern Ireland),16 
DeltaStream (Wales)17 and Meygen (Scotland) projects.18 Despite this, AM remains the 
exception rather than the standard and there is no clearly established legal basis for its 
implementation in EU law. As Ruhl rightly asserts, ‘no other principle of natural 
resources management has so deeply permeated the practice on the basis of so little 
mention in the law’.19 This observation equally applies to EU environmental law.20   This 
                                                          
13 European Commission, ‘Guidance on the implementation of the Birds and Habitats Directive in 
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/publication/59287682-5723-464c-8e5c-b6f6fc263eaf/language-en>  (accessed 20 August 2018) 
14 European Commission, ‘Guidance on Integrating Climate Change and Biodiversity into Environmental 
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(Technical Report, 2013). 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/climatechange/pdf/Guidance%20document.pdf> (accessed 2 
June 2018) 
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issue will be discussed in Chapter VII. This Chapter explores the question of whether 
and how AM could be taken further to enhance the management scientific uncertainty in 
the offshore wind energy sector and help scale up wave and tidal energy projects 
without adversely impacting upon marine Natura 2000 (N2000) sites. 
 
Section 2 will first provide a brief primer on the notions of ecological resilience and 
Panarchy. Section 3 will make the case for a paradigm shift under the AA process of the 
Habitats Directive. Section 4 describes the concept and key elements of AM and 
provides examples of preliminary AM experiences in the ORE sector. Section 5 
emphasises the role of AM in preserving ecosystems’ resilience and thereby, in 
delivering an ecosystem approach. An ‘interim’ methodological framework to guide the 
use of AM strategies on a project-specific basis will be outlined in section 6.  While the 
methodology presented below primarily focuses on marine species, the same approach 
could be applied to other receptors including marine habitats. As an interim solution 
however, the framework can be further enhanced and updated in tandem with 
improvements in the accuracy of scientific methods. The framework is also limited to 
the construction, operation and functioning of ORE projects and does not cover 










2 - Resilience and Panarchy: some fundamental ecological notions  
2.1. Resilience theory  
 
Both the Convention on Biological Diversity21 and the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (MEA)22 define ‘ecosystems’ as ‘dynamic complex of plants, animals and 
communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit’.23 It is 
now widely understood in environmental sciences that ecosystems ‘do not have single 
equilibria [but] multiple equilibria and destabilizing forces’.24   Natural ecosystems ‘are 
not static but in continual change’; change in numbers, change in equilibrium conditions 
and change in species composition.25 In Resilience and Stability of Ecological 
Systems,26 Holling firmly sets the fundamental premises of the resilience theory that he 
defines as the measure of the ability natural ecosystems to absorb incremental 
disturbances while maintaining the same relationships between populations or state 
variables.27. The rationales underlying this doctrine challenge what Holling refers to as 
the ‘stability’ paradigm or ‘stable equilibrium’,28 whereby ecological systems are 
sufficiently stable to revert to their initial equilibrium state after temporary 
disturbances.29 Holling points out that ‘much of traditional ecological evaluation, policy 
design, and even ecological science itself presumes that once disturbance is removed, an 
ecosystem ultimately return its original condition’.30 For Holling, such an ‘equilibrium-
centered’ view is ‘essentially static and provide little insight into the transient behaviour 
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of systems that are not near the equilibrium’.31 In essence, resilience contrasts with such 
deterministic perception of nature whereby ecosystems exist under one stable and 
controllable ecological regime. Instead, resilience acknowledges that ecosystems may 
exhibit abrupt, non-linear and unpredictable changes of ecological states.32  It is based 
on the assumption that natural ecosystems ‘can seem to be behaving according to one 
set of rules, until they suddenly flip into a radically different state’ with alternative 
structures and functions.33 In the face of incremental pressures, ecosystems reorganise, 
in a non-linear fashion, into a different ecological regime with a totally different mode 
of behaviour.34   Commenting on Hollings’ findings, Folke highlights that ‘resilience is 
[therefore] about the opportunities that disturbance opens up in terms [...] of renewal of 
the system and emergence of new trajectories’.35  In a similar vein, Garmestani and 
others emphasis that ‘resilience’ is about the capability of ecosystems to remain ‘within 
a domain of attraction while exhibiting dynamic behavior’.36 Each stability domain is 
characterised by an ‘equilibrium’ in terms of structure, function and biotic-abiotic 
interactions.37 These sets of interactions are referred to by Holling and Meffe as 
‘stabilizing forces’.38 Stabilizing forces operate as ‘positive and negative feedbacks to 
maintain an ecosystem within an attraction domain and reduce the likelihood of regime 
shifts’.39 If a breaking point is reached, ecosystems shift toward an alternative stability 
domain with different feedbacks, structure, functions and governing processes.40   
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32 Carl Folke and others ‘Regime shifts, resilience, and biodiversity in ecosystem management’ (2004) 
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In summary, while an ‘attraction domain’ determines the resilience capability of an 
ecosystem, resilience is the amount of shocks and disturbances that an ecosystem can 
withstand41 without altering its stable ecological state. Resilience necessarily infers that 
ecosystems exhibit a certain degree of ecological integrity in order to be able to absorb 
and resist to incremental pressures.42 Ecological integrity informs the degree to which 
‘complex adaptive systems are capable of self-organization and the degree to which 
these can increase the capacity for learning and adaptation’.43 Natural ecosystems with 
‘greater integrity would be more resistant and resilient to the effects of changing 
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2.2. The Panarchy cycle  
 
The concept of resilience can be conceptually represented by the Panarchy framework 
(Figure 1). Panarchy, as Gunderson and Holling describe it, characterises the 
development process of ecological systems.45 Panarchy suggests that all ecosystems 
evolve through a ‘forward-loop’ cycle of 1) growth (r), 2) stability or ‘conservation’ 
which is characterised by increased connectivity and rigidity of the resources within and 
across the ecosystem (k), 3) a back-loop phase of release or collapse (Ω) and 4) 
reorganisation (α).46 The so-called ‘reorganisation’ or ‘regime shift’ is marked by rapid 
period of change where ecosystems move back, throughout the Panarchy cycle, towards 
a new stable ecological state of growth and conservation.47 This transition from one 
stable conservation stage to a phase of collapse and reorganisation is also known as 
‘ecological thresholds’. Thresholds are defined as ‘zones’ of rapid and non-linear shift 
of ecological state (i.e. regime shift)48 triggered by cumulative endogenous (from within 
ecosystems) or exogenous (eternal to the system) pressures.49  A slight change in one 
anthropogenic or natural stressor may be sufficient to engender disproportionally large 
changes in ecosystems’ states.50 
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Figure 1 – The adaptive cycle of Panarchy (Gunderson L., Holling C.S., 2002)51 
 
The cycle of Panarchy is the antithesis of hierarchy.52 Whilst ‘hierarchy implies top-
down control of lower levels by higher levels, “Panarchy” implies that all ‘levels or 
subsystems can influence one another’.53 Unlike the ‘top-down sequence of 
authoritative control’ in hierarchy, the cycles of Panarchy are interdependent and 
operate in a feedback loop (Figure 1). ‘The cycles of exploitation, conservation, release 
and reorganisation operate simultaneously and interact with other adjacent adaptive 
cycles at multiple temporal and spatial scales.54 Connectivity enhances bottom-up 
exchanges and hence, facilitates the ripple-effect of local regime shifts.55 When a phase 
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of release and collapse occurs at small scale, it will diffuse across adjacent adaptive 
cycles to create ‘cascades of destabilization at larger scales’.56   
The traits of resilience and Panarchy are exacerbated in marine ecosystems. ‘The marine 
environment is both an ecosystem and an ‘interlocking network of ecosystems’.57  
Unlike terrestrial ecosystems, marine ecosystems are ‘fluids in motion’58 with three-
dimensional physical environments (seafloor, water column and/or sea surface).59 The 
three-dimensionality of the physical system means that the biome exhibits higher 
degrees of spatial complexity and biotic-abiotic interactions. The effect of convective 
hydrodynamic forces such as currents and tides play a critical role in the distribution of 
marine organisms.60 Mechanisms of ocean connectivity contribute to enhancing cross-
scale interactions between many processes and large-scale connectivity between 
species.61 Selkoe and other explain in their writings that connectivity in the ocean 
facilitates the ‘ripple effect’ of localised regime shifts by linking distant communities.62 
Marine ecosystems are therefore particularly prone to nonlinear threshold responses.63  
A number of drivers such as increased nutrient input, sedimentation, invasive species, 
ocean acidification, global warming may prompt regime shifts in marine ecosystems.64  
Rocha and others have identified thirteen types of marine regime shifts.65 The most 
illustrative examples of regime shifts caused by human induced pressures include 
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marine eutrophication, coral transitions to macro-algae dominated systems, bivalve 
collapse, seagrass collapse and fisheries collapse.66 
 
3 - The need for a paradigm shift under the ‘appropriate assessment’ of the 
Habitats Directive  
 
‘Now that [the scientific community] is experiencing a paradigm shift in its scientific 
understanding of nature, from static to fluid,  [lawyers] will need to quickly follow that 
with similar paradigm shifts in their vision of nature in law’.67 Forty years after 
Holling’s fundamental contribution,68 effective ecosystem-based management is still 
hampered by legal constraints associated with the so-called ‘command and control’69 
pathology of environmental regulation. Generally speaking, ‘command and control’, 
also referred to in the EU context as ‘direct regulation’,70  provides direct solutions to 
relatively ‘well-bounded’, clearly defined, predictable and linear societal problems. Its 
main feature involves solving problems either ‘through control of the processes that 
lead to the problem [...] or through ‘reactive’ improvement of the problem after it 
occurs’.71 Put simply, ‘Command and control’ pertains to the prescriptive nature of 
environmental regulations (the command), supported by a number of controls including 
licences, prohibitions and at the extreme end of the spectrum, sanctions (i.e. civil or 
criminal, revocation of licences).72 Lee notes that examples of ‘command and control’ 
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69 Holling and Meffe, ‘Command and Control and the Pathology of Natural Resource Management’, 
(n24), 328, 337 
70 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making (Modern studies in European 
law, Hart Publishing, 2nd ed., vol. 43, 2014), 82, 85; Suzanne Kingston, Greening EU competition law 
and policy. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 43 
71 Ibid.  




abound in EU environmental law.73 Drawing on Abbot’s work,74  Lee observes that EU 
environmental law is deeply rooted in ‘command and control’ where fixed regulations 
(the command) together with the issuance of permits and authorisation (the control) are 
central to most environmental assessment procedures.75 In the same line of thought, 
Schoukens stresses that the current interpretation of the Habitats Directive is deeply 
rooted in a ‘command and control’ approach whereby ‘pursuant to a strict scrutiny, 
activities that might significantly impair protected habitats or species should be 
principally prohibited, unless they are covered by a specific derogation’.76 
In this vein, it is worth noting that the purposive approach taken by the Court to 
interpret the normative notion of ‘integrity of the site’ fits well in the traditional 
‘command and control’ approach. Similar to ‘command and control’, Chapter IV 
explained that reliance on the purposive method of legal interpretation has been 
primarily driven by the need to maintain the uniformity, consistency and predictability 
of EU law. In the particular context of the integrity test of Article 6(3), the purposive 
approach reinforces the ‘control’ aspect of command and control by imposing a very 
high precautionary scrutiny on new proposals in the vicinity of N2000 sites. 
Legal certainty is also an important aspect of ‘command and control’. Our legal systems 
are ‘designed to provide social stability through reliance on precedent, prescriptive rules 
and adherence to procedure’.77 As a result, law is more inclined to deal with fixed, linear 
and sectoral legal entities78 and not with complex and unpredictable ecological entities. 
In EU law, legal certainty demands that ‘rules [in particular those with negative 
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consequences for individuals] should be clear, precise and their application predictable 
for those subject to them’.79  ‘Individuals must be able to ascertain unequivocally what 
their rights and obligations are and take steps accordingly’.80 Legal certainty is thus 
intrinsically linked to the principle of finality and predictability of legal decisions. 
Needless to say, the need for legal certainty does not sit easily with ecosystem realities 
characterised by non-linearity and unpredictable alternative regimes.81   
The importance given to ‘command and control’ may have triggered what some 
scientists and environmental lawyers refer to as ‘front-end’82 approach to environmental 
assessment. This approach, which Noble also refers as ‘blueprint approach’,83 assumes 
that accurate predictions of impact can be made from a strict ex ante perspective in the 
environmental assessment process: ‘predictions of environmental risks influence the 
decision-making process and once a decision is made, the process is, for all intents and 
purposes, closed’.84 As such, a static or ‘front-end’ approach to environmental 
assessment is typically characterised by ‘one-time’ predictions and a single model of 
mitigation measures.85  This pathology also goes hand in hand with the predominantly 
practised ‘baseline-led’ model of impact assessment.86 ‘Baseline-led’ takes existing 
baseline conditions as preferred equilibrium or ‘benchmark’ against which the potential 
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ecological impacts of new developments are assessed and mitigated.87 The 
interpretation of the Habitats Directive perfectly epitomises these core aspects of 
‘command and control’. In the context of the Habitats Directive, it is now settled case 
law that an AA is lawfully conducted if it identifies beforehand, and in the light of best 
scientific knowledge, the likely significant effects of a project on N2000 sites.88 The 
CJEU has reinforced this dictum by holding that the legal test of ‘no reasonable doubt’ 
must be satisfied at the time of adoption of the decision authorising the implementation 
of the project.89  The purpose of the AA  is thus to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt and 
prior to the actual deployment of devices, that a proposed development will not 
adversely affect the integrity of a site, identified as a desirable baseline condition. Pre-
consenting data are collected and used accordingly to derive one-time impacts 
predictions and design a single set of mitigation measures. There is no follow-up 
approach to environmental management. An AA is nothing more than a collation of 
historical data, the objective of which is to ensure, through a single-model of predictions 
and mitigation that ORE projects do not modify the integrity of N2000 sites envisaged 
as desirable ‘baseline’ equilibrium. Resilience is thus poorly acknowledged in the 
assessment procedure of the Habitats Directive. This thinking clearly embodies the 
equilibrium paradigm whereby ecosystems systematically return to a steady-state after 
disturbance.90   
As far back as 1996, Holling and Meffe already cautioned against the pervasive effects 
of this pathology.91  Without drawing a sharp distinction between marine and terrestrial 
ecosystems, they argued that ‘command and control’ does not provide a realistic 
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understanding of ecosystems’ behaviours.92  Holling and Meffe explain that ecosystems 
would become even less resilient when subject to ‘command and control’ 
management:93 
‘Policies and management that apply fixed rules for achieving constant yields 
[...] lead to systems that gradually lose resilience-systems that suddenly break 
down in the face of disturbances that previously could be absorbed’.94  
Following on the same line, Raitanen stresses that ‘a formalized legal process is 
important for enforceability but it also complicates the management of resilience, which 
is the prerequisite for the maintenance of biodiversity’.95  When applied to complex 
natural resources problems, ‘command and control’ gives an illusion of control.96  It 
seeks to eliminate or reduce in legal decision-making the range of natural variations 
inherent to all ecosystems in order to increase their predictability and make these 
systems more malleable and ‘reliable’ for human benefits.97 Further, as discussed above, 
‘command and control’ favours a ‘front-end’ model of decision-making which places 
too much confidence in the capacity of science to predict everything from a strict ex 
ante perspective.  As complexity and uncertainty rises, ‘confidence in the front-end 
decision-making method erodes’.98  This approach is predicated on a ‘static vision of 
nature’ and as such, it lacks the necessary flexibility to tackle potential impacts that may 
materialise in systems characterised by non-linearity and unpredictability.  Although 
‘command and control’ may have been successful at dealing with ‘point-source 
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pollution’,99 this approach is now perceived as ‘continually outpaced, by more effective 
technologies, and by increasingly complex environmental problems’.100 ‘Tackling 
diffuse harms through direct regulation is more difficult’.101 It is not surprising that, 
because of its ‘polycentric, uncertain and dynamic nature’, the governance of climate 
change is regarded as ‘legally disruptive’.102 Fisher et al. observe that:  
‘Polycentric means the relationship between cause and effect cannot always be 
linked in a linear way. Risk, uncertainty, and the delays in consequences in the 
changing climate, mean that assessment is heavily dependent on computational 
modelling. Scientific uncertainty is inherent in the process of modelling and, 
while models are developed as rigorous representations of reality, they are not 
“truth machine”’.103 
 
Fisher argues elsewhere that the ‘legally disruptive nature of climate change is also to 
do with the fact that mitigation strategies in response to climate change often require the 
creation of new infrastructures’ in unstable physical environments.104 The marine 
environment shares a number of the characteristics cited above and as such, marine 
ecosystems may also be thought of as equally disruptive from a legal point of view.  
Chapter III points out that marine ecosystems are subject to a wide range of natural 
variation and chaotic fluctuations that are not adequately modelled or understood by the 
scientific community. As rightly observed by Bond et al. changes of ecosystem’s state 
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subsequent to the implementation of a project ‘are not necessarily something that can be 
avoided’ insofar as these changes  ‘are in part determined by natural fluctuation in 
natural conditions”.105 As a result, no amount of observation prior to a device, or 
multiple devices, is actually deployed will reveal with absolute certainty the impacts 
those devices will eventually have on marine N2000 features.  Holling also 
acknowledges that whilst some ‘lessons can be learned from similar situations, and 
conclusions can be drawn from the general responses of disturbed ecological systems,  
post-project system is a new system, and its nature cannot be deduced simply by 
looking at the original one’.’106  
These characteristics significantly hamper the capacity of science to make accurate 
predictions of impacts from a strict ex-ante perspective in the AA process. Empirical 
data on how marine animals and the physical environment interact with ORE devices is 
lacking. Existing data gaps coupled with the existence of natural variations and 
stochasticity mean that impact assessments heavily rely on simulation modelling.107 
Needless to say, model predictions rarely provide real representations of the properties 
and behaviours of marine ecosystems.108 As a result, a number of potential positive or 
negative impact pathways may never be fully understood until devices are deployed and 
further empirical evidence is collected through monitoring at deployment sites.   
In a nutshell, ‘command and control’ may have reached its limits in offshore areas. In 
dynamic marine environments characterised by stochasticity, one ought to acknowledge 
that even the highest ex-ante evidentiary standard of ‘no reasonable scientific doubt’ 
will never be an effective safeguard to prevent encroachments on the integrity of marine 
N2000 sites.  In Adaptive Environmental Management and Assessment, Holling et al., 
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made a strong case for a ‘back end’109 approach to environment assessment that 
incorporates the basic properties of resilience and adaptive management. In order to live 
successfully with uncertainty, Holling argues that a ‘major operational change is 
required to shift assessment from its traditional [front-loaded] role into meaningful 
environmental management’.110 According to Holling, ‘adaptive management is not 
really much more than common sense’.111 An environmental assessment ‘should be an 
ongoing investigation into, not a one-time prediction of, impacts’.112 The best way to do 
so is to promote ‘the continuation of assessment activities during and after the period of 
construction; such an extension of activity requires the addition of a monitoring 
capability’.113 At the very least, Holling also asserts that ‘monitoring provides an 
opportunity to attempt an invalidation of the analysis that has already been done. 
Prediction may not be possible but some post-diction is’.114   
It is worth mentioning that the Habitats Directive was drafted at the beginning of the 
1990’s where the ‘equilibrium centred view’ of nature was predominating the scientific 
discourse. The Directive was adopted in 1992 and came into force in 1994 when the 
tenets of the ecosystem approach were also barely emerging in international 
environmental law (see section 5). The protection of the ‘integrity of the site’ is 
nonetheless very much contingent upon the implementation of an ecosystem approach, 
and this is generally considered to require adaptive management.115 A change of 
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emphasis towards more adaptive AA processes is now necessary to account for 
paradigm shift: ‘past ecosystems behaviour is no longer a useful indication of future 
system behaviour’.116 While the element of ‘command’, characterised by a fixed 
requirement to carry out an AA, will remain a powerful tool to stave off biodiversity 
loss, the ‘control’ aspect of ‘command and control’ must incorporate some elements of 
flexibility and ‘frequent recalibration’ to reduce uncertainty and adapt in light of 
changing environmental conditions. Embracing the Panarchy cycle by introducing AM 
principles into the AA process should encourage a move away from the static ‘predict-
mitigate-implement’ model of assessment towards more effective decision-making 
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4 – The theory of Adaptive Management  
 
4.1. The procedural framework of adaptive management 
 
Adaptive management, also referred to as a ‘learning-by-doing’ management process,118 
has been applied as a systematic approach for adapting and improving management by 
learning from previous management interventions. This approach acknowledges that 
scientific understanding of an ecosystem will always be incomplete and allows 
management actions to be re-adjusted over time to take into account new scientific data 
gained from ecosystem monitoring.119 The onus is on the reduction of scientific 
uncertainty, which as discussed in Chapter III, may result from missing, incomplete or 
inadequate data (systemic uncertainty) or from the inherent complexity and variability 
of natural ecosystems (variability uncertainty). As stated above, AM is not a ‘trial and 
error’ approach,120 but rather a process that promotes learning through careful 
management design, monitoring and periodic review of management actions in the light 
of new information.121 To date, the most recognised definition of adaptive management 
is provided by the US Department of Interior (DOI) in their Technical Guide as: ‘A 
flexible decision-making process that can be adjusted in the face of uncertainties as 
outcomes from management actions and other events become more understood. Careful 
monitoring of these outcomes both advances scientific understanding and helps adjust 
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policies or operations as part of an iterative learning process.122  When applied to new 
ORE developments, this management approach allows decision-makers to accept 
certain levels of uncertainty regarding the putative impacts of a proposed development, 
whilst requiring data gaps and uncertainty to be reduced through continuous 
environmental monitoring and iterative revision of permitting conditions.  
From a procedural perspective, AM involves a cyclical process of assessment, 
implementation, environmental monitoring, evaluation and adaptation of management 
decisions on the basis of data gained123 (see figure 2). Simply monitoring and adapting 
management in light of up-dated information is not sufficient to do adaptive 
management. Under the DOI Technical Guide, AM entails exploring [beforehand] a 
series of management alternatives to meet [pre-agreed] management goals, ‘predicting 
the outcomes of these alternatives based on the current state of knowledge, 
implementing one or more of these management alternatives, monitoring to learn about 
their impacts and then using the results to update knowledge and adjust management 
actions’ on this basis.124 AM is also described as a structured process of decision-
making based on 1) a ‘deliberative’/‘set-up’ phase and 2) an ‘iterative phase’.125  
The ‘set-up’ phase entails preparing an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) or 
Adaptive Management Plan (AMP) that frames the environmental problems in terms of 
uncertainty and data gaps to be addressed in the iterative phase.126  This step of the 
procedure requires: 
1) The identification of the potential impacts and uncertainty related to a 
plan/project;  
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2) The definition of measurable management objectives  
3) The identification of a series of pre-defined management alternatives 
including mitigation and compensatory measures; and 
4) The establishment of environmental monitoring programmes to assess the 
capacity of mitigation, compensatory measures to meet pre-defined management 
objectives.127   
 
Objectives must be clear and measurable metrics against which the effectiveness of 
management actions can be evaluated through monitoring and improved accordingly.128 
If the objectives are not clear and measurable, then the AM framework is 
undermined.129  It is during the iterative phase that management actions are implemented 
and evaluated against monitoring results. Mitigation/compensatory measures must be 
envisaged as a benchmark against which a monitoring programme is operated. 
Monitoring tracks system behaviour and in particular its response to management 
actions.130 Monitoring serves the purpose of validating model predictions against 
empirical observation,131  evaluating the success of management actions and prioritising 
management options in the next time period. Corrective management actions are 
warranted where knowledge gained from monitoring activities indicate that the effects 
of a particular management action deviate from the objectives agreed upon in the set-up 
phase. Follow-up monitoring is therefore a fundamental element to reduce uncertainty 
and optimise management outcomes as knowledge from the system accumulates.132   
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Figure 2 The cycle of adaptive management  
(From: Williams B.K., Szaro C., and Shapiro C.D 2009)133 
 
Stakeholder involvement is also a crucial element of adaptive decision-making. 
Participative decision-making generates learning outcomes that extend ‘beyond the 
scope of science’.134 Stakeholders should be involved early in the AM cycle, to help 
assess environmental problems, design management and monitoring activities and 
participate in the evaluation of monitoring results.135  Collaborative or participatory AM 
processes also facilitate stakeholders’ acceptance and produce robust knowledge on 
which to base management decisions.136   
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4.2. Active adaptive management versus passive adaptive management  
 
Adaptive management can be active or passive.137  Even though the procedural process 
remains the same, active and passive adaptive management place different emphasis on 
‘learning’ to guide the decision making process.138 Active AM, which is also distilled 
down to ‘learning by doing’,139 has ‘learning’ as a primary objective and treats each 
management action as ‘deliberate probing for information’140 in order to generate 
learning about the ecosystems being managed. In its active formulation, an AM 
approach designs and applies management actions as testable hypothesis.141 In contrast, 
a passive approach to AM, or ‘learning while doing’,142 focuses on the effects of 
management decisions on natural resources without treating management actions as 
hypothesis-testing experimentations. Passive AM accounts for uncertainty but 
management decisions are not specifically designed as ‘experimental probing’ to 
generate information.    
At first glance, active AM must be excluded from the scope of the Habitats Directive. In 
its active approach, AM implies that each ORE project would be regarded as an 
‘experiment’ with licensing conditions (i.e. mitigation and choices in operating 
conditions) being designed to test and generate learning on the interactions of marine 
Natura 2000 species with devices.  Here, a management action would be formulated as a 
hypothesis that is consciously ‘put at risk’ to generate knowledge. The Habitats 
Directive does not allow, for the purpose of learning, such experiments involving a 
deliberate risk of causing mortalities or physical disturbances to N2000 protected 
features. As discussed in Chapter IV, the Habitats Directive demands certainty that no 
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negative impacts will occur in the first place. A passive approach to AM may, by 
contrast, be particularly beneficial to reduce uncertainty regarding the interactions of 
protected species/habitats with ORE devices. Passive AM could be implemented more 
effectively, in compliance with the precautionary principle, to retire risks and inform the 
important question of whether monitoring methodologies and mitigation actions are 
effective in ensuring that the installation and operation of ORE projects satisfy the legal 
protection standard of the Habitats Directive. Whilst not conceiving management 
decisions as experimental, passive AM uses new science-based information collected 
through environmental monitoring as a means of checking the correctness of past model 
predictions143 and ensuring that the implementation of consented developments does not 
compromise progress towards sites’ conservation objectives (see below, section 6).   
 
4.3. Preliminary experiences of adaptive management in the ORE sector  
 
4.3.1 Wind energy sector 
 
A recent review of AM practices in the wind energy industry reveals that despite the 
absence of formal regulations for AM, the use of the conceptual attributes of AM are 
progressively emerging to address onshore wind-wildlife interactions and, more 
specifically, impacts on bats and birds.144 Post-consenting monitoring is commonly 
required in licence conditions but monitoring results are rarely used to improve the 
ongoing management of wind farm projects but rather inform future wind energy 
developments.145 Frequently, data collection during the operational phase have served as 
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a means to adjust the specifics of monitoring programmes.146 At best, monitoring 
outcomes have also informed adjustments of curtailment plans envisaged as mitigation 
measures to address collision risks of migrating birds and bats (see below).147   
The most advanced examples of AM in the onshore wind energy sector can be found in 
Germany, the United Kingdom and in the United States.148 In Germany, the Ellern wind 
farm park provides an example of management where specific requirements for 
monitoring (i.e. carcass survey and nacelle monitoring), together with pre-agreed 
thresholds of collision mortality for bats were linked to an adaptive curtailment plan.149 
After one year of operation, monitoring data were assessed and used to alter curtailment 
algorithms until mortality thresholds were no longer exceeded.150 The same approach, 
based on specific species behaviour/events or mortality triggers, has been used in other 
European countries including Switzerland (Gries wind farm),151 Spain and Portugal 
(Candeeiros wind farm)152 and the United States (Alta East Wind Project).153   
In the offshore wind energy sector, the application of AM is limited.  Hanna and others 
point out that the United Kingdom provides the closest example to a true AM approach, 
as prescribed in the US. Department of the Interior Technical Guide (cited above).154 
Monitoring programmes are commonly informed by environmental assessments and 
then required under licence conditions. Monitoring is implemented throughout the life 
time of consented offshore wind farms (OWFs) to improve the state of scientific 
knowledge and facilitate the approval of future developments as part of a ‘double 
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feedback loop’.155 The Survey-Deploy-Monitor (SDM) policy,156 introduced by Marine 
Scotland, is regarded as an example of AM in the pre-consenting phase.157 The SDM 
policy allows for pre-consenting monitoring requirements to be tailored to the risk-
profile of ORE developments and adjusted over time on the basis of information 
gained.158 The SDM has been applied to inform consenting requirements for the 
Hywind Floating Wind Demonstrator project.159 Hywind was assessed as a medium-risk 
proposal requiring one year of site characterisation surveys with subsequent review at 
the end of that year to determine the need for further survey efforts. After one year of 
pre-consent survey, it was found that there was a spike in auk (Alcidae) numbers during 
the post-breeding season. Additional data collection during this period was agreed 
before proceeding to consenting. Development consent was granted in 2015.160 
Although the SDM policy may contribute to rationalising post-consent monitoring 
efforts for relevant sensitive receptors, it does not specify how new knowledge should 
be incorporated in the post-consent phase to inform ongoing project management.161 
The Cape Wind project is the first proposed offshore wind farm in the United States that 
has been granted a commercial lease by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management 
(BOEM). In the early stage of the consenting process, an Avian and Bat Monitoring 
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Plan incorporating an adaptive approach to monitoring and mitigation was elaborated 
for bats and bird species protected under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Endangered 
Species Act.162 The project was cancelled in 2017 due to many delays in the planning 
process and a series of lawsuits fuelled by public opposition.163    
 
4.3.2 Tidal energy sector 
 
The following case studies provide practical examples of how AM has been applied to 
various consented tidal energy projects to reduce uncertainties. While a staged approach 
to consenting has been favoured to authorise offshore tidal arrays under an AM scheme, 
an alternative approach also consists of using AM as part of conditional approvals for 
single devices. This is the approach that was applied at the Meygen project (Scotland), 
SeaGen Tidal Energy project, in Strangford Lough (Northern Ireland), the Cobscook 
Bay tidal energy pilot project (United States) and Delta Stream Tidal Energy project 
(Wales).  
 
4.3.2.1 Meygen Tidal Energy Project, Pentland Firth, Scotland 
 
The demonstration strategy approach at the Meygen Tidal Energy project in Pentland 
Firth (Scotland) is a model of commercial tidal development for which an adaptive 
approach has been applied through a staged consenting process. Development consent 
was granted by Marine Scotland, on behalf of the Scottish Ministers, for the 
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construction and operation of sixty-one fully submerged turbines with a permitted 
capacity of 86MW.164 The conclusions of the AA process found that significant adverse 
effects would occur as a result of predicted levels of collision with protected species 
including sea birds, grey seals, harbour seals, Atlantic salmon and sea lampreys. Other 
potential impacts were related to the loss of foraging habitats and displacement of 
seabirds due to the presence of the turbines as well as to the effects of acoustic noise 
and electro-magnetic fields on fish passage. To mitigate these risks, the AA indicated 
that ‘an initial first phase deployment of six turbines is recommended with a 
comprehensive post-construction monitoring programme to inform future phases’.165 
Therefore, the approval was made conditional upon the company (Meygen Ltd) 
deploying the turbines in distinctive development phases. Meygen Ltd is also required 
to submit an application for approval to Marine Scotland before proceeding with each 
subsequent development phase. Further AA processes must be conducted by Marine 
Scotland prior to the authorisation of any subsequent phase in order to ensure that 
approval is given with full knowledge of the implications of the turbines for N2000 
features.166  Phase 1 was approved in September 2014 in tandem with the initiation of 
monitoring programme designed to measure the behaviour of mobile species occurring 
in close proximity of the turbine. Phase 1a is operational since 2017. It involves four 
turbines of 1.5MW each.  In 2017, Marine Scotland granted consent to install Phase 1b 
which comprises four more turbines (6MW), in addition to the four turbines already 
installed.167  Phase 1b will be installed in 2018. Phase 1c aims to install a further 10 
turbines bringing the total capacity of Phase 1 to 86MW. Deployment of Phase1c is 
                                                          
164 See further: Marine Scotland, Decision Letter Consent and Conditions (September 2013). 
<https://www.gov.scot/Topics/marine/Licensing/marine/scoping/MeyGen/DecisionLetter> (accessed 20 
June 2018), at 25 
165 Marine Scotland, Appropriate Assessment (September 2013). 
<https://www.gov.scot/Topics/marine/Licensing/marine/scoping/MeyGen/AppropriateAssessment> 
(accessed 20 September 2018), at 90-91 
166 Ibid, 77 
167Marine Scotland, Decision Notice – commencement of Phase 1(b) (June 2017). 
<https://www.gov.scot/Topics/marine/Licensing/marine/scoping/MeyGen/DN-Phase1b-092017> 




intended to take place in 2021-2022. The last phase will include the full operational 
phase and installation of the last set of turbines, which, subject to grid connection, 
should generate the capacity currently permitted under the seabed lease of 398MW of 
tidal stream capacity. 
 
4.3.2.2 SeaGen Tidal Energy Turbine, Strangford Lough  
 
SeaGen is the world’s first full-scale and grid-connected tidal stream energy turbine.168 
Deployment of SeaGen in Strangford Lough (Northern Ireland) was heralded by the 
consenting authority and the developer as taking an AM approach.169 Strangford Lough 
is highly designated as a SPA under the Birds Directive, a SAC under the Habitats 
Directive and a Ramsar site. The area is also subject to national designations. The 
environmental assessment process identified a number of receptors (i.e. marine 
mammals, benthic ecology, tidal flow and energy) for which the nature and intensity of 
potential adverse impacts were uncertain.  The main concern was whether the turbine 
would have an adverse impact on the usage of the Lough by harbour seals (Phoca 
vitulina), a qualifying feature of the Strangford Lough SAC.170 There was also a 
potential risk of potential impact on grey seals (Halichoerus grypus) and harbour 
porpoises (Phocoena phocoena). Although not a qualifying species of the SAC, harbour 
porpoises are listed in Annexes II and IV of the Habitats Directive, which means they 
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are subject to a strict protection regime prohibiting death, injury and disturbances. The 
key aspect of the AM process was therefore focused on marine mammals.  
A licence for installation and operation was granted in 2005 to Marine Current Turbines 
Ltd (MCT) and the installation of the device took place in 2008. The licence was 
conditional upon the undertaking of several monitoring programmes comprising sonar 
monitoring, seal telemetry studies, marine mammal observation, shoreline visual 
surveys and aerial surveys.171 Conservation objectives relating to harbour seals include 
inter alia, the maintenance of the numbers of adults at 200 individuals in the Lough.172 
Therefore, the monitoring objectives for marine mammals include, among other things, 
a zero risk mortality tolerance by reason of physical interactions with the turbine 
rotors.173 Associated mitigation measures included operational restriction to daylight 
operation and the use of Marine Mammal Observers (MMO) who had the ability to 
shut-down the turbine whenever marine mammals were seen to cross the agreed shut-
down action perimeter of 200m. In addition to this, the effectiveness of an active 
experimental sonar was also trialled as a mitigation measure to assist in the detection of 
marine mammals.174 After three years of post-installation monitoring, it was found that 
marine mammals were not going to collide with the turbine in the pre-agreed shut-down 
action perimeters. Based on these findings, the precautionary shut down distance was 
progressively reduced from an excessive 200m to 100 m and then, to less than 30m.175 
Unfortunately, although a short trial removal of the shutdown protocol has been 
authorised, final removal of shutdown requirements has never been implemented due to 
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a lack of sufficient time before decommissioning.176  Monitoring data has nonetheless 
demonstrated that active sonar was effective in mitigating collision risks, in a manner 
comparable with MMOs.177 MMOs were fully replaced by the active sonar which 
allowed the turbine to be operated on a 24 hour basis.178 The AM process allowed MCT 
to operate the SeaGen turbine over a period of five years hence, ‘increasing confidence 
in the technology and demonstrate its capacity to export to the grid’.179 Overall, the 
SeaGen project also demonstrated that an AM approach can be successfully applied at 
the scale of a single turbine to reduce uncertainty while mitigating risks thereby, giving 
greater confidence to the regulator. The turbine is now being decommissioned by 
SIMEC Atlantic Energy.180 
 
4.3.2.3 Cobscook Bay Tidal Energy Project, Maine, United States 
 
Using conditional licensing, with AM as a basis, Ocean Renewable Power Company 
(ORPC) was granted a Pilot Project Licence by the Federal Energy Regulation 
Commission (FERC) in 2012 to develop a 750KW tidal energy project in Cobscook 
Bay, Maine. One of the initial conditions attached to the licence included the restriction 
of pile-driving activities during the active season of Atlantic salmon. Mitigation 
measures during pile-driving operations were also required by the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to mitigate the impact on 
Atlantic salmon smolt during the active season. An Adaptive Management Plan (AMP) 
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has been developed as a requirement of the Pilot Licence.181 Environmental studies and 
monitoring plans laying down the foundation for the AM approach were prepared based 
on consultation with federal and State agencies, scientists and local stakeholders. 
Monitoring activities encompassed an acoustic monitoring plan, a benthic and 
biofouling monitoring plan, a marine mammal observation plan and fisheries and 
marine life interaction monitoring plans.182  
The licence stipulates that alleviation of the restriction was dependent upon the results 
of a comprehensive monitoring programme agreed upon by an Adaptive Management 
Team. The monitoring programme collected data on the propagation of noise, 
abundance and distribution of key receptors using different monitoring methods 
including hydro acoustics and air acoustic measurements, marine mammal observations, 
seabird surveys.183 On the basis of data collected, ORPC requested a modification of its 
licence conditions. FERC granted a licence modification to remove the Phase 1 
restrictions on pile-driving based on mitigation and acoustic measurements. The 
Cobscook Bay tidal energy project provides an example of how AM may be operated to 
relax licensing conditions as more data becomes available over time. The extent to 
which mitigation measures will be alleviated varies depending on the receptor 
concerned. Generally speaking, a licence modification includes the removal of 
restrictions or a reduction of monitoring requirements based on increased knowledge 
about species presence and potential impacts.184 
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4.3.2.4 The DeltaStream demonstration project, Ramsay Sound, Wales 
 
DeltaStream is a grid-connected tidal stream turbine installed in Ramsay Sound, off the 
Pembrokeshire coast, Wales. Licence for installation and operation was granted in 2011. 
The turbine was successfully deployed in 2015. The Pembrokeshire waters are 
designated as a SAC under the Habitats Directive. Habitats and species of primary 
concerns include breeding grey seals. Similar to the Meygen project, the licence is 
conditional upon the implementation of a monitoring programme to understand 
potential collision risks with marine mammals. A detailed ‘Collision Monitoring and 
Adaptive Management Plan’ (CMAMP) has been developed to discharge the conditions 
of the licence.185 The CMAMP sets out the approach to marine mammal collision 
monitoring during the operational phase. Collision monitoring includes a passive 
acoustic monitoring system comprising several hydrophones directly deployed on the 
device and an active acoustic monitoring system to detect animals approaching the 
device rotors.186 Initial monitoring results at DeltaStream have shown that marine 
mammals are able to detect and avoid the turbine, albeit these findings cannot be 
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5 - Adaptive management and the ecosystem approach  
 
5.1. The ecosystem approach 
 
There is a broad consensus, including among legal scholars, whereby AM ‘is the only 
practical way to deliver ecosystem management’,188 a variant of what the author will 
also refer to as ecosystem approach.  As discussed above, ecosystems are not static but 
dynamic, ‘moving targets’, with multiple, yet uncertain and unpredictable equilibria.189 
As far back as 1996, Holling and Meffe already argued that ‘management has to be 
flexible, adaptive, and experimental at scales compatible with the scales of critical 
ecosystem functions’.190  The most notable endorsement of AM in the context of the 
ecosystem approach is established under the framework of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity:191 
The ecosystem approach requires adaptive management to deal with the 
complex and dynamic nature of ecosystems and the absence of complete 
knowledge or understanding of their functioning. Ecosystem processes are often 
non-linear, and the outcome of such processes often shows time lags. The result 
is discontinuities, leading to surprise and uncertainty. Management must be 
adaptive in order to be able to respond to such uncertainties and contain 
elements of "learning-by-doing" or research feedback. Measures may need to be 
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taken even when some cause-and-effect relationships are not yet fully 
established scientifically.192  
In a similar vein, the Guidelines on the Ecosystem Approach193 state that an ecosystem 
approach requires a management approach that is flexible and adaptive, both as a 
response to changing circumstances and to take account of new knowledge and 
understanding.194   
Providing a legal or scientific definition of ‘ecosystem approach’ or ‘ecosystem-based 
approach’ is a difficult task.195 There is no formally agreed definition of the ‘ecosystem-
based approach’.196 At first glance, the ecosystem approach finds its origins in 
international law. The 1992 Rio Declaration acknowledges the ‘integral and 
interdependent nature of the Earth’ and proclaimed States’ duty ‘to cooperate to 
conserve, protect, and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystems’.197 The 
approach has also been implicitly endorsed in hard (legally binding) international law 
under the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR),198 the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),199 the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the 1997 Convention on Non-
Navigational Use of International Watercourses.200 Whilst it goes beyond the scope of 
this study to review all these instruments, it is worth noting the ecosystem approach has 
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been adopted as the primary framework for the conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity under the CBD.201 As such, it is under the framework of the CBD that the 
most recognised definition of this notion has been given.202  An ecosystem approach is 
defined in Decision V/6 as ‘a strategy for the integrated management of land, waters 
and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable 
way’.203  Decision V/6 also provides that implementing an ecosystem-based approach to 
management demands the use of ‘appropriate scientific methodologies’ that are 
‘focused on the levels of biological organization, which encompass the essential 
structure, processes, functions and interactions among organisms and their 
environment’.204 This means that management ought to be designed to match the scales 
of the aspects of the ecosystem being managed.205 Again, the framework of the CBD 
offers 12 complementary and interlinked Principles, the so-called Malawi Principles, to 
facilitate the implementation of this approach.206 Many of the Principles refer to the 
need to manage ecosystems within the limits of their functioning (Principle 6), to take 
into account all form of knowledge about ecosystems (Principle 11) in order to conserve 
ecosystems’ structures and functioning (Principle 5), and to decentralise resource 
management in a way that matches the spatial and temporal scale of the ecosystem 
being managed (Principles 2 and 7) with long-term objectives for ecosystem 
management underpinning temporal scales and lag-effects of ecosystem processes 
(Principle 8). The need for AM is emphasised in Principle 9. Recognising that abrupt 
and unpredictable changes in dynamic natural resources are inevitable, ‘the ecosystem 
                                                          
201 COP Decision II/8 ‘Preliminary consideration of components of biological diversity particularly under 
threat and action which could be taken under the Convention’ (6-17 November 1995, Jakarta), para.1 
202 COP Decision V/6 ‘Ecosystem Approach’, section A, para.1; COP Decision VII/11 ‘Ecosystem 
Approach, Annex I (A) (1) 
203 Ibid. 
204 Ibid. 
205 COP Decision V/6 ‘Ecosystem Approach’, section B, para. 6; COP Decision VII/11 ‘Ecosystem 





approach must utilize adaptive management in order to anticipate and cater for such 
change’.207  
In light of these constitutive principles, management envisioned under the ecosystem 
approach should rely on the best scientific knowledge and aim to embrace, rather than 
control, ecosystems’ dynamics. Similar thinking is evident from the working definition 
of the International Council for the Exploitation of the Sea (ICES) and the Bremen 
Statement of the Joint Ministerial Meeting of the OSPAR and Helsinki Commissions:  
the ‘ecosystem approach could be described as the comprehensive integrated 
management of human activities based on the best available scientific knowledge about 
the ecosystems and its dynamic, in order to identify and take actions on influences 
which are critical to the health of marine ecosystems, thereby achieving sustainable use 
of ecosystem goods and services and maintenance of ecosystem integrity’.208  
Further, the ecosystem approach is the topic of ripe doctrinal analysis. DeLaplante209 
and Vito De Lucia consider the ecosystem approach as a methodology applying 
ecosystem principles to a variety of fields and disciplines.210 As a methodology, the 
ecosystem approach entails a ‘metaphor for holistic [system] thinking’ requiring ‘an 
expanded consideration of the dynamic and complexity of ecological systems’.211 In a 
similar line of thought, the ecosystem approach would support what Tallacchini refers 
to as ‘ecological normativity’, i.e. a framework where legal norms are aligned with the 
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ecological description.212 From there, an ecosystem-based approach presupposes that 
intrinsic ecosystem properties, including resilience principles, are firmly accounted for 
in legal terms and in management practices. More generally, the tenets of the ecosystem 
approach underscore the need to manage ecosystems within the limits of their 
functioning and demand both the integration of best scientific knowledge and a holistic, 
‘integrated’ approach to managing human concerns in order to protect ecosystems’ 
integrity.213  For Trouwborst, this calls for an adaptive management process, ‘tailored to 
the ecosystem at hand’.214  
As Morgera points out, few authors have reflected on the interactions of the ecosystem 
approach and the precautionary principle in light of adaptive management.215 
Trouwborst argues that the ecosystem approach and the precautionary principle are 
‘independent concepts, which at the same time are intrinsically linked’.216 Both 
‘embody response to the failure of reactive, ad hoc approaches to environmental 
protection and management, [traditionally associated witch command and control], and 
are products of the little contested view that these approaches are to be turned into 
holistic ones’.217 While the ecosystem approach and the precautionary principle serve 
different functional purposes,218 both have a complementary role to play in protecting 
ecosystems’ integrity by maintaining the level of anthropogenic pressures within 
sustainable ecological limits or thresholds. In the words of Raitanen, both the ecosystem 
approach and the precautionary principle ‘can be considered to be the basic features of a 
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sustainable use of natural resources’.219  This brings us back to the narrative on 
‘ecological sustainability’,220 which as discussed in Chapter V, constitutes the core 
ecological limits [of ecosystem functioning] within which human development can 
thrive and still be sustainable.  
‘While there is a need to accelerate efforts to gain new knowledge about functional 
biodiversity’, it is acknowledged that ecosystem management has to be carried out even 
in the absence of such knowledge’.221  From an ecosystem approach perspective, the 
precautionary principle reminds us that scientific knowledge and understanding of 
functioning of natural ecosystems is never perfect due to their inherent complexity. In 
the face of limited knowledge and information, the role of the precautionary principle, 
within an ecosystem-based approach, is to prescribe prudent and conservative measures 
to avert any undue impingement on ecosystems’ ecological integrity.222  From there, 
Trouwborst rightly observes that ‘the precautionary principle is an integral component 
of the ecosystem approach’.223 In effect, taking an ecosystem approach entails ‘acting 
with caution where knowledge is lacking or, put in another way, implementing adaptive 
management abiding by the maxim: the more incomplete the knowledge, the more 
precautionary planning and management’.224  Against this backdrop, while 
precautionary principle is an integral component of the ecosystem-based approach,225 
AM complements the precautionary principle by incorporating scientific knowledge of 
critical ecological limits. This finding is well entrenched by the Conference of the 
Parties to the CBD which states: 
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‘There are fundamental limits to the levels of demand that can be placed on 
ecosystems while maintaining its integrity. Our current understanding is 
insufficient to allow these limits to be precisely defined, and therefore a 
precautionary approach coupled with adaptive management, is advised’.226  
From an ecosystem approach perspective, adaptive management and the precautionary 
principle should be considered as complementary to manage natural ecosystems and 
conserve their integrity in the face of scientific uncertainty. Tarlock follows along the 
same line when arguing that adaptive management would ‘correct the bias of the 
precautionary principle towards no action in the face of uncertainty and the opposite 
bias for immediate fixes unconnected to long-term monitoring, assessment and 
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5.2. Adaptive management: a resilience-based management approach 
 
Managing for resilience presupposes demands anticipating, detecting and managing 
critical ecological thresholds leading to undesirable regime shifts.228 The identification 
of ecological thresholds is a ‘difficult task’ which is ‘fraught with significant 
uncertainty’.229 This is however an essential prerequisite for ecosystem-based 
management. Mackinnon and others explain that thresholds represent the maximum 
degree to which the receiving ecosystem can be altered and still deemed sustainable.230  
Thresholds are also regarded as ‘the boundaries of a system’s “safe operating space”, in 
which risk of unwanted regime shift is low and resilience is high’.231 Failure to 
incorporate this information into management has often led to unsustainable outcomes 
with severe loss of ecosystem services such as fisheries collapses.232 Environmental 
management that is capable of proactively detecting and avoiding critical thresholds  is 
increasingly regarded as more inclined to avert dramatic consequences associated with 
undesirable regime shifts.233 This however cannot be successfully achieved in the 
absence of science and scientifically-derived monitoring data.234 Kelly and others argue 
that the primary way thresholds are being addressed in planning and permitting 
decision-making has been retrospective, after the threshold is crossed.235 This failure has 
been attributed to limited understanding of those factors triggering threshold 
dynamics.236 It is precisely the existence of uncertainty surrounding regime shifts that 
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has driven the development of AM practices.237 AM has been advocated as an essential 
resilience-based management approach because of its focus ‘on learning, reducing 
uncertainty and monitoring’.238  Similar to the resilience theory, AM acknowledges that 
ecosystems can exist under multiple yet uncertain alternative regimes and builds 
adaptive capabilities accordingly by providing the monitoring framework to ‘reduce 
uncertainty’ about threshold dynamics as well as the iterative management framework 
to proactively avoid critical threshold crossing.239 The framework of AM typically 
breaks with the pathologic ‘command-and-control’ paradigm and mimics the adaptive 
cycle of Panarchy. Similar to Panarchy, the cycle of AM includes a back-loop phase of 
implementation and monitoring, evaluation and reorganisation (figures 1 and 2). 
However, instead of allowing for decreased resilience in the Panarchy cycle, AM 
incorporates an iterative process to proactively detect and avert threshold approaches. 
As interventions are carried out, monitoring data ‘provide opportunities for identifying 
and recalibrating thresholds, thereby reducing uncertainty’.240 Green and others  clarify 
this point by arguing that AM plans should be tailored to accommodate uncertainty as 
monitoring data help identify critical thresholds.241   If monitoring results show that an 
unwanted threshold is being approached, management actions are warranted to avoid 
threshold crossing.  Ecological thresholds can thus be ‘recalibrated in an iterative 
manner’242 as new information from ecosystem monitoring show progress towards an 
undesirable threshold/tipping point.243  Hence, linking the iterative phase of AM to 
specific thresholds is increasingly regarded as ‘an effective tool’ that holds great 
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promise for maintaining resilient ecosystems244 and delivering ecosystem 
management.245  Garmestani and others argue that AM provides a useful framework to 
learn about dynamic ecosystems in a way that is ‘safe-to-fail’, namely, ‘in a manner that 
is unlikely to push these systems over a tipping point’.246  Some environmental 
scientists and managers may already be familiar with this process on the ground. Karr 
and others found that the use of quantitative thresholds linked to adaptive harvest 
control offers a powerful way to deliver precautionary and ecosystem-based fishery 
management in Caribbean coral reefs.247  
Although managing for resilience is data intensive248 and should typically be led at the 
strategic ecosystem-level, there is no reason why the principles of resilience and AM 
could not also be applied at the project-level to better manage scientific uncertainty 
regarding the implications of ORE for the integrity of N2000 sites.  Kelly et al., have 
recently found that smaller ecological systems such as marine protected area would be 
more amenable to threshold-based AM where routine monitoring is implemented to 
track and control undesirable thresholds.249  N2000 sites may thus be appropriate 
ecological fora to implement the mechanisms of threshold-based AM. The Birds and 
Habitats Directive are not explicitly threshold-based but they become so as their 
implementation requires the achievement of Favourable Conservation Status (FCS) and 
the definition of conservation objectives for designated N2000 sites. Conservation 
objectives dictate the notion of ‘adverse effect on the integrity’ of N2000 sites250 and as 
such,  site-specific conservation objectives may provide useful benchmarks against 
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which a threshold-based approach to AM can be utilised to deploy and manage ORE 
projects within the limits of the integrity of N2000 sites.  In the context of the Habitats 
Directive, ‘threshold-based’ AM would allow for iterative adjustment of ORE 
deployments as new empirical information collected through routine monitoring 
indicate that an acceptable threshold of change or impact is being approached. 
Regulatory decision-makers can thus consent ORE developments despite remaining 
uncertainty and review permitting conditions on the basis of monitoring data with the 
goal of avoiding pre-identified thresholds of ‘acceptable’ harm on N2000 features. To 
date, impact thresholds are more commonly used in pre-consent procedures to define 
the acceptability of projected OWF impacts.251 Where thresholds were introduced in 
consenting processes, AM is however rarely implemented to refine their accuracy and 
adjust mitigation actions and monitoring accordingly.252 In some cases, comprehensive 
monitoring around consented OWFs did not exceed three years following 
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6- An interim methodological framework for adaptive management under the 
Habitats Directive  
 
6.1. ‘How much is too much?’ setting the thresholds of ‘acceptable’ 
changes/impacts 
 
The implication of a proposed development for the site’s conservation objectives assists 
in determining whether the development will have lasting adverse effects on the 
integrity of a site. The EC revised guidance document indicates that the determination 
of adverse impact on the  site’s integrity should be focused on, and be limited to, the 
site’s conservation objectives.254 The ‘integrity checklist’ of the methodological 
guidance on Articles 6(3) and (4)  further stipulates that the integrity test involves inter 
alia determining whether a development has the potential to ‘cause delays’ or ‘interrupt’ 
‘progress towards achieving the conservation objectives of the sites’.255 No further 
indication is given regarding how ‘large’ a predicted impact on a N2000 site and its 
qualifying features must be for the integrity of the sites to be adversely affected.256  The 
CJEU partially answered this question in the Sweetman case257 but at the same time 
opted for a purposive approach to interpretation of ‘site integrity’ which deviates from 
scientific understanding of this concept.258 In light of the EC guidance documents and 
CJEU jurisprudence, the critical consideration in relation to the integrity test of Article 
6(3) is whether the predicted direct and indirect impacts of a proposed development on 
protected species and habitats and, or the ecological characteristics of N2000 sites that 
are connected to the presence of these species or natural habitats  will be such that the 
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proposed development will undermine the site’s ability to achieve its conservation 
objectives.259  
Taking an AM approach requires tolerance thresholds of change/harm. The framework 
for AM should first involve defining strategic thresholds of acceptable change having 
regard to the specified conservation objectives of N2000 sites. At the strategic level, 
thresholds are formulated as the maximum precautionary levels of cumulative 
changes/impacts that a N2000 site and its qualifying features (species or habitats) can 
reasonably incur without adversely affecting the capacity of a N2000 site to achieve its 
conservation objectives and as such, the site’s contribution to the objective of FCS. 
Strategic thresholds of acceptable harm/changes are site-specific and must be informed 
by its conservation objectives, species ecology and species conservation status (i.e. 
favourable, declining).260 
Strategic thresholds should in turn be used to inform project-specific thresholds.  At the 
project-level, thresholds of acceptable changes/impacts are values to be avoided 
throughout the life time of a consented project. These thresholds will determine the 
‘safe operating space’261 within which ORE projects can be approved and operated 
under uncertainty in compliance with the specified conservation objectives of N2000 
sites. At the project level, a ‘threshold’ determines the maximum level of changes a 
proposed development can cause to the receiving ecosystem. If an AA is deemed 
necessary, the first step for project developers is to submit a Natura Impact Statement 
(NIS) to support the findings of an AA. NIS must identify the implications of the 
project for N2000 species and habitats concerned and be transparent on the nature of 
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uncertainty surrounding these threats. In the initial set up phase, development consent 
must be contingent upon developer, regulator and an independent advisory body 
agreeing upon the content of an Environmental Management Plan (EMP). The EMP is 
designed to ensure that the potential impacts resulting from the development will 
remain compatible with the strategic thresholds adopted for the site concerned. To do 
so, the EMP should be as detailed as practical and be explicit on how uncertainty is to 
be responded to at all development stages. In particular, the EMP should contain a 
detailed monitoring programme together with clearly defined thresholds triggering the 
adoption of corrective mitigation measures.  
The specifics of the framework have to be adapted to each receptor and the impact 
pathways of each technology. For example, collision risks are predominantly an issue 
for devices with exposed rotor blades such as tidal energy turbines. On the other hand, 
disturbances from acoustic noise, electro-magnetic fields and barrier effect of multiple 
turbines are common issues to all type of technologies including offshore wind farms as 
well as wave and tidal energy devices deployed in arrays. The nature of impacts, either 
direct/lethal (i.e. collision, entanglement, hearing damages) or indirect/non-lethal (e.g. 
disruption of behaviour) determine the nature of thresholds of acceptable 
change/impacts as well as relevant indicators for threshold detection in monitoring 
programmes.  With respect to lethal impacts (collision risks), if one considers that every 
collision leads to injury and death, then a decline in population is expected. Here, the 
threshold of acceptable impact can be formulated as a maximum level/number of 
mortalities from collisions that a species population can sustain without adversely 
impacting its stability. An adaptive management and collision plan based on 
‘thresholds’ of acceptable collisions of marine mammals has recently been developed to 




(section 4.3.2.4).262 The objective is to reduce uncertainty surrounding 
encounter/collision rates while ensuring that collisions do not breach species-specific 
thresholds.263 If these thresholds are met or approached, further mitigation would be 
required to mitigate risks of harmful impacts.264 
With regard to the non-lethal impacts of disturbances from acoustic noise and barrier 
effect, the process is more complex. Displacement of foraging or migrating animals may 
have chronic effects on health, survival and reproduction (vital rates) if animals expend 
more energy to avoid the source of disturbance or reach alternative and potentially less 
profitable foraging habitats.265 Similarly, Permanent Threshold Shifts (PTS) or 
Temporary Threshold Shift (TSS) resulting from exposure to acoustic noise may have 
chronic effect on reproduction and survival if it reduces animal capacity to detect their 
predator, to locate and capture their prey.266 If a sufficient number of animals are 
exposed, this may affect demographic rates and lead to population decline. If the 
population declines, a significant effect on the sites’ conservation objectives and hence, 
on the integrity of the site will occur. In this context, acceptable thresholds may be 
formulated as, for example, 1) a maximum level of animal displacement above which an 
animal’s energy intake and vital rates will be adversely affected; 2) maximum 
thresholds of habitat loss, 3) maximum decrease in prey availability as a result of 
project disturbance; 4) maximum levels of underwater noise above which acoustic 
disturbance is projected to cause PTS or TSS. Threshold values for impulsive piling 
                                                          
262 Tethys, ‘Ramsay Sound’ (n185) 
263  Andrea Copping and others, (2016). Annex IV 2016 State of Science Report: Environmental Effects 
of Marine Renewable Energy Development Around the World. pp.224.  at 41 
264 Sparling C.E., Thompson D., Booth C.G., (2017) Guide to Population Models used in Marine 
Mammal Impact Assessment. (JNCC Report No. 607. JNCC, Peterborough), 8 
265 Jacob Nable-Nielsen and others, ‘Effects of noise and by-catch on a Danish harbour porpoise 
population’ (2014) 272 Ecological Modelling, 242; Frederik Christiansen and David Lusseau, ‘Linking 
Behaviour to Vital Rates to Measure the Effects of Non-Lethal Disturbance on Wildlife’ (2015) 8(6) 
Conservation Letters, 424; Busch M., Garthe S., ‘Approaching population thresholds in presence of 
uncertainty: Assessing displacement of seabirds from offshore wind farms’ (2016) 56 Environmental 
Impact Assessment Review, 31 
266 John Harwood and Stephanie King, (2017). The Sensitivity of UK Marine Mammals Populations to 
Marine Renewables Developments (Revised Version. Report number SMRUC-MSS-2017-005). 




noise already exist. For example, in Belgium and Germany, acceptable thresholds for 
marine mammals shall not exceed 185dB and 160Db respectively, at a distance of 
750m from the piling site.267  
 
A key challenge for scientists and regulators is to determine the thresholds of risk that 
are ‘acceptable’ having regard to statutory conservation objectives. The exact location 
of acceptable thresholds is often unknown or difficult to quantify with certainty. Such a 
level of ‘acceptable risk’ is not prescribed in law nor can it be derived from case law 
and accordingly must be determined on a case-by-case examination of conservation 
status. To date, the notion of ecological thresholds is still more a scientific concept than 
a tangible conservation tool. Johnson stresses that uncertainty and the lack of clear and 
consistent methods for identifying thresholds and appropriate response variables are 
practical limitations to the use of thresholds as regulatory limits.268 Identification of 
acceptable risks cannot therefore rely on science alone.269 Trade-offs between 
conservation and ORE developments must be based on social values through 
participatory decision-making processes. Until there is a better empirical understanding 
of impact pathways and the consequences of these on a species population, 
precautionary margins in the form of conservative thresholds must be adopted to 
acknowledge the extant levels of uncertainty. The size of precautionary margins should 
be informed by a number of factors including social acceptance and risk appetite of 
regulators and stakeholders, the conservation value of the affected species and the levels 
of confidence in modelling outputs.  
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The need to ascertain impact thresholds that fully meet the requirements of the Habitats 
Directive in order to address consenting risks has been identified as a ‘high’ priority 
research area by the Scottish Offshore Renewables Joint Industry Partnership 
(ORJIP).270   Modelling frameworks that seek to define acceptable thresholds exist and 
may be used for setting scientifically sound thresholds of acceptable changes/impacts on 
N2000 features. For example, the ‘Potential Biological Removal’ (PBR) framework has 
been used to calculate the threshold of marine mammal collision mortalities in the AM 
process of the DeltaStream tidal energy turbine.271 Another approach, the Interim 
Population Consequence of Disturbance (iPCoD), has been developed to predict the 
population consequences of noise disturbances on marine mammals during the 
construction and operation of offshore wind farms.272 As discussed in Chapter III, 
iPCoD is subject to significant data limitations and as such, the model heavily relies on 
expert elicitation to inform its parameters.273 Scientific initiatives are currently 
underway to improve these modelling frameworks.274  Progress in scientific methods 
will progressively increase the levels of confidence necessary to authorise ORE 
deployments under AM protocols. Lusseau and others observe that iPCoD may then be 
well suited to an AM scheme where expert opinions would be progressively replaced by 
new observational and empirical data from monitoring, thus ‘increasing the precision 
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and accuracy of model outputs’.275 New empirical data must be used to refine 
‘acceptable’ thresholds and review operational projects accordingly. 
 
6.2. Mitigation  
 
AM strategies must be fully integrated into the mitigation hierarchy, which lies at the 
heart of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive.276  The mitigation hierarchy is embedded by 
a sequence of actions to avoid, reduce and minimise the negative impacts and, as a last 
resort, to compensate for any residual impact.277 At the top of the mitigation hierarchy, 
adverse impacts on habitats and species must be primarily avoided by well-informed 
designated areas for ORE (see conclusion). Where negative impacts cannot be 
completely avoided through macro-siting, harms must be avoided or reduced by means 
of genuine mitigation measures, and lastly compensatory measures should be taken to 
compensate for any residual impact.278 Mitigation measures must be sought and 
implemented from the beginning of project implementation and not solely when 
monitoring data show undesirable trend towards an unacceptable threshold. The 
strength of mitigation requirements reflects the seriousness and irreversibility of the 
threat and the level of uncertainty. The more significant and the more uncertain a likely 
adverse impact, the more precautionary mitigation measures there should be. The aim of 
an AM process should normally be to progressively remove mitigation constraints 
where monitoring data indicates that it is appropriate to do so.  
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A thorough catalogue of all possible mitigation actions goes beyond the scope of this 
study. At first glance, AM may not be technically feasible with respect to all mitigation 
measures. As a learning process, the success of AM is contingent upon the capacity of 
medium/long-term monitoring programmes to provide meaningful information to 
inform responsive mitigation actions. The temporary nature and severity of impacts 
associated with construction works, especially during piling operations, may restrict the 
possible degree to which construction noise mitigation measures can be adapted at the 
project-level on the basis of monitoring results. The prescription of one-time 
precautionary mitigation measures may be preferable to maintain construction noise 
below allowable thresholds of impulsive noise. Available mitigation techniques for 
OWF noise reduction encompass a number of techniques including the use of 1) 
acoustic deterrent devices and ‘soft start’279 to ensure that no animal is present in the 
impact area, 2) low-noise foundation technologies (e.g. floating or gravity-based), 3) 
monitoring of exclusion zones to delay piling operations on the basis of marine mammal 
sighting, and 4) large or small bubble curtains and hydro sound dampers.280   
 
Post-construction mitigation may consist in spatially arranging turbines layout, a 
mitigation measure also known as ‘micro-siting. Research into micro-siting measures is 
lacking for OWFs. Onshore, Gartman and others argue that the best way to minimize 
collision risks consists in avoiding flight corridors, placing turbines parallel to flight 
patterns and arranging turbines in clusters or rows.281 Curtailment or temporary 
shutdowns of turbines operation are also increasingly applied at onshore wind energy 
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sites to mitigate collision risks with birds and bats at times of high flight density or 
sensitive migration periods.282 Whilst such mitigation measures have not yet been fully 
realised in OWFs,283 curtailment operations have been trialled in combination with an 
AM strategy to minimise collision risks for marine mammals at the single SeaGen tidal 
energy turbine (see section 4.3.2 above). There is an obvious ‘economic cost’ associated 
with curtailment operations.284 Likewise, curtailment and temporary shutdowns are 
arguably sufficient to address all negative impacts, especially those related to avoidance 
behaviour as a result of noise disturbance and barrier effects, habitat loss and changes in 
sedimentary regimes. Where a threshold approach under conditional licensing is 
deemed unfeasible or unacceptable, AM may alternatively be implemented through a 
staged consenting process whereby projects can be deployed in stages, starting at small 
scale, and expanding progressively depending on the findings of monitoring. 
Monitoring should provide meaningful evidence showing that the impacts of larger 
scale deployments are properly understood and do not exceed acceptable thresholds. An 
example of phased development is the Meygen tidal energy project – as discussed in 
section 4.3.2.1. In this vein, AM may for example be useful to inform future numbers 
and micro-siting of devices. 
 
On-site habitats re-creation/restoration measures have also been envisaged in AM 
strategies to mitigate the impacts of onshore wind farms.285 Offshore, the restoration or 
replacement of biologically similar habitats has also been contemplated for epifaunal 
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species through the re-creation of seagrass meadows or artificial reefs.286 In-situ 
creation of favourable conditions for artificial reefs and benthic habitats on and around 
offshore wind turbine together with the reintegration of sessile organisms within the 
OWFs could be performed and adaptively managed over the duration of the project. 
However, the legal soundness of this approach and more particularly, the extent to 
which on-site nature creation/restoration measures can qualify as mitigation under the 
AA of Article 6(3) is unclear.287  Mitigation measures must be an integral part of the 
specifications of the project and must be directly linked to the affected habitats or 
species. As a matter of principle, the CJEU held that future creation of an area of equal 
or greater size of the natural habitat type affected, albeit inextricably linked to the 
project, in another location of the site not directly affected by the project cannot be 
considered as mitigation under the AA process.288  This holds true even if habitat 
creation or restoration measures are implemented prior to the occurrence of possible 
adverse effects.289  Off-site/on-site habitat restoration/creation measures may, perhaps, 
be more easily considered for species subject to strict protection under Article 12(1). 
The EC Guidance on Strict Species Protection specifies that mitigation measures may 
include actions that actively improve or manage functional areas through for example, 
‘enlarging the site or creating new habitats, in, or in direct functional relation to, a 
breeding or resting place as a counterweight to the potential loss of parts or functions of 
the site’.290  
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6.3. Follow-up monitoring and adaptive management  
 
The iterative component of the AM process should be explicitly designed to reduce 
uncertainty and ensure that the direct (lethal) and indirect impacts of consented ORE 
projects on protected species are mitigated to acceptable levels. Follow-up monitoring 
gives an opportunity to test the correctness of past model predictions and ensure that 
best scientific knowledge is relied upon at all stages of a project development. AM 
provides a structured approach for 1) validating impact predictions and addressing 
potential non-anticipated impacts; 2) evaluating monitoring results against pre-
determined thresholds of acceptable changes/impacts; 3) assessing the effectiveness of 
mitigation measures in ensuring that project-specific thresholds are avoided; and 4) 
integrate new data to refine thresholds accuracy and improve mitigation strategies 
accordingly.291 
Monitoring activities should follow the ‘Before-After-Control Impact’ (BACI) 
methodology to account for changes prior to installation (baseline monitoring), during 
the construction and during the operational phase of a project. Indicators and early 
warning triggers for threshold detection in monitoring must also be rigorously defined. 
Here, the framework significantly relies on the monitoring guidance elaborated by 
Hawkins and others,292 and Fleishman and others.293 Hawkins et al., argue that 
monitoring indicators should be those for which there is sufficient understanding of 
cause-and-effect relationships between measurable effects (i.e., collision, behavioural 
changes) and animal health, reproduction and survival (vital rates).294 Careful 
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consideration of the mechanisms by which the risks associated with ORE developments 
may have meaningful biological effects on animal reproduction and survival (vital rates) 
is necessary to identify key monitoring indicators. With respect to behavioural changes, 
the process is particularly complex in that it implies quantifying the magnitude of 
animals’ dose-responses above which there will be meaningful biological consequences 
on animals’ vital rates. Monitoring indicators may, for example, focus on the number of 
encounter/collisions or animals or short-term/long-term behavioural changes including 
the temporal/spatial magnitude of displacement and changes in animals’ presence in 
relation to the development.  
For each of these indicators, an ‘acceptable’ scale of change (e.g. magnitude of dose-
responses, displacement range, collision numbers, number of exposed animals) must 
also be defined to inform early-warning trigger points at which 
adaptation/reinforcement of pre-planned mitigation actions is warranted.295 Triggers are 
‘specific points where monitoring data indicates an unexpected or unfavourable 
trajectory’ towards unwanted thresholds of acceptable changes or harm.296 
 If routine monitoring data show that the levels of changes/impacts are such that a 
project-specific threshold is being met or exceeded, a reinforcement of existing 
protective measures and/or adoption of additional corrective mitigation measures are 
warranted to prevent adverse impacts on conservation objectives. On the other hand, if 
the monitoring data indicate that risks have been overestimated in the pre-consenting 
phase, mitigation measures should then be reduced and progressively removed in 
subsequent management decisions.  
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Robust environmental monitoring demands appropriate temporal and spatial scales for 
data collection.297 Large amount of data in AM may become ‘an information 
problem’298 for developers and exacerbate the ‘Data-Rich Information Poor’ syndrome. 
Assessing cumulative and population-level impacts at the project-level can prove to be 
statistically ineffective.299 Because of their scale, these impacts are best addressed at the 
strategic (SEA) level300  in order to place project-specific impacts in the context of the 
objective of FCS. It is recommended that monitoring efforts at the project-level should 
focus on understanding and mitigating the actual interaction processes of 
devices/turbines with marine species and physical environment within the development 
site.301 Lindeboom and Fox suggest that targeting monitoring activities on site-specific 
devices/receptor interaction processes will allow for available resources to be 
rationalised on those changes/impacts that can be effectively monitored at the project 
scale, thus ‘turning off’ the problem of DRIP.302  Project-based monitoring programmes 
will also yield more useable information if using a ‘question-led’ approach303 where 
data collection methods are designed to address specific data gaps and questions 
identified in the initial AA process. A ‘question-led approach’ requires a collaborative 
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approach early in the design of the EMP to identify ‘prevailing uncertainty’ and 
monitoring priorities.304  
Further, it will be of primary importance to reflect the feedback loop of Panarchy by 
adopting a bottom-up approach where data gained in each development site are fed into 
broader marine governance processes through, for example, strategic assessments and 
monitoring programmes supported by government bodies. The ‘double-loop learning’ 
process that characterises the cycle of Panarchy should provide sufficient data 
feedbacks to inform policies and licensing decision-making in a way that reconciles 
further ORE deployments with the objective of FCS. The ORE industry will particularly 
benefit from such a ‘double-loop learning’ process. In theory, the SEA process should 
fulfil many gaps in baseline data, allowing developers to save significant time when 
developing detailed environmental assessments to inform permitting processes.305  The 
use of AM is progressively emerging at the strategic level for OWFs. In the 
Netherlands, the Governmental Offshore Wind Ecological Programme (Wozep)306 has 
been recently developed at the strategic level as part of an AM process for the third 
round of OWFs which consists of ten OWFs to be deployed in five subsequent phases 
of two developments. The programme aims to reduce knowledge gaps and uncertainty 
concerning assumptions made in the strategic assessment. Knowledge gathered by 
Wozep will lead to amendment of planning policies and determine the conditions under 
which offshore wind siting decisions can be issued in the next planning phase.307    
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7 – Conclusions and further recommendations  
 
Adaptive management and the precautionary principle should be envisaged as important 
complementary ‘tools’ to consent and deploy ORE developments within the acceptable 
limits of N2000 sites’ integrity. As a ‘new legal paradigm for ecosystem 
conservation’,308  AM may be particularly useful to improve the merits of the 
precautionary principle in the face uncertain ecological impacts on N2000 sites.  As 
Tickner and Kriebel point out, critical to the precautionary principle is the use of 
‘rigorous science’309 to prevent irreversible harms to the integrity of N2000 sites. 
Critical to the achievement of rigorous science is the flexibility to integrate scientific 
methods and data outputs into the regulatory decision-making process. When viewed in 
this context, AM has an important role to play, within the precautionary principle of 
Article 6(3), for characterising complex environmental risk and providing early 
warnings of adverse impacts on N2000 sites. Follow-up monitoring provides an 
opportunity to correct scientific mistakes made in the licensing procedure, thus ensuring 
that best scientific knowledge is relied upon at all stages of a project development. The 
precautionary principle in turns serves as a constant ‘safeguard against asymmetric 
information and imperfect monitoring’,310 thereby also demanding appropriate 
mitigation to protect the integrity of N2000 sites while waiting for more complete 
scientific evidence.311  
 
Incorporating resilience and AM principles into the AA process would be more 
consistent with the underlying principle of ‘ecological integrity’ that Article 6(3) 
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purports to protect. In particular, linking AM plans to pre-defined thresholds of 
acceptable impacts may encourage an approach to ORE permitting that is premised on 
the underlying science of the ecosystem approach.  Nevertheless, AM does not result in 
‘quick wins’. It is a long process that requires a lot of forethought. Regulators need to 
understand the receiving environment and tailor monitoring questions to what they are 
trying to find out. Doremus cautions on this aspect saying:  ‘before deciding to employ, 
or to continue to employ an adaptive approach to management, and before determining 
the parameters of such an approach, managers should undertake an explicit, structured 
analysis of the need for and practicality of learning’.312 Where uncertainty is low, some 
authors recommend employing a front-end approach to environmental decision-
making.313 Biber for example contends that ‘rigid, inflexible standards based on front-
end analysis will be more useful where dynamism and complexity are more limited and 
adaptive management where dynamism and complexity are more significant but still 
allow for learning’. 314  
AM is also an onerous process: the post-installation monitoring programme for the 
single SeaGen tidal energy turbine came at the considerable cost of £3 million for 
MCT.315 Although scientific knowledge has been gained from monitoring, thereby 
allowing for the reduction of mitigation constraints, the cost of undertaking an AM 
approach may ‘prove too much for future projects’.316 AM should be associated with a 
risk-based approach to project consenting, as exemplified by the Scottish Government’s 
SDM policy, where monitoring requirements can be customised to the risk-profile of 
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each proposed development.  The SDM will certainly contribute to mitigating the 
‘information problem’ of AM by focusing post-deployment monitoring efforts on 
relevant receptors. However, the SDM policy follows on from a series of SEAs317 and 
broader marine spatial planning process initiated by the Scottish Government.318 Marine 
spatial planning (MSP) is almost systematically presented as ‘an idea whose time has 
come’319 to promote the sustainable use of marine resources through integrated, 
forward-looking and ecosystem-based organisation of human activities in the marine 
environment.320 By 2021, Member States shall have adopted overarching maritime 
spatial plans applying an ecosystem-based approach.321 Effective ecosystem-based MSP 
has a critical role to play to enhance spatial trade-offs between protection of species and 
habitats and ORE developments.  Potentials for coexistence with protected sites may be 
found through the MSP process as long as ORE developments are compatible with the 
statutory conservation objectives of N2000 sites.322 This Chapter has provided a model 
as to how this can be achieved. While MSP may facilitate trade-offs between 
ORE/biodiversity conservation, ‘MSP does not hold intrinsic value on its own’.323 
Locating and avoiding areas of ecological importance in offshore environments is 
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challenging due to the large dispersal range, variability in the spatial distribution, 
concentration and occurrence of marine species.324 Likewise, MSP processes are 
constrained by technological advances and uncertainty regarding fine-scale interactions 
of marine wildlife and physical resources with ORE devices.325 To be clear, AM is not a 
substitute for overarching planning processes. The function of the AM framework 
presented above, albeit project-centered, should be to deliver the evidence base which 
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ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE HABITATS 
DIRECTIVE – IS IT POSSIBLE? 
.  
 
This Chapter summarises the findings of this thesis. It also offers a number of final legal 
recommendations that could assist in furthering the use of adaptive management 
(hereafter: AM) as a more pragmatic methodology to achieve the objectives of the 
Habitats Directive and reconcile the increasing contradictions between the need for 
offshore renewable energy and protection of marine N2000 sites.  The conclusion 
provides an attempt to structure the implementation of adaptive management within the 
precautionary principle of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. It intends to do so in a 
manner that preserves legal and regulatory certainty and moves the precautionary 
principle away from the unpleasant ‘uncertainty paradox’ of Van Asselt and Vos.1 As 
stated in the introduction to this thesis, this research goes beyond merely the interests of 
the ORE sector and many of the recommendations are applicable to other forms of 
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1 – Introduction 
 
Federal Agencies in the United-States have adopted adaptive management (hereafter 
AM) as a standard practice to address situations of environmental uncertainty in their 
permitting systems.2  AM has for example, been described as a ‘more integrated 
solution’ to address complex environmental problems, such as biodiversity loss under 
the US Endangered Species Act.3 In Canada, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia has 
recently allowed the deployment of two tidal energy demonstration turbines operated by 
Cape Sharp Tidal Venture Ltd in the Bay of Fundy on the grounds that, despite the 
existence of gaps in baseline data, the adaptive management approach was not adopted 
as a ‘bureaucratic convenience’ but as a practical response to address these 
uncertainties.4  It is now widely understood, at least in the United States, that ‘unless 
adaptive management is given some legal definition [and legal grounding] and its 
application is enforceable in some way, the approach can be used as a smokescreen for 
open-ended and discretionary decision-making that fails to meet legal standards, lacks 
accountability and fails to incorporate some of the most important aspects of the 
paradigm including monitoring and feedback loops that inform an adaptive planning 
cycle’.5 Peel also cautions that ‘used indiscriminately or inappropriately adaptive 
management mechanisms can operate to “water down” regulatory requirements, reduce 
public scrutiny of development approval processes and accord preferential treatment to 
favoured industry, thus substantially detracting from any precautionary role they might 
serve in addressing uncertainty’.6  It is therefore highly important to circumscribe the 
                                                          
2 Robert Fischman, J.B. Ruhl, ‘Judging adaptive management practices of US agencies’ (2015) 30 
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3 Oliva O. Green, Ahjond S. Garmestani, ‘Adaptive Management to protection Biodiversity: best 
available science and the Endangered Species Act (2012) 4(2) Diversity, 164, 170 
4 Bay of Fundy Inshore Fisherman’s Association v. Nova Scotia (Environment), 2016 NSSC 286, para. 58 
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6 Jackeline Peel, (ed.) The Precautionary Principle in Practice: Environmental Decision-Making and 




use  of adaptive management to provide sufficient certainty that  the AM process will 
satisfy the legal protection standard of Article 6(3). 
Since AM is becoming increasingly appealing to the ORE sector,7 it will also be 
necessary to identify a clear legal basis under which AM strategies can be found 
permissible in the context of the Habitats Directive. To date, early attempts to introduce 
AM strategies into the AA process of the Habitats Directive have been made through 
the design of ‘nature inclusive’ projects.8 Nature inclusive project designs have been 
advanced as a possible approach to reconcile societal/economic developments and 
biodiversity conservation under the Habitats Directive.9 This approach consists in 
authorising projects, which despite their potential significant impacts on Natura 2000 
(N2000) sites, aim to ‘neutralise’ their negative impacts by creating, restoring and or 
enhancing ecological values elsewhere in Natura 2000 sites.10 Ecological 
enhancement/restoration measures are directly integrated into the project design.  For 
some authors, the appeal of such more progressive approach ‘is not hard to understand’ 
in that it offers some flexibility to authorise developments under Article 6(3) without 
resorting to the derogation clause of Article 6(4).11 However, the CJEU has been 
particularly reluctant to soften the precautionary standards of Article 6(3) to permit the 
authorisation of such ‘nature inclusive projects’. In its most recent case law, the Court 
has steadfastly reiterated the strict impermeability between mitigation and 
                                                          
7 Sander Van Hees, ‘Large-scale water related Innovative Renewable Energy projects and the Habitats 
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compensatory measures, as respectively prescribed under Articles 6(3) and (4) of the 
Habitats Directive.12  
 
Whilst Article 6(4) seems to feature the core aspects of proportionality and sustainable 
development, Chapter V has pointed out that the strict linkage between Articles 6(3) 
and (4) hardly provides a reliable mechanism to deliver sustainable outcomes.13 
Particularly worrying, the linear flow of Articles 6(3) and (4) may jeopardize the 
Habitats Directive’s stated conservation objectives.14  Improved implementation of the 
Habitats Directive is necessary in order to position the Directive once again as a 
‘gatekeeper’ of biodiversity conservation while facilitating the integration of renewable 
energy objectives with protection of habitats and species. Some commentators have 
already cautioned against burdensome amendment procedures.15 Improved 
implementation of the assessment requirements of Article 6(3) can be achieved without 
resorting to such amendments.  In the Introduction to this thesis, the author stresses that 
the judiciary has a critical role to play in addressing the emerging ‘legal disruption’ 
posed by the ORE sector and catalysing the transition to renewable energy. Without 
pre-empting the finding of this Chapter, the author will thus recommend that the CJEU, 
in its role as the main interpreter of EU law,16 should give more importance to the so-
called ‘non-regression clause’17 of Article 6(2) when interpreting the requirements of 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. Where the evidence presented in the AA is scant, 
or uncertain, a teleological interpretation of Article 6(3) in light of Article 6(2) may 
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provide an avenue to achieve structured certainty by facilitating the introduction of AM 
principles into the appropriate assessment (AA) process.   
 
This Chapter will first consider the legal feasibility of implementing adaptive 
management in light of the recent CJEU case law in Hilde Orleans v Vlaams Gewest,18 
Moorburg19 and Grace and Sweetman.20 Sections 3 and 4 will then raise the question of 
how AM principles can be embedded in the provisions of Article 6 of the Habitats 
Directive. Particular attention is paid to the requirements arising from the principle of 
proportionality.  Finally, the author applies an innovative approach based on a short 
review of American case law to explore how AM principles can be more robustly 
incorporated into the AA process (section 5). American case law displays key attributes 
that one could expect from a precautionary principle based on the best scientific 
knowledge. The United States is probably the jurisdiction with the longest experience of 
AM in biodiversity law and natural resources law.21 AM has achieved some success in 
judicial review under the Endangered Species Act (ESA)22 and the Marine Mammal 
Protection Act (MMAP).23 In particular, Federal Courts have come forward with a set of 
sophisticated legal standards that AM frameworks must satisfy to comply with the ‘no 
jeopardy’ clause of the ESA and the ‘least practical adverse impact’ standard of the 
MMPA. The EU judicature could perhaps draw some lessons from the US jurisprudence 
to review the design of AM processes under the AA of the Habitats Directive.  The 
findings of this study should be strictly limited to sustainable renewable energy projects 
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in order to promote better coherence between EU goals for biodiversity conservation 
and renewable energy. 
 
2 - The mitigation hierarchy of the precautionary principle: a legal impediment to 
the use of adaptive management in the AA process?    
 
Hilde Orleans v Vlaams Gewest24 is probably the first judgement to date in which the 
CJEU was confronted with what can be viewed as an example of AM in the context of 
Article 6(3).25 This case concerned the question of whether the decision to authorise the 
adoption of the Regional Development Implementation Plan (RDIP) for the port of 
Antwerp (Belgium), in light of a proactive nature restoration programme contained in 
the plan, was compatible with the mitigation hierarchy of Article 6 of the Habitats 
Directive, as enshrined by the CJEU in Briels and Others.26 The RDIP provided for the 
creation and replacement of several isolated patches of natural habitats in core 
ecological areas in order to neutralise the adverse effects of port development activities 
on a N2000 site.27  The creation of natural habitats had to be ‘imperatively’ put in place 
before the occurrence of any possible adverse effects on the habitats of the SAC. Plus, 
the RDIP incorporated explicit requirements for monitoring and adaptation to ascertain 
the true impact of the port development and prevent any ecological regression.28 The 
development of the areas would proceed only after the establishment of core ecological 
areas could be demonstrated to be sustainable. The CJEU first noted that adverse effects 
on the integrity of the site were certain since the RDIP will result in the disappearance 
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of an area of 20 hectares of habitats in the SAC in question.29 The CJEU then found 
that, at the time of the AA, the future prospects that proactive habitat creation measures 
will be effective in mitigating the adverse effects of the plan the site were difficult to 
forecast with any degree of certainty. The Court reasoned that the measures in question 
have not yet been completed and as such, their possible outcomes will be visible only 
several years after their implementation.30 The CJEU concluded that future creation of 
sustainable habitats, the completion of which will take place before the occurrence of 
adverse effects on a natural habitat type but after the conduct of the AA, must be 
regarded as ‘compensatory’ by nature and hence, cannot be taken into account in the 
AA process.31 By principally excluding proactive nature restoration measures from the 
scope of Article 6 (3), the CJEU effectively implements the mitigation hierarchy of the 
precautionary principle32 which lies at the heart of Briels.  Since the seminal Briels case, 
it is settled case law that the application of the precautionary principle under Article 
6(3) requires competent national authorities to take into account ‘protective measures, 
which forming part of the project, aim at avoiding or reducing any direct adverse effects 
on the site in order to ensure that it does not adversely affect the integrity of the site’.33 
Measures aiming at ‘compensating for the negative effects of the project on a Natura 
2000 site’ can only be considered as a last resort, if after a negative AA, the proposed 
development satisfies the conditions of Article 6(4).34  
It is still unclear whether the CJEU would reach the same reasoning if the measures 
envisaged by the Flemish Authorities in Hilde Orleans could be characterised as 
mitigation measures by nature. The Court has shed some light on this question in 
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Moorburg.35 This case similarly arose from infringement proceedings brought by the 
EC against Germany for having wrongly classified some measures as ‘mitigation’ under 
Article 6(3).36 Briefly, the German authorities authorised the construction of a coal-fired 
power plant on the grounds that the plant was not incompatible with the conservation 
objectives of a group of N2000 sites located downstream in view of the installation of a 
fish ladder, the objective of which, was to increase migratory fish stocks by allowing 
fish to reach their breeding areas more quickly. This system was expected to 
compensate for the death of Annex II fish during the cooling operations of the plant 
which drew large quantities of water in from the river. A multi-phase monitoring 
programme was prescribed to verify the effectiveness of that measure. The CJEU first 
reiterated its previous case law whereby competent national authorities can only 
authorise an activity if, at the time the authorisation,  no reasonable scientific doubt 
remains as to the absence of adverse effect on the integrity of the site.37 In that regard, 
the Court noted that the ‘impact assessment itself did not contain definitive data 
regarding the effectiveness of the fish ladder and merely stated that its effectiveness 
could only be confirmed following several years of monitoring’.38 With this in mind, the 
fish ladder, together with the multi-phase monitoring programme, were not sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 6(3) insofar as, at the time of decision-making, these 
measures could not guarantee beyond all reasonable doubt, that that plant would not 
adversely affect the integrity of the site.39  
The CJEU did not clearly specify whether the consideration of the fish ladder system as 
a mitigation measure was compatible with Briels.40 Regardless of this semantic 
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distinction, the findings in Moorburg are instructive for the remainder of this analysis: 
competent national authorities are not entitled to apply any element of adaptive 
management in their consenting procedures unless they can establish, beyond all 
reasonable scientific doubt, that the mitigation/compensatory measures envisaged will 
be effective in preventing adverse impact on the integrity of N2000 sites.41  Whilst it 
may be true that, in the German case, the design of the monitoring system was 
methodologically flawed,42 this ruling presents a pernicious impediment to the use of 
adaptive management strategies under the AA of the Habitats Directive.43 The 
systematic judicial requirement for front-loaded certainty leaves very little room for AM 
strategies within the scope of Article 6(3). Where certainty cannot be ascertained 
beyond all reasonable scientific doubt during the AA stage, the only way to proceed is 
through the derogation clause of Article 6(4). 
There is certain logic behind the CJEU reassertion of the strict impermeability between 
mitigation and compensatory measures, as enshrined in Briels. As discussed in Chapter 
V, the complexity of ecological systems makes the success of restoration actions 
relatively weak and sometimes, inefficient to resolve trade-offs between economic 
development and conservation.44  Second, the decision in the Moorburg case is centred 
on a coal-fired power plant. A less demanding mitigation strategy under Article 6(3) 
may open a Pandora’s Box of more flexibility when permitting unsustainable 
developments. An increasing reliance on compensation/restoration in the context of the 
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AA would undermine efforts to avoid and mitigate the true impacts of a project.  As 
observed by Schoukens and Cliquet, since the derogation clause of Article 6(4) is only 
accessible to projects of overriding public interest, it is likely that maintaining a strict 
preventive approach under Article 6(3) will lead to more permit refusals for 
unsustainable plans or projects.45  
Perhaps more shockingly, the Court has very recently upheld the same ruling in a case 
concerning the legality of a staggered Species and Habitats Management Plan (SHMP) 
elaborated with a view to reconciling the approval of a wind energy development with 
the conservation objectives adopted for the hen harrier, a protected species of bird.  
Grace and Sweetman46 arose from a request for preliminary ruling on the interpretation 
of Article 6(3) by the Irish Supreme Court. As regards the factual background, An Bord 
Pleanála, the statutory planning authority in Ireland, had granted permission for a wind 
farm development of 16 turbines within a SPA designated for the hen harrier. The 
SHMP provided for a series of measures including the restoration of blanket bogs and 
wet heath as well as the provision of new areas of optimum habitat for the hen harrier 
and other wildlife (by felling and replacing the canopy forest).47 These measures, some 
of them commencing a year prior construction, were designed to ensure that the 
proportion of suitable habitats would not be reduced and might indeed be enhanced 
throughout the lifetime of the wind farm.48 The measures envisaged to address the 
adverse impacts of the wind farm were an integral part of the project, albeit their 
implementation would take place outside the wind farm area in other locations of the 
SPA. In essence, the CJEU held that the case was similar to Briels and Hilde Orleans in 
that it was based on the assumption that the proposed habitat creation and restoration 
                                                          
45 See further: Hendrik Schoukens and Ann Cliquet, ‘Biodiversity Offsetting and restoration under the 
European Union Habitats Directive: balancing between no net loss and deathbed conservation’ (2016) 
21(4) Ecology and Society, 572 
46 Case C-164/17 Grace and Sweetman v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] ECLI:EU:C: 2018:593 
47 Grace and Sweetman, para.44; Opinion AG Tanchev, 19 April 2018, para. 24 




measures would address the potential adverse effects of the wind farm.49 Therefore, the 
Court rejected the measures envisaged by the SHMP and considered that these measures 
were compensatory in nature and, hence, should be considered under Article 6(4).50  
Perhaps, the Court added a minor refinement when clarifying:  
‘It is only when it is sufficiently certain that a measure will make an effective 
contribution to avoiding harm, guaranteeing beyond all reasonable doubt that the 
project will not adversely affect the integrity of the area, that such a measure 
may be taken into account in the appropriate assessment of Article 6(3)’.51 
Here again, the decision is firmly entrenched in the precautionary principle.52  Based on 
the precautionary principle, the AA shall not leave any reasonable scientific doubt as to 
the absence of adverse effect of the proposed works on the integrity of the site 
concerned.  As a matter of principle, the only solution left in order to authorise 
renewable energy projects for which reasonable scientific doubt remains, despite the 
adoption of mitigation measures, is by means of the derogation clause of Article 6(4).53   
 
It is worth noting that the case law to date seems to exclude from the scope of Article 
6(3) AM strategies that have been adopted as part of ‘nature inclusive projects’.54 As 
discussed in the introduction to this Chapter, an integrated approach to nature 
conservation consists of developing ‘nature inclusive projects’ which, despite their 
adverse effects on N2000 values, address these negative effects by creating and or 
restoring ecological values elsewhere in the N2000 areas concerned.55 The design of 
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nature inclusive projects seem to offer some leverage to approve developments with 
harmful effect on the integrity of protected sites under Article 6(3).56 Notwithstanding 
this, the message of the Court is clear: biodiversity restoration/creation measures, even 
if functionally linked to project developments, cannot be considered as mitigation 
measures for the purpose of the appropriate assessment of Article 6(3). Restoration 
measures can only be relied upon as a last resort option under the derogation clause of 
Article 6(4). Commentators are beginning to deplore the consequences of these rulings 
for the legal feasibility of AM strategies under Article 6(3). Schoukens, for example, 
contends that ‘an adaptive management approach to Article 6(3) could open the door to 
a more pragmatic and reconciliatory approach to nature conservation, one that would 
move more appreciably beyond the “deathbed” conservation’ approach.57  In light of the 
cited case law, it is quite obvious that the issue in the main proceeding mainly pertained 
to the nature of the measures envisaged by Member States to support an AA and not the 
use of AM strategies per se.  Therefore, an important question arises from the 
foregoing: Is there not another way to make adaptive management legally permissible 
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3 - The non-regression clause of Article 6(2): a reactive approach to adaptive 
management under the appropriate assessment process? 
 
Little attention has been given to the non-regression clause of Article 6(2). Article 6(2) 
establishes a general obligation58 to take ‘appropriate steps’ to avoid deterioration of 
natural habitats and disturbance of species which could have significant effects in light 
of the objectives of the Habitats Directive.59 Article 6(2) constitutes an important ‘fall-
back clause’ against all harmful projects and activities that fall outside the scope of the 
AA of Article 6(3).60 The CJEU has steadfastly interpreted this provision as a general 
obligation of protection61 which, among other things, imposes a duty to review the 
implications of consented projects where their implementation results in further 
deterioration of natural habitats or disturbances to species protected by N2000 sites.62 It 
is settled case law that existing projects that do not satisfy the requirements of Article 
6(3), by way of being authorised before the inclusion of a site on the SCIs list or before 
the entry into force of the Directive, may be subject to subsequent review under the 
scope of Article 6(2).63 The precautionary principle applies for this purpose: where ‘a 
probability or risk’ of deterioration or disturbance exists, the general obligation of 
protection of Article 6(2) requires that such review be carried out as an appropriate step 
without a cause and effect relationship between that activity and significant disturbance 
to the species having to be proved’.64 In the recent Grüne Kaga Sachsen judgement,65 
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the CJEU confirmed this ruling and specifically relied on Article 6(2) to require review 
of the authorisation of a road bridge project on the river Elbe. The project was approved 
before the inclusion of the Elbe valley in the list of SCIs and following an assessment 
procedure that did not meet the requirements of Article 6(3).66 In this case, because 
there had been no AA prior to authorisation, the CJEU held that Article 6(2) entails an 
obligation to review the implications of the project for the site, as an appropriate step, in 
order to avoid deterioration or disturbance.67 Such a review must enable the competent 
authority to guarantee that the implementation of this project will not cause 
deterioration or disturbance which could be significant in relation to the objective of the 
Habitats Directive..68 
 
One may ponder whether Article 6(2) could not also be understood as an obligation to 
review permitting conditions of ongoing ORE projects which, albeit having been 
lawfully authorised pursuant to an Article 6(3) AA, may subsequently give rise to 
deterioration/disturbance of habitats or species? The CJEU may have come to such 
conclusion in its seminal Waddenzee case.69 In essence, the Waddenzee judgement 
concerned the question of whether mechanical cockle fishing, which had been carried 
out for many years and for which a licence was granted annually, amounted to a plan or 
project within the meaning of Article 6(3) and as such, required the conduct of a fresh 
AA process.  The CJEU made it clear that Articles 6(2) and (3) serve distinct purposes 
and as such, they cannot be applied concomitantly in the AA process.70 Compliance 
with Article 6(3) in the AA process entails a presumption of ‘no deterioration or 
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disturbance’ which excludes the concomitant application of Article 6(2) in the initial 
AA process.71 In Waddenzee, the Court has nevertheless reasoned that an authorisation 
granted pursuant to the AA of Article 6(3) does not preclude that a consented project 
will subsequently give rise to deterioration or disturbance, ‘even where the competent 
national authorities cannot be held responsible for any error’.72  In this situation, the 
application of Article 6(2) ‘makes it possible to satisfy the essential objective of the 
preservation and protection of the quality of the environment, including the 
conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, as stated in the first recital 
in the preamble to that Directive’.73 In other words, the presumption of no-deterioration 
and no-disturbance underpinning the relationship Articles 6(2) and (3) no longer 
applies. Without elaborating further on the question of whether a new AA was 
necessary for each new licence issued, this ruling suggests that ‘additional measures’74 
may be sought in the post-project approval phase under Article 6(2) to prevent future 
deterioration of natural habitats or disturbance of species.  
In a similar vein, in Grüne Kaga Sachsen,75 AG Sharpston has also remarkably stressed 
that even where an approval has been granted in compliance with Articles 6(3) and (4), 
Article 6(2) lays down an ongoing obligation to carry out ‘constant monitoring’ and to 
‘take appropriate steps’ to avoid deterioration and disturbance.76 ‘That must be true a 
fortiori where the procedure was not fully compliant and needs to be rectified’.77  In 
particular, where there is a change in the conditions of a N2000 site or in the details of 
the project, an appropriate step under Article 6(2) may entail ‘the need for review in 
light of the changed situation to avoid deterioration of habitats or disturbances of 
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species’.78 This should also be the case where ‘the original assessment has not clearly 
identified what impact the project would be likely to have on habitats and species in the 
site, leaving the possible existence of a threat undetermined’.79 In this situation, AG 
Sharpston explains that ‘a review of the original assessment seems likely to be an 
appropriate step to take, though alternatives should be envisaged’, through for example 
‘suitable but circumscribed preventive measures’.80 Since Article 6(2) imposes an 
ongoing obligation to ensure the same level of protection as Article 6(3), it would 
indeed, run counter to the objectives of the Directive to allow planning approvals to 
stand unchanged after a significant change in the circumstances of the site or details of 
te project.81 Although not legally binding, AGs’ opinions are still authoritative. Such an 
interpretation of Article 6(2) is an important refinement in that it clearly accounts for 
uncertainty and could pave the way towards a more adaptive approach to appropriate 
assessment with a view to preventing deterioration or disturbance that may materialise 
as a result of the absence or imprecision of data relied upon in the initial AA process. 
 
Domestic Courts may have begun to endorse a similar understanding of Article 6(2). In 
a recent judicial review (Murphy’s Application for Judicial Review),82 the Court of 
Appeal of Northern Ireland reiterated the CJEU ruling in Grüne Kaga Sachsen by ruling 
that in cases where there has been no AA prior to authorisation, Article 6(2) requires the 
carrying out of an assessment that meets the requirements of Article 6(3). In this case 
however, eight years passed between the initial AA and the authorisation of road 
development works. Whilst Article 6(2) does not necessarily require the conduct of a 
new AA, the Court of Appeal held that a high standard of investigation nonetheless 
arises from the provisions of Article 6(2), even though there is no prescribed form for 
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the conduct of such an investigation.83 On this ground, the Court remarkably ruled that a 
subsequent ‘statement’ which aimed to review the findings of the initial AA process and 
establish the risk of disturbance or deterioration in light of new circumstances was an 
‘appropriate investigation’ which complied with Article 6(2).84  
 
Unfortunately, the CJEU did not have the opportunity to endorse the AG Sharpston’s 
position as the construction of the road bridge in the Grüne Kaga Sachsen case was 
approved before the inclusion of the site in the list of SCIs and thus, the project was not 
subject to the requirements of Article 6(3). The CJEU has however characteristically 
employed a teleological interpretation of the provisions of the Habitats Directive, 
agreeing that Article 6(2) and (3) must ‘be construed as a ‘coherent whole’ in light of 
the conservation objectives pursued by the Directive.85 In line with this method of 
interpretation, the CJEU and domestic courts should give more importance to 
requirements to ‘take appropriate steps’ under Article 6(2) to enhance the outcomes of 
the AA of Article 6(3) in the face of uncertain ecological impacts. Unlike the EIA 
Directive,86  the Habitats Directive is depicted as a procedural hurdle87 with no explicit 
requirement to implement follow-up monitoring and to adapt decision-making to new 
monitoring data. Although Article 6(2) cannot be applied concomitantly during the 
initial AA,88 nothing in the CJEU jurisprudence seems to rule out the application of 
Article 6(2) post-consent, where a risk of deterioration or disturbance cannot be 
excluded. The procedure prescribed by Article 6(3) only applies ‘before the Member 
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States create planning rights whose exercise could adversely affect a site’.89 The scope 
of Article 6(2) on the other hand, is broader in that it constitutes an ongoing obligation 
to take appropriate actions in order to avoid deterioration and disturbance.90 As a 
general obligation of protection, the requirement ‘to take appropriate steps’ under 
Article 6(2) could be operated more effectively, in a teleological way, to require 
continuous environmental monitoring and re-evaluation of permitting conditions 
regardless of whether a licence was granted in compliance with Article 6(3).  Increased 
monitoring and corrective mitigation activities must be envisaged as ‘appropriate steps’ 
where the monitoring outcomes confirm that the operation or functioning of a consented 
ORE project is likely to give rise to disturbance or deterioration such that this may 
exceed precautionary thresholds of acceptable change/harm. 
 
In this respect, the CJEU has steadily repeated that an activity complies with Article 
6(2) only if it is guaranteed that it will not cause any disturbance likely to significantly 
affect the objectives of the Directive, particularly its conservation objectives.91 Since 
Article 6(2) aims to ensure the same level of protection as Article 6(3), ‘appropriate 
steps’ may then be taken accordingly, on the basis of Article 6(2), to guarantee that the 
implications of operating ORE projects in or near  N2000 sites remains compatible with 
site conservation objectives at all stages of their development.  This interpretation 
would accord with the reasoning adopted by AG Kokott in Commission v. France.92 AG 
Kokott argued that ‘deterioration’ or ‘disturbance’ within the meaning of Article 6(2) 
must ‘be assumed to exist if the conservation objectives of the relevant N2000 area are 
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affected’.93  In a similar line of thought, AG Sharpston’s opinion on the Sweetman case 
also made it clear that compliance with Article 6(2) ‘is to be measured having regard to 
the conservation objectives of the site’.94 The requirement of Article 6(2) consists in 
taking ‘all appropriate steps to avoid those sites’ conservation objectives to be 
prejudiced’.95 The conservation objectives of the site are therefore of importance not 
only in the identification of disturbance of species or deterioration of habitats,96 but also 
in the assessment of significance.97 After all, the absence of adverse effects on the 
integrity of the site necessarily assumes that no deterioration or significant disturbance 
is likely to arise within the meaning of Article 6(2).98   
 
With regard to the nature of the corrective measures envisaged under Article 6(2), the 
CJEU emphasises that Article 6(2) imposes a duty to take, ‘in good time’, the necessary 
measures to bring deterioration or disturbances to an end as quickly as possible.99  These 
measures shall not be reactive but anticipatory by nature in order to bring threats of 
deterioration or disturbance to an end before such deterioration or disturbance has 
occurred.100 The precautionary principle applies for this purpose: since Article 6(2) and 
Article 6(3) are designed to ensure the same level of protection, the mere existence of a 
‘probability or risk’ of disturbance for a qualifying species constitutes an infringement 
of Article 6(2).101 Similar to the requirements of AA, the threshold at which subsequent 
review is warranted is a very light one. Such concretisation of the precautionary 
                                                          
93 Case C-241/08 Commission v France, Opinion of AG Kokott, 25 June 2009, para.28 
94 Sweetman, Opinion of AG Sharpston, 22 November 2012, para.44 
95 Ibid.  
96 European Commission, (n90), 30 
97 Möckel, (n41), 81 
98 Waddenzee, (n69), para.36 
99  Case C-404/09 Commission v. Spain, (n58), para.152 
100 Case C- 418/04 Commission v. Ireland [2007] ECR I-11067, paras.208, 209 





principle102 raises the important issue of legal certainty for developers who have placed 
legitimate expectation in their licences.103  No reason based on the principle of legal 
certainty or the principle of the protection of legitimate expectation precludes a realised 
development from being subject to subsequent review applying the requirements of 
Article 6(2).104 According to the Court, the effective protection of N2000 sites would 
otherwise be jeopardised.105 Developers must accept that the operation of their 
developments might be altered by subsequent review of their licence conditions. In 
practice however, once a project with negative impacts is granted a licence, it may be 
difficult to alter its operating conditions or even, to terminate the licence if it turns to be 
harmful in future.106 The risk that is introduced for developers by such interpretation 
must be carefully accounted for.  
 
In addition, Article 6(2) is now increasingly understood in the legal literature as a result-
based obligation for Member States.107 As such, the ‘non-regression clause’ of Article 
6(2) cannot be satisfied by a mere duty to act with due diligence but by the achievement 
of the result of no-deterioration/no-disturbance of natural habitat types and species. The 
landmark decision of the CJEU in Commission v Ireland provides a good illustration in 
this respect.  The CJEU held that in order to fulfil its obligations under Article 6(2), it 
was not only necessary for the Irish Government to take measures to stabilise the 
problem of overgrazing in order to avoid deterioration of the priority habitat type of the 
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Red Grouse, but also to ensure that damaged habitat was allowed to recover.108 As a 
result-based obligation, Article 6(2) may address some commentators’ concerns 
whereby AM may lead to a ‘fait accompli-scenario’;109 a situation where licensing 
authorities may be inclined to use AM as a smokescreen covering up ‘loopholes and 
gaps in ecological surveys’ to permit harmful projects.110   
 
In summary, while an absolute procedural obligation to review permitting conditions 
cannot be inferred from Article 6(2),111 a teleological interpretation of Article 6(3) in 
light of Article 6(2) would still provide an elegant way to initiate a paradigm shift 
towards more adaptive AA processes, as recommended in section 3 of Chapter VI.  
Through the implementation of robust monitoring linked to the possibility of routine 
review of permitting conditions, a stronger linkage between Articles 6(2) and (3) will 
provide regulatory decision-makers with an opportunity of control and better scientific 
knowledge necessary to consent and manage ORE deployments within the limits of the 
integrity of N2000 sites. Such a re-interpretation would also give developers the 
opportunity to deploy, monitor and learn about their technologies while ensuring that 
their deployment does not cause irreversible damage to N2000 qualifying features. If an 
ongoing obligation to monitor and to review the implications of consented 
developments under Article 6(3) can be teleologically derived from Article 6(2), the 
Habitats Directive may already provide a ‘ready-made’ legal basis to consent future 
ORE developments under AM protocols.    
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This reasoning reaches its limits when confronted with the maxim ‘Lex specialis 
derogat legi generali’. As general protection rule, Article 6(2) is superseded by the lex 
specialis provisions of Article 6(3). As such, the ‘non-regression principle’ of Article 
6(2) may offer little room to revisit permitting conditions that have been issued in 
compliance with Article 6(3). As Schoukens rightly writes: 
 
‘Article 6(2) [does] not only cover ongoing degradation, but in some ways 
situations which involve additional future losses, especially if such activities 
appear to have been based on flawed or incomplete assessments. Among other 
things, Article 6(2) forces competent authorities to rectify earlier mistakes that 
have occurred in earlier permitting procedures, or, in other instances, to adjust 
permitting conditions in view of recently changed environmental conditions’.112  
 
Article 6(2) seems to suggest a reactive approach to AM, after a project has been 
approved. The Court has never held that Article 6(2) cannot be applied concomitantly 
with the derogation clause of Article 6(4). Hence, it would be possible to permit ORE 
developments under proactive AM within the derogation scheme of Article 6(4).  This 
question goes beyond the scope of this study. As stated above, the provisions of Article 
6 of the Habitats Directive must ‘be construed as a ‘coherent whole’ in light of the 
objective of the Directive.113  From there, if Article 6(2) cannot be used in conjunction 
with Article 6(3) to require continuous monitoring and routine review of consented 
projects, neither can it be applied within the scope of Article 6(4). If a teleological 
interpretation of Article 6(3) in light of Article 6(2) offers little promise to facilitate the 
introduction of AM principles into the AA process, an obligation of continuous 
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monitoring and re-evaluation certainly arises from the general principle of 
proportionality. 
 
4 - Adaptive management in light of the proportionality principle  
 
The proportionality principle serves as an important ‘limiting factor to the precautionary 
principle’.114 As stated many times throughout this thesis, the proportionality principle 
requires that measures adopted on the basis of precaution do not exceed the limits of 
what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objectives legitimately pursued.115  A 
truly proportionate precautionary approach involves opting for the less restrictive 
alternative while still attaining the legitimate objective pursued. Leading author Marr 
rightly explains that the doctrine of proportionality necessarily implies that the 
precautionary principle should no longer apply ‘when its requirements ceased to 
exist’.116    This is the case for example when new scientific evidence has been produced, 
reducing scientific uncertainty to such an extent that the risk becomes merely 
hypothetical. Acting on hypothetical risks would be contrary to the principle of 
proportionality.117 Gillespie notably explains that the core of the precautionary principle 
involves a second step, which is an attempt to resolve uncertainty. For this reason, he 
argues that ‘any measures adopted under the auspice of the precautionary principle are 
of a transitory nature and may be eclipsed when greater scientific evidence is 
ascertainable’.118 Trouwborst also writes that the proportionality principle is a ‘crucial 
feature of the application of the precautionary principle in the sense that precautionary 
responses to environmental threats ought to correspond to the perceived dimensions of 
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the risk involved’.119 As scientific evidence accumulates, the intensity of precautionary 
measures should also be ‘proportionally responsive’120 to the gravity and probability of 
the threat. In this respect, Marr convincingly asserts that the proportionality principle 
entails ‘a duty to monitor the premises upon which the precautionary principle is 
applied’.121  Established case law in the field of human health protection seems to 
confirm this point when standing for the proposition that even the most stringent 
precautionary measures would still be proportionate as long as the measures are 
provisional pending the availability of additional scientific evidence.122 The withdrawal 
of authorisation for the virginiamycin was not deemed disproportionate by the CFI 
because it constituted a provisional measure subject to a duty of re-examination.123 In a 
more recent decision, the CJEU also held that ‘the Community legislature is entitled to 
adopt provisional risk management measures necessary to ensure a high level of health 
protection and may do so whilst awaiting further scientific information for a more 
comprehensive risk assessment’.124 Even before the formal integration of the 
precautionary principle within the EU legal order,125  the duty of review was already 
implicitly endorsed in embryonic case law on the application of the principle.126  The 
duty to re-examine precautionary measures was even more strongly formulated in 
Agrarproduktion Staebelow GmbH where the CJEU held that ‘when new elements 
change the perceptions of a risk or show that risk can be contained by less restrictive 
measures than the existing measures, it is for the institutions and in particular the 
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Commission, which has the power of legislative nature, to bring about an amendment to 
the rules in the light of the new information.127 From there, the EU judiciary has 
assumed that continuous scientific monitoring and re-evaluation of precautionary 
measures are inherent elements of a  proportionate application of the precautionary 
principle.128     
 
In Agrarproduktion Staebelow GmbH, the CJEU gave effect to the so-called principle of 
precedence to justify the proportionality of a measure ordering the slaughter of a cohort 
of infected bovine animals to eradicate exposure of humans to BSE. The principle of 
precedence has been elegantly used by the EU judiciary to give priority to 
environmental/health concerns over economic interests and  accept the legality of 
restrictive measures entailing precautionary bans and withdrawal of certain substances 
until further information becomes available.129  In Chapter V, the author argued that the 
precedence principle can hardly be invoked, on the basis of the precautionary principle, 
to postpone the deployment of renewable energy technologies as this would have the 
effect of slowing down the achievement of climate-energy policy objectives.130 What is 
more, the principle of precedence is subject to the proportionality principle.131 Pursuant 
to the EC Communication on the precautionary principle, a ban or prohibition should be 
the maximum of what is normally tolerated by the proportionality principle.132 Imposing 
a ban on innovative renewable energy technologies until greater scientific evidence 
                                                          
127 Case C-504/04 Agrarproduktion Staebelow GmbH v. Landrat des Landkreises Ba Doberan [2006] 
ECR I-00679, para.40 
128 Nicolas De Sadeleer, ‘The Precautionary Principle in European Community Health and 
Environmental: Sword or Shield for the Nordic Countries?’ in De Sadeleer N., (ed.) Implementing the 
Precautionary Principle: Approaches from the Nordic Countries, EU and USA (London, Earthscan, 
2007), pp.39-40 
129 Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00, & T-141/00, 
Artegodan GmbH v. Commission para.184 ; Case T-392/02 Solvay Pharmaceuticals BV [2003] ECR II-
4555, para.121 
130 Chapter VI, section 6.2.2 
131 Solvay Pharmaceuticals BV, (n129), para.125 




becomes available to retire potential risks of adverse effect is not acceptable. ‘Learning 
while doing’ is certainly a better option. 
  
Following along the same line, the EC Communication recommends that ‘the measures 
must be maintained as long as scientific data are inadequate, imprecise or inconclusive 
and as long as the risk is considered too high to be imposed on society’.133  On the other 
hand, the measures envisaged on the basis of precaution may have to be modified or 
abolished in light of new scientific findings134 and depending on the follow-up of their 
impact.135 The Communication acknowledges that the condition whereby precautionary 
measures should, as a matter of principle, be of temporary nature only concerns the 
scope of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS Agreement).136  In other 
sectors such as the environment, different principles can apply.137  Nonetheless, the EC 
seems to suggest that the maintenance of precautionary measures should depend on the 
results of continued scientific research ‘in light of which they should be re-
evaluated’.138 From there, a truly precautionary approach appears to be predicated on the 
continuation of scientific monitoring to account for more complete scientific data.  One 
ought to note that the Preamble of the Habitats Directive also recognises that the 
improvement of scientific and technical knowledge is essential for the implementation 
of the Directive and that it is consequently appropriate to encourage the necessary 
research and scientific work.139  
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The EC Communication and the case law cited above infer that a duty to monitor and to 
re-evaluate precautionary measures in light of new scientific evidence is the necessary 
corollary of a proportionate application of the precautionary principle. This clearly calls 
for the need to act despite scientific uncertainty and to respond to knowledge deficiency 
by means of constant re-evaluation. This is also the ‘Achilles heel’ of adaptive 
management. AM allows for provisional decisions to be made, monitored and re-
evaluated as technical knowledge becomes available. Where the evidence presented in 
the AA process do not allow for meaningful evaluation of impacts, AM should be 
envisaged as good practice in light of the proportionality principle to engage truly 
provisional precautionary measures based on the best scientific knowledge.  
 
The interplay between AM and the precautionary principle is complex. Chapter VI 
emphasises that their relationship has received some scant attention in the literature on 
the ecosystem approach. Commenting on Trouwborst’ s seminal work,140 Raitanen 
contends that ‘the precautionary principle shares many converging features with the 
ecosystem approach and its management strategies’. For this reason, the precautionary 
principle should be ‘a key element in legitimatizing more adaptive natural resources 
governance’.141 Raitanen goes on to explain that adaptive law methods and processes 
are the regulative tools to operationalizing the precautionary principle.142 In a similar 
vein, Morgera notes that the precautionary principle ‘applies to International 
biodiversity law through adaptive management’.143 In some jurisdictions, AM has 
sometimes been described as an alternative to the ‘paralyzing’ effect of the 
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precautionary principle.144 More pragmatic views envisage adaptive management and 
the precautionary principle as complementary approaches145 in situations where, despite 
uncertainty, there is a strong ‘call for moving in the dark rather sitting still’.146  The 
author broadly shares this view.  AM should not be envisaged as an alternative to the 
precautionary principle. Instead, AM integrates the best scientific knowledge that is 
needed to give an evidentiary basis to precautionary actions. Chapter VI concludes on 
this aspect that AM strategies have an important role to play, within the precautionary 
principle of Article 6(3), for filling data gaps and providing early warning indicators of 
adverse impacts on N2000 sites. The precautionary principle in turns demands 
temporary mitigation/compensatory measures to protect the integrity of N2000 sites 
until further scientific evidence is acquired through continuous monitoring. 
 
Federal Agencies in charge of administrating biodiversity law in the United States have 
found it necessary to apply rigorous AM147 to achieve the protection standards of ‘no 
jeopardy’ under the 1973 Endangered Species Act (ESA)148 and the standard of ‘least 
practicable adverse impact’ under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).149 
More than 20 years separate the enactment of the Endangered Species Act and the 
adoption of the Habitats Directive. The American case law under the ESA and MMPA 
is unarguably more developed than the CJEU case law under the Habitats Directive. 
Federal Courts have been particularly active in elaborating sophisticated standards 
under which AM frameworks can be lawfully implemented in compliance with the ESA 
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and MMPA. EU Courts could probably learn something from the lengthy experience of 
the US judiciary to frame the use of AM in the context of the Habitats Directive.  
 
5 - The rule of adaptive management under the Endangered Species Act and 
Marine Mammal Protection Act 
 
Notwithstanding the position of some commentators asserting that the flexible tenets of 
AM ‘do not fit neatly’ within the statutory requirements of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA),150 AM has achieved some success in US Federal Courts.151 Federal Courts have 
defined a number of substantive legal standards that AM must satisfy to meet the 
statutory requirements of the MMPA152 and the ESA.153 While it is true that the 
jurisprudence on AM (below) primarily concerns large-scale public plans, take-home 
lessons can still be drawn to suggest how AM could be considered in the ‘appropriate 
assessment’ of the Habitats Directive.  To get a deeper understanding of how US Courts 
treat the use of AM, it is worth briefly explaining the statutory backgrounds 
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5.1. The authorisation regime under the ESA and MMPA  
 
Similar to the Habitats Directive,154 the ESA and MMPA have been criticised for being 
too strict,155 failing to accommodate economic aspirations within their protection 
schemes.156 Both regulatory instruments are also subject to growing criticisms for 
representing a regulatory constraint on the siting and permitting of renewable energy 
projects.157 The ESA and MMPA are based on a mandate to use the ‘best available 
science’.158 However, unlike the CJEU, Federal Courts have been more proactive in 
defining what is required by this mandate within the scope of the ‘arbitrary and 
capricious’ standard of judicial review.159  Recognising that ‘the determination of what 
constitutes the best scientific data available’ belongs within an agency’s special 
expertise,160  the Courts have nonetheless held that an agency’s decision will be found 
‘arbitrary and capricious’ if the agency ignores the available biological information 
before it.161 More specifically, agencies ‘cannot disregard available scientific evidence 
that is in some way better than the evidence they rely upon’.162 In this respect, best 
available science does not necessarily mean using the best data available but the best 
scientific data possible.163 What is more, in the absence of best available science, 
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agencies are to give ‘the benefit of the doubt to the species’,164 which means that ‘they 
should not proceed in the face of inadequate knowledge’.165 Although not as stringent as 
the ‘criminal like’ standard of proof under Article 6(3), US Courts have enshrined a low 
evidentiary threshold to trigger the application of the ESA.166 Plaintiffs only have to 
establish by a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ that the project is ‘reasonably certain’ to 
harm a listed species’.167  
 
The ESA and MMPA seek to protect a number of marine species, including marine 
mammals and fish, by creating a prohibition against ‘taking’ any individual of a 
protected species.168 ‘Take’ under ESA is defined to mean ‘harass, harm, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture or collect or to attempt to engage in any such conduct’.169 
‘Take’ under the MMPA means to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine mammals or 
attempt to do so.170 The ‘take’ prohibition also includes the destruction and adverse 
modification of habitats designated for listed-species.171  Any ORE project that has the 
potential to adversely affect a listed species will fall under these prohibitions and thus, 
may need to apply for an Incidental Take Permit.172 In order to receive an Incidental 
Take Permit (ITP), project developers must develop a Habitat Conservation Plan 
(HCP).173  The HCP is a detailed document that includes measures that a project 
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developer will envisage to minimise and mitigate ‘to the maximum extent practicable’ 
the adverse impact on the species.174  The ITP then binds the applicant to their HCPs. 
 
Under the ESA, each federal agency shall ensure that any action authorised, funded or 
carried out by such agency (referred to as ‘agency action’)175 is not likely to jeopardise 
the continued existence of an endangered or threatened species or result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of their critical designated habitat.176  ‘Jeopardy’ is 
defined as ‘engaging in an agency action that reasonably would be expected, directly or 
indirectly, to reduce appreciably the survival and recovery of a listed species by 
reducing the reproduction numbers or distribution of that species’.177 There is no de 
minimis exception to this provision: the take of a single animal violates the Endangered 
Species Act.178 Section 7 of the ESA imposes a duty on federal agencies to engage in 
formal consultation with a consulting wildlife service179 where the actions they fund, 
authorise or carry out, is likely to jeopardy an ESA-listed species.180 The consultation 
process culminates in the production/issuance of a Biological Opinion by the consulting 
service.181 If jeopardy or adverse modification of habitats is found, the consulting 
wildlife service issues a ‘jeopardy’ opinion including ‘reasonable and prudent 
alternatives’ to be implemented by the ‘action agency’ and the project development to 
comply with the no jeopardy standard.182 Where the consulting service finds that an 
action may adversely affect a species but not jeopardise its continued existence, or 
where there is prudent alternative for the agency to avoid jeopardy and adverse 
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modification of habitats, the service may issue an ITP, which if followed exempts the 
agency from the prohibition on takings found in Section 9.183  The ITP must include the 
amount of anticipated ‘take’ allowable, along with reasonable and prudent measures that 
must be implemented to minimise the impacts of anticipated take, and the terms and 
conditions that must be observed by developers in their HCPs.184  ITPs often commands 
the implementation of AM strategies in HCPs.185  
 
In a similar language, the MMPA authorises the ‘taking’ of small numbers of marine 
mammals if taking is incidental to a specified activity.186 The issuance of incidental 
authorisations under the MMPA is an action that requires consultation under section 7 
of the ESA. The consulting wildlife service (NOAA Fisheries)187 may authorise 
incidental take through an Incidental Harassment Authorisation (maximum one year)188 
or a Letter of Authorisation for longer term harassment (up to five years).189 A letter of 
Authorisation can only be granted if the proposed activity will have a ‘negligible 
impact’ on such species.190 The consulting service must find that the ‘take’ will have a 
‘negligible impact’ on the species concerned191 and issue regulations to achieve ‘the 
least practicable adverse impact’ before it can authorise incidental take. The regulation 
shall set forth the permissible method of taking and other means of effecting ‘the least 
practicable adverse impact’ as well as requirements related to monitoring and 
reporting.192  Once incidental take authorisation has been taken in the scope of the ESA 
or MMPA, AM becomes a matter of securing compliance with the ‘no jeopardy’ and 
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‘least practicable adverse impact’ standards. AM processes envisaged in developers’ 
HCP must also satisfy these standards to comply with the ESA and MMPA. 
 
5.2. Adaptive management in the US jurisprudence 
 
Federal case law has provided substantive standards to review the legality of adaptive 
management plans elaborated under the ESA and the MMPA.193 The most 
comprehensive reviews of AM case law have been published by Ruhl and Fishman.194 
Despite a relatively sparse body of jurisprudence,195 Ruhl and Fishman note that Federal 
Courts have begun to support the use of AM and developed substantive legal standards 
to overturn what those authors refer to as ‘adaptive management lite’ or ‘AM-lite’196 
This approach is considered a ‘watered down’197 version of passive AM in which 
‘management objectives are loosely defined, monitoring protocols are vague and 
management actions triggered by monitoring thresholds are not clearly detailed’.198 
‘AM- lite’ ‘resembles ad hoc contingency planning more than it does structured 
learning while doing’.199 At best, ‘AM-lite’ complements the ‘front end’ analysis with 
‘bold promises to adapt unspecified parameters of the decision through unspecified 
methods when unspecified conditions arise’.200 At worst, this ‘compromised version’201 
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of AM holds little promise to reduce scientific uncertainty202 and to meet the regulatory 
standards of the ESA and MMPA.203    
 
It is settled case law that in order to avoid a substantive violation of the prohibition 
against jeopardy, mitigation measures adopted as part of an AM plan, must be 
‘reasonably specific, certain to occur, and capable of implementation; they must be 
subject to deadlines or otherwise enforceable obligations; and most importantly, they 
must address the threats to the species in a way that satisfies the jeopardy and adverse 
modification standards’.204 These requirements have been repeatedly endorsed in US 
litigation on AM.205 In two related cases, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s 
Association206 and Natural Resources Defense Council v Kempthrone,207 the District 
Court of California had to review the legality of two AM plans adopted to reduce 
uncertainty as to the impacts of two federally-managed water projects on two ESA-
listed species. For example, in Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Association, the 
District Court upheld the salmonid AM plan for a Californian water infrastructure 
project because it contained ‘enforceable, definitive and certain requirements’208 to 
ensure that the salmonid species or its critical habitats would not be in jeopardy. The 
Court found that the AM plan contained ‘definite’ and ‘non-discretionary’ criteria, 
formulated as maximum temperature thresholds, which if met or exceeded, triggered 
enforceable mitigation measures.209 Mitigation responses were formulated as a non-
discretionary mandate to re-initiate consultations (with the consulting service) in order 
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to adjust water system operations before annual water delivery decisions could be 
made.210 Further, in its determination, the Court held that the required action-mitigation 
measures were included in the Incidental Take Statement and as such, were ‘sufficiently 
certain to be enforceable’ under civil and criminal law.211   
 
By contrast, in Natural Resources Defense Council v Kempthrone, the Court rejected 
the AM plan for the smelt species, referred to as the Delta Smelt Risk Assessment 
Matrix (DSRAM). The Biological Opinion’s primary protection scheme for the smelt 
relied on the implementation of the DSRAM. Although the AM process was ‘within the 
agency’s discretion to choose and employ, the absence of any definite, certain or 
enforceable criteria or standards make its use arbitrary and capricious under the totality 
of the circumstances’.212 Here, the triggering criteria warranting responsive action-
mitigation were clear and well-defined. However, the Biological Opinion and the 
DSRAM provided for a discretionary mitigation process whereby recommendations of 
fish protection actions would be forwarded to a separate management group ‘for 
discussion and potential implementation’213 should one of these triggers be met or 
exceeded.214 Fish mitigation actions included, among other things, changes in south 
delta stream barrier operations, changes in river flows, and changes in the operation of 
the Delta cross channel.215 The DSRAM did not contain further defined action criteria 
but left the specifics of responsive actions to the discretion of the working group.216  The 
Court held that the existing AM process provides absolute no certainty that needed 
protection actions for the delta smelt will be taken at any time. Although mitigation 
measures were identified, ‘no defined mitigation goals were required, nor was any time 
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for implementation prescribed’.217 From there, the Court considered that the ‘DSRAM, 
as it was structured, did not provide reasonable certainty that appropriate and necessary 
mitigation measures will be implemented’218 and that adverse impacts would be 
mitigated.219 In the view of the Court, the plan was merely a discretionary process 
devoid of any clear requirements to take actions and as such, it was legally insufficient 
to meet the ESA legal requirement of ‘no jeopardy’.   
 
These two judgements are still described to date as the most ‘thorough judicial 
discussion of AM strengths and weaknesses’.220 These further demonstrate that an 
‘appropriate balance’ can be struck between the incident flexibility of AM and the need 
for legal certainty prescribed by law.221 The legal standards elaborated in these cases 
have continued to inform trade-offs contemplated by Courts.222 For example, in an 
another instructive decision in Animal Welfare Institute v Beech Ridge Energy,223 the 
District Court of Maryland acknowledged that AM was ‘the best way to reduce the risk 
of death and injury’ posed to bats by the wind energy project but eventually rejected the 
AM process on the grounds that the project developer was ‘not currently required to 
implement any minimisation or mitigation techniques’.224 The Order authorising the 
construction and operation of the wind farm provided that it was only in the event of 
‘significant levels of bat mortality’ that the developer would be required to make ‘a 
good faith effort to implement adaptive management strategies’.225 It is not necessary to 
address the content of the AM plan in detail here. Suffice to say that the Court rejected 
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the AM process because the responsive mitigation actions envisaged were ‘entirely 
discretionary’ and as such, could not eliminate the risks to the listed bat species.  
 
Similarly, for AM to suffice as a basis for delisting the Grizzly Bear from the ESA list 
of threatened species, ‘more specific management responses tied to more specific 
triggering criteria are required’.226 In this case, the US Fish Wildlife Service relied on 
the premise that scientists would continue to monitor relationships between food 
declines and size of grizzly population and that specific thresholds of change in 
mortality rates, litter size and cub survival would lead the scientific team ‘to recommend 
appropriate management responses’.227 Although the Strategy was based on an intensive 
management and monitoring programme, the Court pointed out that, unfortunately, 
these were not legally-binding and not responsive to food declines.228  The Court further 
noted that ‘the regulatory mechanisms relied upon by the Service [...] depend on 
guidelines, monitoring, and promises or good attention for future actions’.229 Promise of 
good intentions to take future actions ‘are not the rules of law’ if there is ‘no way to 
enforce them or to ensure that they will occur’.230   
 
This also holds true with regards to AM plans elaborated to satisfy the standard of ‘least 
practicable adverse impact’ under the MMPA. A recent judicial opinion states that ‘the 
duty to adopt in advance measures to ensure the least practicable adverse impact cannot 
be met simply by deferring to potential unknown measures’.231 In this case, the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration issued a rule authorising the incidental 
take of marine mammal by the Navy’s use of low-frequency sonars during training 
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exercises. The Final Rule included mitigation measures to minimise the impacts of the 
‘incidental take’ and planned to engage in AM to develop more effective mitigation 
over time but failed to specify how the sonar mitigation measures envisaged in the AM 
process will achieve the MMPA’s standard of ‘least practicable adverse impact’ on 
marine mammals. It merely stated that new information will be considered to continue 
developing more effective mitigation for sonar operations through the AM process. 
Citing the Greater Yellowstone Coal v Servheen case, the Court held that ‘the mere 
possibility of changing the rules to accommodate new information does not satisfy the 
MMPA’s strict requirements for mitigating the effects of incidental take’.232  
 
In New Zealand, the Supreme Court has also elaborated its jurisprudence on AM in 
cases involving resource consents for aquaculture farms. The Court has developed 
judicial standards that broadly reflect those elaborated by US Federal Courts. The ‘vital 
part of the test’ involves evaluating whether an AM process will sufficiently reduce the 
risk and the uncertainty. This requires the presence of the following factors: 1) 
collection of good baseline data on the receiving environment, 2) consent conditions 
providing for effective monitoring using appropriate indicators, 3) thresholds set to 
trigger adaptive responses before the effects become overly damaging; and  4) the 
effects that might arise can be remedied before they become irreversible.233  These 
factors determine the consistency of an AM process with the precautionary principle 
(see below). 
 
In summary, Federal Courts have allowed the use of AM as long as compliance with the 
substantive standard of ‘no jeopardy’ could be demonstrated with reasonable certainty. 
As a matter of principle, AM frameworks have generally failed to pass judicial review 
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where they lacked clear objectives and monitoring requirements with pre-agreed and 
definite triggers that, if met or exceeded, prompt the adoption of enforceable remedial 
actions.234 AM processes must provide ‘reasonable certainty’ that the legal protection 
standards of the ESA and MMPA will be satisfied. AM plans that provide for specific 
monitoring requirements and explicit trigger points tied to clear mitigation requirements 
and implementation timeframes are more likely to meet the standards of ‘no jeopardy’ 
and ‘least practicable adverse impact’.235 If a threshold of unacceptable change or harm 
is threatened, competent authorities must be bound to take corrective mitigation actions. 
Mitigation measures must be ‘reasonably specific, certain to occur and capable of 
implementation’.236 Competent agencies must also demonstrate a clear commitment to 
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6 – ‘Take home lessons’: balancing adaptive management and the precautionary 
principle under the appropriate assessment of the Habitats Directive 
 
Some commentators write that ‘innovative ways will have to be pursued to balance the 
flexibility needed for adaptive management and the [certainty] demanded by law’.238 At 
first glance, facilitating AM in the context of the AA process necessarily demands a 
degree of flexibility in the application of the precautionary principle. ‘Ascertain’ should 
no longer be understood as a ‘static’ standard to be satisfied from a strict ex ante 
perspective in the initial AA process.239 Better ecological outcomes reconciling ORE 
and biodiversity protection could be achieved if ‘ascertain’ was jurisprudentially re-
interpreted as an ‘active’ standard to be satisfied through constant requirements for 
monitoring, reporting and adjustment of mitigation/operating conditions on the basis of 
feedbacks observed during deployments. The AM process will then become a matter of 
eliminating all reasonable scientific doubts while ensuring that construction, operation 
and functioning of consented ORE projects continue to comply with the standard of ‘no 
adverse impact on the integrity’ of N2000 sites. As such, AM would work well as a 
‘compliance tool’ whereby the implications of ORE projects for N2000 sites are 
continually monitored and adjustments are made in responses to specific circumstances 
in order to ensure adherence to the legal protection standard of Article 6(3).  Stated 
differently, AM could be envisaged as a ‘structured process’ to assure compliance with 
the legal standard of ‘no adverse impact on the integrity’ of N2000 sites. 
 
Such re-interpretation is interesting in that it has for effect to shift ‘the precautionary 
principle away from its substantive [front-end] function in decision-making, moving it 
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into a process oriented role’.240 In her seminal paper on ‘precaution and adaptive 
management in wildlife trade’, Wiersema argues that the primary way the parties to 
CITES241 have given effect to the precautionary principle within AM in the listing 
process of species is by restricting it to a procedural role of risk assessment, monitoring 
and information gathering.242 Wiersema argues that this ‘procedural adaptive 
management version of precaution’ is a necessary albeit insufficient implementation of 
the precautionary principle. It fails to acknowledge that uncertainty in wildlife 
conservation goes beyond data gaps and may result from complexity and variability 
which cannot always be remedied by accumulating more data. Hence, the precautionary 
principle plays a dual role within AM: a procedural role and a substantive protection 
role. As stated above, the procedural aspects of precaution should stem from the 
requirements of the proportionality principle. These include the need to implement 
continuous scientific monitoring and re-evaluation of precautionary measures. The 
substantive function of the precautionary principle within AM in turn serves as a 
constant reminder of the limits of science and informs interim mitigation actions until 
further conclusive evidence is achieved from monitoring. In this sense, Wiersema 
concludes that ‘the substantive and procedural roles for precaution [within adaptive 
management] work together’.243 The author agrees but defends a slightly different view 
whereby adaptive management is the procedural framework that allows the 
precautionary principle to play its substantive role, not only from a strict front-end 
perspective in decision-making, but also iteratively throughout the post-consenting 
phase.  
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Implementing adaptive management within the confines of the precautionary principle 
however demands rigorous procedural safeguards and commitment to communicate 
uncertainty with transparency. AM should not be used to offer unbounded discretion to 
regulatory decision-makers and lessen the protection standard of the Habitats Directive. 
In line with the US case law, ‘adaptive management cannot substitute for a showing of 
reasonable certainty that substantive legal criteria [of no jeopardy] will be met’.244  
Shultz and  Nie note that, ‘if Agencies choose to proceed despite uncertainty, they must 
demonstrate that substantive standards will be met in the future, that they have specific 
and enforceable monitoring and mitigation strategy that is within their power to 
implement if unacceptable effects are detected’.245 US Courts have made a strong case 
against a ‘trial and error’ approach to AM that fails to establish the link between 
monitoring, pre-determined triggers/criteria and responsive mitigation actions. 
Monitoring plans, mitigation commitments and their associated trigger points must be 
clear, non-discretionary and enforceable for AM to survive judicial scrutiny. All these 
elements must be agreed upon in the set-up phase of peer-reviewed AM plans.246  
 
The use, in the design stage, of triggers or thresholds has been described as critical to 
reconcile the theory of AM with precaution and the legal certainty demanded by law.247 
Schultz and Nie assert that the use of trigger mechanisms in AM ‘came as a result of 
litigation [mentioned above] and the need to provide a more precautionary, science-
based, and assured way of meeting the strictures of the ESA’.248  The same authors 
explain elsewhere that decision-making triggers ‘can be used to increase accountability, 
by predefining points at which an AM plan will be revisited and re-evaluated and thus 
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improve the application of adaptive management in a complicated legal context’.249  In a 
similar vein, MacDonald and Styles also argue that the value of using a ‘trigger 
approach’ in environmental approvals ‘lies in their capacity to incorporate new 
information and monitoring data whilst ensuring legal accountability’.250 
Similar judicial criteria could be applied by the EU judiciary in the context of the 
Habitats Directive to give the precautionary principle a substantive role within adaptive 
management and provide legal certainty that the AM process will be effective in 
reducing uncertainty and securing compliance with the standard of Article 6(3). In order 
to ‘ascertain’ that no adverse impact on the integrity of the site will come about, the use 
of an AM plan would have to be clearly circumscribed and deployed in combination 
with structured monitoring and clear scientific triggers so that the process does not lack 
certainty, but rather establishes a regime which permits adjustments within pre-defined 
project parameters. Implementing AM in a ‘trigger approach’ will provide regulators 
with a degree of certainty that protection of N2000 features will be ensured and that 
acceptable thresholds of change/harm will not be exceeded.  
The adoption of precautionary/conservative thresholds and associated monitoring 
triggers are paramount to reconcile the AM process with the precautionary principle. 
Thresholds of ‘acceptable’ change or harm determine the maximum degree to which a 
proposed development can alter the receiving ecosystem. In Chapter VI, thresholds have 
been qualified by the author as values to be avoided throughout the lifetime of a project 
to maintain its compliance with N2000 sites’ conservation objectives. Monitoring 
triggers in turn indicate unexpected or unfavourable progress towards unwanted 
thresholds of change or ham. Within AM, monitoring triggers shall identify ‘what and 
when corrective mitigation actions will be taken if monitoring information show x or 
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y’.251 As such, they serve as early warning indicators for ‘legal compliance’ with the 
standard of no impact on the integrity of the site.  
AM processes should be directly incorporated into licensees’ environmental 
management plans (EMP) and drafted with considerable care. In order to avoid ‘AM-
lite’ practices and successfully pass judicial scrutiny, EMPs will have to contain clear 
and objective thresholds, a structured monitoring framework together with measurable 
triggers linked to specific actions and timelines. The devil is in the details  The content 
of an EMP adopted for N2000 qualifying features should identify exactly what will be 
monitored how and when monitoring data will trigger a change in mitigation actions, 
and what mitigation actions will be taken or reduced overtime.252  
The feedback-loop process of AM must be clearly articulated in the EMP by linking 
each monitoring trigger to a pre-determined set of mitigation measures. This means that, 
for each development phase, the EMP must explicitly stipulate what 
alternative/remedial mitigation actions will be implemented once a monitoring trigger is 
reached. Once approved by the competent licensing authority, the content of the EMP 
becomes legally binding on developers and licensing authorities as a result of its 
incorporation in the conditions of the licence. Pursuant to the polluter pays principle, 
developers remain responsible for completing required monitoring works and providing 
licensing authorities with regular reports showing adherence to licensing conditions. 
Monitoring data should then be reviewed by developers, representatives of the licensing 
authority and an independent scientific advisory group.  
Whilst it clearly goes beyond the scope of this study to anticipate the content of 
developers’ EMP, the AM process could perhaps be formulated as a ‘monitoring and 
mitigation matrix’ where measurable monitoring triggers are explicitly linked to 
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corresponding on-site and off-site remedial actions. For example, the EMP for the 
single SeaGen tidal turbine initially provided for a marine mammal detection perimeter 
of 250m to trigger manual shut down of the turbine. The precautionary trigger of 250m 
was then progressively reduced to 30m as understanding of marine mammal behaviour 
increased thereby, reducing the number of shutdown actions (Chapter VI).253   While 
this type of trigger can potentially be utilised with respect to all ORE technologies, the 
use of triggers as a means to reconcile AM with the precautionary principle faces a 
number of challenges.254 At larger development scale, there is a risk that the ‘trigger 
event’ is detected too late and as such, that remedial mitigation measures fail to 
effectively respond and avert an adverse impact on a qualifying feature. Triggers for 
remedial actions should be used in a precautionary way, which means that they should 
be set at a point below a significant impact on the sites’ conservation objectives so that 
adverse effects can be remedied before transgressing an acceptable threshold of 
change/impact. This is a sine qua none for adaptive management to be truly 
precautionary. The ‘level of statistical certainty’ in monitoring should also serve as a 
reference point to set ‘more or less’ precautionary triggers.255   
US Federal Courts and the Supreme Court of New Zealand tend to accept a lower 
standard of evidence, stating that ‘reasonable certainty’256 or ‘reasonable assurance’257 
that the AM process will achieve its goals in adequately reducing uncertainty and 
mitigating potential impacts suffices to show compliance with legal protection 
standards. At this stage, it is unclear how the iterative elements of adaptive management 
will comply with the evidentiary threshold taken by the CJEU in Moorburg (cited 
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above). Pursuant to the CJEU’s jurisprudence, any EMP embedding an adaptive 
management approach should provide definitive data to guarantee, beyond all 
reasonable scientific doubt, that the mitigation measures envisaged in an AM process 
will achieve their goal in preventing adverse impacts on the integrity of the site.258 In 
Grace and Sweetman, the Court may have taken a more nuanced approach whereby it is 
only when it is ‘sufficiently certain that a [mitigation] measure will make an effective 
contribution to avoiding harm, guaranteeing beyond all reasonable doubt that the project 
will not adversely affect the integrity of the area’, that such a measure may be taken into 
account in the AA of Article 6(3).259 While a conclusion of no reasonable scientific 
doubt as to the absence of adverse impacts on N2000 sites should be the ultimate goal 
pursued by an AM process, ‘sufficient certainty’ in the design phase that mitigation 
measures will make an ‘effective contribution’ towards this objective, may suffice for 
AM plans to pass the legal test of Article 6(3). This interpretation appears to be 
consistent with the EC guidelines on the implementation of the Birds and Habitats 
Directive in estuaries and coastal zones.260 It is in this document that the only mention 
to AM in relation to the implementation of the assessment requirements of the Habitats 
Directive can be found.  The Guidelines recognise that an adaptive approach to 
implementation of a plan or project may be envisaged where competent authorities 
cannot fully ascertain the adverse effects because of ‘science limits’ or ‘uncertainty on 
the functioning of complex and dynamic ecosystems’.261 In this case, ‘rigorous 
monitoring scheme’ and a ‘pre-defined validated package of corrective measures’ must 
be foreseen. Such corrective measures must guarantee that the ‘initially unforeseen 
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adverse effects’ will be neutralised.262  These Guidelines apply to estuaries and coastal 
zones which mean that most ORE projects fall outside of their geographical scope of 
application. There are no reasons why similar guidelines could not also be adopted 
under the guidance documents envisaged by the Action Plan for ‘nature, people and the 
economy’.  
Overall, the question of whether AM is consistent with the precautionary principle 
should always be informed by the level of uncertainty and severity of the consequences 
if an impact materialises. Where the ex-ante uncertainty and/or the seriousness of the 
likely adverse impact is high, the framework of AM may be best reconciled with the 
precautionary principle if implemented through a phased approach to licensing. Under a 
staged licensing process, a proposed development is allowed to expand in stages, 
starting at small scale or in a small spatial area. The approval of any subsequent phase is 
made conditional upon monitoring results showing that relevant thresholds are not 
triggered. Implementing AM in this way provides a mechanism to reduce uncertainty 
while ensuring that no unintended adverse impacts will occur due to the absence or 
imprecision of information relied upon for the initial approval.  
 
It is worth making one final point here. For AM to be implemented in compliance with 
the requirements of the Habitats Directive, a flexible approach to risk may need to be 
recognised within the statutory N2000 conservation objectives.263  Le Lièvre et al, argue 
elsewhere that: ‘in order to increase our understanding about the interactions of N2000 
qualifying features and ORE projects, it may be necessary for the tolerance of risks to 
be reflected in the statutory conservation objectives’. They further contend that ‘if the 
qualifying interests are considered to require strict “zero tolerance” protection, the 
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outcomes will be that both the N2000 sites and the areas of spatial connectivity with 
these protected species/habitats will be poorly suited to undertaking AM and potentially 
authorising ORE projects’.264  Without a degree of flexibility, no impact can be accepted 
and an AM approach will not be suitable. Statutory conservation objectives are not 
determined by Courts but by scientists who understand the role of adaptive management 
in increasing the predictive capacity of environmental assessments. AM may be 
stipulated under statutory conservation objectives as a requirement that critical species 
thresholds are not exceeded and that these thresholds can be determined through a 






















7 - Analysis of the thesis  
 
Within this thesis, the author has explored the legal and technical feasibility of 
incorporating the principles of adaptive management into the AA process of the 
Habitats Directive. The author did so from the point of view of the strict application of 
the precautionary principle under the regime of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. 
The major question addressed in this contribution was how realistic the judicial 
interpretation of the precautionary principle under the regime of Article 6(3) is in the 
context of ORE deployments. The research also raised the important question of how 
adaptive management can be best implemented within the confines of the precautionary 
principle of Article 6(3) to enhance the outcomes of the AA process in the face of 
scientific uncertainty as to the potential impacts of ORE projects on marine N2000 sites. 
During this research, serious issues and points of interest were raised in relation to 1) 
the current state of scientific knowledge regarding the interactions of ORE technologies 
with marine wildlife, 2) the absence of clear judicial understanding of ‘scientific 
uncertainty’, 3) the interplay between the Union’s energy policy and environmental 
policy under the legal system established by the Lisbon Treaty and 4) the complex legal 
interactions between the environmental integration principle of Article 11 TFEU and the 
constitutional objective of sustainable development. Further, this research applied 
elements of trans-disciplinarity by developing an interim adaptive management 
framework for ORE permitting under the Habitats Directive. From there, I believe that 
this thesis answered, at least partially, the interrogation posed by Jackson in 2011: ‘are 
provisions aimed at biodiversity protection sacrosanct, even if their application impedes 
policies aimed directly at addressing climate change?’265 My research has shown that 
separating these two imperatives is a false dichotomy. It went further to suggest 
                                                          




practical solutions, grounded in law and in science, to facilitate greater penetration of 
offshore renewable energy without adversely impacting upon marine N2000 sites.   
The rigid interpretation of the precautionary principle under the AA requirements of the 
Habitats Directive has been found to significantly slow down the process of energy 
transition which lies at the heart of sustainable development. If the Habitats Directive 
does not place a general ban on ORE developments, the evidentiary standard of ‘no 
reasonable scientific doubt’ under Article 6(3) has been found to place an unrealistic 
onus on ORE developers to prove the absence of threat to marine N2000 sites. The 
dogmatic approach to biodiversity conservation taken by the EU judiciary clearly 
epitomises a strong normative interpretation of the environmental integration principle 
of Article 11 TFEU.266 As a constituent principle of sustainable development, the 
environmental integration principle cannot however be operated to give absolute 
priority to biodiversity protection goals over policy objectives related to renewable 
energy. There is in the European Union legal order ‘a systemic legal argument’ whereby 
‘the founding Treaties form a consistent legal system’.267  This means that, to the extent 
possible, ‘Treaty provisions should be interpreted so as to help and not hinder, the EU’s 
other policy objectives’..268  This approach, Voigt explains, is also justified when 
interpreting secondary EU law.269 A great deal has changed since the Court sparked 
mayhem in its seminal Waddenzee case. The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 
2009, formally introduced the objective of combating climate change as a policy 
objective to be pursued under the environmental policy competence.270 In this vein, 
renewable energy has been found to be a significant driver of integration, sometimes 
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blurring the separation between environmental and energy policy under the Lisbon 
Treaty. The promotion of renewable energy has been given a place in the Pantheon of 
‘overriding requirements’ for environmental protection justifying restrictions to the 
single market.271 More recently, it has been recognised by the EU judiciary as 
paramount to realise the objective of sustainable development.272 As a manifestation of 
the environmental integration principle, the doctrinal role of the precautionary principle 
cannot therefore become a ‘rhetorical device’ to thwart the expansion of ORE 
developments.  
 
Uncertainty is an unavoidable pattern of all scientific investigations in the marine 
environment. Accepting that there will always be uncertainties about the ecological 
interactions of new ORE technologies demands new paradigms of environmental 
integration in order to achieve more sophisticated trade-offs between the demand for 
offshore renewable energy and protection of N2000 sites. In this respect, the dynamic 
nature of marine ecosystems coupled with the inherent limitations of scientific 
observation methods have been recognised to necessitate a departure from the 
traditional ‘command and control’ approach to authorisation in favour of AA processes 
that better embed adaptive management principles. Without lowering the protection 
standard of the Habitats Directive, this research has demonstrated that AM, in its non-
experimental/passive form of implementation, can be designed within the precautionary 
principle of Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive to enhance the treatment of scientific 
uncertainty under the AA process and help us achieve desirable trade-offs. A threshold-
based approach to AM has been developed as a feasible methodology to maximise the 
use of best scientific knowledge while reconciling the need for offshore renewable 
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energy and protection of marine N2000 sites. As an interim solution, the 
methodological framework elaborated in Chapter 6 can be further enhanced and updated 
in tandem with improvements in the accuracy of monitoring methods and scientific 
modelling tools. Some parties and commentators will always resist a more flexible 
precautionary principle under the N2000 protection scheme to encourage greater 
penetration of offshore renewable energy. In this respect, the author is conscious of the 
growing concern among legal scholars whereby adaptive management is not completely 
‘safe-to-fail’.273  Citing Crieg and Murray’s earlier work, leading Canadian author 
Olszynski considers AM as ‘safe fail’, which means that ‘it should only be applied 
when failure is an acceptable outcome’.274 Adaptive management can help us ‘recognize 
management mistakes and limit the damage they cause by modifying or correcting them 
expeditiously’.275 However, Doremus reminds us that no form of adaptive management, 
no matter how rigorous, can guarantee successful resource protection.276 From there, the 
hypothesis defended by this thesis is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. AM may not be 
appropriate for highly sensitive and endangered species. If the overriding goal is to 
protect features of high conservation value, the need to protect these sensitive features 
should be more important than the desire to address uncertainty associated with ORE 
developments. In this respect, the conservation status of the species concerned should 
inform the ‘risk appetite’ of regulators and developers. Where there is significant 
uncertainty as to the impact of a development on a declining species, a low threshold of 
risk tolerance should always be preferred.  
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